Iran Update Special Report: Syria after the Israel-Iran War, June 13 - July 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 10:00 AM ET

 The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

CTP and ISW temporarily refocused the Iran Update to cover the Israel-Iran War. This product covers over two weeks of developments in Syria between June 13 and July 3.

US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said on June 26 that the US objectives in Syria are to eliminate the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and protect the Syrian government from Iranian-backed militias.[i] Barrack’s description of US goals in Syria follows nearly two months of direct US engagement with the new Syrian transitional government in Damascus. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s government has demonstrated that it supports these US objectives but still faces several challenges that it will need to resolve in order to successfully contain ISIS and prevent Iranian re-infiltration into Syria.[ii] Sanctions relief is important to help improve Syria’s economy, but its impacts will be relatively slow and largely insufficient to solve many of the political and security challenges Syria still faces.[iii]  Shara and his government have struggled to rebuild trust with minority groups, for example, which could create conditions that enable an ISIS resurgence or opportunities for Iranian-backed militias to recruit fighters. Recent increases in Salafi-jihadi activity, including an ISIS-inspired or -conducted suicide bombing, and active but weak IRGC-supported militia groups demonstrate that US policy objectives are not yet fully achieved.[iv]

Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war, which reflects the extremely limited abilities of Iran’s network in Syria after the fall of Assad in December 2024. Iranian-backed groups in Syria only conducted very limited attacks targeting Israel in the October 7 War, primarily because the Assad regime was unwilling to attack Israel or allow major attacks on Israel.[v] These groups are now much smaller, much weaker, and have not conducted any major attacks targeting Syrian government forces or the IDF since December 2024. The war between Israel and Iran had limited effects in Syria. Roughly 70 Iranian drone and missile fragments struck Syrian territory during the Israel-Iran War out of the roughly 550 missiles and 1,000 drones that Iran launched at Israel. Israeli and US air defenses often intercepted Iranian drones and missiles over Syria before they could reach Israeli territory.[vi] The majority of drone fragments fell in the southern Syrian provinces of Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda.

Some small and largely irrelevant Iranian-backed militias continue to operate in Syria, but they have so far failed to take any serious action that would threaten to destabilize the Syrian government. These small groups remain hostile to the Syrian transitional government, however.[vii] Iran may try to rebuild some of its networks in Syria despite its other competing requirements in the aftermath of the Israel-Iran War. An effort to rebuild these groups would require significant investment because the groups appear very small with limited to no support in Syria. The Iranian regime likely lacks the capacity to undertake even these very limited destabilizing activities in Syria while it attempts to recover from the Iran-Israel war. Iran’s recovery from the Israeli campaign, which will prioritize regime stabilization and rebuilding Iranian deterrence, will constrain Iran’s ability to invest in proxy networks or devote the attention of senior leaders to the development of these networks.

ISIS remains a serious threat to US interests in Syria and could exploit any opportunities created by infighting between rival political groups in Syria. A cell of likely ISIS-influenced Saraya Ansar al Sunnah fighters conducted a suicide bombing in Damascus on June 22. The cell likely used safehouses and ground lines of communication stretching through the Syrian desert and northeastern Syria, where ISIS has a significant presence. Syrian authorities raided several safehouses and discovered suicide vests and motorcycle-borne improvised explosive devices northeast of Damascus, which indicates that these fighters have some rear support areas in which they can manufacture these weapons (see more below). Salafi-jihadi groups like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah or ISIS seek to destabilize the government by conducting major attacks in urban areas that distract the government and enable the groups to build sanctuaries in rural areas from which they can either attack urban areas or plan external attacks. CTP-ISW has not observed indications that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is poised to conduct external attacks at this time, though a decision to develop an external attack capability would be consistent with the group’s ISIS-inspired ideology.

US forces in Syria remain essential to stabilizing Syria, countering ISIS, and limiting Iranian presence, even as the United States consolidates its forces in northeastern Syria.[viii] US forces have engaged both the Syrian government and the SDF to prevent active combat between the two parties, which would have created opportunities for ISIS to exploit and rebuild its organization. Iranian or ISIS efforts to destabilize the transitional government also risk complicating Syrian efforts to recover economically from the civil war due to decreased investment. A failed economic recovery would only amplify the Iranian-backed or ISIS destabilization efforts and make any pre-existing destabilization worse.

