Iran Update, September 24, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran. Most updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas Monday updates also include events from the preceding weekend, collected after ISW-CTP's 2:00 PM ET Friday data cutoff. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled a Houthi advance on September 23 that sought to sever the primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that connects Taiz City and Aden City. Houthi control over the Taiz-Aden GLOC would effectively represent an encirclement of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City, as the Hijat al Abd road is the only effective main supply route (MSR) that connects Taiz City to the rest of Yemeni government-controlled territory.
• The Houthis likely seek to capture the Taiz-Aden GLOC to impose multiple dilemmas on Yemeni government-aligned forces. An effective Houthi encirclement of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City could set conditions for Houthi forces to seize Taiz City and other parts of the governorate, which would provide the Houthis with strategic high ground over their recently captured Red Sea coastal positions, and improve the Houthis’ ability to threaten the Yemeni government’s capital in Aden City.
• The Houthis are likely attempting to deter Saudi Arabia from conducting cross-border ground operations against the Houthis in Yemen by claiming that they conducted “preemptive” strikes targeting reported Saudi military buildups near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.
• The People's Republic of China supplied dual-use technology to Iran during the war to support Iran's drone and missile programs and may be transporting goods to Iran by air to circumvent the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Toplines

Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled a Houthi advance on September 23 that sought to sever the primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that connects Taiz City and Aden City. Houthi forces reportedly attempted to advance from al Akbush in Hayfan District southwestward toward Hijat al Abd, Lahij Governorate, in order to sever the primary GLOC connecting Taiz and Aden City on September 23, according to multiple Yemeni government-aligned sources.[i] A DC-based Yemen analyst reported on September 23 that Houthi forces severed the Taiz-Aden GLOC for less than an hour before Yemeni government-aligned forces, including the Yemeni National Army, Southern Giants Brigades, and local Popular Resistance fighters, recaptured the Hijat al Abd area.[ii] Yemeni government-aligned forces conducted at least three airstrikes on Houthi positions in al Akbush to prevent Houthi advances on the GLOC on September 23, according to Saudi media and the Yemen analyst.[iii] Yemeni government forces and the Yemen analyst reported that government forces retained control of the Taiz-Aden GLOC in Hijat al Abd and continued to use the resupply route on September 24.[iv]

Houthi control over the Taiz-Aden GLOC would effectively represent an encirclement of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City, as the Hijat al Abd road is the only effective main supply route (MSR) that connects Taiz City to the rest of Yemeni government-controlled territory.[v] A DC-based Yemen analyst assessed on September 10 that Yemeni government-aligned forces would struggle to resupply Taiz positions via alternative mountain roads, which are “far more difficult and expensive.”^[vi] Houthi forces likely do not need to seize the entirety of the Taiz-Aden GLOC to sever government reinforcements and resupply because sustained Houthi fire on the Hijat al Abd MSR or other sections could make the route too dangerous to use. Houthi forces previously advanced eastward from western Taiz Governorate toward the Taiz-Aden GLOC in al Turbah, Taiz Governorate, on September 14 and 21.[vii] Hijat al Abd is less than 10 kilometers east of al Turbah.

The Houthis likely seek to capture the Taiz-Aden GLOC to impose multiple dilemmas on Yemeni government-aligned forces. An effective Houthi encirclement of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City by capturing the GLOC could:

• Set conditions for Houthi forces to seize Taiz City and other parts of the governorate, which would provide the Houthis with strategic high ground over their recently captured Red Sea coastal positions.
• Improve the Houthis’ ability to threaten the Yemeni government’s capital in Aden City.
• Provide the Houthis with a propaganda victory, as locals in Taiz Governorate have historically opposed Houthi rule and the Houthis have attempted to capture Taiz for nearly 15 years.[viii]
• Effectively resurrect the borders of the northern Yemen Arab Republic—with the exception of parts of Marib and Jawf governorates—which could provide the Houthis with political legitimacy for a separate northern Yemeni state.[ix]
• Relieve Houthi forces to pursue the group’s other objectives, such as the seizure of oil resources in Marib Governorate, as well as further expansion and consolidation of Houthi positions along the Red Sea Coastal Plain.
• Provide the Houthis with greater leverage in negotiations for a peace settlement with the Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis are likely attempting to deter Saudi Arabia from conducting cross-border ground operations against the Houthis in Yemen by claiming that they conducted “preemptive” strikes targeting reported Saudi military buildups near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.[x] Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree stated on September 24 that the Houthis launched “dozens” of ballistic missiles and drones at a Saudi military base in al Tuwal, Najran Province, Saudi Arabia, which is located approximately 1.5 kilometers from the Yemeni border, on September 23.[xi] Saree claimed that the Houthis conducted the attack in response to observed Saudi troop buildups in the area.[xii] Saree added that the Houthis killed or injured “hundreds” of Saudi, Yemeni, and Sudanese soldiers in the attack.[xiii] This marks the first time that the Houthis have claimed a preemptive attack against Saudi Arabia since the Houthis announced their blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20.[xiv] ISW-CTP has not observed any indicators that Saudi Arabia was amassing forces in al Tuwal prior to the Houthis’ attack. Saudi Arabia has not acknowledged the attack on al Tuwal at the time of this writing. The group’s justification for its recent attack, regardless of whether the Houthi claims of Saudi troop movements are true, is likely an effort to try to deter Saudi Arabia from deploying its forces to the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border and conducting cross-border ground operations by indicating the Houthis’ ability and willingness to attack Saudi forces.[xv] Saree emphasized on September 24 that the Houthis will target future Saudi troop buildups along the border until Saudi Arabia ceases all kinetic activity against the Houthis in Yemen and concedes to the Houthis’ demands.[xvi]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) supplied dual-use technology to Iran during the war to support Iran's drone and missile programs and may be transporting goods to Iran by air to circumvent the US naval blockade on Iranian ports. The Wall Street Journal, citing Iranian customs data, reported on September 23 that PRC aircraft delivered roughly 1,300 shipments of dual-use technology, including technology that could support drone and missile guidance production, to Iran's Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry between January and June 2026.[xvii] One shipment contained GPS tracking devices, electric motors, and aircraft engine parts, while a dozen other shipments included parts worth more than $6 million USD that could support flight-control units for precision-guided weapons.[xviii] The Wall Street Journal also highlighted a notable increase in Iran-PRC air traffic since June 2026, which may reflect Chinese support for Iranian military reconstitution and Iran and the PRC's attempts to circumvent the US naval blockade.[xix]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF)—a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups—continues to pose a threat to the Iranian regime by mounting effective resistance against regime counterinsurgency operations targeting the group in southeastern Iran.[xx] The MPF claimed responsibility for the September 23 clash with regime forces in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, that killed two senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces officers.[xxi] The MPF claimed that regime forces attacked one of its positions on September 23, which prompted hours of fighting and the deployment of reinforcements.[xxii] The MPF killed IRGC Ground Forces Shahid Sajjad Operational Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Hossein Zarifi and Intelligence Commander Major Ahmad Zeraati during the operation.[xxiii] The September 23 regime operation targeting the group is part of an uptick in Iranian security operations in southeastern Iran over the past month, particularly against MPF networks in Saravan.[xxiv] The regime previously conducted a raid on MPF’s hideouts in Saravan on September 12.[xxv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the regime will likely intensify security measures and counterinsurgency operations in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in response to the killing of Zarifi and Zeraati.[xxvi]

