Iran Update Special Report, July 31, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.  

Key Takeaways:

• The United States has not conducted any strikes on Iran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. Iran has conducted only one attack against US assets in the region since CTP-ISW's July 30 data cutoff. This attack was likely part of Iran’s ongoing effort to try to erode US willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
• Conflicting Iranian statements about Iran's role in the recent attack on Egypt are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that there are divisions among regime factions over the means through which Iran should try to achieve its war aims.
• The Persian Gulf Strait Authority suggested on July 31 that it will not issue transit permits for vessels to pass through the strait until the United States ends military operations in the region, likely as part of Iran's effort to impose economic costs on the global economy to erode the United States’ willingness to continue the war. Iran also likely calculates that this economic pressure will coerce the Gulf states to urge the United States to halt its campaign against Iran.

Toplines

The United States has not conducted any strikes on Iran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 30. The United States has targeted Iranian military command centers, drone storage facilities, communications networks, coastal surveillance sites, maritime capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure in recent days.[i] US President Donald Trump met with his cabinet at Camp David on July 31 to discuss US operations against Iran.[ii]

Iran has conducted only one attack against US assets in the region since CTP-ISW's July 30 data cutoff. This attack was likely part of Iran’s ongoing effort to try to erode US willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.[iii] The Artesh announced on July 30 that it launched drones against Ahmed al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait and targeted fighter aircraft storage facilities, satellite communications systems, and equipment warehouses.[iv] A US Department of Defense official told the New York Times that Iran launched multiple projectiles overnight but that US bases in the region did not sustain major damage.[v] Iran has repeatedly attacked US bases and personnel across the region to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian leaders likely assess that sustained attacks and US casualties will increase domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict and accept Iranian control over the strait.[vi] Iran nevertheless appears to have limited its regional strikes overnight following the pause in US strikes, possibly to avoid triggering a full-scale US campaign that could threaten key Iranian strategic objectives, including developing its missile and drone programs as well as maintaining its nuclear program.

Conflicting Iranian statements about Iran's role in the recent attack on Egypt are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that there are divisions among regime factions over the means through which Iran should attempt to achieve its war aims. Two Iranian officials implied in a statement to the New York Times that Iran may have conducted or, at the very least, supported the July 29 drone attack on a US gas tanker at Damietta Port in northeastern Egypt.[vii] The officials said that the attack “was designed” to show that global shipping and energy supplies could be further disrupted if Iran chose to escalate.[viii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi criticized the strike on July 31, however. Araghchi accused Israel of conducting the attack and emphasized that Egypt is an important partner for Iran.[ix] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency recirculated Araghchi's comment. Tasnim's recirculation of Araghchi's comment is noteworthy given that Tasnim has repeatedly supported a hardline position during the conflict. The New York Times report and Araghchi's comments nevertheless reflect divisions in the regime over how the regime should try to achieve its strategic objectives, including securing control over the Strait of Hormuz. Araghchi and other "pragmatist" actors view diplomacy as the most effective way to achieve the regime’s objectives, while IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom CTP-ISW continues to assess is playing an outsized role in decision-making, and his allies have supported a more forceful approach to achieve Iran’s objectives. CNN reported on July 31 that unspecified officials have concluded that the IRGC is “firmly in control” of regime decision-making.^[x]

The Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) suggested on July 31 that it will not issue transit permits for vessels to pass through the strait until the United States ends military operations in the region, likely as part of Iran's effort to impose economic costs on the global economy to erode the United States’ willingness to continue the war. Iran also likely calculates that this economic pressure will coerce the Gulf states to urge the United States to halt its campaign against Iran.[xi] The PGSA falsely claimed on July 31 that US military operations have made passage through the Strait of Hormuz "not possible."[xii] The PGSA added that it will review requests to transit the strait and issue permits only after "stability and calm are restored," which presumably refers to a cessation of the US campaign against Iran.[xiii] Iran has repeatedly falsely portrayed the United States as responsible for the disruption to international shipping, likely to push Gulf states to pressure Washington to end military operations against Iran.[xiv] Iran continues to be the only threat against commercial shipping in the strait, however. The IRGC has continued to claim attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and has threatened to attack any actor that cooperates with the United States to restore freedom of navigation.[xv]

US and Partner Military Operations

See topline section.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.

