March 03, 2026

Iran Update Morning Special Report: March 3, 2026

Data Cutoff: 08:00 AM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways:

  • The United States and Israel continued to attack Iranian internal security institutions. The combined force reportedly destroyed the Marivan Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in Marivan, Kurdistan Province, on March 3. This reported attack comes after the combined force struck the Kurdistan Province LEC Headquarters in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, on March 2. The attacks on internal security institutions in Kurdistan Province are notable given that significant protest activity took place in this province during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement.
  • The IDF confirmed that Iran launched a ballistic missile with a cluster munition warhead at Israel on March 1. A cluster munition warhead contains submunitions that disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage. Iran previously launched a Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile containing a cluster munition warhead at Israel during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.
  • Iran continued to conduct drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting energy and maritime infrastructure in Gulf countries. An Iranian drone struck the Port of Salalah in Raysut, Oman, on March 3. Several Iranian drones struck a fuel tanker at the Duqm Port in Duqm, Oman, on March 3. Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure in the Gulf have continued to disrupt some regional oil and gas industries.
  • Two Iranian drones struck the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 2. The Iranian drone attack caused a limited fire and minor material damage to the US Embassy. The Saudi Foreign Ministry condemned the Iranian drone attack on the embassy and stated that Saudi Arabia reserves the right to respond to the attack. A senior Israeli official told Israeli media on March 3 that Israel assesses that Saudi Arabia will soon strike Iran. US President Donald Trump responded to the attack on the US Embassy, stating “you [will] find soon what the retaliation will be for the attack.”
  • The Qatari Foreign Ministry denied reports that Qatar conducted strikes against Iran. Iran has launched around 101 ballistic missiles, 39 drones, and 3 cruise missiles at Qatar since the start of the war.
  • Hezbollah has launched several attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. The IDF launched “forward defense maneuver[s]” in southern Lebanon on March 3. The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military sites and institutions in Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff in order to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against Israel.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes on key Iranian political institutions in Tehran on March 3.[i] The IDF struck the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Presidential Office, and the Assembly of Experts building in Tehran.[ii] The SNSC is Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body.[iii] The IDF also reportedly targeted an Assembly of Experts meeting in Qom where the Assembly of Experts was convening to select the next Supreme Leader.[iv] The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member elected clerical body tasked with appointing, supervising, and—at least in theory—removing the Supreme Leader.[v]

The United States and Israel continued to attack Iranian internal security institutions. The combined force reportedly destroyed the Marivan Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in Marivan, Kurdistan Province, on March 3.[vi] This reported attack comes after the combined force struck the Kurdistan Province LEC Headquarters in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, on March 2.[vii] The LEC is the regime’s premier internal security service and first line of defense against protests.[viii] The attacks on internal security institutions in Kurdistan Province are notable given that significant protest activity took place in this province during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement.[ix]

Geolocated imagery published on March 3 shows that the combined force destroyed the LEC Intelligence Organization headquarters in Tehran on March 1.[x] OSINT accounts also published videos of an explosion at an unspecified provincial intelligence headquarters in Ilam City, Ilam Province.[xi]

The combined force continued to target Iranian defense industrial sites. Geolocated imagery published on March 3 shows that the combined force struck the Esfahan Optics Industry in Esfahan.[xii] The Esfahan Optics Industry is a subsidiary of Iran Electronic Industries, which operates under the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[xiii] The United States sanctioned the Esfahan Optics Industry in October 2023 for contributing to the development of Shahed-129 drones for Iran’s Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center.[xiv] The IDF separately issued an evacuation order for the Hakimiyeh Industrial Zone in northwestern Tehran.[xv] It is unclear what the IDF intends to target in this area, although many Iranian defense industrial sites are located in industrial zones.

