Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3, 2025

Assessment as of December 3: 10:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on December 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory and negotiating tactics assume that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition. Rubio stated on December 2 in an interview with Fox News that Putin appears to be the "most difficult" party in the peace negotiations process.[1] Rubio amplified Putin's recent statement that Russia will "achieve its objectives" no matter the cost or timeline and noted that this is Putin's "actual mentality" about his war in Ukraine. Putin's long held theory of victory for the war in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that the Russian military and economy can outlast and overcome both Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine’s own ability to continue defending itself against Russian aggression.[2] Rubio stated that it is not realistic for Russia to continue its war for another "four or five years" and emphasized that Russia holds less Ukrainian territory currently than it did in the first few months of the full scale invasion in early 2022. Ukrainian forces have notably retaken over 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have seized since 2022, and Russia's economy is facing several issues that will likely continue to affect its ability to continue a war of attrition in the medium to long term.[3]

Russian officials continue to falsely frame recent Russian advances on the battlefield as an indication that a Russian victory is imminent and inevitable. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 3 that Russian forces' successes had a "positive impact" on the December 2 meeting between Putin and a US delegation in Moscow and that Russian advances have given the West a "more accurate assessment" of the "paths to achieving" peace in Ukraine.[4] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed on December 3 that Western officials are changing their negotiating positions given Russia's successes on the front.[5] The Kremlin's claims about, and overinflation of, Russian battlefield gains and their impact on the negotiating process support Putin's theory of victory for a protracted war. Putin and other high ranking Kremlin officials have recently intensified their cognitive warfare efforts that aggrandize battlefield claims to convince the United States that Russia is winning in Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should acquiesce to Russian demands now during negotiations.

Kremlin officials continued to refuse to publicly discuss the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russia meeting, as ISW previously forecasted. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa stated on December 3 that Russia is holding the talks with the United States “confidentially” to prevent outside forces from “exerting pressure” on the negotiations.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly stated that Russia will conduct the negotiations “in silence” and claimed that the negotiations will be more successful if they are private.[7] Peskov also claimed that Russia hopes the United States will adhere to Russia’s preference not to divulge information about the negotiations. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin was preparing to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russia meeting, to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.[8]

The Kremlin is reigniting narratives that Odesa City is a Russian city. Russian State Duma Deputy Dmitry Pevtsov claimed on December 3 that Russia will likely resolve the war with the "pseudo-state" Ukraine through military means so that Russians can go to their "ancestral lands" in Odesa City.[9] Former Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin claimed on November 26 that he would like Odesa and Mykolaiv cities to be a part of Russia through "voluntary" means, not military means.[10] Russian claims regarding Odesa and Mykolaiv cities come against the backdrop of Russian President Vladimir Putin's December 2 threat that Russia could cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea – possibly to set conditions to seize territory on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[11] These recent Russian territorial claims and threats against the Black Sea region are not new or isolated but follow repeated statements in the past, including from Putin himself.[12] Putin claimed in December 2023 that Russia historically controlled the Black Sea region and that Odesa City is a "Russian" city."[13] Russian officials last ignited their narrative that Odesa City is a Russian city during the height of the April 2025 peace negotiations, likely in an attempt to paint Russia as prepared to protract the war and seize even more territory from Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia's seemingly more limited demands now.[14] Russian officials’ renewal of these narratives in December 2025 likely aims to support the Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort to portray Russia as capable of protracting the war to achieve its goals and a Russian victory as ultimately inevitable. The Kremlin may also aim to use repeated narratives over the years about Odesa City to set conditions to justify renewed aggression against Ukraine following a future peace settlement in the name of protecting ethnic Russians and "ancestral" Russian lands. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not in a position to cross the Dnipro River, make significant advances westward, and seize Odesa City, however.[15]

