Iraqi Government Formation: Iranian-backed Iraqi Parties Are Poised to Control the Next Government

Iranian-backed political parties are preparing to form the next Iraqi federal government after winning over a third of the seats in the recent parliamentary elections. These parties may exclude or at least weaken Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, despite his coalition winning the plurality of seats. Sudani could try to obstruct the Iranian-backed parties, but will face considerable challenges, especially given their readiness to use political tools and force to consolidate their political influence. If the parties succeed in excluding or weakening Sudani, they may be further empowered to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.

The largest bloc formed after the Iraqi parliamentary elections will form the next government in accordance with a controversial 2010 interpretation of the Iraqi constitution.[1] The Federal Supreme Court first ratifies the election results, and then the parliament will elect a speaker, deputy speakers, and a president who must receive a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum.[2] The new Iraqi president then selects the largest bloc to form a government, which requires at least 165 seats.[3] This means that a one-third minority in parliament can block a presidential election and, therefore, the government formation process.[4] The Shia Coordination Framework, which has 116 seats other than Sudani’s, would be the largest bloc under the 2010 constitutional interpretation.[5] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Other parties, including Sudani’s, would need to form a separate bloc larger than the framework before the parliament elects a president. Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition currently controls 46 seats.[6] Either the framework or Sudani, if he collected additional allies, could stop government formation by blocking the presidential election.

Multiple Shia Coordination Framework leaders, such as Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, oppose Sudani serving a second term due to his perceived resistance to the framework’s direction.[7] The framework is currently interviewing prime minister candidates other than Sudani.[8] Top framework leaders chose Sudani for his malleability, not his independence, when selecting him in 2022.[9] Sudani’s decision to form his own power base and parliamentary bloc, combined with his national popularity, has increased his independence at the expense of the framework. Sudani withdrew a bill from the parliament in August 2025 that would have formally institutionalized parts of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) due to US concerns over the legislation.[10] Ameri and Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali both supported the legislation and stood to gain personally from the PMF’s formalization, so Sudani’s decision to withdraw the vote demonstrated his willingness to act contrary to the interest of his framework allies. Formalizing parts of the PMF under the Iraqi federal government would presumably increase the access that the PMF and its leaders have to state resources. Parliamentarians and media tied to Ameri, Maliki, and Khazali tried to discredit Sudani and his coalition ahead of the elections by accusing him of being corrupt and a Baathist.[11]

Other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with political representation within the framework, including Kataib Hezbollah, also likely oppose Sudani serving a second term. Sudani fired two Kataib Hezbollah commanders and called for investigations into a Kataib Hezbollah-linked PMF operational command following clashes between Kataib Hezbollah and the Iraqi Federal Police in July 2025.[12] The Kataib Hezbollah secretary general responded in August 2025 by calling for the framework to “block” Sudani’s decisions because he had “contradicted fundamental positions.”[13] Sudani also appeared to prevent Kataib Hezbollah from undermining the investigation into the clashes that Sudani ordered.[14] A framework source told Arab media on November 20 that most Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the framework oppose Sudani serving a second term due to the belief that he has aligned too heavily with US positions regarding the militias.[15] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government in recent months to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[16]

The five best-performing framework parties are likely coordinating efforts to strengthen framework unity, which reduces Sudani’s ability to successfully oppose the framework. An Iranian-backed Badr Organization member claimed on November 13 that the framework received enough votes to form the largest bloc—and thus first priority to build the government—without Sudani’s coalition.[17] Ameri, Khazali, Maliki, Ammar al Hakim, and Mohsen al Mandalawi held meetings from November 13 to 14, presumably to coordinate the reunification of the framework parties after they ran separately in the elections.[18] These five men control 101 seats directly.[19] Other Iranian-backed groups, like Kataib Hezbollah (5 seats) or Kataib Imam Ali (5 seats), and parties close to Hakim, like Abshir Ya Iraq (5 seats), give them 116 seats.[20] Maliki separately discussed government formation with delegations from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Progress Party on November 17.[21] These parties won 15 and 27 seats, respectively.[22] An alliance of this size would get the first opportunity to form a government and make it very difficult for Sudani to form an independent, larger coalition. Sudani would need to court other smaller parties, such as those linked to the 2019 protest movement, which tend to be opposed to the established governing elite. Sudani could ally with other parties to form a one-third obstructionist minority, however.

