5 hours ago

Iran Update: October 07, 2026

Parker Hempel, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei and Annika Ganzeveld

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.

Key Takeaways:

Ongoing Houthi advances in Taiz Governorate demonstrate that the Yemeni government’s recent counteroffensives failed to sufficiently pull Houthi reserves in order to relieve pressure around Taiz Governorate and enable Yemeni government offensive operations in other areas of the country. Houthi forces have advanced north and eastward in Taiz Governorate since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 6, seizing territory that encircles Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City.
The Yemeni government and its partners did not set sufficient political conditions prior to initiating the recent counteroffensives, which hindered their effectiveness. The sudden collapse of Yemeni government-aligned forces at multiple points along the frontline in Taiz Governorate in recent days is indicative of a lack of coordination among the various Yemeni government-aligned groups and their commanders operating in the area.
The Houthis targeted reported Saudi and international efforts to supply the Yemeni government with materiel to sustain the government's operations against the Houthis. The Houthi strike on Aden Airport comes amid a recent increase in the scale of Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia since October 5.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is attempting to assuage US concerns over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by amending existing draft legislation as part of a broader effort to balance between Iran and its Iraqi allies and the United States. Qatari-funded, UK-based media reported on October 7 that Zaydi-affiliated Iraqi federal government officials have drafted multiple amendments to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law that reduce the powers of the PMF and prevent it from being a competitor to the Iraqi Army.
Multiple Shia Coordination Framework members are fighting Zaydi's attempts to meet US demands concerning the militias. Iraqi media reported on October 6 that Zaydi and several unidentified framework members disagree on several amendments to the PMF draft law, despite Zaydi's office claiming on September 29 that the government had sent the bill to parliament.
A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq's political wing appeared to downplay the gravity of Zaydi's reported amendments to the PMF law, which could reflect Asaib Ahl al Haq's support for some of Zaydi's efforts related to the PMF.

Toplines

Ongoing Houthi advances in Taiz Governorate demonstrate that the Yemeni government’s recent counteroffensives failed to sufficiently pull Houthi reserves in order to relieve pressure around Taiz Governorate and enable Yemeni government offensive operations in other areas of the country. Houthi forces have advanced north and eastward in Taiz Governorate since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 6, seizing territory that encircles Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City and severing the last remaining Yemeni government-aligned ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting Taiz City to the rest of Yemeni government-controlled territory, including Aden City.[i] The Houthis seized the town of Najd al Nashamah, which is located along the GLOC, according to geolocated imagery from October 7.[ii] Houthi forces have also advanced in al Maafir and Mawasit districts, further contesting segments of the Taiz-Aden GLOC and consolidating Houthi control over former Yemeni government territory in Taiz Governorate.[iii] The Houthi seizure of the last remaining GLOC will severely constrain Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to reinforce and resupply front-line positions in the remaining Yemeni government-controlled territory within Taiz Governorate, particularly Taiz City. Houthi pressure on other Yemeni government GLOCs in Taiz Governorate has already likely reduced the government’s ability to resupply its forces in the governorate in recent days.[iv]

The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia designed their counteroffensives to include simultaneous attacks across multiple Yemeni frontlines in order to stretch Houthi bandwidth.[v] Yemeni government-aligned forces, led particularly by the Southern Giants Brigade, launched a counteroffensive along Yemen's western Red Sea coastal plain on October 5, capturing recently seized Houthi territory and pushing Houthi forces back to Dhubab.[vi] The Houthis have prevented further Yemeni government advances since October 6.[vii] Yemeni government-aligned forces have slightly advanced against Houthi forces and seized some positions along the Marib frontline. Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly seized the Umm Rish Military Camp in Marib Governorate on October 7, for example.[viii] The counteroffensives in the coastal plain and in Marib Governorate have not caused the Houthis to draw extensive reserves to those areas, which has enabled the Houthis to continue operating and even advance in areas of Taiz Governorate. The limited territorial gains of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Yemen’s western coastal plain and in Marib Governorate may come at the cost of potentially larger strategic setbacks, such as the possibility of the Houthis capturing Taiz City, because the various Yemeni government counteroffensives failed to sufficiently pull Houthi reserves to various frontlines and thereby stretch Houthi bandwidth.