Key Takeaways:

• US Policy in Syria: US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said on June 26 that the US objectives in Syria are to eliminate the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and protect the Syrian government from Iranian-backed militias. US sanctions relief is important to help improve Syria’s economy, but its impacts will be relatively slow and largely insufficient to solve many of the political and security challenges Syria still faces. Shara and his government have struggled to rebuild trust with minority groups, for example, which could create conditions that enable an ISIS resurgence or opportunities for Iranian-backed militias to recruit fighters.
• Iran in Syria: Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war, which reflects the extremely limited abilities of Iran’s network in Syria after the fall of Assad in December 2024. Some small and largely irrelevant Iranian-backed militias continue to operate in Syria, but they have so far failed to take any serious action that would threaten to destabilize the Syrian government. Iran’s recovery from the Israeli campaign, which will prioritize regime stabilization and rebuilding Iranian deterrence, will constrain Iran’s ability to invest in proxy networks or devote the attention of senior leaders to the development of these networks.
• The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Syria: ISIS remains a serious threat to US interests in Syria and could exploit any opportunities created by infighting between rival political groups in Syria. US forces in Syria remain essential to stabilizing Syria, countering ISIS, and limiting Iranian presence, even as the United States consolidates its forces in northeastern Syria.

Mar Elias Suicide Bombing

An “ISIS-affiliated” cell planned and conducted a suicide bombing that killed at least 26 Syrian Christians in Damascus on June 22. A gunman opened fire and detonated a suicide vest (SVEST) in the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church during Sunday prayers in the Duwayla neighborhood of Damascus.[ix] The attack killed at least 26 people and injured over 50 others.[x] This attack marked the first suicide bombing that any group has conducted in Damascus since the fall of the regime. The Syrian Interior Ministry referred to the attacker and the cell that planned the attack as “ISIS-affiliated.”[xi] ISIS has not claimed the attack at the time of this writing. ISIS would likely claim a successful attack in Damascus that it conducted because of the propaganda value in doing so. ISIS previously claimed attacks in Damascus and at the Sayyida Zainab Shrine, which is southeast of Damascus, in 2023.[xii] The Syrian Interior Ministry later announced that the ISIS-affiliated cell had also planned to attack the Sayyida Zainab Shrine and other civilian targets.[xiii] 

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, which is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State, claimed responsibility for the Mar Elias suicide attack.[xiv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah formed prior to the fall of the Assad regime but has conducted attacks targeting Syrian minorities since February 2025.[xv] The group has, in particular, conducted extrajudicial killings targeting Syrians perceived to be tied to the Assad regime in Hama, Homs, and Aleppo provinces.[xvi]  Syrian Interior Ministry Spokesperson Noureddine al Baba stated on June 24 that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is “not an independent organization” and is "affiliated” with ISIS.[xvii] Baba emphasized that the perpetrator of the attack was “directly” connected to ISIS.[xviii]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah probably operates in close connection to or integration with ISIS members and ISIS support networks, even if it is not an ISIS front group or official affiliate. The group's stated ideology is extremely close to that of ISIS, and Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has previously implied that it could cooperate with ISIS in the future.[xix] ISIS has not historically employed front groups to advance its objectives. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s close ideological and physical proximity to ISIS cells suggests that it or its personnel could cooperate with ISIS fighters, even if the cooperation is on an ad-hoc or personalized basis.[xx]

