The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in a speech on September 23.[i] Khamenei’s speech marks the first time that Khamenei has rejected all negotiations with the United States since the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Khamenei previously rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations in a speech in August 2025.[ii] Khamenei did not distinguish between direct or indirect negotiations in his September 23 speech, which indicates that he likely rejects any type of negotiation with the United States.[iii] Khamenei stated on September 23 that negotiations with the United States “do not serve [Iran’s] national interests” and cause serious and sometimes “irreparable damage.”[iv] Khamenei claimed that the United States approaches negotiations with a predetermined goal to end Iran’s nuclear activities and enrichment and stated that engaging in such negotiations means accepting coercion. Khamenei warned that negotiating under threat signals submission and would embolden the United States to demand more concessions from Iran, such as reducing Iran’s missile range. Khamenei also reiterated that Iran will not accept the United States’ demand for Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment, stating that enrichment is a national achievement that was developed through decades of effort.[v]

Khamenei separately claimed that national unity was decisive in undermining Iran’s adversaries during the 12-day war. Khamenei stated that Iranians’ cohesion prevented unrest despite “enemy effort[s]” to kill commanders, disrupt state functions, and “eradicate Islam in Iran.”[vi] Khamenei also highlighted the importance of swift leadership succession, the resilience of the Iranian armed forces, and effective state management during the war.[vii] Khamenei’s remarks about unity echo other regime officials’ comments since the 12-day war about national cohesion and solidarity. Moderate and pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, initiated calls for unity after the war.[viii] Rouhani emphasized in July the need for unity and to rebuild trust between the regime and the Iranian people, for example. Other senior officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have made similar statements about the importance of unity.[ix]

Iran is highly unlikely to prevent the reimposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by September 27 because Iran has failed to meet the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands for delaying the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with his E3 counterparts and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in New York on September 23 to try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[x] A European diplomat described the prospect of an agreement as “slim” because Iran has not fulfilled the E3’s conditions for delaying the snapback mechanism. These conditions include Iran granting inspectors full access to Iran’s nuclear sites, accounting for the location and amount of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, and resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States.[xi] A US journalist reported on September 23 that Araghchi did not make progress toward preventing the reimposition of UNSC sanctions in his meeting with Kallas and the E3 officials.[xii] Germany’s Foreign Office stated that the E3 and the European Union urged Iran to take “practical steps” in the coming hours and days to resume direct negotiations with the United States, among other steps.[xiii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, as noted above.

Iran is attempting to use the September 9 Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement to pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process. The Iran-IAEA agreement reportedly sets procedures for future inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities but does not provide a timeline for inspections.[xiv] Araghchi met with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 22.[xv] Grossi stated in an interview with PBS on September 22 that the IAEA has not received any “official communication” about Iran suspending the September 9 agreement.[xvi] Senior Iranian officials, including Araghchi, have maintained that the Iran-IAEA agreement will be voided if the E3 imposes snapback sanctions on Iran, however.[xvii] Iran may calculate that it can pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process by threatening to suspend cooperation with the IAEA given that the E3 has repeatedly called for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and allow IAEA inspectors to resume inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities.

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in a speech on September 23. Khamenei’s speech marks the first time that Khamenei has rejected all negotiations with the United States since the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.
• Snapback Sanctions: Iran is highly unlikely to prevent the reimposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by September 27 because Iran has failed to meet the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands for delaying the snapback mechanism. Iran is attempting to use the September 9 Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement to pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process.

Iran

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) canceled military parades in Hamedan and Kurdistan provinces due to unspecified threats.[xviii] Iran holds annual military parades across the country during its Sacred Defense Week. The IRGC commander in Hamedan, Brigadier General Hossein Zare Kamali, announced on September 22 that the IRGC will refrain from holding large gatherings due to “emerging threats.” The IRGC’s decision to cancel military parades indicates that Iran remains concerned about potential security threats following the Israel-Iran War.

