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The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 10 that the Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement is unlikely to persuade the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to stop pursuing the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran because the agreement does not include a timeline for inspections or a deadline for Iran to clarify the status of its enriched uranium stockpile.[i] The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28, which will automatically reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran or postpone the snapback mechanism’s expiration date.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[iii] The E3 stated in response to the agreement that “it is not enough for Iran to make promises for tomorrow.”[iv] UK Ambassador to the UN Corinne Kitsell stated on September 10 that the E3 “must be prepared to hold Iran to account” if Iran does not grant full access to its nuclear sites to the IAEA.[v] Grossi stated that the details of the agreement will not be made public due to its “technical and operational” nature and that the agreement “will open the way for the respective inspections and access.”[vi] Araghchi stated that the agreement will consider the agreement “void” if the UNSC reimposes sanctions on Iran.[vii] Araghchi also stated that Iran will not allow inspectors to access Iranian nuclear facilities besides the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant for fuel replacement.[viii]

The casualties from Israel’s strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9 remain unclear.[ix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders who were meeting to discuss ongoing ceasefire negotiations.[x] Saudi media reported that the Israeli strikes killed at least three Hamas leaders, including Hamas’ Gaza Strip leader Khalil al Hayya, West Bank leader Zaher Jabarin, and Leadership Council member Khaled Meshaal.[xi] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on September 9 that the Israeli security establishment felt “optimistic” about the strikes’ success and estimated that it would take several hours to confirm which Hamas officials were killed in the strikes.[xii] A senior Israeli official told the Guardian on September 10 that Israel’s optimism about the strikes’ success was “waning.”[xiii] Two Israeli defense and intelligence sources similarly told Israeli media that they felt pessimistic about whether the strikes killed "most or even all” of the intended targets.[xiv] Israel reportedly informed the United States that the likelihood of the strikes’ success has “decreased significantly.”[xv] Hamas has denied that the Israeli strikes killed any of its negotiating team, which includes Hayya, Jabarin, and Meshaal.[xvi] Hamas has consistently lied about the deaths of senior commanders and waited weeks or even months to confirm the deaths of commanders who were killed by Israel in the Gaza Strip, however. There have been no official Israeli statements about which Hamas officials were killed in the strikes at the time of this writing.

Qatar and several regional countries have strongly criticized Israel’s recent strikes in Doha.[xvii] Qatar condemned Israel’s violation of its sovereignty and stated that it reserves the right to respond to the strikes and will “act firmly” against any “reckless breach” that threatens Qatari security.[xviii] Qatar also announced that it formed a legal team to take action against Israel in response to the strikes.[xix]  Several Gulf and regional countries also strongly condemned the Israeli strikes and expressed support for Qatar on September 9.[xx] The UAE called the Israeli strikes a “reckless attack” and “flagrant violation” of international law, while Iran and Saudi Arabia characterized the strikes as a “criminal act.”[xxi]  The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the Israeli strikes indicate that Israel does not seek a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xxii]  Regional leaders are converging in Doha to meet with Qatari leaders and show support for Qatar following the strikes.[xxiii] UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed al Nahyan and Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah arrived in Qatar on September 10, and Saudi Crown Price Mohammad bin Salam is expected to arrive in Qatar on September 11.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions on Iran: The Wall Street Journal reported on September 10 that the Iran-IAEA agreement is unlikely to persuade the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to stop pursuing the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran because the agreement does not include a timeline for inspections or a deadline for Iran to clarify the status of its enriched uranium stockpile.
• IDF Strikes in Doha: The casualties from Israel’s strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9 remain unclear. Israel reportedly informed the United States that the likelihood of the strikes’ success has “decreased significantly.” Regional leaders are converging in Doha to meet with Qatari leaders and show support for Qatar following the strikes.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah released Israeli-Russian hostage Elizabeth Tsurkov on September 9.[xxv] US President Donald Trump announced on September 9 that Kataib Hezbollah released Tsurkov and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani later confirmed her release.[xxvi] Tsurkov, a Princeton University graduate student, disappeared in Baghdad in March 2023 while conducting research for her doctoral dissertation.[xxvii] No group claimed responsibility for her abduction, but the Israeli government accused Kataib Hezbollah of abducting Tsurkov in July 2023.[xxviii]

The Iraqi government, Kataib Hezbollah, and other regional sources have presented conflicting accounts of the circumstances that led to Tsurkov’s release. An Iraqi Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief spokesperson announced on September 10 that an Iraqi military operation freed Tsurkov, whereas several unspecified Iraqi militia officials told Arab and Western media on September 10 that Tsurkov’s release resulted from direct negotiations between the Iraqi government and her kidnappers.[xxix]  An unidentified Kataib Hezbollah source told Agence France-Presse on September 10 that Tsurkov was released in exchange for a peaceful US withdrawal from Iraq and a guarantee that “Iraq be spared any conflict.”[xxx] The Kataib Hezbollah source was likely referring to the upcoming US withdrawal from Iraq. Unspecified militia sources told Saudi media on September 10 that Tsurkov was released in exchange for the release of a Kataib Hezbollah member who was involved in the July 27 attack on an Agriculture Department building.[xxxi] Iraq’s Joint Operations Command arrested 14 members of the Kataib Hezbollah-controlled 45th and 46th Popular Mobilization Forces brigades on July 27 in response to their suspected involvement in the July 27 attack on an Agriculture Department building in Baghdad and the engagement that followed.[xxxii] Kataib Hezbollah fighters killed a civilian and a federal police officer in the engagement.[xxxiii] 