Russian forces achieved the tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025, likely in part by concentrating and committing a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) currently operating in the Hulyaipole and Dnipropetrovsk direction is comparable in combat effectiveness and numerical strength to the Central GoF operating in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya sectors and that the Eastern GoF may even have a greater concentration of manpower in its area of responsibility (AoR).[16] Ukrainian officials reported in November 2025 that the Russian military command committed between 170,000 to 220,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction.[17] The Russian Eastern GoF near Hulyaipole consists of three brigades of the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) operating south of Hulyaipole; one division and two brigades of the 5th CAA (EMD) operating directly east and north of Hulyaipole; two brigades of the 36th CAA (EMD) operating near Velykomykhailivka and southwest of Novopavlivka; and one brigade and one regiment of the 29th CAA (EMD) conducting active defense jointly with the 36th CAA.[18] The Russian military command notably strengthened the Eastern GoF in Summer-Fall 2025 by redeploying a number of elements to the area. The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to the Hulyaipole direction from Sumy Oblast in September 2025; elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) from the Central GoF's AoR to the area between Novopavlivka and Hulyaipole; and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (both of 35th CAA, EMD) to the 5th CAA's AoR northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[19]

Mashovets assessed that the redeployment of elements of the two brigades to the 5th CAA's AoR significantly improved its combat capability, enabling the 5th CAA to develop a tactical breakthrough 17 kilometers in depth, conduct a wide river crossing over the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and reach the outskirts of Hulyaipole from the north and northeast.[20] Mashovets speculated that the Russian military command may have committed some elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), including detachments of the 34th and 205th motorized rifle brigades or possibly elements of the 7th Military Base, to the area because the Russian military command frequently uses these elements to reinforce various GoFs - including the Dnepr GoF (operating in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts) and the Western GoF (operating in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions).[21] Mashovets stated that the 5th CAA presumably has two brigades in reserve and warned that Russian forces may try to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division or the 90th Tank Division to reinforce the 5th CAA's tactical breakthrough.[22] The commitment and redeployment of elements of several units from other frontline sectors further suggests that the recent Russian tactical breakthrough in the Hulyaipole direction is, in part, due to significant manpower concentration in the area over several months, rather than a sudden breakthrough or collapse of Ukrainian defenses as Kremlin officials have recently tried to claim.[23] This significant force concentration suggests that Russia will likely need to concentrate even more forces and deprioritize other frontline sectors to exploit tactical advances around Hulyaipole and attempt to develop them into operational successes.

The 5th CAA's tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole could enable Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions. Russia's ability to exploit such a breakthrough, however, largely depends on Ukrainian resistance and denial of Russian river crossings. Elements of the 5th CAA achieved a tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole after seizing a tactical bridgehead over the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (on the west bank of the Yanchur River) in November 2025.[24] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces were able to advance in the area using infiltration tactics and by exploiting foggy weather, which undermined Ukrainian drone operations in the area.[25] Rural terrain west of Uspenivka likely facilitated a rapid Russian advance towards the Haichur River, which flows through Hulyaipole. Ukrainian forces likely struggled to defend positions in the open fields that cover the area west of Uspenivka, allowing Russian forces to relatively rapidly advance 17 kilometers deep. Russian forces now face the challenge of crossing the Haichur River.

Russia's ability to cross the Haichur River will likely be the determining factor in its ability to make operationally significant advances further westward. Russian forces may aim to isolate and threaten an encirclement of Hulyaipole from the north and northwest. Mashovets warned that Russian advances near Danylivka (north of Hulyaipole at the junction of the Yanchur and Haichur rivers) could threaten to isolate the Ukrainian grouping in Hulyaipole from Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovske-Oleksandrivka area (north of Danylivka along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway).[26] Russian forces may aim to cross the Haichur River in the Danylivka-Dobropillya area to threaten an encirclement of Hulyaipole from the northwest. Russian forces may also aim to advance across the river to the O-081238 Rizdvyanka-Zaliznychne highway that runs west of Hulyaipole and supplies Ukrainian forces defending the town. Russian forces may further aim to advance westward from the Haichur River to threaten Ukrainian defenses in the Orikhiv direction by advancing to the T-0408 Orikhiv-Novomykolaivka highway, a major GLOC into Orikhiv. Russia's ability to cross the Haichur River is therefore critical to its ability to isolate Ukrainian groupings in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv areas.

