The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[i] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Parchin and Shahroud military sites in October 2024 and during the Israel-Iran War.[ii] Satellite imagery of the Parchin missile site from August 28 and of the Shahroud missile site from September 5 showed that Iran has begun reconstructing buildings that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential to producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[iii] The Associated Press assessed that Iran still does not have mixers at Parchin or Shahroud to produce solid fuel, however.[iv] The IDF previously destroyed Iranian solid fuel mixers during its October 2024 attack on Iran. Israeli sources stated in October 2024 that Iran could not domestically produce solid fuel mixers and would need to purchase them from China, which could take at least a year.[v] China previously assisted Iran in rebuilding its ballistic missile program after the October 2024 Israeli attack on Iran by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a component of solid fuel.[vi] The Associated Press report comes after Iran tested an unspecified ballistic missile in Semnan Province on September 18.[vii] The report also comes after the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities,” which include Iranian missile capabilities.[viii]

An Iranian parliamentarian who is affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front and a member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran.[ix] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran’s acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict. Abolfazl Zohrevand claimed that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets have arrived in Shiraz, Iran, as part of Iran’s efforts to strengthen its air force.[x]  Russia has not confirmed this report. CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm whether Russia has delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran at the time of this writing. The MiG-29 is an antiquated system and would not be able to confront more advanced Israeli and US aircraft, such as F-35 fighter jets. Zohrevand also claimed that Russian Su-35 fighter jets are “gradually entering” Iran and that Russia will supply Iran with S-400 air defense systems.[xi] Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed that Russia will provide Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air defense systems in recent years, but Russia has not yet delivered any such systems to Iran.[xii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia is unable to divert critical systems like the Su-35 and S-400 away from its war effort to Ukraine. Zohrevand further claimed that China would supply Iran with HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).[xiii] Chinese HQ-9 SAMs bear similarities to Russian S-300s. Senior Iranian officials have expressed openness to expanding military cooperation with China, but it is unclear whether China is willing to provide Iran with the advanced systems that it seeks.[xiv]

Shia Coordination Framework parties that will compete against Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in the November 2025 parliamentary elections are continuing to try to detract voter support for Sudani’s coalition. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The spokesperson for former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition accused the Sudani administration of withholding government services, such as electricity, to pressure State of Law members to join Sudani’s coalition in an interview with Iraqi media on September 21.[xv] The spokesperson added that the State of Law Coalition opposes Sudani serving another term as prime minister. Unidentified Shia Coordination Framework members previously accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s prospects in the upcoming elections.[xvi]

Iraqi media separately reported on September 24 that unidentified Shia Coordination Framework parties have circulated rumors that Sudani is a Baathist.[xvii] An unidentified Shia Coordination Framework party previously accused Sudani of having ties to the Baath Party during discussions about Sudani becoming prime minister in 2022, according to an unidentified former Iraqi minister. It is unclear which Shia Coordination Framework parties are behind these accusations at the time of this writing. Maliki has frequently warned that Baathists could infiltrate the elections, however.[xviii] CTP-ISW assessed on August 20 that Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission, which bars candidates with Baathist ties from running in the elections, to sideline political opponents.[xix]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War.
• Russo-Iranian Defense Cooperation: An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran. CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran’s acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework parties that will compete against Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in the November 2025 parliamentary elections are continuing to try to detract voter support for Sudani’s coalition.

Iran

Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) signed a three-year roadmap for trade and economic cooperation in Moscow on September 24.[xx] The Iranian Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister, Mohammad Atabek, stated that the 2025-2028 Iran-EAEU roadmap will expand cooperation between Iran and EAEU countries in various fields, including infrastructure, logistics, road and maritime transport, customs, and digital trade. The Russian minister for EAEU trade, Andrey Slepnev, stated that the previously signed Iran-EAEU free trade agreement, which went into effect in May 2025, eliminated tariffs on 87 percent of goods and has increased Iran-EAEU trade by 16 percent. Iran’s efforts to expand its trade partnerships with regional countries is part of its “neighborhood policy,” which seeks to undermine and mitigate the impact of international sanctions.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara celebrated Syria's transformation since the fall of the Assad regime and discussed several of the challenges facing Syria’s transition during his speech at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York on September 24.[xxi] Shara’s speech marks his most significant diplomatic engagement on the world stage since coming to power in December 2024. Shara discussed Syria's emergence from decades of regime rule and proclaimed that Syria has transformed from an “exporter of crises” to a state with the opportunity to bring peace and stability to the region. He warned that some parties have attempted to “incite sectarian strife and internal conflict” with the objective of “dividing and tearing” Syria apart. Shara discussed the government’s establishment of independent commissions to investigate abuses committed on the Syrian coast in March 2025 and in southern Syria in July 2025.[xxii] He noted that he will “bring to justice” those who have harmed or killed innocent civilians and that he aims to build a country with laws that guarantee the rights of all individuals “without exception.” Shara called on all countries to lift sanctions on Syria.

