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7 hours ago
Iran Update, November 19, 2026
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.
Key Takeaways:
- CTP-ISW is considering three possible courses of action (COAs) that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah could take in response to the Iraqi federal government’s demand for the militia to withdraw from Jurf al Sakhr.
- In a most likely course of action, Kataib Hezbollah will attempt to coerce Zaydi to abandon his plans to deploy Iraqi military forces to Jurf al Sakhr. A less probable COA is for Kataib Hezbollah to sign an agreement with the Iraqi federal government that would likely include at least a partial Kataib Hezbollah withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr. The most dangerous COA would include armed confrontation between Kataib Hezbollah and the Iraqi federal government.
- The Iranian regime is likely trying to reform the Ministry of Intelligence and Security by proposing the removal of the religious requirement for the intelligence minister position and creation of separate counterintelligence and ideological-political organizations within the ministry in order to better counter foreign infiltration of the Iranian intelligence apparatus.
- The Houthis may be conducting an offensive against Yemeni government-controlled territory in Abyan Governorate to fix Yemeni government-aligned forces that could reinforce other Yemeni government-aligned forces currently defending Aden City, the de facto Yemeni Capital. The Houthis may also be opening an additional front from which to threaten Aden City.

Toplines
CTP-ISW is considering three possible courses of action (COAs) that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah could take in response to the Iraqi federal government’s demand for the militia to withdraw from Jurf al Sakhr. Kataib Hezbollah has controlled Jurf al Sakhr since 2014 and has denied the Iraqi federal government access to the area for over a decade.[i] Kataib Hezbollah's tensions with Baghdad follow the recent leak of a "top-secret" Iraqi Interior Ministry report detailing how Kataib Hezbollah has generated millions of dollars in illicit revenue from oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr since 2021.[ii] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi called for Kataib Hezbollah to withdraw from Jurf al Sakhr after a government committee's investigation into the oil smuggling proved Kataib Hezbollah's involvement.[iii] Iraqi security forces, including units from the Iraqi Army, the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the Federal Police, are prepared to deploy to Jurf al Sakhr at 22:00 ET on November 19 if Kataib Hezbollah does not withdraw by then.[iv] Kataib Hezbollah may respond to this government pressure through the following COAs:
In a most likely course of action (MLCOA), Kataib Hezbollah will attempt to coerce Zaydi to abandon his plans to deploy Iraqi military forces to Jurf al Sakhr. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said in a November 19 statement that the militia would settle its issues with the federal government via “private channels” and that Kataib Hezbollah members should return to their “normal activities.”[v] Hamidawi’s objection to any federal government presence in Jurf al Sakhr suggests that Kataib Hezbollah will attempt to coerce Baghdad, either via the use or threat of force, to abandon its plan to enter Jurf al Sakhr during the militias’ “private” discussions with the government.[vi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically used force and the threat of force to compel the Iraqi government to act in line with militia aims.[vii] A Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson also rejected on November 19 Kataib Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr, noting that the militia won’t leave the area even if an agreement is reached with the government.[viii] The spokesperson may have been referring to attempts by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to mediate between Kataib Hezbollah and the government (see more below).[ix] Iran could support Kataib Hezbollah’s attempts to coerce the government to back down, depending on Kataib Hezbollah's actions and the potential for further escalation. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have demonstrated their ability to successfully pressure Zaydi to abandon efforts to challenge militia interests, such as his plans for Iraqi security forces to enter Jurf al Sakhr in August 2026.[x]
It is unclear if Zaydi will yield to Kataib Hezbollah's coercion efforts, given that he has consistently demonstrated in recent months his resolve to counter Iraqi militias. The United States has pressured Zaydi to crack down on Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, which has pushed him to try to constrain the militias in recent months.[xi] A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on November 18 that Zaydi and US Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack talk every day.[xii] A US State Department spokesperson said on November 18 that the United States expects Baghdad to hold Iraqi militias accountable for undermining Iraqi sovereignty.[xiii] CTP-ISW also continues to assess that Zaydi’s ambitions to increase his power as prime minister have also motivated his efforts against the militias.[xiv] The public nature of the oil smuggling report that precipitated this current situation also increases pressure on Zaydi to not back down from his demands for at least a partial Kataib Hezbollah withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr.