CTP-ISW is considering several courses of action moving forward. The non-Sudani framework parties retain a dominant political position due to their 116 seats, which is enough to prevent government formation.[23]

2. The framework forms a new government with a weakened Sudani as prime minister. That would involve the framework constraining Sudani’s ability to make independent decisions. The framework parties are currently considering 15 candidates, including Sudani and Badr Organization-affiliated Intelligence Minister Hamid al Shatri, according to one framework source.[24] A Badr Organization member and a member of Hakim’s National State Forces Alliance denied that the framework would form a bloc without Sudani, and an unspecified framework source added that Sudani had a “good chance” for a second term.[25] Measures that restrain Sudani would enable the framework both to control him and blame him for any of the government’s shortcomings, but it is unclear if Sudani would agree to subordinate himself to the framework again. A member of Sudani’s coalition denied on November 16 any splits within the framework and referred to any “understandings” outside of the framework as “suicidal.”[26]
3. The framework forms a new government that includes Sudani’s bloc but does not make Sudani prime minister. Framework members have said that the number of votes does not necessarily correspond with who the framework will select as their candidate for prime minister, implying that the coalition may not select Sudani.[27] It is unclear if Sudani would agree to such a scenario because he remains committed to serving another term. A member of Sudani’s coalition said on November 20 that the coalition could enter the opposition “depending on the circumstances,” likely in reference to whether the framework selects Sudani for a second term.[28] The framework may thus have to consider either offering a variety of spoils to induce Sudani to accept membership in the government without premiership or forcing Sudani’s hand.
4. The framework forms a new government without Sudani’s bloc. In this scenario, Sudani could respond by trying to form an obstructionist minority to disrupt the government formation process before it even begins by preventing parliament from achieving the two-thirds quorum needed to elect a president. The president orders the largest bloc to form a government after their election.[29] The framework blocked the 2022 presidential election by preventing the parliament from achieving a two-thirds quorum, which prevented Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr from forming a government that excluded Iranian-backed parties.[30]
5. In the least likely scenario, Sudani tries to form the “largest bloc” and thus the government by allying with Kurds, Sunnis, and one or more framework parties. Sudani could still form an alliance outside of the framework to ensure he serves a second term as prime minister. Sudani announced on November 13 that his coalition is willing to discuss government formation with all parties.[31] Sudani has already likely discussed government formation with multiple Kurdish political parties at the time of this writing.[32] Sudani could secure 129 seats via a cross-sectarian alliance, assuming he allies with all major Kurdish and Sunni parties. This falls 36 short of the 165-seat threshold needed to form a government, and the framework parties could still block a presidential election (and thus government formation). Sudani would need to expand his coalition to include some framework parties in order to overcome framework obstruction. CTP-ISW has not observed any indicators that suggest the framework is fracturing at this time or that a single party will split away, which makes this scenario least likely. Sudani would also have to ensure that members of his coalition, such as Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, would not defect in this scenario.

The framework would almost certainly attempt to disrupt any opposition by Sudani to framework government formation efforts. The framework would use a mix of force, the threat of force, and judicial and political means to prevent Sunni and Kurdish parties from joining a Sudani-led government. Iranian-backed groups used all three approaches in 2021 to successfully defeat Sadr’s bid to form a government that excluded them, and Sadr held 27 more seats than Sudani’s coalition does now.[33] The framework would presumably use all three approaches again. At least one framework source said that the framework has multiple “scenario[s]” prepared if Sudani forms an alliance without the framework, which means that the framework will use multiple methods to stop government formation in that scenario.[34] The framework and its associated militias can use threats and rocket or drone attacks against different political parties to coerce them from aligning with Sudani. Framework parties could also attempt to use the Iraqi judiciary to slow the government formation process or change the election results through a complaint mechanism. Finally, they could use political inducements—such as government positions for supporters of certain parties—to break Sudani’s coalition and allow more parties into the framework.

The Iranian-backed parties are thus well-poised to consolidate their political influence in the months ahead. That will allow Tehran to further advance its state capture in Iraq and to continue using the country as a platform for power projection and as a conduit to evade international sanctions. That would in turn undermine US interests in Iraq and the Middle East more broadly.