Iran Update, September 30, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Defectors from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq have formed a new armed group with "significant" Iranian support, according to the Washington Post on September 30. This report illustrates the obstacles that the Iraqi federal government will face in verifying the disarmament of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
• This breakaway militia may be operating under direct Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) control.
• Several other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to refuse to disarm even as US-led international coalition forces withdrew from Iraq on September 30.
• Kataib Hezbollah also urged all Iraqi militias on September 30 to halt all military operations, with the exception of operations targeting "hostile aircraft" until the Iraqi federal government secures air defense systems.
• Iran is attempting to secure an agreement with the United States in which Iran would obtain some economic relief before easing restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz or making any nuclear concessions.
• Saudi and Yemeni government-aligned forces are targeting Houthi military bases and missile launch platforms in Houthi-controlled areas of far northwestern Yemen, likely in an effort to degrade the Houthis' ability to attack Saudi Arabia.

Toplines

Defectors from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq have formed a new armed group with "significant" Iranian support, according to the Washington Post on September 30.[i] This report illustrates some of the obstacles that the Iraqi federal government faces as it attempts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.  An Iraqi official told the Washington Post that Asaib Ahl al Haq transferred only half of its weapons arsenal to the Iraqi state and that a group of defectors used the remainder to form a new militia.^[ii] Asaib Ahl al Haq announced its intent to disarm on June 2 in a move that likely reflected Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali‘s ongoing political and economic aspirations.[iii] The decision of some Asaib Ahl al Haq members to form a new militia rather than disarm is consistent with the disarmament-related internal fissures that CTP-ISW has previously identified within the group.[iv] The Iraqi official's statement to the Washington Post on September 30 also confirms that the weapons that Asaib Ahl al Haq handed over to the federal government in August 2026 only constituted a fraction of the militia's arsenal.[v] Asaib Ahl al Haq reportedly handed over some weapons to the disarmament committee and unspecified brigades of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces, under which Asaib Ahl al Haq controls three brigades.[vi] Asaib Ahl al Haq controls several headquarters and bases across Iraq at which the militias store weapons, including missiles and drones.[vii]

This breakaway militia may be operating under direct Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) command. There are several indicators that suggest that the Asaib Ahl al Haq splinter militia is currently responding to IRGC commands. The new militia has coordinated operations with the Houthis and participated in recent attacks on Saudi Arabia's energy sector, according to the Washington Post.[viii]  Iraqi militias and the Houthis have increased cooperation in recent months, including through Houthi attacks targeting Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory.[ix] Saudi Arabia and unspecified regional partners have assessed that the IRGC coordinated the recent Iraqi and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in late July 2026.[x] The Asaib Ahl al Haq splinter militia may also be among the ”newly-formed,” IRGC-directed Iraqi militia cells that Iraqi militia commanders claimed are currently receiving preferential support from Iran.[xi] These ”newly-formed” militias are reportedly conducting attacks on Saudi Arabia, which is consistent with the Washington Post’s reporting about the Asaib Ahl al Haq splinter group’s recent attacks. It is possible that the defectors are unwilling to consistently respond to IRGC commands, however. Asaib Ahl al Haq formed as a splinter from Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and has occasionally displayed a willingness to disregard Iranian directives, such as when the militia attempted to assassinate the Iraqi prime minister in 2021.[xii]

Several other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to refuse to disarm even as US-led international coalition forces withdrew from Iraq on September 30.[xiii] The US Defense Department and Iraqi officials said the United States and Iraq will now prioritize bilateral security and intelligence cooperation following the withdrawal of coalition forces.[xiv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have long used the US presence in Iraq to justify their armament and will likely cite other pretexts now that US forces have withdrawn. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is an Iraqi militia coalition that includes the militias most active kinetically and historically closest to Iran, reiterated on September 30 its refusal to disarm.[xv] Kataib Hezbollah, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, separately claimed the militia has proof that the United States is still operating in Iraqi airspace.[xvi] Kataib Hezbollah threatened on September 28 to shoot down "hostile aircraft" operating in Iraqi airspace.[xvii] A Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba front group also stated on September 29 its refusal to disarm without permission from a religious authority and threatened to attack any "foreign presence" in Iraq or any country that is aggressive toward Iran.[xviii] Many of the Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, ultimately answer to Iran's Supreme Leader. Iran has repeatedly expressed its opposition to the Iraqi militias disarming.[xix]

September 30 also marks the original date that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi previously declared to be the deadline for the federal government to disarm the militias.[xx] Zaydi announced that the new deadline for militia disarmament is June 2027, almost certainly due to a lack of government progress.[xxi] 

Kataib Hezbollah also urged all Iraqi militias on September 30 to halt all military operations, with the exception of operations targeting "hostile aircraft" until the Iraqi federal government secures air defense systems.[xxii] Iraqi militias have historically used the phrase "hostile aircraft" to refer to US and Israeli aircraft, but Kataib Hezbollah recently used this term to refer to countries adhering to US sanctions on Iran's aviation industry.[xxiii] The Iraqi militias, and their representatives in parliament, have urged the Iraqi federal government to secure air defense systems capable of blocking use of Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.[xxiv] Iraq is currently finalizing financing mechanisms to purchase a South Korean air defense system.[xxv]