A less probable COA is for Kataib Hezbollah to sign an agreement with the Iraqi federal government that would likely include at least a partial Kataib Hezbollah withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr. Three senior Iraqi security officials claimed to Reuters on November 19 that the Iraqi federal government and Kataib Hezbollah had reached an agreement.[xv] A member of the Badr Organization’s Political Bureau similarly told Iraqi Kurdish media on November 18 that Ghaani and Zaydi reached a written draft agreement to redeploy some Kataib Hezbollah forces from Jurf al Sakhr and allow government forces into the area.[xvi] This Badr Organization member probably received information on the draft agreement through Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, who has been involved in mediation efforts between Zaydi and Kataib Hezbollah.[xvii] The Badr Organization member specified that two out of three of the Kataib Hezbollah brigades currently based in Jurf al Sakhr would deploy to al Qaim, near the Iraq-Syria border, and that one Kataib Hezbollah brigade would stay in Jurf al Sakhr.[xviii] It is notable that Zaydi would reportedly make a deal to deploy Kataib Hezbollah members to the Iraq-Syria border as he is in the process of transferring security responsibilities in multiple areas along the border, including al Qaim, from the PMF to the Iraqi Army and Interior Ministry.[xix] Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated PMF brigades have controlled al Qaim and several areas of the Iraq-Syria border for years.[xx]
Zaydi and Ghaani likely tried to craft the agreement in a way that would make it palatable for Kataib Hezbollah. The Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces announced on November 19 that the Federal Police will lead the military headquarters responsible for commanding all security forces operating in Jurf al Sakhr, which will include Iraqi Army, PMF, and Energy Police forces.[xxi] The PMF will deploy the 72nd and 79th brigades, both of which Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh specifically requested.[xxii] The Popular Mobilization Commission is the PMF’s administrative body.[xxiii] An Iraq analyst noted on November 18 that the 72nd PMF Brigade is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah, which suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi actors picked these specific PMF brigades to appease Kataib Hezbollah and convince it to accept the plan.[xxiv] The plan’s partial withdrawal--instead of full withdrawal--of Kataib Hezbollah forces from Jurf al Sakhr may also be intended to appease Kataib Hezbollah.

Any agreement between Kataib Hezbollah and the federal government would depend on Ghaani’s ability to force Kataib Hezbollah’s hand, given Hamidawi’s refusal to allow federal forces into Jurf al Sakhr. Ghaani has previously successfully pressured Iraqi militias to take actions against their wishes. Ghaani’s intervention in January 2024 caused Iraqi militias to stop attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria during the October 7 War after a Kataib Hezbollah attack killed three US service members in Jordan, for example.[xxv] Iranian demands for Kataib Hezbollah to even partially withdraw from Jurf al Sakhr may require additional leverage, however, due to the importance Kataib Hezbollah attaches to the area. Jurf al Sakhr’s location benefits the militia as it is between Baghdad City and Karbala City, which provides the militia access to smuggling routes. The location is also close enough to Baghdad City for militia members to travel easily to the city but far enough that it complicates government efforts to control the area. A Kataib Hezbollah commander said on November 19 that Iraqi security forces would have to enter Jurf al Sakhr “over the bodies” of Kataib Hezbollah members.[xxvi]
Iran could condition its material and financial aid to Kataib Hezbollah on the militia agreeing to a deal with Baghdad. Reports that Iran has suspended its funding to unspecified Iraqi militias due to Iran’s increasing economic difficulties could hamper this point of leverage, however.[xxvii] Two unspecified sources told Iraqi Kurdish media on November 18 that Ghaani assured Zaydi that Kataib Hezbollah would withdraw from Jurf al Sakhr peacefully when discussing the plan to replace Kataib Hezbollah-controlled PMF brigades in Jurf al Sakhr with other brigades.[xxviii]
