Iran Update, September 29, 2025

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU’s reimposition of sanctions comes after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[i] The EU froze the Iranian Central Bank and other major Iranian banks’ assets, banned the import of Iranian oil, and banned the export of technologies or materials that Iran could use for uranium enrichment, among other measures.[ii]  The EU reimposed sanctions on Iranian economic institutions, such as the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, that play an outsized role in the Iranian economy.[iii] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has built power plants, oil vessels, and transportation infrastructure on behalf of the IRGC. The EU also reimposed sanctions on Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran’s defense industry.[iv] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe as of March 2024.[v] The reimposition of EU sanctions on Iran may further isolate Iran from international financial networks and reduce the volume of EU-Iran trade. The EU was Iran’s fifth largest trading partner in 2024.[vi] The full impact of the EU sanctions is currently unclear, however. The United States’ imposition of maximum pressure sanctions against Iran in 2018 has already significantly diminished the volume of EU-Iran trade in recent years.[vii] The EU’s reimposition of sanctions on September 29 follows the UNSC’s reimposition of snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, which are similarly designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations in the JCPOA.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website framed snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” and called on the regime to expand ties with neighboring countries and pursue a “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of sanctions.[viii] A newspaper run by Khamenei’s website argued on September 28 that Iran must rely on its domestic strength and work with neighbors, “countries in the Global South,” and countries that are part of Iran’s “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran’s “Look East” policy seeks to counter US pressure by building ties with countries such as China and Russia.[ix] This editorial is consistent with recent statements from Khamenei in May 2025 in which he framed Iran’s participation in multilateral institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as “opportunities” for Iran.[x] Iran joined BRICS in January 2024. Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran's participation in BRICS provides opportunities for Iran to reduce its reliance on the US dollar and develop alternative financial platforms.[xi] Iran has also deepened economic, political, and security ties with Russia in recent years and recently joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[xii] Iran likely seeks to use its membership in multilateral institutions to reduce the impact of Western sanctions and to secure alternative trade routes, energy partners, and financial channels.

Iranian officials are concerned that the reimposition of snapback sanctions may trigger economic unrest. Four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran’s economic isolation and fuel public anger.[xiii] An Iranian official said that the regime is increasingly concerned that discontent over economic difficulties may lead to mass protests. Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran, which likely reflects Iranian officials’ belief that Iran’s adversaries seek to increase public disillusionment by increasing economic pressure on Iran.[xiv] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei warned on September 29 that Iranian authorities will take legal action against individuals who undermine public morale or disrupt markets in ways that “serve enemy objectives.”[xv] Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, which makes it very unlikely that Iran will receive economic relief in the near term.[xvi] The regime’s concerns about potential internal unrest come as inflation has risen above 40 percent and the Iranian rial fell to a record low of 1,121,000 rials per one US dollar on September 29.[xvii]

The Turkish military's reported deployment of assets to Kuweires Airbase near Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in eastern Aleppo Province may indicate that Turkey and Syria are preparing for a joint military operation against the SDF.[xviii] An unspecified source from the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Syrian media that the Turkish military deployed Samur armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, unspecified air defense systems, and helicopters to the Kuweires Airbase on September 28.[xix] A separate local anti-SDF source circulated a video of a Turkish military convoy driving toward Kuweires Military Airbase on September 28.[xx] The MoD source did not specify why Turkey deployed military assets to Kuweires.[xxi] Kuweires Airbase is located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the province. Kuweires Airbase is positioned near an east-west highway that runs along the SDF’s salient south of Lake Assad. The MoD source added that several Syrian Army divisions also deployed to Kuweires Airbase to "secure” the base.[xxii] The Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Tal Abyad in Raqqa Province and Ras al Ain in Hasakah Province along the Syria-Turkey border, according to the same MoD source.[xxiii]

Turkey’s reported deployment of military assets to Kuweires Airbase may signal Turkey’s willingness to launch a military operation against the SDF if the SDF does not integrate into the Syrian state. Turkey has consistently threatened the SDF with military action since the MoD and SDF began continually engaging each other along the Deir Hafer salient in August.[xxiv] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara recently stated that he had persuaded Turkey to refrain from taking military action against the SDF until the end of the year, but the Turkish Defense Ministry said as recently as September 25 that SDF engagements with the Syrian MoD are a threat to "regional peace and stability.”[xxv]

The reported Turkish reinforcements position new and valuable assets near SDF-MoD frontlines that Turkey or Syrian forces could use in the event of a military operation targeting the SDF. The Turkish military’s deployment of armored vehicle-launched bridge systems could enable Syrian and Turkish forces to move large vehicles across waterways that divide MoD and SDF frontlines north of the Deir Hafer salient, including the northern canal and the Euphrates River. The Turkish Samur armored vehicle-launched bridge system can ferry large vehicles across rivers up to 100 meters wide, if 12 Samurs are connected.[xxvi] Water-crossing capabilities would open additional routes of advance into SDF-controlled territory in the event of a military operation. Turkish-backed forces stalled at Tishreen Dam in January 2025 due to limited plausible avenues to reach SDF-controlled territory to the east, for example.[xxvii] Turkish helicopters would additionally provide Syrian MoD forces with close air support and reconnaissance capabilities during an operation against the SDF.

