Iran Update, November 13, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET 

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Increased cooperation among Yemeni government-aligned forces likely enabled these forces to successfully halt a Houthi offensive operation and recapture territory in southeastern Lahij Governorate. The threat the Houthi advance poses to southern Yemeni territory likely motivated some STC-aligned factions to increase their cooperation and coordination with forces currently fighting the Houthis in the area.
• Saudi aircraft simultaneously provided close air support to aid the Yemeni government-aligned forces’ counterattack by targeting Houthi frontline units in Madaribah wa al Arah District and Houthi logistics necessary to sustain Houthi operations in the area. Saudi aircraft targeted Houthi forces and materiel in al Turbah, southern Taiz Governorate, a key staging area for the Houthis that is located about 30 kilometers north of al Majza.
• The Iraqi federal government began a highly circumscribed investigation into Kataib Hezbollah's involvement in oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on November 13. An Iraqi federal government investigation committee conducted a field inspection of Kataib Hezbollah's Jurf al Sakhr stronghold on November 13, according to multiple Iraqi media reports and footage from the area.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi almost certainly made a deal with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to allow an investigation of this nature as a balance between efforts to hold Iranian-backed Iraqi militias accountable and efforts to avoid armed conflict with Kataib Hezbollah. This investigation, which appears to be highly coordinated with the militias, follows a previous attempt by the government to enter Jurf al Sakhr without militia permission.

Toplines

Increased cooperation among Yemeni government-aligned forces likely enabled these forces to successfully halt a Houthi offensive operation and recapture territory in southeastern Lahij Governorate. The Houthis launched a combined-arms offensive on November 11 that allowed Houthi fighters to advance approximately 12 kilometers southwest from al Majza into al Shatt and al Sarih Junction, both in Madaribah wa al Arah District, on November 12.[i] The southwest Houthi advance was part of a likely Houthi push toward Jabal Kharaz, which provides high ground from which the Houthis could threaten the Mokha-Aden ground line of communication and isolate Yemeni government-aligned forces operating on Yemen’s Red Sea coast.[ii]

Pervasive coordination and cooperation issues along southeastern frontlines may have enabled previous Houthi advances, such as the recent Houthi advance into al Shatt. The forces currently fighting for Yemen’s internationally recognized government consist of a variety of factions with varying objectives and command structures that hamper coordination and cooperation among the fighters, particularly in southeastern Yemen, although this issue persists across the various fronts.[iii] One of the more influential factions within this coalition is the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a political organization that controls some forces in the south and seeks to form independent southern Yemeni state. STC-backed military forces in southern Yemen fight for the Yemeni government but often compete with other government-aligned forces. Some STC-backed groups reportedly refused to allow the northern Yemeni government-aligned forces withdrawing from Yemen’s Red Sea coastal plain to enter Aden City in early September, for example.[iv] At least some STC-backed groups have more recently refused to operate outside the former borders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen, which includes Lahij and Aden governorates, until the Yemeni government grants the Yemeni people a referendum on southern Yemeni secession.[v]

The threat that the Houthi advance poses to southern Yemeni territory likely motivated some STC-backed groups to coordinate with the forces currently fighting against the Houthi forces in southwestern Lahij Governorate. The Support and Reinforcement Brigades, an STC-aligned faction, began to reinforce the Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces in southwest Lahij Governorate on November 12.[vi] This marks the first time the Support and Reinforcement Brigades have deployed to the Madaribah wa al Arah front since the start of the campaign, according to an independent Yemeni journalist.^[vii] The Support and Reinforcement Brigades likely decided to deploy and coordinate with the Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces because the Houthi advances on November 12 threatened to consolidate Houthi control over territory in southern Lahij Governorate, which is territory that is part of the independent southern Yemeni state that these groups seek to form. Many Support and Reinforcement Brigades fighters, including senior commanders, are from southern Lahij Governorate and are members of local Lahij-based tribes.[viii] The involvement of the Support and Reinforcement Brigades likely contributed to the successful counterattack in which government forces recaptured both al Shatt and al Sarih on November 13.[ix] Yemeni government-aligned forces also reportedly continued to advance and engaged Houthi fighters near al Majza later on November 13.[x]

The Yemeni government is attempting to improve coordination among Yemeni government-aligned groups by establishing a unified command structure for units operating in southwestern Yemen. A Yemeni military source said on November 12 that the Yemeni government implemented a unified joint command structure for forces currently operating in Lahij Governorate, including the Southern Giants Brigades, Homeland Shield Forces, and Support and Reinforcement Brigades, and other local groups.[xi] Another independent Yemeni journalist reported on November 13 that the Yemeni government has appointed former Homeland Shield Forces Commander Bashir al Mazarbi al Shuaihi to lead the unified forces.[xii] The Yemeni government has not announced Shuaihi’s appointment at the time of this writing.