The combined force continued to attack Iranian naval facilities to limit Iran’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against international shipping and US Navy vessels. An Israeli analyst published imagery of fires at the Jask Port, which is home to the Artesh Navy 2nd Naval District.[xvi] The Artesh Navy 2nd Naval District moved its headquarters from Bushehr, which is located in the Persian Gulf, to Jask, which is located south of the Strait of Hormuz, in October 2008.[xvii] Iran also opened an oil pipeline between Goreh, Bushehr Province, and Jask in May 2021 that is meant to enable Iran to export oil without having to transit vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.[xviii]

The US-Israeli combined force continued to degrade Iran’s ballistic missile and drone infrastructure in Iran. US-Israeli strikes targeted an Iranian drone facility in Kermanshah Province on March 3.[xix] Satellite imagery confirms strikes on the IRGC drone base in Mahidasht, west of Kermanshah.[xx] Israel previously targeted the base during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[xxi] US-Israeli strikes separately targeted Iranian missile bases in Esfahan and Fars provinces in order to disrupt Iran’s ability launch missile barrages against Israel and US forces.[xxii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) previously reported that US B-1 bombers struck targets in Iran on March 1 to degrade Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.[xxiii]

Saudi Arabia-based Al Arabiya reported on March 3 that Israel conducted a ground operation inside Iran involving Mossad operatives and special forces.[xxiv] The report stated that the operation took place during the night but did not provide details about its objective, scope, or outcome.[xxv] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

Iran Retaliation

Iran has continued to launch ballistic missile barrages at Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 2. Iran conducted at least four missile barrages targeting Israel between March 2 at 4:00 PM ET and March 3 at 8:00 AM ET.[xxvi] CTP-ISW did not observe any reports of impacts.

The IDF confirmed that Iran launched a ballistic missile with a cluster munition warhead at Israel on March 1.[xxvii] A cluster munition warhead contains submunitions that disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage.[xxviii] Iran previously launched a Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile containing a cluster munition warhead at Israel during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[xxix] The combined force struck a missile base in Yazd Province on March 1 that Iran used to launch a ballistic missile containing a cluster munition warhead at Israel during the June war.[xxx]

Iran continued to conduct drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting energy and maritime infrastructure in Gulf countries. An Iranian drone struck the Port of Salalah in Raysut, Oman, on March 3.[xxxi] The Port of Salalah is an important transshipment hub that handles a variety of cargo, including locally mined industrial minerals, liquefied natural gas, and fuel.[xxxii] Several Iranian drones struck a fuel tanker at the Duqm Port in Duqm, Oman, on March 3.[xxxiii] Iranian drones previously struck Duqm Port on March 1.[xxxiv] Duqm Port is a major commercial port that serves as a key logistics and maritime hub in the Arabian Sea for regional trade and energy transport.[xxxv] The port is a valuable asset for US logistics and shipping because the port can host military roll-on/roll-off ships, which are crucial for moving large supplies and equipment to and from the theater.[xxxvi] The US Navy has had regular access to the port since 2019.[xxxvii] Iranian drone fragments caused a massive fire at the al Fujairah Oil Terminal in Fujairah, the United Arab Emirates, on March 3.[xxxviii] The terminal is a critical global energy hub, serving as the world’s third-largest oil bunkering hub and a major oil storage center.[xxxix]

Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure in the Gulf have continued to disrupt some regional oil and gas industries. State-owned QatarEnergy announced on March 3 that it has halted its downstream production of several products, including urea, polymers, methanol, and aluminum.[xl] Iraq also announced the halt of oil production at the Rumaila oil field, which is operated by the British-owned BP PLC.[xli] A person “familiar with the operation” told Bloomberg on March 3 that the field is closing because it is running out of storage space because its oil tankers have struggled to exit the Persian Gulf due to the war.[xlii]  

Iran continued to conduct drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting US forces and sites in Gulf countries. Two Iranian drones struck the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 2.[xliii] The Iranian drone attack caused a limited fire and minor material damage to the US Embassy.[xliv] The Saudi Foreign Ministry condemned the Iranian drone attack on the embassy and stated that Saudi Arabia reserves the right to respond to the attack.[xlv] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media on March 3 that Israel assesses that Saudi Arabia will soon strike Iran.[xlvi] US President Donald Trump responded to the attack on the US Embassy, stating “you [will] find soon what the retaliation will be for the attack.”[xlvii]

The IRGC claimed on March 2 that it conducted at least 10 drone attacks targeting US Camp Arifjan in Kuwait.[xlviii] It is unclear whether the IRGC was claiming responsibility for previous attacks on the base or whether it was announcing new attacks. Iran previously struck Camp Arifjan on March 1, killing six US servicemembers.[xlix] The IRGC claimed that it launched 20 drones and three missiles targeting the Isa Airbase in Bahrain.[l] The IRGC claimed that the attack destroyed the airbase’s main command building and set fuel tanks on fire.[li] Iran claimed that it conducted drone attacks targeting al Udeid Airbase in Qatar on March 3.[lii]  

