Iran Update, November 6, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthi-controlled Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) has reportedly issued voluntary "transit permits" in recent months that grant civilian vessels safe passage through the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Houthis’ establishment of a permit system sets conditions for the Houthis to exert greater control over maritime traffic through the strait in the future by normalizing the Houthis’ regulation of shipping through the waterway.
• Allowing state and non-state actors to control transit through global chokepoints risks causing economic disruption for the United States and its partners over the long term. Iranian and Houthi control over the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb Strait, respectively, causes economic disruption by increasing insurance rates, raising shipping costs, and imposing transit fees.
• The Houthis may be concentrating forces and materiel in al Turbah, which lies astride the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), in preparation for a large-scale offensive operation into Lahij Governorate and toward Aden.
• Iran may have deployed at least four commercial vessels to map subsea cable routes in the Gulf of Oman last month. Iran would need to conduct such reconnaissance before conducting any operation to disrupt and damage regional subsea cables, which Iranian officials have recently threatened to do if the United States and Israel conduct strikes on Iran.

Toplines

The Houthi-controlled Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) has reportedly issued voluntary "transit permits" in recent months that grant civilian vessels safe passage through the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Houthis’ establishment of a permit system sets conditions for the Houthis to exert greater control over maritime traffic through the strait in the future by normalizing the Houthis’ regulation of shipping through the waterway. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 6 that "some" civilian cargo vessels have coordinated with the HOCC to secure voluntary "transit permits" in order to minimize the risk of Houthi attacks.[i] The HOCC previously announced on August 1 that the Houthis would only allow "authorized" civilian vessels to transit through the strait and the Houthis have repeatedly attacked Saudi vessels to enforce their blockade on Saudi Arabia.[ii] The HOCC, which the Houthis have used since 2024 to communicate with international shipping companies, closely resembles the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, which Iran established in May 2026 to regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.[iii]

The Wall Street Journal reported that "many" vessels have not contacted the HOCC as they transit the strait due to the United States' designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.[iv] The Houthis could at any time choose to compel international civilian vessels to acquire mandatory transit permits and enforce their decision by striking vessels in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb that refuse to coordinate with the HOCC. The Houthis have established control over territory along Yemen's Red Sea coast since September 10, which puts Houthi forces at a closer range from which they can target international shipping.[v] Iran has implemented a similar mandatory transit permit system and fees for maritime traffic transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, which the regime has attempted to enforce through repeated attacks on civilian shipping.[vi]

Allowing state and non-state actors to control transit through global chokepoints risks causing economic disruption for the United States and its partners over the long term. Iranian and Houthi control over the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb Strait, respectively, causes economic disruption by increasing insurance rates, raising shipping costs, and imposing transit fees: 

• Insurance Rates: The threat of damage to civilian vessels and cargo and injury to crew compels insurance companies to raise insurance rates and increase risk premiums.[vii] Insurance industry sources told Western media in late July that insurance costs to ship goods through the Red Sea rose following the Houthis’ announcement of the group's blockade on Saudi Arabia, even before the Houthis struck vessels to enforce the blockade.^[viii] Threats to commercial vessels also make some insurance firms unwilling to offer coverage for certain voyages or vessels, which, in turn, raises rates among remaining insurers as coverage options decrease.[ix] Insurance underwriters reportedly cancelled policies for some Saudi-linked tonnage in the Red Sea in late July due to the Houthi blockade, for example.[x]
• General Shipping Costs: Shipping companies often reroute commercial vessels to longer routes to avoid the risk of damage or injury to the company's vessel and crew. International shipping companies previously rerouted vessels around Africa during the Houthis’ 2023-2024 campaign against international shipping, which added significant time to these vessels’ journeys.[xi] The increased voyage time results in increased ship fuel, maintenance, and crew costs.
• Fees: Iran has further increased the cost of shipping via the Strait of Hormuz by charging illegal fees on vessels that transit through the strait. Iran has compelled some civilian vessels to pay between $150,000 and $2 million USD depending on the size of the vessel.[xii] The Houthis have claimed that the group will not charge fees on vessels that transit the Bab al Mandeb.[xiii] Regional sources told Reuters on July 29 that the Houthis have considered imposing fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait, however.[xiv] The Houthis could decide to impose fees at any time of their choosing.