Saudi aircraft simultaneously provided close air support to aid the Yemeni government-aligned forces’ counterattack by targeting Houthi frontline units in Madaribah wa al Arah District and Houthi logistics necessary to sustain Houthi operations in the area. Saudi aircraft targeted Houthi forces and materiel in al Turbah, southern Taiz Governorate, a key staging area for the Houthis that is located about 30 kilometers north of al Majza.[xiii] Saudi aircraft reportedly targeted Houthi supply lines in al Maqatirah and al Shamayatayn districts which are also located north of al Majza and likely supported Houthi operations around al Shatt and al Sarih.[xiv] Saudi aircraft also targeted Houthi forces and vehicles on the frontline as Yemeni government-aligned forces, including the Southern Giants and Homeland Shield Forces, launched counterattacks against the Houthis in unspecified locations within Madaribah wa al Arah District on November 13.[xv]

The Iraqi federal government began a highly circumscribed investigation into Kataib Hezbollah's involvement in oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on November 13. An Iraqi federal government investigation committee conducted a field inspection of Kataib Hezbollah's Jurf al Sakhr stronghold on November 13, according to multiple Iraqi media reports and footage from the area.[xvi] Kataib Hezbollah has not allowed federal authorities to enter Jurf al Sakhr in over a decade.[xvii] The government visit follows a recent leaked, "top-secret" Iraqi Interior Ministry report that revealed how Kataib Hezbollah has generated millions of dollars in illicit revenue from oil smuggling in the Jurf al Sakhr area since 2021.[xviii] Zaydi directed on November 13 the formation of a Jurf al Sakhr investigation committee chaired by the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated head of the Popular Mobilization Commission's Security and Discipline Directorate and consisting of other federal government representatives.[xix] The Popular Mobilization Commission is the Popular Mobilization Forces' administrative body.[xx] Iraqi media reported that the investigation committee and a contingent of Iraqi Federal Police met with Iraqi militia members—almost certainly from Kataib Hezbollah—before the inspection.[xxi] The committee reportedly agreed with the militia members on the investigation’s mechanisms and the "arrangement of the committee's rounds," which probably refers to how and where the committee would investigate oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr.[xxii]

Zaydi almost certainly made a deal with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to allow an investigation of this nature as a balance between efforts to hold Iranian-backed Iraqi militias accountable and efforts to avoid armed conflict with Kataib Hezbollah. This investigation, which appears to be highly coordinated with the militias, follows a previous attempt by the government to enter Jurf al Sakhr without militia permission. Iraqi media reported that Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and Counter Terrorism Service units prepared on November 12 to escort an Iraqi government investigative committee into Jurf al Sakhr to inspect smuggling-related oil storage sites, tankers, and transport routes.[xxiii] Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi reportedly mobilized fighters in preparation to confront Iraqi government forces and threatened to fire on any Iraqi security forces that entered Jurf al Sakhr without the militia’s approval on November 12.[xxiv] The Iraqi federal government suspended its planned operation after Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, and Interior Minister Yasser al Maliki intervened to mediate between Zaydi and Kataib Hezbollah, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media.[xxv] Hamidawi reportedly objected to Zaydi's Office of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces leading the original investigation instead of the PMF.[xxvi] That the chairman of the new investigations committee is the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated head of a PMF directorate suggests that the committee's orientation was part of the deal Zaydi made with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[xxvii]

Zaydi's efforts to constrain the militias, as well as the public release of the report, probably motivated him to make a deal to conduct a highly circumscribed investigation of the area. Pressure by Iranian-backed Iraqi actors in August 2026 forced Zaydi at the time to reverse plans to enter Jurf al Sakhr, but Zaydi’s more recent actions to counter militia activity, as well as domestic political pressure, appear to have changed his calculus.[xxviii] Zaydi has taken numerous actions in recent months to constrain the Iraqi militias, including by attempting to disarm them and disrupt their illicit economic activities.[xxix] Zaydi's actions to counter the militias are likely related to US pressure as well as his desire to increase his own personal power as prime minister, which illicit militia operations undermine. The leaked Interior Ministry report on Kataib Hezbollah oil smuggling, which has cost the government millions of dollars in revenue since 2021, included satellite imagery.[xxx] CTP-ISW assessed on November 10 that this suggests that the government has been monitoring activities in Jurf al Sakhr for years.[xxxi] Parliament also created a committee to investigate militia oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr following the release of the report, which also probably motivated Zaydi to follow through with the investigation.[xxxii]