The Yemeni government and its partners did not set sufficient political conditions prior to initiating the recent counteroffensives, which hindered their effectiveness. Yemeni government-aligned forces are not a cohesive, unified national military but rather a collection of loosely aligned anti-Houthi militias with varying objectives and command structures.[ix] Previous successful Yemeni government offensives against the Houthis required the Yemeni government and international partners, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to put political pressure on the commanders of these various government-aligned groups to enforce coordination among them during broad counteroffensive efforts.[x] Yemeni government-aligned forces' ability to advance along the western coastal plain to Dhubab demonstrates Yemeni government-aligned groups' ability to recapture Houthi territory with sufficient political coordination.[xi] The Southern Giants Brigades and the Homeland Shield Forces are participating in the ongoing Yemeni government counteroffensives along Yemen's western plain and in Waziyah District, Taiz Governorate, despite historic rivalries between the two groups. Saudi Arabia originally supported the creation of the Homeland Shield Forces as a counterweight to the Emirati-backed National Resistance Forces (NRF).[xii]

The sudden collapse of Yemeni government-aligned forces at multiple points along the frontline in Taiz Governorate in recent days is indicative of a lack of coordination among the various Yemeni government-aligned groups and their commanders operating in the area. The Houthis rapidly advanced from al Turbah, Taiz Governorate, on October 4 along the main GLOC to the group's current position at Najd al Nashamah (see above), which indicates that Yemeni government forces were unable to effectively confront the Houthi breakthrough and establish an effective defense.[xiii] Yemeni sources told Emirati media on October 4 that the Yemeni government-aligned commander of the area fled to Aden City, the Yemeni government's de facto capital, almost certainly degrading coordination among Yemeni government-aligned forces.[xiv]

Yemeni government-aligned forces also did not effectively coordinate during efforts to reorganize following the Houthi offensive along Yemen's western coastal plain in early September due to longstanding political grievances between the various Yemeni government-aligned groups. The New York Times and a DC-based Yemen analyst separately reported that southern Yemeni government-aligned factions refused to allow the northern Yemeni government-aligned NRF to enter Aden City.[xv] Southern Yemeni government-aligned groups, many of which seek to establish an independent southern Yemeni state, also reportedly attempted to disarm NRF soldiers who withdrew to Aden Governorate following the NRF’s retreat from the western coastal plain.[xvi]

The Houthis targeted reported Saudi and international efforts to supply the Yemeni government with materiel to sustain the government's operations against the Houthis. The Houthis struck Aden International Airport on October 6 with ballistic missiles and drones, according to the Yemeni government Transportation Ministry.[xvii] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed that the Houthis targeted Saudi forces unloading military equipment for the Yemeni government at the Camp Badr military camp, which is collocated at the airport.[xviii] Local Aden City-based sources reported that the Houthis also potentially struck Pakistani-provided military equipment at the airport.[xix] A Pakistani official told Reuters on October 2 that Pakistan dispatched four cargo aircraft carrying military equipment, including light artillery and drones, to Yemeni government-aligned forces in Aden in September.[xx]

The Houthi strike on Aden Airport comes amid a recent increase in the scale of Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia since October 5. These strikes are part of a Houthi effort to compel Saudi Arabia to end its support for the Yemeni government’s counteroffensive. Saree claimed that the Houthis launched six additional strikes on Saudi airports and military bases since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff.[xxi] Saudi coalition spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile north of Riyadh on October 6.[xxii]

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is attempting to assuage US concerns over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by amending existing draft legislation as part of a broader effort to balance between Iran and its Iraqi allies and the United States. Qatari-funded, UK-based media reported on October 7 that Zaydi-affiliated Iraqi federal government officials have drafted multiple amendments to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law that reduce the powers of the PMF, which includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and prevent it from being a competitor to the Iraqi Army.[xxiii] The same outlet previously reported many similar details about the PMF law on August 25 but did not specifically attribute the amendments to Zaydi.[xxiv] The Iraqi federal government has not published the text of the draft law at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW assessed on August 26 that Zaydi was pursuing the amendments to consolidate his individual power as prime minister.[xxv] Zaydi's efforts to amend this legislation, which former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew in August 2025 reportedly due to US concerns, come amid increased US economic pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the Iraqi militias.[xxvi] Zaydi likely seeks to assuage US concerns regarding the PMF given that the government‘s reported plan to disarm the militias stipulates that the Iraqi militias would hand over their weapons to the PMF.[xxvii]

Zaydi may also be attempting to frame himself as an independent Iraqi leader, given a September 29 statement by his office that his government sent the draft law to Parliament despite reports that the Shia Coordination Framework is still discussing key aspects of the law. This order of events suggests that Zaydi may have attempted to send a version of the PMF law, probably with his amendments, to Parliament without the framework’s approval. The framework has preferred to directly manage previous Iraqi prime ministers, particularly former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[xxviii] Zaydi has proven his willingness to at least attempt to stand up to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including those in the framework, in recent months.[xxix] Zaydi’s potential bypassing of the framework would be consistent with this pattern of activity and Zaydi’s efforts to consolidate his own personal authority.