The most dangerous COA would include armed confrontation between Kataib Hezbollah and the Iraqi federal government. This course of action would assume that Ghaani is unable to pressure Kataib Hezbollah to reach an agreement or engage in negotiations with the government and that Kataib Hezbollah is unable to coerce Zaydi to back down. Kataib Hezbollah official and PMF Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi, aka Abu Fadak, has engaged in mediation efforts alongside Ghaani and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[xxix] CTP-ISW noted on November 17 that the standoff with Baghdad over Jurf al Sakhr appears to have exacerbated Abu Fadak's divisions with Abu Hussein al Hamidawi.[xxx] Hamidawi remains opposed to allowing any Iraqi federal government presence in Jurf al Sakhr, while Abu Fadak reportedly supports reaching an understanding with Zaydi to allow a limited Iraqi government presence in some areas of Jurf al Sakhr.[xxxi] It is unlikely, however, that these tensions would prevent Kataib Hezbollah members aligned with Abu Fadak from engaging federal government forces if Kataib Hezbollah failed to coerce Zaydi from backing down and the militia entered an armed confrontation with the government. A Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson’s rejection of the group’s withdrawal from Jurf al Sakhr, combined with a Kataib Hezbollah commander’s claim that Iraqi security forces would have to enter Jurf al Sakhr “over the bodies” of Kataib Hezbollah members, suggests that Kataib Hezbollah could engage government forces if the other two courses of action CTP-ISW identified do not occur.[xxxii] Zaydi placed all Iraqi security forces on their highest level of alert and recalled all security forces on leave in preparation for a potential conflict with Kataib Hezbollah.[xxxiii] Zaydi could also be using these preparations to pressure Kataib Hezbollah to comply with the government’s demands or at least negotiate with the government.
The Iranian regime is likely trying to reform the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in order to better counter foreign infiltration of the Iranian intelligence apparatus. The Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission proposed a bill on November 14 to remove the clerical requirement for the intelligence minister position and create separate counterintelligence and ideological-political organizations within the ministry.[xxxiv] The MOIS’s current structure requires the minister to hold a certain religious qualification (mujtahid) in addition to intelligence expertise.[xxxv] The removal of the mujtahid qualification would expand the number of candidates the regime could consider for this role and enable the regime to select a qualified minister regardless of their religious credentials. Inept leadership has previously led to security breaches in the regime, such as under former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb, who was dismissed in 2022 following a series of successful Israeli covert operations in Iran.[xxxvi]
The bill's creation of counterintelligence and ideological-political organizations is also likely designed to reduce the risk of foreign infiltration. The proposed "Intelligence Protection Organization" would oversee counterintelligence, vetting, and the prevention of leaks to foreign adversaries.[xxxvii] The "Ideological-Political Organization” would focus on religious adherence, political affairs, and indoctrination, likely to make MOIS personnel more loyal to the regime and reduce the risk of infiltration.[xxxviii] Israel has significantly infiltrated Iran’s security apparatus in recent decades. Israeli forces built drones in Iran in the days leading up to the June 2025 12-Day War and killed numerous senior Iranian officials, including former Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib, across the 12-Day and Spring 2026 40-Day wars, for example.[xxxix]
The regime likely calculates that the existing MOIS structure is insufficient to counter Israeli infiltration. The MOIS has previously conducted counterintelligence and indoctrination efforts through ministry officials who answered to the intelligence minister.[xl] The establishment of organizations dedicated to these issues indicates that the ministry is prioritizing reducing infiltration, particularly as the new organizations will likely be allocated government funds and resources to conduct their missions.
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
-
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
Nothing significant to report.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
See topline section.
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
See topline section.
