Iran Update, September 25, 2025

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Hezbollah is reportedly facing internal divisions among its members over its response to the Lebanese state’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Senior Hezbollah officials are divided over how to address the Lebanese government’s August 2025 decision to disarm the group, according to a Lebanese journalist speaking to Saudi media.[i] Some Hezbollah officials, such as Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem and Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc Head Mohammad Raad, have rejected the Lebanese government’s decision. Raad previously proclaimed “death over handing over” Hezbollah’s weapons, for example.[ii] Qassem has similarly directly threatened confrontation with the Lebanese government.[iii] Other Hezbollah officials have called for more flexibility and sought to avoid confrontation with the Lebanese Armed Forces.[iv] Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Head Mahmoud Qamati stated in August 2025 that Hezbollah will use all “peaceful means possible to oppose” the Lebanese government’s disarmament plan and affirmed that Hezbollah “will not use [its] weapons inside Lebanon” or “be dragged into internal strife with the [Lebanese Armed Forces].”[v]  It is unclear if the differences between Hezbollah officials will impair Hezbollah’s ability to form and execute a cohesive strategy to prevent the Lebanese state’s disarmament campaign.

Hezbollah is also reportedly facing challenges in appointing new leaders following the Israeli decapitation campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024. Unspecified sources familiar with Hezbollah’s internal affairs told Saudi media on September 25 that Hezbollah has been unable to appoint a deputy for Qassem.[vi] Hezbollah has similarly been unable to fill positions in its Coordination and Liaison Unit, which is Hezbollah’s main security apparatus.[vii] The unit is responsible for communicating with Lebanese security agencies and reports directly to Qassem.[viii] Hezbollah’s need to appoint senior leaders is a lingering effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) air campaign in late 2024, in which the IDF killed a significant number of top Hezbollah commanders and inflicted a 45 percent casualty rate on Hezbollah.[ix] Unspecified informed sources told Saudi media on September 25 that Hezbollah’s Shura Council is taking steps to replace Coordination and Liaison Unit Head Wafiq Safa due to “his failures and poor relations” with Lebanese state agencies.[x] Safa has led the unit for over a decade and survived a targeted Israeli airstrike in Beirut in October 2024.[xi] Safa is one of the few officials who was on former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s Shura Council to survive the war.[xii] Hezbollah reportedly seeks to replace Safa with a new unspecified figure close to Qassem.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emphasized on September 24 the strategic importance of maintaining an Iranian presence near Israel’s borders to defend against Israel.[xiii] Ghalibaf claimed that Israel’s recent campaign against Iran would "definitely not have occurred” and that Iran would have “confronted” Israel on its border with Syria if Iran still retained a presence in Syria.[xiv] Ghalibaf may have been arguing that Iran could have opened another front against Israel in Syria and thereby detracted Israel’s attention and diverted its resources away from Iran during the Israel-Iran War if Iran maintained its foothold in Syria. Iranian-backed groups in southern Syria, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias, often launched munitions targeting Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights in the months following October 7, 2023. Iran’s network in Syria remains extremely limited after the fall of Assad in December 2024, and Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war.[xv] Ghalibaf also claimed that Israel would advance to Iran's border if Iran does not “stand against [Israel] in the Golan [Heights].”[xvi] Ghalibaf’s comments reflect Iran’s long-held objective to encircle Israel and to prevent conflicts with Israel from reaching Iran.

Ghalibaf also emphasized the need for Iran to strengthen its air power. Ghalibaf claimed that Iran’s Bavar-373, Khordad, Sayyad, and Majid air defense systems operated effectively during the Israel-Iran War, but called on the regime to prioritize purchasing fighter jets.[xvii] Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within a few days of the start of the Israel-Iran War.[xviii] Ghalibaf’s statements come amid reports that Iran may have acquired Russian MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[xix] Ghalibaf’s statements also come after Iranian armed forces-affiliated Defa Press expressed support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets in June.[xx]

The United States is continuing to pressure the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. Three unnamed Iraqi officials told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on September 24 that the United States asked the Iraqi federal government to reform the Iraqi judiciary and improve financial oversight as part of an effort to reduce Iranian influence over Iraqi state institutions.[xxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have coopted the Iraqi judicial system to issue rulings favorable to militia interests.[xxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[xxiii] The US demand for improved financial oversight comes after Iraq’s Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with a US-based financial consulting firm on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[xxiv] The Iraqi government previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[xxv]    

Key Takeaways

• Internal Hezbollah Disagreements: Hezbollah is reportedly facing internal divisions among its members over its response to the Lebanese state’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah is also reportedly facing challenges in appointing new leaders following the Israeli decapitation campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024.
• Iranian Perspective on Syria: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emphasized on September 24 the strategic importance of maintaining an Iranian presence near Israel’s borders to defend against Israel. Ghalibaf claimed that Israel’s recent campaign against Iran would "definitely not have occurred” and that Iran would have “confronted” Israel on its border with Syria if Iran still retained a presence in Syria.
• US Pressure on Iraq: The United States is continuing to pressure the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. Three unnamed Iraqi officials told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on September 24 that the United States asked the Iraqi federal government to reform the Iraqi judiciary and improve financial oversight as part of an effort to reduce Iranian influence over Iraqi state institutions.