Multiple Shia Coordination Framework members are fighting Zaydi's attempts to meet US demands concerning the militias. Iraqi media reported on October 6 that Zaydi and several unidentified framework members disagree on several amendments to the PMF draft law, despite Zaydi's office claiming on September 29 that the government had sent the bill to parliament.[xxx] The October 6 Iraqi media report stated that disputed amendments include those that address term limits for the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) chairman, who leads the PMF's administrative body.[xxxi] The framework has debated current PMC Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh's position since 2025.[xxxii] Zaydi reportedly wants the term limit for the position to be two years and non-renewable, while unspecified framework members prefer a five-year, renewable term.[xxxiii] The Iraqi media report added that unspecified framework leaders and Zaydi disagree about amendments concerning the creation of a special unit in each PMF ”formation”--likely referring to PMF brigades--to receive militia weapons.[xxxiv] The militias would likely attempt to use the establishment of such units to transfer their weapons to PMF brigades they control, which would allow them to effectively remain armed. A parliamentarian from Nouri al Maliki's State of Law Coalition told Iraqi media that the framework also has "sharp disagreements” on the draft law's clauses regarding the PMF's structure, privileges, and mechanisms.[xxxv] The parliamentarian also referred to weapons "restriction" instead of weapons disarmament, further indicating the differences between framework members and Zaydi, who has expressed support for genuine militia disarmament.[xxxvi] Multiple Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, have conditioned their disarmament on the passage of the PMF law, almost certainly without Zaydi's amendments.[xxxvii]

A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq's political wing appeared to downplay the gravity of Zaydi's reported amendments to the PMF law, which could reflect Asaib Ahl al Haq's support for some of Zaydi's efforts related to the PMF.[xxxviii] The Sadiqoun parliamentarian called the amendments to the PMF law "simple" and "limited," and added that they do not affect the interests of PMF fighters.[xxxix] The parliamentarian could have been attempting to calm concerns from PMF members, and Iraqi parliamentarians who represent them, who have advocated for legislation to grant the members more rights and privileges in recent years.[xl] There are multiple reasons Asaib Ahl al Haq could support some of Zaydi's efforts regarding the PMF law. Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali has prioritized political and economic engagement over kinetic activity in recent years, hence Asaib Ahl al Haq's announcement that it would disarm on June 2.[xli] US economic pressure on Iraq has the potential to hurt the investments of figures like Khazali, thus making it in his interest to support Zaydi's efforts to assuage US concerns over the militias. Khazali has also long pushed for Fayyadh's replacement as PMC chairman and could support Zaydi's efforts to set term limits for the PMF chairman position.[xlii] It is also possible, however, that the parliamentarian is not aware of the full extent of Zaydi's proposed amendments.

Iran may have partially reconstituted its maritime targeting capabilities or adopted alternative methods that have enabled it to increase attacks against commercial vessels and tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked at least 12 tankers in and around the strait between September 28 and October 5, according to three maritime security sources speaking to Reuters on October 7.[xliii] This represents the highest weekly total of Iranian attacks in the strait since the US-Israel-Iran War began on February 28.[xliv] The Joint Maritime Information Center separately reported on October 4 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has continued to attack and harass commercial vessels with drone overflights, targeted surveillance, and occasional radio warnings.[xlv] Iran’s increased rate of attacks suggests that the regime may have begun to overcome some of the operational constraints that previously limited its ability to disrupt shipping.[xlvi] CTP-ISW assessed in September that US strikes on Iranian coastal radars had likely constrained Iran’s ability to detect and fix maritime targets.[xlvii] The United States has not struck Iran since September 8, however, and Iran may have used the pause in strikes to try to rebuild coastal radars and other assets used in its attacks on shipping.[xlviii] A US official told the Wall Street Journal on October 4 that Iran’s ability to target vessels has improved in recent weeks, but the official did not explain how Iran has improved its targeting ability.[xlix] Iran has also recently tested new weapons systems in its attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. A senior Iranian official recently announced that Iran tested a new anti-ship missile against US naval forces, for example.[l] The recent increase in Iranian attacks on vessels could therefore also possibly be explained by Iran’s adoption of new technology and capabilities.

Reports of Attacks on Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

<div

[i] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2107893836764848253 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2107770349316387214 ; https://x.com/diralwatan/status/2107766667329806348 ; https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1896957-اليمن-غارات-تستهدف-الحوثيين-بالمواسط-ومعارك-جبهات-تعز ; https://x.com/war_cube/status/2107812007785451567?s=20

[ii] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2107893836764848253

[iii] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1896957-اليمن-غارات-تستهدف-الحوثيين-بالمواسط-ومعارك-جبهات-تعز ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2107770349316387214 ; https://x.com/diralwatan/status/2107766667329806348

[iv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-1-2026/

[v] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudis-plan-assault-houthis-break-red-sea-chokehold-2026-10-02/

[vi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-5-2026/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-launch-missiles-yemens-aden-airport-fighting-intensifies-2026-10-07/