The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) conducted a raid targeting an “ISIS-affiliated” cell in Harasta and Kafr Batna, Rif Dimashq Province, on June 23 that had planned the Mar Elias attack.[xxi] The GSS killed two ISIS-linked fighters and arrested five others, including the cell’s leader, Muhammad Abd al Ilah al Jumaili (Abu Imad al Jumaili).[xxii] The Syrian government reported that Jumaili was a resident of Damascus and was known as an ISIS “desert governor.”[xxiii] Jumaili’s activities in the desert would give him the opportunity to contact at least some ISIS fighters there, regardless of whether the Syrian government is conflating ISIS and Saraya Ansar al Sunnah. GSS forces seized additional SVESTs and a motorcycle vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (M-VBIED) during the raid.[xxiv] The existence of these materials suggests ISIS or Saraya Ansar al Sunnah ground lines of communication stretching into the central Syrian desert and a weapons flow into the Syrian capital for Salafi-jihadi cells. The Syrian government stated that Jumaili had recruited the cell’s members at al Hol detention camp in northeastern Syria.[xxv] These cell members would have almost certainly had interaction with ISIS supporters or members in al Hol, given the nature of that camp. Several of the cell’s members are not Syrian, which is particularly important because they would have been held in the foreign section of al Hol.[xxvi] The foreign section of al Hol is infamous for its ISIS infiltration. The Syrian government stated that Jumaili “took advantage” of the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 to “infiltrate” Damascus from al Hol through the Syrian central desert.[xxvii] Jumaili could have relied upon ISIS networks in al Hol and the Syrian desert to execute his operation, regardless of whether he is himself a member of ISIS or Saraya Ansar al Sunnah.[xxviii] The Syrian government has repeatedly stated that ISIS exploited the security vacuum during the fall of the Assad regime to seize weapons and infiltrate urban areas.[xxix]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has vowed to continue to conduct sectarian-motivated attacks that are likely designed to destabilize the political transition in Syria. The group opposes a Syrian state that includes Christian, Alawite, Druze, and Shia citizens. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah killed two Alawite men of the Murshidiyyah sect in the Karem Zeitoun neighborhood of Homs on June 13, which caused thousands of Syrians to protest in Homs.[xxx] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also likely killed an Alawite man of the Murshidiyyah sect in Homs Province on June 19.[xxxi] The Murshidiyyah sect is a religious movement founded in the 1920s that embraces reincarnation and elements of Christianity and Judaism that hardline Salafi-jihadi groups, including Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, find especially offensive.[xxxii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah issued a statement on April 1 calling on its followers to kill members of the Murshidiyyah sect. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah announced on June 25 that it will continue to plan covert attacks and suicide bombings.[xxxiii]  A Saraya Ansar al Sunnah leader said in May 2025 that the group is building control zones in rural areas before expanding to attack zones in government-controlled cities, which is consistent with long-running Salafi-jihadi strategies in the Middle East.[xxxiv] Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS, and others have all pursued this strategy. The Damascus attack suggests that the group has continued to pursue this operational strategy.  

The Syrian government condemned the Mar Elias Church attack and vowed to defend Syrian religious institutions. Syrian transitional government officials, including President Ahmed al Shara, and prominent Syrian religious leaders of different faiths expressed condolences for the Mar Elias Church attack victims, calling for religious coexistence and condemning attacks against places of worship.[xxxv] The Syrian Interior Ministry released a statement on June 23 in which it emphasized that attacks targeting Syrian religious institutions are a “red line” for the Syrian government.[xxxvi] The GSS deployed to secure a vigil for the victims of the Mar Elias Church attack.[xxxvii] Local religious figures of different faiths attended the vigil at the St. Grace Church in Izraa, Daraa Province.[xxxviii]

Some Syrian Christians criticized the transitional government’s response to the Mar Elias Church attack, however. Several prominent Syrian Christian leaders accused the government of not being transparent about its investigation of the attack and criticized President Ahmed al Shara for not visiting the church.[xxxix] The Christian leaders stated that the Syrian government bore “responsibility in full” for the attack and called on the government to ensure the safety of Syrian Christians.[xl] The Syrian government's response to this incident may reinforce other Syrian minority groups’ lack of trust in the government. Several Syrian minority groups, including the Kurds, Alawites, and prominent members of the Druze community, continue to voice skepticism about the government’s willingness and ability to adequately protect their communities. These concerns about insecurity among minority communities may discourage them from cooperating with the government.