Ukrainian forces have been successfully restraining the 36th CAA's advances further northeast near Velykomykhailivka, however. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian counterattacks in recent weeks have pushed elements of the 36th CAA back near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka and just south of the Vorona River) and allowed Ukrainian forces to maintain a bridgehead between Orestopil and Novoselivka (northwest and northeast of Sosnivka) between the Vorona and Vovcha rivers.[27] Mashovets noted that Ukrainian defenses near Oleksandrivka (west of Velykomykhailivka on the southern bank of the Vovcha River) are also holding back Russian advances to the Vovcha River and allowing Ukrainian forces to strike the C-041424 road between Voskresenka and Novoselivka (both east of Velykomykhailivka in the Russian near rear) that Russian forces use to bring supplies to the Vovcha River. Ukrainian forces have thus far prevented Russian forces from advancing to and seizing Oleksandrivka, a key settlement near the junction of the Haichur and Vovcha rivers, and Ukraine's continued successful defense of this area may complicate Russian attempts to cross the Haichur River.

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to set conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Moldova and the Baltics. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on December 3 that authorities in the Baltic states and Moldova are passing "racist" laws and are "discriminating" against the Russian population.[28] Lavrov's statement notably mirrors the narratives that the Kremlin used to try to justify its invasions of Ukraine. Russian officials have long applied the Kremlin's informational playbook used against Ukraine to threaten Moldova as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.[29] ISW continues to assess that Russia has entered a "Phase Zero" effort that aims to set informational and psychological conditions to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia conflict in the future.[30]

The Kremlin is attempting to mobilize Russian and Belarusian civil societies, including Belarusian organizations and the Russian Orthodox Church, to garner support for the war in Ukraine and influence campaigns globally. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with volunteers involved in humanitarian aid deliveries in Russia and occupied Ukraine as part of the state-affiliated #MyVmeste (#WeAreTogether) international forum for civic participation on December 3.[31] Putin spoke with a veteran from occupied Donetsk Oblast who is currently involved in providing supplies to Russian servicemembers in Ukraine, and the veteran asked Putin to expand the forum's operations in Russia's "border regions," likely referring to regions bordering Ukraine as well as areas of occupied Ukraine. Putin also offered state support to a volunteer who sought to create a civil society initiative that aims to unite family members of Russian servicemembers. Putin also stated that he will talk with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilev about a proposal from a physician at the only Russian Orthodox Church's hospital, which has been treating Russian servicemembers fighting in the Pokrovsk direction and training volunteers on tactical medical treatment. The physician stated that the hospital trained over 8,000 volunteers and would like to restart a 19th and 20th century-era movement that provided battlefield treatment in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea. The physician asked for government funding and Kremlin support to open the movement's branches in all Russian regions and occupied Ukraine.

Putin also spoke to a Belarusian Paralympian and the founder of a charitable foundation based in Belarus that supports occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Paralympian claimed that the foundation remained operational despite US sanctions, that many Russian volunteers travel to Belarus to support the foundation, and that the foundation is opening a rehabilitation center in Borisov, Belarus, for children who sustained injuries from mine explosions. The Paralympian asked for Putin's support for the foundation's effort to launch a separate Missiya Dobra (Mission of Good) program to advance the Russian and Belarusian Union State's humanitarian objectives in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, which had already reportedly received 500,000 rubles (about $6,500) from the Crimea occupation government. Putin also spoke to the founder of the BRICS Youth Council, who discussed how Russia sent volunteers to India and announced that the Russia-BRICS project office approved the creation of the BRICS Youth Council. Putin's meetings with various civil societies and organizations come against the backdrop of various Russian reports that civil support and crowdfunding efforts had significantly decreased over time, especially after the Kremlin began efforts to centralize control and to restrict the operations of non-government organizations (NGOs).[32] The December 3 meeting also follows Putin's November 25 decree on Russia’s “State National Policy,” which in part aims to strengthen all Russians’ civic identity, civil unity, and patriotism to ensure Russia’s national interests and to safeguard Russia’s national security.[33] ISW also assessed that Russia would leverage its control over Belarus to augment Russia's war effort and the Union State framework as a model to expand Russian influence in the former Soviet Union.[34]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine. Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide announced on December 3 that Norway, Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands will provide two packages totaling $500 million to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[35] Eide noted that Germany and Poland will provide one package, and Germany and the Netherlands will provide the second. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated that Germany will provide $200 million toward the packages, which will provide Ukraine with essential supplies, including air defense equipment and ammunition.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory and negotiating tactics assume that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition.
• Kremlin officials continued to refuse to publicly discuss the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russia meeting, as ISW previously forecasted.
• The Kremlin is reigniting narratives that Odesa City is a Russian city.
• Russian forces achieved the tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025, likely in part by concentrating and committing a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction.
• The 5th CAA's tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole could enable Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions. Russia's ability to exploit such a breakthrough, however, largely depends on Ukrainian resistance and denial of Russian river crossings.
• High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to set conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Moldova and the Baltics.
• The Kremlin is attempting to mobilize Russian and Belarusian civil societies, including Belarusian organizations and the Russian Orthodox Church, to garner support for the war in Ukraine and influence campaigns globally.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of December 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Dmitriyevka, Tambov Oblast, overnight, causing several fires.[37] Footage published on December 3 shows explosions and fires at the Nikiforovsky Oil Refinery "Tambovnefteprodukt" in Dmitriyevka.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's strike against the Livny Oil Depot in Oryol Oblast on the night of December 1 to 2 caused fires to two RV-5000 tanks. A source within Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 3 that unspecified actors used a remotely detonated explosive and additional combustible mixtures to destroy a section of the Druzhba oil pipeline near Kazinsky Vysilky, Tambov Oblast, on the Taganrog-Lipetsk oil pipeline section on the night of December 1 to 2.[39] Footage published on December 3 shows explosions and fires near Kazinsky Vysilky.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City toward Nova Sich and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on December 2 and 3.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[42]

