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Iran Update: October 28, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia is actively supporting Houthi operations to disrupt global energy markets by providing the Houthis with satellite imagery of Saudi oil and military infrastructure. Russian satellites have routinely positioned above major Saudi energy and military sites in the days prior to and after Houthi attacks on those sites since July 2026.
  • The Houthis struck Aden International Airport on October 28, likely as part of an ongoing effort to degrade the government’s ability to sustain military operations against the Houthis. The Houthis have repeatedly attacked Aden International Airport in recent weeks in order to disrupt weapons shipments to Yemeni government-aligned forces via the airport.

Toplines

Russia is actively supporting Houthi operations to disrupt global energy markets by providing the Houthis with satellite imagery of Saudi oil and military infrastructure. A Switzerland-based geospatial intelligence firm told the Associated Press on October 28 that it has consistently observed Russian military satellites positioned above major Saudi energy and military sites in the days prior to and following Houthi drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia.[i] Russian satellite activity followed a similar pattern around attacks on Saudi infrastructure originating from Iraq, where the Houthis maintain a presence and have launched attacks on Saudi Arabia with Iraqi militias. A Saudi official and a high-ranking Houthi official separately told the Associated Press that Russia is providing satellite-based targeting intelligence to the Houthis, reportedly through Iranian military advisers who are operating in Yemen.[ii] Russian pre- and post-strike imagery very likely enables the Houthis and Iranian military advisers to conduct battle damage assessments of their strikes.[iii] The geospatial intelligence firm observed 40 instances of Russian satellite positioning over Saudi military and energy sites between July 1 and October 19, including the September 10 drone strike on the Saudi East-West Pipeline.[iv] Russian support is enabling the Iranian-supported Houthi campaign to constrain Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil during a global energy crisis that Iran has caused by attacking ships in the Strait of Hormuz.[v]

Russian support for Houthi efforts to disrupt Saudi energy exports is consistent with long-standing Russian support for Iran and its regional partners, particularly the Houthis. Russia previously provided the Houthis with satellite-based targeting intelligence to help the group attack US vessels and international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in 2023 and 2024, for example.[vi] The Houthis supported Russia in turn by promising to not target Russian vessels in the Red Sea and by recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.[vii] Russia has also provided targeting intelligence to support Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia and other regional targets during this current conflict, according to unspecified sources speaking to the Associated Press.[viii] Russian intelligence sharing with Iran and its partners in this war demonstrates how Russia is directly supporting Iranian and Iranian-backed efforts to disrupt global energy markets and raise the cost of oil.[ix]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

  • Assessed Iranian War Aims:
    • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
    • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
    • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
    • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch anti-Iranian regime groups, recently established a temporary mobile checkpoint to more aggressively target regime security personnel and undermine regime authority in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. MPF published footage that showed about five armed fighters, stopping cars and taking their information at an unspecified location on the Khash-Saravan road on October 25.[x] Several of the fighters were armed, including one with an anti-tank guided missile. The MPF claimed that its fighters “controlled” the main transit route for “a few hours with the aim of trying to arrest” regime security personnel.[xi] The MPF established a similar temporary checkpoint on the Sarbaz–Rask road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in January 2026.[xii] The MPF's ability to establish such ”checkpoints” openly in broad daylight suggests that the group assessed that security forces would be unlikely to disrupt such activities in this area, either due to a lack of capability or unwillingness.

The MPF published the footage of the operation on their Telegram account, likely to generate fear among regime officials and affiliates and create the conditions to deter civilians from working with the Iranian regime in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xiii]  MPF operations targeting regime security personnel can generate fear among the populace that working with the regime, or even cooperating with it, will make such civilians targets. Regime security forces presumably rely on local informants for information on MPF fighters' activities and locations, and MPF checkpoints could be part of a larger effort intended to, over time, discourage residents in these areas in southeastern Iran from cooperating with the government in order to hinder regime counterinsurgency efforts and set conditions for the group to expand its base and operations. The MPF may also simultaneously be attempting to increase the group’s public visibility in order to recruit more fighters.