US Withdrawal from Syria

The United States has withdrawn personnel and equipment from two small positions in Hasakah Province in northeastern Syria. Reuters reported on June 17 that US forces have fully vacated former positions at Tal Baydar and al Wazir in Hasakah Province.[xli] The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remain at both bases, according to Reuters.[xlii] These withdrawals are consistent with the US Department of Defense’s announcement in April 2025 that the United States would reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to “less than a thousand” in the coming months.[xliii] The US military had 900 troops in Syria prior to the October 7 War, when it increased the force presence to around 2,000 troops. The United States has thus far withdrawn from five bases in northeastern Syria and either closed or transferred control of these bases to the SDF.[xliv] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack said on June 2 in an interview with Turkish media that the United States will reduce its presence in Syria from "eight bases to five to three” and will “eventually” reduce its presence to one base.[xlv]

Counterinsurgency

The GSS conducted counterinsurgency operations against Assadist and Iranian-backed militants in eastern Syria between June 15 and 29. These operations seek to suppress Iranian-backed militia and smuggler activity along the Syria-Iraq border.  The Syrian transitional government, like the Assad regime before it, maintains limited control over the largely unpopulated central Syrian desert between Deir ez Zor Province and western Syria’s major population centers. ISIS has historically exploited this security vacuum to operate in this area, and Iranian-backed militias have used the area to move supplies and personnel. Deir ez Zor GSS Commander Colonel Dirar al Shamlan launched a province-wide search operation on June 15 to apprehend Assadists and Iranian-backed militants and interdict weapons shipments to SDF-controlled areas.[xlvi] Shamlan said that his forces apprehended about 70 individuals in the first three days of the campaign.[xlvii] Over one-third of the arrested individuals have ties to Iranian-backed forces.[xlviii] Raids targeting Assadists continued in Deir ez Zor Province through June 29.[xlix]

Iran-affiliated militant groups remain active along the Syria-Iraq border and continue to engage in arms and explosives smuggling from Iraq into Syria, which necessitated the transitional government’s search operation. Deir ez Zor-based media reported on June 17 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander in Albu Kamal, Baqer Karimi (known as Hajj Askar), met with unspecified individuals near the al Qaim border crossing on June 15.[l] Hajj Askar is one of the IRGC’s most senior commanders in eastern Syria. Hajj Askar’s meeting coincided with reports of arms smuggling operations by Iraqi and Syrian nationals into Syria through the al Qaim border crossing.[li] Iranian IRGC personnel fled Syria during the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW has not seen any media reports about Iranian officials returning to eastern Syria since December 2024, which suggests that local Assadists and Iranian-aligned leaders have maintained the anti-transitional government insurgency in the IRGC’s stead. Reported engagements between the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Syrian army near the Syria-Iraq border on June 13 and 17 further indicate that Iranian-backed militia networks remain active on the Iraqi side of the border.[lii] The Iraqi federal government reportedly replaced PMF brigades controlled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with PMF brigades close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani along the Iraq-Syria border in April 2025, however.[liii]

GSS forces arrested at least 39 former regime security officials between June 13 and July 1, with eleven arrests occurring on June 29 alone.[liv] The arrests were concentrated in Latakia and Deir ez Zor provinces, likely due to the significant presence of Assadists in Alawite-majority Latakia and ongoing GSS operations in Deir ez Zor.[lv] The GSS transferred former regime security officials to the Anti-Terrorism Authority for investigation, but it remains unclear what judicial process former regime officials are subject to. Former Assad regime officials have repeatedly been targeted by extrajudicial killings, which undermine transitional government-led accountability and reconciliation processes (to the extent that these processes exist).[lvi]

The GSS arrested the following high-ranking former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and regime State Security officers:

• SAA 20th Air Division Commander Major General Mazer Suwan. GSS forces arrested Suwan in Harasta, Rif Dimashq Province, on June 25.[lvii]
• SAA 9th Division Commander Major General Hussein al Jadawi. GSS forces arrested Jadawi in Sanamayn, Daraa Province, on June 25.[lviii]
• SAA 3rd Armored Division Commander Major General Muwaffaq Nazir Haidar. GSS forces arrested Haidar in Latakia Province on June 24.[lix]
• Former Deir ez Zor State Security Commander Brigadier General Dadas Hassan Ali. GSS forces arrested Ali in Latakia Province on June 17.[lx]

The GSS arrested the following high-ranking Assadist militia officers and leaders:

• Former Baath Brigades leader Ali al Dasm al Zail. GSS forces arrested Zail in Sabikhan, Deir ez Zor Province, on June 25.[lxi]
• Former parliamentarian and al Qaterji militia leader Madloul al Aziz. Aziz was known as the “right arm of Iran” in Syria for his political and militant connections to the IRGC. GSS forces arrested Aziz in Damascus on June 25.[lxii]
• Cousin of former President Bashar al Assad and drug trafficker Wassim al Assad. GSS forces arrested Assad in Talkalakh, Homs Province, on June 21.[lxiii] Talkalakh is located along a major trafficking route into Lebanon from Syria.
• Former National Defense Forces (NDF) Commander Firas Mufid Saeed. GSS forces arrested Saeed near Jableh, Latakia Province, on June 20.[lxiv]

People’s Assembly

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara established the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections on June 13 to develop the process for forming Syria’s legislative body.[lxv] Shara appointed 11 members, including Committee Chairman and former Syrian Salvation Government Agricultural Minister Mohammed Taha al Ahmed, to the committee and attended its first meeting in Damascus on June 14.[lxvi] Committee Spokesperson Najar Nawaf said on June 18 that the committee expects to select the first People’s Assembly in the next two to three months.[lxvii] The Supreme Committee has held public consultation sessions in at least 10 Syrian provinces, including Damascus, since June 21 to explain the electoral process and hear public concerns.[lxviii] The committee visited Damascus and Quneitra on June 21, Daraa on June 23, Idlib on June 24, Aleppo on June 25, Homs on June 26, Hama on June 28, Latakia on June 29, Tartous on June 30, and Deir ez Zor on July 1.[lxix] The committee has yet to visit provinces with significant Druze and Kurdish populations. Political, legal, academic, and civil society representatives, alongside members of the general public, attended the consultation sessions.[lxx]

Shara will select one-third of the 150-seat People’s Assembly. Provincial subcommittees will elect the other 100 representatives. Chairman Ahmed will preside over the first People’s Assembly until he transfers leadership to the oldest assembly member.[lxxi] The Supreme Committee will appoint 30 to 50 subcommittee members for each seat allocated to a province.[lxxii] Each provincial subcommittee will elect People’s Assembly members from the members of the subcommittee.[lxxiii] Technocrats and industry experts will comprise about 70 percent of the assembly, while the remaining 30 percent will consist of local dignitaries.[lxxiv] The assembly will be responsible for creating legislation and overseeing executive bodies. The assembly can call a vote of no confidence against the government “based on performance.”[lxxv] Shara’s appointment of one-third of the assembly and pro-Shara Supreme Committee members’ role in determining provincial subcommittee members suggest that the assembly will be reluctant to check President Shara’s authority through the no confidence mechanism.

The 100 provincial seats will tentatively be allocated as follows:[lxxvi]

• Aleppo: 20 seats
• Damascus: 11 seats
• Rif Dimashq: 10 seats
• Homs: 9 seats
• Hama: 8 seats
• Idlib: 7 seats
• Latakia, Deir ez Zor, and Hasakah: 6 seats each
• Tartous: 5 seats
• Daraa: 4 seats
• Raqqa and Suwayda: 3 seats each
• Quneitra: 2 seats

The transitional government dominates the Assembly’s member selection process and seat allocation, which risks generating public dissatisfaction with the body. Attendees at the Daraa Province consultation session on June 23 expressed dissatisfaction with Daraa’s allocation of four seats, which the committee determined based on demographic data from the 2010 Syrian census.[lxxvii] Attendees at the Aleppo session on June 25 criticized the vagueness of the People’s Assembly’s powers, subcommittee members’ ability to nominate themselves for the assembly, and uncertainty about women’s representation in the assembly.[lxxviii] Attendees at the Homs session on June 26 petitioned the Supreme Committee to separate Homs’s electoral district from the central Syrian desert, adopt a seat quota for war-wounded Syrians, and expedite the election date to reduce instability.[lxxix] 125 individuals and 19 organizations in Raqqa signed an open letter on June 29 demanding that the Supreme Committee allocate more assembly seats to Raqqa Province based on its population.[lxxx]  The Supreme Committee’s decision to rely on the 2010 census will not justly distribute seats based on current population due to significant population flows during the Syrian Civil War, particularly to Idlib and Raqqa provinces.[lxxxi]