Iraq

Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr indicated that he will not support a coalition bloc in the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, according to Iraqi media on September 23. Sadr reportedly stated that he was unable to find a coalition bloc that aligns with his political objectives during a recent Sadrist movement meeting in al Hanana, Najaf Province.[xix]  A social media account that is likely controlled by Sadr posted in July 2025 that Sadr requested information about candidates and blocs that support his agenda, which includes limiting the use of weapons to the Iraqi state and cracking down on corruption.[xx] Sadr announced in March 2025 that his Shia Nationalist Movement would not participate in the elections and has repeatedly urged his supporters, who are primarily Shia, not to vote.[xxi] Sadr’s statement comes as Shia Coordination Framework parties are reportedly concerned that voter turnout in the upcoming elections will fall below 20 percent due to Sadr’s continued calls for Sadrists to boycott the elections.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A 20 percent voter turnout rate would represent a massive drop from the 41 percent voter turnout rate in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[xxiii]

Syria

Syrian officials emphasized the need for US sanctions relief and discussed security cooperation during meetings with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on September 22.[xxiv] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Rubio on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York on September 22 and discussed methods to achieve Syrian “security and prosperity,” particularly through US sanctions relief.[xxv] Shara and Rubio also discussed counterterrorism coordination, Syrian government efforts to locate missing US citizens in Syria, and relations between Israel and Syria.[xxvi] Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani also discussed bilateral security and economic cooperation with Rubio on September 22.[xxvii] Shaibani emphasized the importance of lifting US sanctions to support Syrian reconstruction efforts.[xxviii] Shaibani met with US lawmakers in Washington, DC, on September 18 to discuss permanently lifting sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019.[xxix] The Trump administration issued a 180-day suspension of Caesar Act sanctions on May 23, but Congress must pass a law to permanently remove the sanctions.[xxx] The Caesar Act targets anyone who provides support to the Syrian government, supports the Syrian oil and gas industry, exports aircraft or military equipment to Syria, or provides construction or engineering services directly or indirectly to the Syrian government.[xxxi]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese officials have continued to ask the United States to pressure Israel to cease its operations in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, and Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 22.[xxxii] Aoun asked the United States to pressure Israel to implement the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah by ceasing operations in Lebanon, withdrawing from Lebanese territory, returning Lebanese prisoners held in Israel, and abiding by UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[xxxiii] Aoun previously told Barrack during his visit to Beirut in August 2025 that Israel must commit to the US proposal and that the proposal would not become effective until Israel approves it.[xxxiv] The US proposal stipulates that Israel will withdraw from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement’s implementation and that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will completely disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[xxxv] The LAF expects that it will require 15 months to disarm Hezbollah, however.[xxxvi] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam similarly told Barrack in August that the United States must fulfill its responsibilities as a sponsor of the plan by pressuring Israel to cease hostilities and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[xxxvii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Arabic-language spokesperson stated on September 23 that the IDF will not cease its operations in southern Lebanon “until the south of the Litani is completely cleaned” of Hezbollah.[xxxviii]

The Lebanese government has continued to try to acquire economic and military support for the Lebanese state and the LAF. Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa met with the Austrian Ambassador to Lebanon Francesca Husovitz Frensing on September 23 to discuss strengthening military and security relations.[xxxix] Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji separately met with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General Jasem al Budaiwi on September 23 in New York on the sidelines of UNGA.[xl] Budaiwi proposed organizing a Gulf-Lebanon trade and investment forum in 2026 to enhance economic cooperation and encourage investments in Lebanon.[xli] Lebanese media reported on September 23 that Saudi Arabia and France will soon hold a conference in Riyadh to secure financial and logistical support for the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon.[xlii]  The Gulf states have continuously stated that Lebanon will not receive any economic investments until it completely disarms Hezbollah and implements economic reforms.[xliii] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits to retain its Lebanese Shia support base but has recently struggled to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and maintain its financial commitments to fighters.[xliv] Economic incentives enabled by Gulf investment would help undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build and maintain support among the Lebanese population by enabling the government to provide services that it has previously failed to provide.

Hezbollah and its allies used US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s interview with Sky News Arabia on September 22 to try to undermine the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm the group. A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist claimed that Barrack “acknowledged” the logic behind Hezbollah’s raison d'etre by stating that continued Israeli operations in Lebanon strengthen Hezbollah’s argument that it protects the Lebanese people from Israel.[xlv] Hezbollah often cites continued Israeli operations as justification for retaining its arms.[xlvi] The Hezbollah-affiliated journalist also claimed that Barrack acknowledged that disarming Hezbollah would create a civil war in Lebanon.[xlvii] Barrack stated that the Lebanese government is concerned about civil war but did not state that disarming Hezbollah would cause civil war.[xlviii] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri stated that Barrack’s description of the Lebanese government, the LAF, and Hezbollah is “unacceptable.”[xlix] Berri was referring to Barrack’s statements that the Lebanese government is scared to disarm Hezbollah and that “all the Lebanese do is talk and there has never been one act.”[l] Berri was also referring to Barrack’s statements that the LAF is underequipped and “the only force available” and that Hezbollah is “[the United States’] enemy.”[li]