Shia Coordination Framework parties are reportedly debating the appointment of the next Iraqi prime minister, which demonstrates the confidence that these parties have in their electoral position ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Shia Coordination Framework sources told Iraqi media on September 29 that the Shia Coordination Framework is divided into two camps over who to appoint as the next prime minister: one camp is comprised of the Shia Coordination Framework “sheikhs” while the second camp is comprised of the rest of the coalition.[xxix] The term “sheikhs” in this context likely refers to the most prominent Shia Coordination Framework leaders, such as State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali. Iraqi media reported that Maliki, Ameri, current Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, Sadrist Basra Governor Assad al Eidani, and Wasit Governor Mohammad al Mayahi, among others, have expressed interest in becoming prime minister.[xxx]

Maliki claimed in an interview with Iraqi media on September 28 that Iraqi prime ministers are not meant to participate in parliamentary elections because their position and access to resources can unfairly impact the elections. Maliki acknowledged that previous Iraqi governments have not followed this practice, however.[xxxi] Maliki himself campaigned for the Iraqi premiership during the Iraqi 2010 and 2014 elections, despite serving as the prime minister at the time.[xxxii] A Shia Coordination Framework source claimed on September 29 that unidentified Shia Coordination Framework parties have considered choosing one of the Shia Coordination Framework "sheikhs” as the next prime minister due to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections.[xxxiii]

The Shia Coordination Framework reportedly plans to form a post-election coalition, which likely explains why Shia Coordination Framework parties are confident enough to discuss possible prime minister appointments ahead of the elections.[xxxiv] Shia Coordination Framework parties could individually win a small amount of votes but form a coalition among themselves and with other parties after the elections to form the largest parliamentary bloc. The Iraqi Constitution states that the Iraqi president asks the leader of the largest parliamentary bloc to form a government, but, in reality, the appointment of the prime minister results from highly politicized post-election negotiations.[xxxv] Smaller and poorer performing Iraqi parties therefore have an opportunity after the elections to form a coalition to determine the next Iraqi government.[xxxvi]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani conducted his second visit to Beirut since becoming SNSC secretary on August 5.[xxxvii] Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months highlight the extent to which Iran is prioritizing retaining its influence in Lebanon amid Lebanese state efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Larijani met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who is currently leading the Lebanese state‘s disarmament efforts, on September 27.[xxxviii] Larijani previously visited Beirut in August 2025 and similarly met with Lebanese officials, including Salam and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[xxxix] Larijani’s previous visit reportedly aimed to “prevent a complete shift in Lebanon’s internal power balance to the detriment of Hezbollah,” according to an Iranian analyst close to the regime.[xl]  Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months are likely part of an Iranian effort to prevent Hezbollah’s disarmament, although it remains unclear how specifically Iran intends to achieve this objective.

Larijani overstated the degree of Iranian support to Hezbollah and Lebanon during his visit to Beirut on September 26 and 27. Larijani met with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem on September 26 and told Qassem that Iran is prepared to back Lebanon and Hezbollah at “all levels.”[xli] Larijani did not specify what types of support Iran is prepared to give Hezbollah moving forward. Larijani’s vow of support for Hezbollah is largely performative, particularly given that Iran failed to support Hezbollah during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in late 2024 and sustained significant damage during the Israel-Iran War. Iran has provided Hezbollah with limited support since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which has included some financial support for reconstruction. Qassem previously claimed in December 2024 that Iran had allocated at least $50 million to reconstruct damaged households in Lebanon.[xlii] Larijani noted that he traveled to Beirut to follow up on Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts.[xliii] Iran’s claimed economic support is unlikely to help Lebanon make any meaningful progress in its reconstruction. The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon would need approximately $11 billion for its reconstruction and recovery needs following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xliv] $50 million from Iran is minuscule in comparison to the economic support that the Lebanese state requires for its post-war reconstruction.