[vii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-launch-missiles-yemens-aden-airport-fighting-intensifies-2026-10-07/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-6-2026/ ; https://x.com/ALyemennow/status/2107797824377155666

[viii] https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/10/07/العربية-تدخل-الجبهة-الجنوبية-لمحافظة-مارب-برفقة-القوات-الحكومية

[ix] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1939650450061431076?s=46&t=nQTab-m77zhUUBSh8E68DQ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-8-2023

[x] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/2018-red-sea-coast-offensive

[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-5-2026/

[xii] https://x.com/alamalikah/status/2107553960563294555 ; https://x.com/diralwatan/status/2107476295453933712 ; https://x.com/IbrahimJalalYE/status/2107029818357239984 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/who-is-fighting-yemen-2026-10-06/

[xiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-4-2026/

[xiv] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1896142-مصادر-يمنية-الحوثيون-يدخلون-مدينة-التربة-جنوبي-تعز

[xv] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/10/06/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-reconstruct.html?searchResultPosition=3 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2098012183594426570

[xvi] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2098012183594426570

[xvii] https://www.mot-ye dot net/news/15232 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2107619718450331912 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2107612978996523054?s=20 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2107630223978319892 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2107649389942444188?s=20

[xviii] https://t.me/army21ye/3840

[xix] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2107625922719572182

[xx] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudis-plan-assault-houthis-break-red-sea-chokehold-2026-10-02/

[xxi] https://t.me/army21ye/3837 ;

https://t.me/army21ye/3838 ;

https://t.me/army21ye/3839

[xxii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2107651009317405053

[xxiii] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/خاص-أبرز-تعديلات-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-في-العراق-تمهيداً-لإقراره

[xxiv] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/خاص-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-يعاود-الظهور-معدلاً-أمام-البرلمان-العراقي

[xxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-26-2026/

[xxvi] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/270820253 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-blocks-iraqs-dollar-shipments-to-squeeze-its-iran-backed-militias-3270d5af ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/us-sends-dollar-shipment-iraq-threatens-sanctions; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-اميركا-تشترط-تفكيك-الفصا-ل-مقابل-تحرير-30-مليار-دولار-من-موال-صدام

[xxvii] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/خاص-تفاصيل-مهلة-30-يونيو-لحصر-سلاح-الفصائل-العراقية

[xxviii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sudani-general-manager-how-militias-view-iraqs-new-prime-minister

[xxix] https://almadapaper dot net/449191/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/449222/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/القضا-العراقي-يبر-قياديا-بالحشد-من-تهمة-اغتيال-ضابط-المخابرات-نبراس-الفيلي ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5308585-الحشد-يمنع-التحقيق-مع-مسؤول-شبكة-تهريب-صواريخ-ومسيّرات

[xxx] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة ; https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/iraq/1079513

[xxxi] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة

[xxxii] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/قانون-الحشد-يفاقم-الانقسام-داخل-الإطار-الشيعي ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/822045/العامري-ينفي-إقالة-الفياض

[xxxiii] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة

[xxxiv] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة

[xxxv] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة

[xxxvi] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/world/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-interview-disarm-militias.html

[xxxvii] https://t.me/Smedia1/2028 ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/944365/خلافات-حادة-حول-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-واستحداث-قسم-للطائرات-المسيرة

[xxxviii] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87

[xxxix] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87

[xl] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=261983 -;

https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/515229/%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%89-%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86

[xli] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-militia-leader-khazali-seeks-rebrand-politician-2025-11-07/ ; https://www.iraqnewsgazette dot com/sheikh-al-khazali-and-un-envoy-discuss-election-integrity-and-regional-stability/#:~:text=Baghdad%3A%20The%20Secretary-General%20of%20the%20Asa%E2%80%99ib%20Ahl%20al-Haq,elections%20and%20establishing%20a%20conducive%20environment%20for%20them. ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%83-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD

[xlii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/qais-al-khazali-calls-faleh-al-fayyads-removal-pmf-chairman

[xliii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/attacks-tankers-hormuz-hit-highest-any-week-since-start-iran-war-sources-say-2026-10-07/

[xliv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/attacks-tankers-hormuz-hit-highest-any-week-since-start-iran-war-sources-say-2026-10-07/

[xlv] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-102-jmic-advisory-note-04-october.pdf?rev=19ed7005d1134f6c8c811271824cf646 ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/attacks-tankers-hormuz-hit-highest-any-week-since-start-iran-war-sources-say-2026-10-07/

[xlvi] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2063081770422030840?s=20 ;

https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2064457103134343170?s=20 ;

https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2064512017197941163?s=20 ;

https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2064824143640502670?s=20 ;

https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2070607101207232829?s=20

[xlvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-1-2026/ ;

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-4-2026/