The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on December 3 that Russian forces are trying to attack both on foot and on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) under the cover of fog throughout the day and recently unsuccessfully attempted to climb through a gas pipe.[43] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces noted that Russian forces in northern Sumy Oblast have insufficient drone and counter-drone capabilities, and claimed that the Russian military command ordered all territorial control battalions within the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), and Moscow Military District (MMD) to maintain 13 full-time and part-time drone crews and fixed-wing drone squads.[44] The milblogger claimed that 90 percent of VKS losses in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) were due to Ukrainian first person view (FPV) drones, as Russian forces lacked countermeasures.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces, positions, and equipment in the Sumy direction.[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vilcha, Prylipka, Starytsia, Lyman, and Synelnykove and toward Izbytske on December 2 and 3.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 3 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha.[48] 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Verkhnii Saltiv (northeast of Kharkiv City).[49] Elements of the Veter Assault Detachment of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC) are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[50] Drone operators of the Pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) and of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian personnel and hexacopters in the Kharkiv direction.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Ambarne, and Khatnie, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on December 2 and 3.[52] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 2 and 3.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Kontora Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and drones in the Kupyansk direction.[54] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) advanced in Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novovodyane, and Hrekivka and toward Stepove on December 2 and 3.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, Shandryholove, and Derylove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; and south of Lyman toward Dibrova on December 2 and 3.[58]

On December 3, Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps (AC) refuted Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's November 30 claim that Russian forces entered Lyman.[59] The 3rd Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces repelled "tens" of Russian infiltration attempts into the outskirts of Lyman in the past month and are repelling roughly 40 Russian attacks on the outskirts of Lyman daily. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on December 3 that Russian forces have been trying to take advantage of foggy weather to increase the number of attacks in recent weeks.[60] The brigade reported that Russian forces are attacking in small fireteams of three to five personnel and periodically try to attack on motorcycles. A Russian milblogger claimed that part of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) is a contested “gray zone.”[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampil.[62] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Lyman direction.[63] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[64]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 28 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances east of Siversk.[65] Additional geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced in eastern Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southern Siversk and along the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway in central Svyato-Pokrovske.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized half of Svyato-Pokrovske.[68]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Svyato-Pokrovske on December 2 and 3.[69]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have cut the main Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Siversk, forcing Ukrainian forces to conduct logistics through fields.[70] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of the Russian forces’ wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks in the Siversk direction.[71]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in northern Siversk.[72] FPV drone operators of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian vehicles and hexacopters east of Siversk.[73]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[74]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and advanced north of Ivanopillya.[75]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Footage published on November 28 and geolocated on December 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway in southern Kostyantynivka – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[76]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Klynove and Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka; and west of Druzhkivka toward Torske and Novopavlivka on December 2 and 3.[77]