Iran

Iran is preparing economic measures to try to withstand the likely reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on September 27. UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and terminated six earlier UNSC resolutions.[xxvi] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28.[xxvii] The UNSC will reimpose the six suspended resolutions, which include sanctions on Iranian military and nuclear entities, on September 27 unless Iran meets its obligations laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on September 24 that the Iranian government has developed contingency plans to counter snapback sanctions and claimed that oil sales will continue at their current rate despite sanctions.[xxviii] Paknejad added that snapback sanctions will not directly target Iranian oil sales but could affect trade, finance, and shipping.[xxix] Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin similarly stated on September 24 that the bank will stabilize the Iranian currency if UNSC sanctions are reimposed.[xxx] Farzin also claimed that the Central Bank will sell more gold coins and bullion to keep the gold market stable and control inflation.[xxxi] The Iranian rial reached 1,085,000 rials per one US dollar on September 25, reflecting Iranian anticipation about imminent snapback sanctions.[xxxii]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on September 23 that Iran still retains the capacity to advance its nuclear program after US and Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[xxxiii] Grossi stated that the strikes may not have damaged all Iranian centrifuges and that Iran retains facilities to manufacture centrifuge components.[xxxiv] Grossi also stated that it would take Iran only “weeks” to enrich its uranium stockpile to 90 percent.[xxxv] Israel struck the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) workshop in Karaj, west of Tehran, and the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Tehran Province during the Israel-Iran War.[xxxvi] Iran manufactured centrifuge components at TESA and manufactured and tested advanced centrifuge rotors at the TNRC.[xxxvii]

Iran showcased its nuclear technology at the 2025 Atom Expo in Moscow on September 25.[xxxviii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami presented advancements in Iran’s nuclear technology on September 25.[xxxix] China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan also participated in the exhibition.[xl] Eslami met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the event.[xli] Eslami announced that Iran plans to develop large nuclear power plants and small modular reactors (SMRs) with the help of Russian state-owned atomic energy corporation Rosatom.[xlii] Eslami and the Rosatom director general signed a memorandum of understanding on September 24 for Russia to build eight SMRs in Iran, including four at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.[xliii]

Indian officials recently discussed the possibility of purchasing oil from Iran and Venezuela in exchange for reducing Russian oil imports with the Trump administration.[xliv] An anonymous source with knowledge of the discussion told Bloomberg on September 25 that an Indian delegation visiting the United States emphasized to the Trump administration that India must receive oil from Iran and Venezuela in order to be able to suspend oil imports from Russia without causing a spike in global oil prices. India has not purchased oil from Iran since 2019.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) conducted several drone strikes to disable US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) artillery positions south of Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, on September 23. Deir Hafer is the westernmost city that the SDF still holds in Aleppo Province and the salient where MoD and SDF engagements occur most frequently. The SDF and local media reported that the MoD launched two drones that struck an SDF rocket artillery position near Khasaf, a village south of Deir Hafer, on September 23.[xlv] The drone strike killed one SDF member and injured two others.[xlvi] A similar incident occurred on September 20, when the MoD conducted a drone strike on an SDF rocket artillery position in Maskana, 40 kilometers south of Deir Hafer.[xlvii] Anti-SDF media reported that the SDF has conducted several rocket artillery attacks on MoD positions near the Deir Hafer salient since September 20.[xlviii] It is unclear what is prompting the SDF’s reported attacks.

The SDF responded to the MoD drone strike by targeting MoD positions near the Deir Hafer salient on September 23 and 24.[xlix] The SDF fired rocket artillery targeting several MoD positions in the area, including Kuweires Military Airbase, on September 23.[l] The SDF and MoD also exchanged fire in several towns within a seven-kilometer radius of Deir Hafer on September 24.[li] A local anti-SDF source claimed that MoD snipers injured an SDF member at a school in Umm Tina during an engagement with MoD forces positioned in Zaraya.[lii] Syrian media reported on September 24 that an SDF sniper killed an MoD 80th Division fighter near Deir Hafer.[liii] Continued SDF-MoD engagements are violations of the March 2025 ceasefire.[liv] Renewed larger-scale conflict along the Deir Hafer salient could hinder the SDF's integration into the Syrian state before the end of the year. Turkey reportedly gave the Syrian transitional government until the end of 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian state before it takes military action against the SDF.