Lebanon

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is reducing its ground force presence in Lebanon after achieving operational objectives that advance Israel’s strategic objective of destroying Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[xxvii] Israeli Army Radio reported on September 24 that the IDF has withdrawn the 89th (Commando) Infantry Brigade (98th Paratrooper Division), 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division), 55th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade (98th Paratrooper Division), and 4th (Kiryati) Reserve Armored Brigade (146th Reserve Division) from southern Lebanon in recent days.[xxviii] Israeli Army Radio also reported that the IDF deployed the 188th (Barak) Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division) and 828th (Bismalach) Training Brigade (IDF Infantry Corps) to southern Lebanon to replace the four withdrawn brigades, indicating that the IDF has reduced its ground force presence in Lebanon from eight to six brigades.[xxix] An IDF source told Israeli Army Radio that the low level of kinetic activity in southern Lebanon and recent IDF operational successes, including the capture of Hezbollah’s tunnel network at Ali al Taher on September 3, made the force reduction feasible.[xxx] Hezbollah is unlikely to interpret the force reduction as a sign of Israeli capitulation or the result of Hezbollah military activity, which has remained sparse for months. An Israeli force presence consisting of six brigades in southern Lebanon is largely capable of maintaining the IDF's current military activities in southern Lebanon, which include demolishing Hezbollah infrastructure, seizing weapons, and engaging small-unit Hezbollah fighters.[xxxi]

Iraq

The Iranian regime is likely concerned about the Iraqi government’s cooperation with US efforts to target Iran’s sanctions evasion networks. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi at the UN General Assembly on September 23 to discuss bilateral relations, including economic cooperation and the implementation of existing agreements.^[xxxii] Pezeshkian and Zaydi may have discussed the Iraqi government’s recent decision to close Baghdad airport to Iranian planes, almost certainly in response to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s warning on September 21 that foreign companies providing services to Iranian airlines would risk secondary sanctions.[xxxiii]  The Iraqi government’s decision to ban Iranian flights at Baghdad airport as well as Zaydi’s ongoing efforts to meet US demands regarding Iranian-backed Iraqi militia disarmament are likely driving Iranian concerns that Zaydi will cooperate with US efforts to target Iran’s economy and its sanctions evasion networks.^[xxxiv] Iran has historically exploited Iraqi government and financial institutions to evade sanctions, illicitly obtain US dollars, launder money, and generate revenue for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxxv] Increased Iraqi government cooperation with these US efforts would further isolate Iran’s economy and worsen its severe economic crisis.

Turkey agreed on September 23 to withdraw its forces from the Zelikan military base in Bashiqa, Ninewa Province.[xxxvi] The agreement stipulates that Turkish forces will “gradually” hand over the base to the Iraqi government over an unspecified timeline.[xxxvii] This announcement comes as the Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered drafting legislation to monitor the implementation of a Turkish withdrawal, possibly in response to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia demands for the expulsion of Turkish forces from Iraq.[xxxviii] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically attacked the Zelikan base in response to Turkish regional activity that they oppose.[xxxix] 

Arabian Peninsula

Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces separately advanced in western Taiz Governorate on September 24 near the contested Jabal Kahbub area on the Lahij-Taiz Governorate border in southwestern Yemen.[xl] Jabal Kahbub sits approximately 30 kilometers north of Houthi positions by the Bab al Mandeb Strait, which provides Yemeni government-aligned forces advantageous high ground above Houthi forces along the relatively open Red Sea coastal plain. Yemeni government-aligned forces took control over mountainous terrain around al Ajram, Taiz Governorate, according to geolocated footage published on September 23.[xli] The National Resistance Forces, which is a military faction aligned with the Yemeni government, also conducted drone strikes on Houthi forces after Houthi fighters made small advances into Dar Qashimiyah, Taiz Governorate, on September 24.[xlii] Commercially available satellite imagery posted on September 24 indicates that the Yemeni government-aligned Southern Giants Brigades reinforced their defensive positions near Jabal Kahbub.[xliii] The Southern Giants Brigades have defended their positions near Jabal Kahbub against repeated Houthi attacks since September 16.[xliv]

Saudi air defenses intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles in Saudi airspace near Taif and Yanbu on September 24.[xlv] A Greek military-operated Patriot missile battery also intercepted a Houthi drone over Yanbu on September 24.[xlvi] The Houthis likely targeted Saudi energy infrastructure in Yanbu. The Houthi strikes follow reports that Saudi Arabia resumed transporting oil via its East-West Pipeline to Yanbu Port on September 22 after the Houthis struck multiple points along the pipeline on September 11.[xlvii] The Houthis have attacked Saudi oil infrastructure since July 2026 to maximize the political and economic costs of the Saudi campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to surrender to Houthi demands.[xlviii]