Kataib Hezbollah almost certainly only allowed the investigation committee into specific areas in Jurf al Sakhr that would not further incriminate the militia. A Babil provincial council member said on November 13 that the investigations committee completed their preliminary investigations but will return soon to collect more information.[xxxiii] The provincial council member added that no actors objected to or obstructed the committee's preliminary work.[xxxiv] Hamidawi had publicly objected to the original investigation committee's refusal to disclose the sites to be investigated.[xxxv] Kataib Hezbollah's eventual support for the investigations committee entering Jurf al Sakhr suggests that the militia received advance notice of where the committee would inspect and that the committee did not receive full access to the area. The provincial council member also said that the investigation committee had to take extra precautions because of mines and war remnants from the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in parts of Jurf al Sakhr.[xxxvi] Kataib Hezbollah has commonly used this excuse to deny the federal government access to the area and to keep Sunni internally displaced persons from returning to Jurf al Sakhr.[xxxvii]

Zaydi also appeared to increase security precautions in and around Baghdad on November 13 in preparation for potential retaliation by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias for government pressure against them. A security source told Iraqi media that all Iraqi military units were on the highest level of military alert in preparation for dealing with a security emergency.[xxxviii] Iraqi authorities reportedly inspected people and vehicles entering Baghdad from any direction.[xxxix] Iraqi media also posted footage that purportedly showed a Counter Terrorism Service deployment to the Green Zone, which hosts the US Embassy in Baghdad and other Iraqi federal government buildings.[xl] The Iraqi militias and their supporters have historically launched protests in Baghdad, which have sometimes sparked attacks against Iraqi security forces, when the Iraqi federal government acts against militia interests.[xli]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Iranian forces targeted US radar infrastructure in Bahrain on November 13, likely to degrade US regional air defense capabilities in retaliation for recent US strikes on Iranian coastal infrastructure.[xlii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force claimed on November 13 that its forces destroyed a US early-warning radar in Bahrain in retaliation for a US airstrike on a telecommunications tower in Sirik, Hormozgan Province.[xliii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on November 13 that Iran launched two drones toward Bahrain but added that US forces intercepted both drones.[xliv] Iran likely targeted the early-warning radar to degrade the United States’ ability to detect incoming projectiles and protect fixed targets in Bahrain. This attack is notably the first time that IRGC forces have claimed a strike against a land-based US asset since early September 2026, when Iran launched multiple drone attacks against US bases across the Persian Gulf and Jordan.[xlv]

Iran also likely intended to signal to regional states and the international shipping industry that the United States cannot guarantee security from Iranian attacks. Iran has targeted US bases and energy infrastructure in regional countries throughout the war, in part, to raise the costs of supporting US forces and deter regional states from doing so.[xlvi] The IRGC also warned international companies against "oil smuggling" and abiding by "enemy tricks" in the same statement in which it claimed the radar strike, likely referring to the US campaign to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz.[xlvii]

Iran’s attack also comes amid Iran‘s continued efforts to compel the international community to recognize its control over the strait. The IRGC Navy claimed on November 13 that a liquified gas carrier struck a naval mine and suffered major damage after attempting to transit the southern transit route, which is the route through which US forces are escorting ships.[xlviii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iranian claims of vessels striking naval mines are part of an information campaign designed to coerce ships into transiting Iranian territorial waters.[xlix] CTP-ISW has observed no indicators that Iran has successfully re-mined the strait.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.
Arabian Peninsula

The Houthi movement claimed that it struck Saudi energy infrastructure on November 13 as part of its ongoing campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed on November 13 that the Houthis struck an East-West Pipeline pumping station with drones for a second time in 24 hours.[l] The Houthis have targeted and struck the East-West Pipeline on multiple occasions throughout the conflict.[li] A previous Houthi attack on the East-West Pipeline in September 2026 forced Saudi authorities to close the pipeline for approximately 11 days to conduct emergency repairs.[lii] ISW-CTP cannot verify the Houthis’ claims at the time of this writing. The Houthis seek to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia to compel the kingdom to meet Houthi demands, such as recognizing Houthi sovereignty in Yemen, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[liii]

Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced on November 12 that Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone near Riyadh and two Houthi drones in the Eastern Province.[liv] Saudi Civil Defense also issued an early warning alert in Jazan Province on November 13.[lv] The Houthis have not claimed these attacks as of this writing.