The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

A Syrian militia sympathetic to the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance claimed an attack on a US base in northeastern Syria on October 2.[i] This attack marks the first time that the militia has claimed to attack US forces. The Syrian Popular Resistance announced that it and “allied forces” targeted US forces with unspecified weapons south of Hasakah City.[ii]  Syrian social media accounts posted videos purporting to show US air defense systems activating over al Shaddadi Base, Hasakah Province, on October 2.[iii] The United States has not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing and CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify the group’s claim.

The Syrian Popular Resistance previously limited its attacks to entities associated with the Syrian transitional government and had not targeted US forces, despite its opposition to the US force presence in Syria.[iv] Unspecified US officials told US-based al Monitor on October 2 that the United States has paused its planned reduction of forces in Syria due to concerns about the Syrian transitional government’s stability.[v] The Syrian Popular Resistance warned in August 2025 that it would expand its target bank and operational reach because of its opposition to the United States, Israel, and the Syrian transitional government.[vi] The Syrian Popular Resistance formed immediately after the fall of Assad in December 2024 to oppose the Syrian transitional government.[vii] The group’s last claimed attack was in March 2025, when it claimed to poison the meals and water of Syrian government soldiers using a “biological weapon.”[viii] The Syrian Popular Resistance has venerated former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani on its channel in addition to its regular pro-Assad content, suggesting that the group is ideologically aligned with the Axis of Resistance.[ix] The Syrian Popular Resistance celebrated Iran’s attack on US forces in Qatar during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, further underscoring the group’s ideological alignment with Iran.[x]

Key Takeaways

• Reported Attack on US Forces in Syria: A Syrian militia sympathetic to the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance claimed an attack on a US base in northeastern Syria on October 2. This attack marks the first time that the militia has claimed to attack US forces.
• Iraqi Elections: Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to detract voter support from their political opponents ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. A Middle Eastern news outlet that is likely affiliated with Iranian-backed actors claimed on September 30 that Sunni Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar is involved in a US-supported effort to return Baathists to power in the upcoming elections.
• Houthi Weapons Shipment Interdiction: Yemeni security forces seized a vessel that was transporting equipment, including manufacturing equipment, surveillance gear, and raw materials, to the Houthis on October 2. The Houthis could have used the equipment to strengthen their drone capabilities.

Iran

Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani inspected the combat and operational readiness of units deployed on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf on October 2.[xi] Irani emphasized the critical position of Kharg Island in Iran’s maritime domain and added that the Artesh Navy plays an important role in ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf and open waters. Iran exports around 90 percent of its crude oil from Kharg Island.[xii]

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to detract voter support from their political opponents ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. A Middle Eastern news outlet that is likely affiliated with Iranian-backed actors claimed on September 30 that Sunni Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar is involved in a US-supported effort to return Baathists to power in the upcoming elections.[xiii] A senior security source in Anbar Province told the outlet that Kurdish political parties and unidentified senior officials in Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s office are involved in this scheme. A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian alleged that Baathist remnants have met in multiple neighboring countries to discuss this effort and implicated unspecified civilians involved in the 2019 Iraqi protests in the scheme. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. It is notable that Iranian outlet Defa Press, which is affiliated with the Armed Forces General Staff, circulated the report on September 30.[xiv] Iraqi media has not circulated this report at the time of this writing.

This report follows continued efforts by Shia Coordination Framework parties to oppose both Khanjar and Sudani ahead of the elections. A parliamentarian from Kataib Hezbollah’s Haquq Movement filed a complaint with the Iraqi electoral commission on August 31 to bar Khanjar from the elections for “insulting” the Iraqi people after Khanjar reportedly said that he would defend Iraqi Sunnis from “the mob.”[xv] The Iraqi electoral commission requested in June for the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to confirm whether Khanjar was under investigation for suspected Baathist links following State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s call for the ACJ and the Iraqi electoral commission to investigate candidates and parties for Baathist links.[xvi] CTP-ISW assessed on August 20 that Maliki may be using the ACJ to sideline political opponents ahead of the elections. Shia Coordination Framework parties have also accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption and Baathist ties in recent months.[xvii]

Syria

Syrian media reported on October 2 that the International Coalition likely conducted a drone strike targeting a former al Qaeda (AQ)-affiliated faction leader in Harem, Idlib Province.[xviii] The drone reportedly fired several missiles that killed former Ansar al Islam leader Abu Darda Kurdi.[xix] Ansar al Islam is an AQ-affiliated faction that was formed in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2003 and has operated in Syria since 2011.[xx] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not claimed responsibility for the strike at the time of this writing. US CENTCOM has repeatedly targeted members of designated terrorist organizations in Syria, including ISIS and AQ-affiliates, since the fall of the Assad regime.[xxi]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni security forces seized a vessel that was transporting equipment, including manufacturing equipment, surveillance gear, and raw materials, to the Houthis on October 2. The Houthis could have used the equipment to strengthen their drone capabilities.[xxii] Authorities seized 58 commercial containers weighing over 2,500 tons that contained drone production technology, launch platforms, spare parts, jet engines, surveillance and jamming equipment, and raw materials used to manufacture drones and drone airframes.[xxiii] The vessel was headed from Djibouti Port to Hudaydah Port but diverted to Aden Port due to damage at Hudaydah Port following recent Israeli strikes.[xxiv]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc head Mohammad Raad met with senior Lebanese officials on October 2.[xxv] This meeting marked the first time that a Hezbollah official has directly met with Lebanese government officials since the Lebanese government agreed to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah in August 2025.[xxvi]  Raad and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reportedly discussed Israeli operations in Lebanon, reconstruction efforts, and Lebanese legislation on October 2.[xxvii] Aoun and Raad agreed to “address differences” to achieve “the supreme national interests.“[xxviii] Raad and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal also met on October 2 and discussed the relationship between Hezbollah and the LAF.[xxix]

The United States has taken steps to provide Lebanon with military support. Unspecified US and Lebanese sources told Reuters on October 2 that the United States approved a $230 million military aid package for Lebanese security forces.[xxx] An unspecified Lebanese source noted that the funding includes $190 million for the LAF and $40 million for the Internal Security Forces (ISF).[xxxi] Unspecified US congressional aides noted that the United States has already provided these funds to Lebanon.[xxxii]  A US State Department spokesperson stated that the US military aid package supports Lebanese forces’ efforts to “assert Lebanese sovereignty” and fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[xxxiii] The LAF has historically faced resource deficits that have limited its ability to successfully counter Hezbollah.[xxxiv]