Iran is attempting to secure an agreement with the United States in which Iran would obtain some economic relief before easing restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz or making any nuclear concessions.^[xxvi] The Iranian government confirmed on September 30 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi received the US response to a recent Iranian ceasefire proposal passed through Qatari mediators.[xxvii] Iran had sent the United States a "seven-day" proposal on September 16, under which Iran would reopen the strait on the sixth day and resume nuclear negotiations on the seventh day if the United States accepted the plan.[xxviii] US President Donald Trump publicly rejected the proposal on September 26.[xxix] Axios reported on September 29, citing three sources familiar with the talks, that Qatari mediators discussed a two-page compromise proposal with Araghchi that addressed Iran’s demand to lift the US naval blockade and the US demand for Iranian nuclear concessions.[xxx] A non-Iranian official briefed on the talks told Reuters on September 30 that the circulated seven-day "trust-building" plan sought to return both sides to an "enhanced" June US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) and included unspecified "concrete steps" on Iran’s nuclear program.[xxxi] It remains unclear which proposal the official described or how the "enhanced" framework and its nuclear provisions differ from the June MoU.

The non-Iranian official added that the primary disagreement concerns the sequencing of the plan’s steps rather than its components.[xxxii] Iran’s proposed sequencing echoes its approach during negotiations in May and June 2026, in which Iran sought sanctions relief, frozen assets, an end to the naval blockade, and recognition of its role in managing the strait before substantive nuclear talks could take place.[xxxiii] Iran’s current proposal would “reopen” the strait on the sixth day of implementation if the United States accepted the plan, unlike the immediate ”reopening” of the strait under the June MoU.[xxxiv] Securing economic relief from the United States as a first step before reopening the strait reduces US leverage in subsequent negotiations over the strait and nuclear issues.

Saudi forces are targeting Houthi military bases and missile launch platforms in Houthi-controlled areas of far northwestern Yemen, likely in an effort to degrade the Houthis' ability to attack Saudi Arabia. Likely Saudi airstrikes targeted Houthi missile launch platforms and military bases in northwestern Yemen’s Amran Governorate on September 30, according to Houthi media and anti-Houthi Yemeni reports.[xxxv] An anti-Houthi, Marib-based journalist reported on September 29 that unspecified forces conducted airstrikes on Houthi weapons depots in Saada and Amran Governorates.[xxxvi] Saudi Arabia likely struck these targets to degrade the Houthis’ ability to attack Saudi oil infrastructure and military bases, which the group has frequently targeted since July 2026.[xxxvii] Saudi Arabia likely seeks to prevent Houthi missile and drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure, including the East-West Pipeline, which resumed operations on September 22 after attack damage that halted the pipeline’s operations on September 11.[xxxviii] Houthi missile sites in Saada and Amran governorates lie near the Saudi border and far from active frontlines, which suggests that the Houthis use these positions to attack Saudi Arabia rather than government forces to the south. Saudi Arabia previously identified and targeted missile launch sites and Houthi military infrastructure in Saada and Amran governorates in order to prevent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2018 and 2021, for example.[xxxix] Saudi airstrikes also targeted communications infrastructure in Amran Governorate on September 30, although it is unclear whether these strikes were part of Saudi Arabia's effort to disrupt Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.[xl]

CTP-ISW assesses that Saudi and Yemeni government-aligned forces are pursuing three main operational objectives through their air campaign against the Houthis:

• Degrade Houthi command-and-control (C2) and military capabilities central to the group’s strike campaign against Saudi assets: Saudi and Yemeni government-aligned forces seek to degrade the Houthis’ ability to attack Saudi oil infrastructure, military bases, and vessels by decapitating Houthi missile and drone force leadership.[xli] Saudi strikes on Houthi missile sites and bases in northwestern Yemen likely complement this campaign. C2 disruptions only provide temporary opportunities for anti-Houthi forces to exploit.[xlii]
• Disrupt Houthi sustainment and logistics efforts to weaken forces that are engaged in combat across several sectors: Saudi and Yemeni government-aligned forces have targeted Houthi food storehouses and weapons depots on major ground lines of communication (GLOC) near Taiz City in recent days.[xliii] These GLOCs and supply centers are essential in sustaining Houthi combat operations to isolate and capture Taiz City, secure long-term Houthi control over the Red Sea coastal plain, and cut off Yemeni government GLOCs.[xliv]
• Halt Houthi ground advances in Yemen with close air support to Yemeni government-aligned forces: Saudi and Yemeni government-aligned forces frequently conduct airstrikes and drone attacks targeting Houthi fighters and positions on front lines in southern and eastern Yemen.[xlv] These air operations support ground forces that are engaged in constant combat with Houthi fighters and face significant logistical strains from Houthi advances and attacks.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.  

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.  
Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.
Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.  
Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.