Iranian security forces continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in Sistan and Baluchistan Province to arrest cells of likely MPF or MPF-affiliated anti-regime fighters. Iranian forces most recently forces arrested an unspecified number of fighters in Saravan and Iranshahr on October 27.[xiv] It remains unclear if any of the fighters arrested in Saravan were involved in establishing the Khash-Saravan checkpoint on October 25. CTP-ISW has recorded 15 MPF attacks against regime security personnel in October 2026 (see graph below).

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

 

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.


Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis struck Aden International Airport on October 28, likely as part of an ongoing effort to degrade the government’s ability to sustain military operations against the Houthis.[xv] The Houthis struck Aden International Airport on October 28 with at least two ballistic missiles after issuing a warning on social media to evacuate the airport.[xvi] The Houthis have repeatedly attacked Aden International Airport in recent weeks in order to disrupt Saudi weapons shipments to a Yemeni government military base that is co-located at the airport.[xvii] The Houthis may also be targeting the airport in an effort to deter future weapons shipments to Aden and prevent Saudi partners from supporting operations against the Houthis. Pakistan reportedly delivered military aid to Yemeni government-aligned forces at Aden International Airport in September, for example.[xviii] The Houthis may calculate that a higher risk to Saudi and partner forces’ personnel and equipment at Aden International Airport would deter these forces from resupplying Yemeni government-aligned forces in Aden.

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to engage Houthi fighters positioned south and southwest of Taiz City on October 28. Geolocated footage published by the Houthis shows the Houthis firing an anti-tank guided missile at a Yemeni government tank on the outskirts of Taiz City from mountainous terrain southwest of the city.[xix] The footage also showed Houthi fighters operating at the Hangar Checkpoint, which lies on a main roadway leading into Taiz City from the southwest.[xx] Yemeni government-aligned forces separately announced that they repelled Houthi attacks south of Taiz City in al Misrakh and Sabr al Mawadim districts on October 28.[xxi]


[i] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24

[ii] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24

[iii] https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/jts/cjcsi_3162_02.pdf?ver=2019-03-13-092459-350

[iv] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24

[v] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/oil-prices-rise-as-houthi-militants-target-saudi-energy-45c38fe0 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-little-changed-supply-concern-lingers-amid-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia-2026-10-23/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-climbs-mideast-conflict-tanker-attacks-persist-2026-10-11/

[vi] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b ; https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64144 ; https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363

[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-march-5-2025/

[viii] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-23-2026/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-strikes-cia-facilities-prompt-questions-about-possible-russian-role-2026-07-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-9-2026/;

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-9-2026/

 

[ix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-19-2026/ 

[x] https://t.me/jmmfront/201

[xi] https://t.me/jmmfront/201

[xii] https://t.me/jmmfront/127

[xiii] https://t.me/jmmfront/201

[xiv] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/872882/

[xv] https://www dot mot-ye.net/news/15260 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-call-immediate-evacuation-aden-airport-2026-10-28/ ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2115451327127929123 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3975 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3976

[xvi] https://www dot mot-ye.net/news/15260 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-call-immediate-evacuation-aden-airport-2026-10-28/ ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2115451327127929123 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3975 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3976

[xvii] https://www.mot-ye dot net/news/15246 ; https://saba dot ye/ar/news3811557.htm?cid=1 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-7-2026/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-17-2026#_edn4ab1aea3f5c50a8b3654da92e389a1395ceb8bac60fff1036c9628126c44a68e14

[xviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudis-plan-assault-houthis-break-red-sea-chokehold-2026-10-02/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-23-2026/

[xix] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2115481256762941719?a=bDSZsEnkiCCeAZ3VTVw&s=20

[xx] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2115481256762941719?a=bDSZsEnkiCCeAZ3VTVw&s=20

[xxi] https://x.com/axistaiz/status/2115167332985352430

 [KW3]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFNyH2

 
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