International shipping costs do not typically return to pre-crisis levels once a crisis has ended, particularly if a state or non-state actor retains the ability to resume its restrictions under threat of force. The average global cost to ship a standard 40-foot container has increased from $1,899 USD near the start of the Iran War in late February 2026 to $4,389 USD as of November 5.[xv] The average global container shipping cost peaked in early July 2026 and has remained above $4,200 USD through November 2026, which, at least in part, is likely due to the start of the Houthi blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20 and Iran's ongoing strikes on civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.[xvi] The Houthis had a similar effect on global shipping prices between 2023 and 2025, as prices remained elevated over the two-year period even after the Houthis largely halted strikes on civilian vessels in November 2024.[xvii]

The Houthis may be concentrating forces and materiel in al Turbah, which lies astride the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), in preparation for a large-scale offensive operation into Lahij Governorate and toward Aden. An independent Yemeni journalist reported on November 5 that the Houthis have moved military equipment from rural areas on the Taiz-Lahij governorate border to al Turbah in southeastern Taiz Governorate.[xviii] The journalist reported that the equipment transfers occurred during a period of relatively low kinetic activity on the frontlines along the GLOC in Maqatirah District, southeast of al Turbah.[xix] Another Yemeni journalist reported on November 5 that Saudi forces conducted airstrikes on Houthi fighters and vehicles in al Turbah.[xx] These reports suggest that the Houthis may be concentrating forces and supplies in al Turbah amid ongoing Houthi efforts to advance southeastward along the GLOC and threaten the Yemeni government's de facto capital in Aden.[xxi]

Al Turbah is an ideal staging area for a Houthi offensive southeastward into Maqatirah District along and around the Taiz-Aden GLOC. Al Turbah is the largest town in southeastern Taiz Governorate and lies in the Houthi rear several kilometers behind the current frontlines in Maqatirah District. The town's location on the Taiz-Aden GLOC enables the Houthis to receive and assemble reinforcements and supplies from Houthi-controlled territory further north, and its position at a key junction in the GLOC could enable simultaneous Houthi advances along the roadway's southern and eastern forks into Maqatirah District.[xxii] The Houthis could also attempt to exploit smaller, less developed roadways that extend south from al Turbah to infiltrate government-held territory in valleys southwest of the GLOC.[xxiii] The Houthis have likely used these roadways to infiltrate areas surrounding al Majza, about 25 kilometers southwest of the GLOC, in recent days to divert Yemeni government-aligned forces defending positions along the GLOC.[xxiv]

A concentrated Houthi offensive along the Taiz-Aden GLOC in northern Lahij Governorate would likely encounter vulnerabilities and challenges from local terrain and Yemeni government-aligned forces, however. The rugged mountain valley terrain in Taiz and Lahij governorates generally forces large, vehicle-dependent military columns to use the few available local roadways.[xxv] These roadways, even the Taiz-Aden GLOC, are relatively narrow and poorly maintained, which would require large Houthi vehicle columns to advance slowly and single-file.[xxvi] Local Yemeni government-aligned forces' knowledge of the rugged terrain could help them ambush these columns and identify targets for close air support (CAS).[xxvii] Yemeni government-aligned forces demonstrated their ability to coordinate effective CAS with Saudi aircraft on October 30, when Saudi airstrikes destroyed a Houthi vehicle column attempting to advance along the GLOC at Hayjat al Abd.[xxviii]

Iran may have deployed at least four commercial vessels to map subsea cable routes in the Gulf of Oman last month. Iran would need to conduct such reconnaissance before conducting any operation to disrupt and damage regional subsea cables, which Iranian officials have recently threatened to do if the United States and Israel conduct strikes on Iran. A shipping analytics firm recorded suspicious movements by three US-sanctioned vessels in the Gulf of Oman and an Iranian fishing vessel over the Europe-India Gateway cable south of Oman between October 21 and 26.[xxix] Their movements reportedly matched patterns commonly associated with subsea cable mapping, according to the firm speaking to the Financial Times on November 6.[xxx] Iranian officials, including Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei, have threatened to attack subsea cables in the Persian Gulf in recent months if the United States resumes airstrikes against Iran.[xxxi] Iran would need to map subsea cable routes before conducting any operation to disrupt them, given that publicly available maps of subsea cable systems only show approximate locations of the systems. Any disruption to subsea cables, which provide cross-border internet connectivity and data transmission, would have serious repercussions for regional states, as well as wider implications for global communications networks, trade, and economic security.[xxxii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iran is conducting excavation operations at at least two major missile sites as part of its ongoing efforts to rebuild damaged military bases. BBC Verify, citing satellite imagery from October 2026, reported on November 6 that Iran has conducted significant excavation operations and constructed tunnel entrances at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force-controlled Garmdareh and Shahroud missile bases in Alborz and Semnan provinces, respectively.[xxxiii] The United States and Israel conducted several airstrikes on both of these sites and damaged numerous facilities affiliated with missile production and storage during the 2026 US-Israel-Iran War.[xxxiv] Iran could be conducting excavation operations to move some facilities underground to protect them from future airstrikes. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mehrdad Aklaghi recently noted that Iran will rebuild its defense industrial base in areas less vulnerable to airstrikes, including “mountains and security structures.”[xxxv]