Shara additionally highlighted Syria’s commitment to “dialogue and diplomacy” with Israel, likely in reference to the ongoing Syrian-Israeli negotiations over a new security agreement to determine the Israel-Syria disengagement line and address Israel’s presence in southern Syria and activity in Syrian airspace.[xxiii] Shara condemned “Israeli threats” against Syria since the fall of the regime and accused it of “exploiting” the transitional period and risking the “spiral of new conflicts.”[xxiv] Shara called on the international community to stand with Syria in confronting Israeli “threats.”[xxv]

Arabian Peninsula

A Houthi Samad drone crashed in Eilat, southern Israel, on September 24, marking the second time that a Houthi drone has penetrated Israeli air defense systems in the past week.[xxvi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on September 24 that the Iron Dome failed to intercept the drone and that the drone crashed in Eilat.[xxvii] An initial investigation conducted by the Israeli Air Force found that the Iron Dome air defense system detected the drone late in its flight path.[xxviii] Israeli media suggested that the Iron Dome may have failed to intercept the Houthi drone due to the drone’s low altitude.[xxix] Israeli media reported that the Houthi drone attack wounded at least 22 civilians.[xxx] The Houthis confirmed the attack on September 24.[xxxi] This attack comes after a Houthi drone penetrated Israeli air defense systems and struck a hotel in Eilat on September 18.[xxxii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned the Houthis on September 24 that “those who harm Israel will be harmed sevenfold.”[xxxiii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated on September 23 that continued Israeli operations in Lebanon hinder the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from being able to implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxiv] Aoun met with UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23.[xxxv] Aoun told Guterres that the LAF is carrying out its duties in southern Lebanon but is waiting for Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon to fully deploy its forces there.[xxxvi] The LAF has previously stated that continued Israeli airstrikes will prevent the LAF from fully deploying to southern Lebanon and hinder its ability to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxvii] The LAF plan stipulates that the LAF will disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River by the end of November 2025.[xxxviii] Aoun noted that the Lebanese government’s disarmament plan was expected to be implemented shortly after the plan was approved on September 5 but that continued Israeli attacks in Lebanon are preventing the plan’s implementation.[xxxix] Aoun stressed to other foreign officials on the sidelines of the UNGA that continued delays in Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon hinder “all efforts” to strengthen the state’s sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.[xl] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[xli]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf claimed on September 24 that Hezbollah is “more alive than ever” and noted that Iran is continuing to provide support to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance.[xlii] Ghalibaf’s statements support Hezbollah’s campaign to pressure the Lebanese government to reverse its decision to disarm Hezbollah by portraying Hezbollah as strong and capable of confronting the government. Ghalibaf told Hezbollah-aligned media on September 24 that Hezbollah is “stronger, more steadfast, and more cohesive” than it was previously.[xliii] Ghalibaf added that US diplomats’ visits to Lebanon and the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah demonstrate Hezbollah’s “strength and influence.”[xliv] Ghalibaf’s statements mirror those from senior Hezbollah officials who have sought to demonstrate Hezbollah’s strength and willingness to confront the Lebanese government to prevent disarmament.[xlv] Iranian officials regularly emphasize the strength of the Axis of Resistance, so it is unclear whether Iran intentionally coordinated its language with Hezbollah in this instance.

Hezbollah’s decision not to call on its supporters to protest suggests that Hezbollah is engaged in a pressure campaign against the Lebanese government and does not currently seek to incite confrontation with the government. Hezbollah reportedly called on its supporters on September 23 to take part in an upcoming rally at Raouche Rock in Beirut to commemorate the death of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, according to Lebanese media.[xlvi] Hezbollah often uses commemorative events to rally its supporters and signal its strength.[xlvii] Several Lebanese officials condemned Hezbollah’s call for a rally.[xlviii] Lebanese parliamentarian Waddah al Sadek said on September 23 that Hezbollah often warns the Lebanese government against being “dragged into civil war” but “wastes no chance to provoke Beirut’s residents.”[xlix] Hezbollah later denied that it had organized a rally at Raouche.[l] Hezbollah has threatened in recent months to call on its supporters to confront the Lebanese government if the government follows through on its plan to disarm Hezbollah, but has largely refrained from inciting protests against the Lebanese government.[li] Hezbollah and the Amal Movement have only issued one call to protest since August 25 but later postponed the protests to allow for dialogue.[lii] Hezbollah’s decision not to hold protests against the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm the organization highlights Hezbollah’s relative weakness within the Lebanese political space, given that Hezbollah has previously incited mass protests in response to much less significant issues in the past.[liii]

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