Key Takeaways

• Turkish Assets in Syria: The Turkish military's reported deployment of assets to Kuweires Airbase near Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in eastern Aleppo Province may indicate that Turkey and Syria are preparing for a joint military operation against the SDF. An unspecified source from the Syrian Ministry of Defense told Syrian media that the Turkish military deployed Samur armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, unspecified air defense systems, and helicopters to the airbase.
• EU Sanctions on Iran: The European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The EU’s reimposition of sanctions comes after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website framed snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” and called on the regime to expand ties with neighboring countries and pursue a “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of sanctions.
• Iraqi Elections: Shia Coordination Framework parties are reportedly debating the appointment of the next Iraqi prime minister, which demonstrates the confidence that these parties have in their electoral position ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
• Larijani in Beirut: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani conducted his second visit to Beirut since becoming SNSC secretary. Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months highlight the extent to which Iran is prioritizing retaining its influence in Lebanon amid Lebanese state efforts to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

The Iraqi federal government resumed exporting crude oil from the Kurdistan region through Turkey’s Ceyhan Port on September 27.[xlv] The Iraqi federal government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and eight international oil companies operating in northern Iraq signed an interim deal on September 25 to resume oil exports.[xlvi] The KRG halted oil exports through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Pipeline in March 2023 after the International Chamber of Commerce ruled that the Iraqi federal government had the right to control loading at Turkey’s Ceyhan Port.[xlvii] The Iraqi federal government and the KRG have attempted to reach an oil export agreement and reopen the pipeline since at least February 2025.[xlviii] The United States reportedly threatened to sanction the Iraqi federal government in February 2025 if it prevented the KRG from resuming oil exports.[xlix] The closure of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline led to an uptick in the smuggling of Kurdish oil to Iran as companies in northern Iraq had no way to legally export oil and make profits.[l] Renewed KRG oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline will likely curb crude oil smuggling from Iraqi Kurdistan to Iran by providing a legal route to sell crude oil on the international market.[li] 

Iraqi politicians and militias responded to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s September 26 speech at the United Nations in which he vowed to “eliminate” Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders if they attack Israel.[lii] French media reported on September 27 that Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki are taking unspecified precautionary measures following Netanyahu’s speech.[liii] The report added that unspecified Iraqi militias evacuated key sites and ceased using cellphones after Netanyahu’s speech.[liv]  Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein and Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh condemned Netanyahu’s remarks.[lv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba dismissed Netanyahu’s speech as containing “empty threats” on September 26.[lvi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently conducted attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[lvii]

Syria

The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) seized a large weapons cache near the Syria-Lebanon border on September 27.[lviii] GSS forces interdicted a weapons shipment that contained 200 Grad rockets, mortar rounds, rocket-propelled grenade warheads, and heavy machine guns in al Qusayr, Homs Province.[lix] A Syrian source assessed that this weapons cache was the largest cache that the GSS has seized since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[lx] The weapons shipment was likely intended for Hezbollah as the weapons were interdicted in Homs Province, which borders the Bekaa Valley, a Hezbollah-stronghold in Lebanon. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024 as part of its campaign against Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[lxi] Al Qusayr is also located along a well-established smuggling corridor that Hezbollah formerly operated with Assad regime and Iranian-backed smugglers.[lxii]

Syrian media reported on September 28 that the International Coalition conducted a drone strike that targeted a suspected Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighter’s house in southern Idlib Province.[lxiii] Syrian media reported that an International Coalition drone killed the suspected fighter in his home in Tammanah, southern Idlib Province.[lxiv] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.  CENTCOM has conducted strikes targeting several ISIS fighters in northern Syria since the fall of Assad, including a drone strike on June 10 and a likely CENTCOM drone strike on September 4.[lxv] US forces also conducted ground raids that killed two ISIS leaders in northern Idlib Province on August 19 and southern Hama Province on September 19.[lxvi]

The Turkish and Syrian interior ministries conducted a joint raid against a reported ISIS cell in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on September 28.[lxvii] Turkish forces participated in the raid after the ISIS cell killed a Turkish citizen in Turkey and fled across the border into Syria.[lxviii]  The Turkish Interior Ministry announced on September 28 that a cell comprised of 14 ISIS members killed a Turkish citizen in Turkey, stole his vehicle, and then fled across the border to Atmeh.[lxix] Turkish and Syrian forces killed eight ISIS members and arrested six others, who were extradited to Turkey.[lxx] This joint counter-ISIS operation follows increased Syrian military cooperation with Turkey. Turkey began training Syrian MoD forces on September 9 after Turkey and Syria signed a security agreement in August.[lxxi] US-led International Coalition forces and the Syrian GSS previously coordinated on a joint counter-ISIS raid in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20, killing a senior Iraqi ISIS leader.[lxxii]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting several “sensitive” sites in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area and two drones targeting “vital” sites in Eilat, southern Israel, on September 28.[lxxiii] The Israel Defense Forces intercepted the missile on September 28.[lxxiv] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since October 2023.[lxxv]

The Houthis disabled a Dutch cargo ship, MV Minervagracht, with an anti-ship ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden on September 29.[lxxvi] The missile attack injured two crew members and forced the crew to abandon the vessel 128 nautical miles southeast of Aden.[lxxvii] The Houthis have not claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. The Houthis previously launched a missile targeting MV Minervagracht on September 23 but failed to strike the vessel.[lxxviii] The Houthis have targeted international shipping to impose an economic “blockade” on Israel since October 2023. The US Navy-run Joint Maritime Information Center stated that MV Minervagracht has no ties to Israel.[lxxix]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.