The Supreme Committee’s electoral plan also risks generating dissent from minority groups. Druze communities in Suwayda have consistently demanded that they maintain control over their own security affairs and have a special policing arrangement with the transitional government.[lxxxii] It is unclear how Druze leaders will respond when they hold only three out of 150 seats in the legislature, and if their concerns about political control in Suwayda will be as acute as their concerns about security control. The Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) issued a statement on June 26 in which it argued that a centralized government is unsustainable and advocated for a decentralized and localized federal system.[lxxxiii]

Economic Stabilization

The United States has continued to lift Assad-era sanctions on Syria. US President Donald Trump signed an executive order lifting sanctions on Syria on June 30.[lxxxiv] The executive order went into effect on July 1.[lxxxv] The order began a review of Syria’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism but did not remove Syria’s designation.[lxxxvi] The order also directed the US State Department to review Hayat Tahrir al Sham’s (HTS) status on the foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) list.[lxxxvii] The order maintains sanctions on former Syrian President Bashar al Assad and individuals affiliated with the former regime, ISIS, and Iran-aligned groups. The US Treasury Department also lifted sanctions on 518 individuals and entities from the specially designated nationals (SDN) sanctions list.[lxxxviii]

Syria has continued to integrate into the global economy following the lifting of US and EU sanctions.

Syrian Finance Minister Yisr Barnieh announced on June 25 that the World Bank approved a $146 million grant to repair Syrian power lines and energy infrastructure.[lxxxix]ⁱ This grant is the first grant that the World Bank has given Syria in over four decades.[xc] The grant will finance the reconstruction of two critical 400-kilovolt interconnector transition lines that were damaged during the civil war.[xci] Syrian Central Bank Governor Abdelkader Husriyeh announced that Syria completed its first Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) transaction with an Italian bank on June 19.[xcii] This transaction was the first transaction that Syria has made using SWIFT since the United States imposed sanctions on Syria 14 years ago.[xciii] Husriyeh told Reuters that Syria could begin transactions with US banks within weeks.[xciv]

The Syrian government has also sought to increase economic stability by subsidizing prices and exporting goods to other countries. The Syrian economic and industry minister said that Syria agreed to a deal with the World Food Program to subsidize bread production in 64 bakeries across Syria.[xcv] The program seeks to lower bread costs because bread costs rose after the fall of the Assad regime.[xcvi] The Syrian transitional government has also exported oil derivatives for the first time since the fall of the Assad regime. A Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker left Baniyas Port for an undisclosed location on June 16 with 30,000 tons of naphtha worth approximately $20 million.[xcvii]  Syria also sold 40,000 tons of phosphate to Romania and Turkey on June 12 via the Port of Tartous.[xcviii]  The Syrian energy minister separately announced an agreement with his Jordanian and Qatari counterparts on June 25 in which Qatar will increase its supply of natural gas to Syria to increase electricity generation in Syria.[xcix] The gas will arrive via Jordan to the Deir Ali Power Plant in southern Syria.[c]

President Shara signed a decree on June 19 to double military and public sector salaries despite reports that police officers and government administrators have faced salary delays. The decree also raised the minimum wage from around 315,000 Syrian pounds ($25) in 2024 to 750,000 Syrian pounds ($75) beginning in July 2025.[ci] This decision comes after Qatar announced in May that it would provide $29 million to Syria every month for three months, with the possibility for an extension, to pay public salaries in Syria.[cii] Shara issued a separate decree on June 19 that increased public sector pensioners’ retirement funds by 200 percent.[ciii] The Syrian economic minister called on the private sector on June 23 to raise salaries.[civ] Nearly 90 percent of Syrians lived below the World Bank-defined poverty line in 2024.[cv]

Local sources have reported that the Syrian Interior Ministry has not paid over 2,000 Suwaydawi police officers and administrators since early May.[cvi] Informed sources told Suwayda-based media that only 700 officers were paid for three months before payments stopped without explanation.[cvii] Suwayda-based media said that there have been no guarantees or clarification about payments.[cviii]