Geolocated footage published on December 2 shows Ukrainian drone operators repelling a Russian reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Popiv Yar (southwest of Druzhkivka), likely toward Volodymyrivka.[78] A Ukrainian brigade operating near Pokrovsk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian MTU-72 bridge layer, one tank, and one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), including its 1st battalion, and of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Ivanopillya.[80] FPV drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka.[81] Drone operators of the Hugins FPV Shock Platoon of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka and Ivanopillya.[82]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Toretske, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak on December 2 and 3.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya salient.[84]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[85]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 3 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[86]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 2 and 3.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Hryshyne to Rodynske and along the Kotlyne-Udachne line.[88]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 3 that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to conceal their positions and attack in small groups.[89] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces recently stopped a column of Russian equipment moving towards the frontline. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 3 that the Pokrovsk direction remains tense, and Russian forces continue prioritizing tactical gains to degrade Ukraine's negotiating position.[90] The officer noted that the Russian forces' BAI campaign is preventing Ukrainian forces from conducting logistics on the ground, so Ukrainian forces have adapted logistics to use air drops and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). The Ukrainian East Group of Forces Spokesperson Hryhoriy Shapoval refuted claims on December 3 that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk and denied that there are Ukrainian forces trapped in Myrnohrad.[91] Shapoval stated that Ukrainian forces still hold the northern part of Pokrovsk and have organized additional logistics routes to supply Ukrainian units in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators and other elements of the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near and within Myrnohrad.[92]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 3 that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[93]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[94]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste, Zelenyi Hai, and Ivanivka on December 2 and 3.[95]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 3 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions southeast of Velykomykhailivka, an area where Russian sources claimed Russian forces previously maintained a presence.[96]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove on December 2 and 3.[97]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka and Pryluky; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on December 2 and 3.[98] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovske.[99]

See topline for more information about Russian activity in the Hulyaipole direction.

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Vysoke (east of Hulyaipole), which ISW assessed that Russian forces had seized as of December 1.[100] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), including its 114th, 143rd, and 349th motorized rifle regiments and 218th Tank Regiment, and elements of the 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, EMD) are operating directly east and north of Hulyaipole.[101] Mashovets reported that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 5th Separate Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velykomykhailivka and southwest of Novopavlivka. Mashovets reported that elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (both 35th CAA, EMD) are operating south of Hulyaipole. Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 29th CAA) are operating within the 29th CAA’s AoR and are conducting joint active defense with the 36th CAA. Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[103]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on December 2 and 3.[104]

Acting head of the Khortytsia National Reserve's nature protection sector, Mykhailo Mulenko, stated on December 3 that dense vegetation has grown at the former Kakhovka Reservoir, which largely dried up following the Russian detonation of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant Dam in early June 2023.[105] Mulenko stated that heavy equipment cannot traverse the terrain due to the sandy or swampy conditions that make movement difficult, but noted that small vehicles like buggies can pass through the terrain. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are using forests for concealment to bypass Ukrainian positions from the west. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are trying to advance in Plavni and Prymorske (both west of Orikhiv) to enter the former reservoir from Malokaterynivka (just north of Prymorske). Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are also setting up observation posts near the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have thus far only used drones, but there may be direct small arms combat engagements in the area in the future.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Prymorske.[106] Drone operators and other elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[107]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 2 and 3.[108]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 217th VDV Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[109]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military objects in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a technical observation post on the MSP-4 offshore stationary platform in the Black Sea.[110] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike eliminated a Russian drone crew and destroyed a surface radar on the Syvash floating rig and noted that battle damage assessment is ongoing. The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that the November 27 Ukrainian strike against Saky Airfield in occupied Crimea destroyed three Orion-type reconnaissance and strike drones, each of which is reportedly valued at $5 million.[111]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 111 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which more than 60 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[112] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 83 drones, that 27 drones struck 13 locations, and that drone debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[113]

The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on December 3 that Ukrainian officials are implementing measures to limit residential and industrial energy consumption on December 4 due to ongoing Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[114] Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk stated on December 3 that Russian strikes and shelling have limited Ukraine’s ability to transmit electricity between oblasts, especially between central oblasts and eastern Ukraine.[115] ISW has observed reports that Russia aims to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale by creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine, where consumption is typically higher and where Russian forces have destroyed almost all local generation capabilities, while gradually stopping the flow of electricity from west to east.[116] 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.