Lebanon

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) demolished multiple Hezbollah tunnel networks near Beaufort Castle in Nabatieh Governorate on July 30.[xvi] The IDF stated that it had secured the area around the tunnels and prepared them for demolition over the past “several weeks.”[xvii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the IDF demolished the tunnels in response to a Hezbollah drone attack on an IDF engineering vehicle operating near Ali al Taher in Nabatieh Governorate on July 29.[xviii] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated on July 31 that the IDF’s tunnel demolitions pose a ”direct threat” to the implementation of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[xix] US, Israeli, and Lebanese delegations are expected to meet in Rome, Italy, between August 4 and 6 to discuss the implementation of the Agreement.[xx]

Israeli and Lebanese delegations reportedly disagree over the mechanism to monitor Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) activity in the "pilot zones,” according to an unspecified Lebanese source familiar with the Israel-Lebanon negotiations speaking to a UK-based, Saudi-owned media outlet on July 31.[xxi] The source claimed that “there is no agreement on a verification mechanism” to monitor LAF activity in the “pilot zones.”[xxii] The Israeli delegation is reportedly insisting that the IDF be responsible for monitoring LAF activity in the “pilot zones,” which the Lebanese delegation reportedly rejects.[xxiii] Lebanese media reported on July 6 that the United States, Israel, and Lebanon had established the US-led Military Coordination Group for Lebanon under the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement to monitor and coordinate LAF activity in the “pilot zones.”[xxiv] The LAF reportedly notified the Coordination Group after it seized a Hezbollah weapons cache in one of the “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon for the first time on July 27.[xxv]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged to increase military aid to the LAF during a meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Turkey on July 30.[xxvi] Syrian media reported that Turkey will provide the LAF with surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, logistics equipment, military vehicles, and “specialized training programs” for LAF border units.[xxvii] Aoun’s visit marks the first time a Lebanese president has visited Turkey in 17 years.[xxviii]

Iraq

Saudi officials may be attempting to weaken Iraqi militias’ justification for future attacks against Saudi Arabia by emphasizing to Saudi, Iraqi, and Western media on July 31 that Saudi Arabia did not target Iraqi civilians.[xxix] The United States and Saudi Arabia struck militia weapons and logistics supply sites across Iraq on July 28 in retaliation for Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[xxx] A senior Saudi official told Saudi media on July 31 that Saudi Arabia struck "terrorist militias" in Iraq.[xxxi] Another Saudi official told the New York Times on July 31 that Saudi Arabia targeted Iraqi militia weapons depots.[xxxii] These clarifications come after several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias issued statements on July 29 accusing Saudi Arabia of targeting Iraqi civilians and vowing to retaliate for recent US and Saudi strikes across Iraq.[xxxiii]  Saudi Arabia may seek to undermine Iraqi militias’ justification for retaliation by emphasizing that its strikes only targeted the militias and militia infrastructure and did not harm Iraqi civilians. CTP-ISW has not recorded any new Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Saudi Arabia at the time of this writing.

Arabian Peninsula

Unspecified Yemeni sources told the Guardian on July 30 that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a naval and possibly land-based military offensive against the Houthis.[xxxiv] Saudi Arabia’s objective for any such operation would be to end the Houthis’ “chokehold” on Saudi oil exports through the Bab al Mandeb Strait, according to the Guardian.[xxxv] The Houthis imposed a naval blockade on Saudi ports and vessels on July 20.[xxxvi] The blockade has reduced vessel traffic through the Bab al Mandeb by one-fifth as of July 30.[xxxvii] Saudi Arabia formed a multinational “maritime defense coalition” on July 30 with 14 other countries to protect Red Sea shipping from Houthi and Iranian threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[xxxviii] This mission is intended to be “purely defensive” in nature and does not involve “targeting any country.”[xxxix] Saudi Arabia could simultaneously undertake offensive operations against the Houthis to degrade the Houthis’ capability to threaten shipping and compel the Houthis to end their blockade. The Royal Saudi Air Force struck several Houthi targets across Yemen on July 24 and 25 in response to Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea. [xl]

The Yemeni sources said that Saudi forces appear to be concentrating in an unspecified area or areas, possibly in preparation for an offensive on Bayda Governorate.[xli] The Houthis control the majority of territory within Bayda Governorate.[xlii] The sources did not elaborate on any details of the deployments. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on July 29 that Saudi Arabia has sent reinforcements to Aden in recent days.[xliii] The Saudi-supported Yemeni government arrested several individuals in Marib Province on July 31 for filming troop movements and warned the public not to film military forces.[xliv]