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis may be conducting an offensive against Yemeni government-controlled territory in Abyan Governorate to fix Yemeni government-aligned forces that could reinforce other Yemeni government-aligned forces currently defending Aden City, the de facto Yemeni Capital. The Houthis may also be opening an additional front from which to threaten Aden City. Saudi aircraft recently conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi positions following a Houthi advance near Thara, Abyan Governorate, which is located along the al Bayda-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), according to an independent Yemeni journalist on November 18.[xli] Saudi aircraft also reportedly struck Houthi forces in Mukayras District, al Bayda Governorate, which is roughly five kilometers northwest of Thara.[xlii] These Houthi forces were likely supporting the Houthi advance into Abyan Governorate.[xliii]
The Houthis may seek to fix Yemeni government-aligned forces along the Abyan frontline and prevent these forces from redeploying to counter Houthi advances along the Mokha-Aden and Taiz-Aden GLOCs.[xliv] Southern Yemeni media reported that Yemeni government-aligned Support and Reinforcement Brigades deployed to Lawdar District, where Thara is located, to prepare for further Houthi attacks in the area on November 19.[xlv] Support and Reinforcement Brigades forces recently deployed to reinforce other Yemeni government-aligned factions, including the Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces, in Lahij Governorate for the first time on November 12.[xlvi]
Houthi advances along the al Bayda-Aden GLOC could also represent a Houthi effort to open another front from which the movement could threaten Aden City from the east. It is unlikely that the Houthi advance in Thara will pose an immediate threat to Aden City because current Houthi positions on the al Bayda-Aden GLOC are over 160 kilometers from Aden City. The Houthis would also need to capture multiple larger cities in Abyan Governorate, including Lawdar and Abyan City, from Yemeni government-aligned forces in order to advance southwest toward Aden City.[xlvii] A Houthi offensive along the al Bayda-Aden GLOC could also degrade Yemeni government-aligned forces’ and Saudi Arabia’s ability to transfer supplies from Yemeni government-controlled eastern governorates, including Shabwa and Hadramawt, to western Yemen.[xlviii]

The Houthi movement claimed that it struck the Saudi Public Investment Fund headquarters and other Saudi critical infrastructure on November 18 and 19 as part of its ongoing campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands. Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on November 18 and 19 that the Houthis conducted several attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, and the King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh, including an attack on the Saudi Public Investment Fund headquarters.[xlix] Saudi and international media reported on November 19 that a Houthi missile caused damage to the Saudi Public Investment Fund headquarters.[l] The Houthi movement separately claimed that it attacked a Saudi Petrochemical Company complex in Jubail, Eastern Province, and an unspecified “sensitive target” in Jizan Province.[li] Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki confirmed on November 18 and 19 that Saudi air defenses intercepted one Houthi cruise missile near Riyadh and five Houthi ballistic missiles and one cruise missile over southern Saudi Arabia.[lii] The Houthis seek to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia to compel the kingdom to submit to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi support for Yemen’s legitimate government, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[liii]

The Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia come amid US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper’s meetings in Riyadh with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Chief of the General Staff and Acting Commander of the Joint Forces General Fayyad Al Ruwaili, and other Saudi military officials.[liv] Cooper almost certainly discussed the ongoing Houthi strike campaign on Saudi Arabia in these meetings. The United States is currently providing Saudi Arabia with targeting intelligence to support the Saudi strike campaign on Houthi targets in Yemen.[lv]

[i] https://alhurra dot com/32845 ; https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[ii] https://alhurra dot com/53527
[iii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الكتا-ب-تنفي-تقرير-لجنة-التحقيق-بتهريب-النفط-الجرف-والسلاح-خارج-الصراع-السياسي ; https://alhurra dot com/53527
[iv] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/categories/iraq/1876618; https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/categories/iraq/1876617 ; https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2123376344444641421
[v] https://t.me/centerkaf/5956 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5957
[vi] https://964media dot com/737310/
[vii] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/
[viii] https://almadapaper dot net/461820/
[ix] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/11/17/iran-s-quds-force-commander-in-baghdad-to-ease-iraqhezbollah-tensions-sources-say ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-iran-kataib-hezbollah-jurf-alsakhar-fed4063af6dbf61fd4fb6f5f5c3d278d ; https://alhurra dot com/55082