Turkish officials continue to reiterate to the Syrian government that the SDF is not complying with its agreement to integrate into the Syrian state, likely to encourage the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in New York on September 24.[lv] Erdogan stressed to Shara that the SDF must comply with the March 10 integration agreement, according to an official Turkish readout of the meeting.[lvi] Erdogan’s comments to Shara come as Turkey is “growing impatient” with the SDF's limited progress toward integrating into the Syrian state.[lvii] Turkey has long sought to dismantle the SDF, which it sees as a threat to Turkish regional ambitions and domestic stability.[lviii] CTP-ISW recently assessed that Turkey is likely encouraging the Syrian government to increase military and political pressure on the SDF to integrate into Syria.[lix] The spokesperson for the Turkish Defense Ministry cited recent SDF-MoD clashes in Aleppo as evidence that the SDF is not abiding by its commitments.[lx] Damascus has reportedly asked Turkey to delay any military action against the SDF to allow for negotiations to continue. The Syrian MoD has continued to cooperate with Turkey against the SDF on and near the frontlines in Aleppo Province in recent days, including through possible Turkish drone reconnaissance, however.[lxi]

Syrian Navy Commander Brigadier General Mohammed al Saud discussed Syrian-Turkish naval cooperation with Turkish Fleet Commander Admiral Kadir Yildiz in Turkey on September 25.[lxii] The Syrian MoD delegation toured a Turkish frigate in Kocaeli Province, Turkey.[lxiii] The Turkish Defense Ministry stated that Turkey has pledged to provide “land, sea, or air” support to develop the “defense and security capacity” of the new Syrian government.[lxiv] The Turkish Defense Ministry said that Saud’s visit to Turkey comes within the context of the Syrian-Turkish military training and “consultation” agreement signed in Ankara on August 13.[lxv] The Turkish Defense Ministry pledged to provide training programs and technical support to strengthen the Syrian MoD and “reform the security apparatus comprehensively” under the provisions of the agreement.[lxvi]

Syria and Ukraine restored diplomatic relations on September 24 after a meeting between Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).[lxvii] Ukraine severed ties with Syria in 2022 after the Assad regime recognized the independence of Luhansk and Donetsk following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[lxviii] Shara and Zelensky discussed common security threats and areas where Syria and Ukraine can enhance cooperation, which likely includes trade.[lxix] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met with Shara in Damascus in December 2024 shortly after Assad’s fall and agreed to provide Syria with 500 tons of flour to offset Russia’s suspension of exports to Syria at the time.[lxx] Syrian and Ukrainian port and trade officials met in Damascus on September 23 to discuss strengthening bilateral economic and trade relations.[lxxi] The restoration of diplomatic relations between Syria and Ukraine follows an increase in diplomatic contact between Russia and Syria in recent months. Syrian officials, including Chief of Staff Ali al Nassan, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Shara, met with senior Russian officials in Damascus on September 9, likely to continue negotiating the status of Russian bases in Syria.[lxxii] Shara is expected to travel to Moscow on October 15 for the Arab-Russian summit.[lxxiii]

US President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on September 24 on the sidelines of the UNGA.[lxxiv] Trump and Shara first met in Saudi Arabia in May 2025, when Trump announced that he would lift all US sanctions on Syria.[lxxv] Syrian Foreign Ministry Director of US Affairs Qutaiba Idlibi said that Trump and Shara’s September 24 meeting focused on sanctions relief, likely in reference to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019.[lxxvi] The Trump administration suspended Caesar Act sanctions for 180 days on May 23, but Congress must pass a law to permanently remove the sanctions.[lxxvii] Idlibi indicated that Shara and Trump will soon meet again in Washington, DC, but not during Shara’s visit to the United States to attend the UNGA.[lxxviii]

Arabian Peninsula

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck five Houthi command sites and two weapons depots in Sanaa City, Yemen, on September 25.[lxxix]  The IAF conducted the airstrikes in response to a Houthi drone attack that injured 22 civilians in Eilat, southern Israel, on September 25.[lxxx] The IAF struck the Houthi General Staff Headquarters, facilities affiliated with the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service (SIS), the Houthi Propaganda Department, and additional military complexes.[lxxxi] Local sources reported that IAF airstrikes targeted the Presidential Palace Complex in southern Sanaa City, which reportedly houses Houthi command sites.[lxxxii] Houthi SIS sources confirmed that Israeli airstrikes targeted one of the SIS’s facilities in southern Sanaa City.[lxxxiii] The SIS sources and a Yemen analyst claimed that the facility housed political prisoners detained by the Houthis, which CTP-ISW is unable to verify.[lxxxiv] Local sources also reported that IAF airstrikes targeted an unspecified site in the Hada neighborhood of southern Sanaa City and a residential building on Raqas Street in eastern Sanaa City.[lxxxv] Houthi media reported that the IAF also struck the Houthi-controlled Dhahban Power Station in northern Sanaa City.[lxxxvi] The IAF last conducted airstrikes targeting the Dhahban Power Station in May.[lxxxvii]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi confirmed on September 25 that the Houthis attacked a vessel on September 23.[lxxxviii] This attack is part of the Houthis’ offensive campaign against international shipping transiting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to economically “blockade” Israel. An unspecified vessel’s crew reported an explosion in the vicinity of their vessel 120 nautical miles east of the Port of Aden on September 23.[lxxxix] The crew did not report any casualties or damage to the vessel.[xc]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.