Syria

A likely Assadist insurgent group announced its formation in the Syrian coastal region in August 2025 and has since claimed at least two attacks targeting government forces. A likely Assadist militant group called “Rijal al Nour, Saraya al Jawad” announced its formation on August 1 in a social media post that commemorated Bashar al Assad’s “Syrian Arab Army Day,” which was a former regime holiday to honor the Syrian army.[xxxiv] Rijal al Nour’s attacks, goals, rhetoric, and iconography suggest that the group seeks the restoration of Assad-era political and economic structures rather than Alawite representation or statehood, as other coastal Syria-based insurgent groups do. Rijal al Nour has stated that its objectives include the withdrawal of the Syrian transitional government from the Syrian coast and it has claimed at least two attacks targeting government forces in coastal Syria.[xxxv] Rijal al Nour posted a video on September 1 that allegedly shows the group conducting a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting a Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) vehicle in Jableh, Latakia Province, on August 15.[xxxvi] The attack did not cause any MoD casualties.[xxxvii] Rijal al Nour claimed another IED attack targeting a Syrian government vehicle on September 4 that the group claimed it conducted in revenge for the government’s recent arrest of an Assadist cell in Tartous City.[xxxviii] The cell had reportedly participated in the Alawite-led insurgent attacks on government forces in early March 2025.[xxxix] Rijal al Nour has not explicitly advocated for Alawite representation or autonomy, as other Alawite insurgent groups on the coast have done. Many groups supported the Assad regime because the regime advanced their political and/or economic interests. These groups have sought to retain these benefits or even restore the Assad regime since its collapse in December 2024.

Arabian Peninsula

The IDF struck several Houthi targets in Yemen on September 10 in response to the Houthi drone and missile campaign against Israel.[xl] The Houthis have launched at least 19 drones and five missiles targeting Israel since September 1, including strikes targeting Ben Gurion and Ramon airports.[xli] IDF Air Force fighter jets struck sites in Sanaa and al Jawf, including military camps, operations and intelligence centers, a Houthi media headquarters, and a fuel storage site used to support Houthi operations.[xlii] The IDF stated that the media headquarters was central to Houthi propaganda and psychological warfare efforts. The Houthi military camps contained command-and-control sites that the Houthis have used to plan attacks against Israel.[xliii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Israel’s “long arm” will strike targets wherever threats to Israeli civilians emerge.[xliv]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is reportedly attempting to persuade various Palestinian militias in Lebanon to hand over their weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[xlv] Lebanese media reported on September 10 that Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee head Ramez Dimashqiyeh opened new channels of communication with Hamas and other Palestinian militias to convince the militias to disarm.[xlvi] Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reportedly recommended that Dimashqiyeh open the new channels of communication.[xlvii] Salam and PA President Mahmoud Abbas previously agreed in May 2025 to disarm all Palestinian militias in Lebanon.[xlviii] Joint Lebanese-Palestinian efforts to disarm Palestinian militias in Lebanon have so far been limited to Abbas’ Fatah, however.[xlix] Fatah is the dominant political party in the PA.[l] Dimashqiyeh met with Hamas’ representative in Lebanon, Ahmed Abdel Hadi, on September 10 to discuss the Lebanese government and PA’s efforts to disarm militias in Palestinian refugee camps.[li] Hadi reiterated Hamas’ demand for a meeting with all Palestinian militias to reach a unified position on disarmament.[lii]

The PA and Lebanese government currently appear to be trying to disarm Palestinian militias through persuasion, but the PA reportedly remains open to using force. Abbas’ son, Yasser Abbas, reportedly told Lebanese officials in August 2025 that the PA would support the Lebanese government’s use of force to disarm any non-compliant militias.[liii] It is unclear whether the Lebanese government would decide to use force against Palestinian militias in Lebanon. Palestinian factions, like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), are unlikely to voluntarily turn over their weapons.[liv] Hadi reiterated on September 10 Hamas’ view that Palestinian militias will retain their weapons until there is a comprehensive solution to the “Palestinian issue.”[lv] Hamas similarly stated in August 2025 that Palestinian factions in Lebanon will keep their weapons as long as Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip continue.[lvi] Disagreements among Palestinian militias in Lebanon regarding disarmament have previously delayed the Lebanese government’s attempts to disarm these groups.[lvii]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons during a speech on September 10.[lviii] Qassem stated that Hezbollah has four priorities that include preventing Israeli operations in Lebanon, compelling Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory, securing the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel, and conducting reconstruction in Lebanon.[lix] Qassem criticized the United States for “failing” to convince Israel to agree and comply with the recent US proposal.[lx] The US proposal calls for an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement’s implementation.[lxi] The agreement also stipulates that the LAF will completely disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[lxii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed, however.[lxiii] Hezbollah officials, including Qassem, have continuously rejected calls to disarm and have maintained that Hezbollah will not disarm until Israel halts its operations in Lebanon and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[lxiv] Hezbollah’s continued refusal to disarm could complicate the Lebanese government and the LAF’s ability to implement their disarmament plan.