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Iraqi authorities reportedly arrested three members of the 15th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade on November 6 for attempting to transport 35 rockets from al Latifiyah, south of Baghdad, to Babil Province.[xxxvi] This incident suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be preparing for potential conflict between the United States and Iran. The 15th PMF Brigade, which is affiliated with the armed wing of a Dawa Party splinter group, managed militia logistics hubs in Ninewa Province in March and April in support of militia attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxvii] Iraqi militias also maintained logistics hubs south of Baghdad during the war that supported militia attacks launched from Kataib Hezbollah's stronghold in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province.[xxxviii] The militia members’ attempt to transport rockets to Babil Province may reflect a similar effort to move weapons stockpiles to militia launch zones, such as those in Jurf al Sakhr, especially amid reports that the United States may be preparing for imminent attacks on Iran.[xxxix] CTP-ISW assessed on November 3 that Iraqi militias would likely respond to US strikes on Iran.[xl] 

Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh is pressuring tribal leaders in Maysan Province to compel Iraqi officials and Shia Coordination Framework leaders to re-open the al Shayeb Iran-Iraq border crossing, according to Iraqi government sources who spoke to US-funded regional media on November 6.[xli] Sadegh is reportedly a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[xlii] The Iraqi federal government closed the al Shayeb border crossing on October 21, reportedly to “review security” and install equipment to prevent the “smuggling of prohibited materials.”[xliii] Iraqi political sources told Agence France-Presse on October 21 that the United States has pressured Baghdad to close most Iran-Iraq border crossings to restrict trade and financial exchanges that could help Iran mitigate the financial strain of US sanctions, however.[xliv] Baghdad has only closed one border crossing, which likely reflects Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s attempts to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. CTP-ISW assessed that the closure of the al Shayeb border crossing, combined with other closures along the Pakistan-Iran border, will likely exacerbate the effects of the economic restrictions Iran currently faces because Iran has increasingly relied on overland trade due to US restrictions on its maritime and air trade.[xlv] 

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to advance into central Jawf Governorate on November 6. Saudi media and an independent Yemeni journalist reported on November 6 that Yemeni government-aligned forces have seized additional positions in the Jabal Dahida mountain range.[xlvi] Yemeni government-aligned forces have seized territory from the Houthis near Jabal Dahida since November 2.[xlvii] Yemeni government efforts to seize Jabal Dahida are likely part of a shaping operation to facilitate an offensive to recapture al Hazm, the capital of Jawf Governorate.[xlviii]

Syria has deployed a small number of military advisers to Saudi Arabia to train and prepare Saudi forces amid ongoing Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.[xlix] Two senior Syrian military sources and one senior US official told Reuters on November 6 that Syria is deploying military advisers to Saudi Arabia to provide Saudi forces with military advice and training.[l] The senior US official said that the Syrian units will help train Saudi and Yemeni units in Saudi Arabia to improve their combat effectiveness.[li] A senior Saudi diplomat told Reuters that the Syrian advisers could share their expertise fighting against militia groups during the Syrian civil war with the Saudi military.[lii] Saudi Arabia and Syria signed a defense cooperation deal on November 4 that includes advisory support, training, and exchange of expertise between the countries.[liii] This Syrian support comes amid broader military assistance from Saudi partners and continued Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia.[liv]

The Houthis launched a drone toward Mecca and ballistic missiles toward Najran on November 6. Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone near Mecca and two Houthi ballistic missiles near Najran City.[lv] The Houthis have consistently denied targeting the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the start of their strike campaign against Saudi Arabia, but the group has not denied the most recent attack as of this writing.[lvi] Saudi air defenses have nevertheless repeatedly intercepted Houthi missiles and drones in the vicinity of these cities, however.[lvii] Saudi Arabian Civil Defense also issued early warning alerts in Najran Province on November 6.[lviii] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of their ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[lix]