[x] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-19-2026/
[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-27-2026/
[xii] https://almadapaper dot net/461590/
[xiii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%82-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9
[xiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-13-2026/
[xv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-forces-strike-compromise-with-powerful-pro-iran-militia-security-officials-2026-11-19/
[xvi] https://almadapaper dot net/461656/
[xvii] https://t.me/centerkaf/5954 ; https://almadapaper dot net/461656/
[xviii] https://almadapaper dot net/461656/
[xix] https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/2123095864574935373
[xx] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-24-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Iran20Update2C20February2032C20202420PDF.pdf
[xxi] https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2123376344444641421
[xxii] https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2123376344444641421 ; https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2123034203642110264/photo/2
[xxiii] https://www.aei.org/commentary/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[xxiv] https://x.com/HamdiAMalik/status/2123085625561604483
[xxv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/
[xxvi] https://baghdadtoday dot news/307414-.html
[xxvii] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/11/09/8-billion-lifeline-iranian-deal-set-to-land-on-trumps-desk/
[xxviii] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/953907/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A2%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AE%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9
[xxix] https://t.me/centerkaf/5957
[xxx] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-17-2026/
[xxxi] https://964media dot com/737310/
[xxxii] https://baghdadtoday dot news/307414-.html ; https://almadapaper dot net/461820/
[xxxiii] https://www dot alsumaria.tv/news/security/581811/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%91%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7
[xxxiv] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1405082416128/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/27/3752027/
[xxxv] https://kadivar dot com/18982/
[xxxvi] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf p.22
[xxxvii] https://iranwire.com/en/news/160149-iran-moves-to-restructure-intelligence-ministry-following-mossad-breaches/
[xxxviii] https://iranwire.com/en/news/160149-iran-moves-to-restructure-intelligence-ministry-following-mossad-breaches/
[xxxix] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/06/13/revealed-mossads-secret-base-of-explosive-drones-inside-iran/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/mossad-set-up-a-drone-base-in-iran-uavs-were-activated-overnight-to-strike-surface-to-surface-missile-launchers-aimed-at-israel/ ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034219767561679086?s=20
[xl] https://www.parstimes.com/history/mois_loc.pdf
[xli] https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2123192347508777197
[xlii] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2123226132552044840 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2123192347508777197
[xliii] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2123226132552044840 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2123192347508777197
[xliv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2026/
[xlv] https://crater-sky dot com/posts/243901
[xlvi] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2120983999938003135 ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2121230561511666118 ; https://x.com/almasaobl/status/2121235444285296991
[xlvii] https://crater-sky dot com/posts/243901
[xlviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2026/
[xlix] https://t.me/army21ye/4111; https://www dot saba.ye/ar/news3838710.htm?cid=1; https://x.com/Almasirah_YE/status/2123374784830448030 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2123484135209795733 ; https://t.me/army21ye/4119
[l] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-missile-threat-towards-riyadh-causes-damage-saudi-led-coalition-says-2026-11-19/; https://www dot spa.gov.sa/en/N2731674
[li] https://t.me/army21ye/4111; https://www dot saba.ye/ar/news3838710.htm?cid=1; https://x.com/Almasirah_YE/status/2123374784830448030 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2123484135209795733 ; https://t.me/army21ye/4119
[lii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123176041145684150 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123242062472429691 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123259282896359557 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123477264448749693?a=WElBnshskSHRtLQ0kSk&s=20 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123293753737900325
[liii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-11-2026/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3948
[liv] https://www.spa dot gov.sa/en/N2731153
[lv] https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/10/politics/us-military-support-saudi-arabia-houthi-iran-yemen; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/04/world/middleeast/houthis-oil-attack-saudi-arabia-yemen.html ; https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/centcom-chief-meets-saudi-arabias-mbs-amid-houthi-gains-yemen