Axis Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on March 2 that its fighters launched a “squadron” of drones targeting a hotel in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, that housed US forces.[liii] Saraya Awliya al Dam is widely considered to be a facade group and has historically claimed attacks on US convoys and Iraqi Kurdistan.[liv] Saraya Awliya al Dam previously claimed that its fighters attacked a US base in Erbil with drones in support of Iran on March 1.[lv]

Gulf Response

The Qatari Foreign Ministry denied reports that Qatar conducted strikes against Iran.[lvi] Iran has launched around 101 ballistic missiles, 39 drones, and 3 cruise missiles at Qatar since the start of the war.[lvii] Qatar intercepted Iranian missiles and drones targeting Hamad International Airport in Doha on March 3.[lviii] Qatar shot down two Iranian Su-24 aircraft on March 2.[lix] The Qatari Foreign Ministry stated on March 3 that there is currently no contact between Qatar and Iran.[lx] The Qatari Foreign Ministry also denied that Iranian attacks on the Gulf countries will “lead to a return to the negotiating table.”[lxi]

Lebanon

Hezbollah has launched several attacks targeting IDF positions and forces in northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. Hezbollah launched a “squadron” of drones targeting radar sites and control centers at the Israeli Air Force (IAF) Ramat David Airbase in Ramat David, northern Israel, on March 2.[lxii] Hezbollah launched a “squadron” of drones targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Meron Air Operations and Control Base in Mount Meron, northern Israel, on March 3.[lxiii] Hezbollah claimed that its attack damaged a radar and a command building at the base.[lxiv] Hezbollah claimed that it launched a large rocket salvo targeting the Nafah Base in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on March 3.[lxv] Hezbollah claimed that the Nafah Base is the headquarters for the IDF 210th Territorial Infantry Division, which operates along Israel’s border with Lebanon and Syria.[lxvi] Hezbollah launched a rocket barrage targeting an IDF site in Maayan Baruch, northern Israel, on March 3.[lxvii] The IDF has not confirmed or commented on any of these attacks at the time of this writing. The IDF intercepted two drones launched from Lebanon on March 2.[lxviii]

Hezbollah issued a statement on March 2 in which it explained its decision to enter the war.[lxix] Hezbollah claimed that all political and diplomatic efforts to halt Israeli operations in Lebanon and compel Israel to comply with the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement had failed. Hezbollah declared that it must “put an end to the aggression by all available means, with decisive action and effective measures.”[lxx] Hezbollah claimed that its attacks against Israel are “defensive act[s] and a legitimate right.”[lxxi] Hezbollah’s statement underscores the group’s long-standing (and incorrect) narrative about its role in defending Lebanon. Hezbollah has consistently initiated wars against Israel while using the excuse that Lebanon needs Hezbollah to “defend” it against Israel to prevent its disarmament.[lxxii] Hezbollah’s raison d’etre is the destruction of the Israeli state, which requires offensive wars against the Israeli state at places and times of Hezbollah’s choosing.[lxxiii]

The IDF launched “forward defense maneuver[s]” in southern Lebanon on March 3.[lxxiv] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorized the IDF on March 3 to advance into southern Lebanon to seize “controlling areas” to prevent Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.[lxxv] The IDF said that the IDF 91st Territorial Division is operating in southern Lebanon and is holding several points in the area to strengthen Israel’s forward defense.[lxxvi] The IDF noted that it is working to create “an additional layer of security” for northern Israeli residents.[lxxvii] The IDF previously issued several evacuation warnings for residents located along the Israel-Lebanon border.[lxxviii]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military sites and institutions in Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff in order to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against Israel. The IDF stated on March 3 that it struck over 160 Hezbollah targets, including Radwan fighters and military command centers, in southern Lebanon over the past day.[lxxix] The IDF conducted a wave of strikes targeting Hezbollah command centers, weapons depots, and satellite communication components in Beirut on March 3.[lxxx] The IDF struck the Hezbollah-owned al Manar television station and the Hezbollah-owned al Nour radio station in Beirut on March 3.[lxxxi] The IDF said that Hezbollah used these sites to conduct operations, gather intelligence, and disseminate propaganda.[lxxxii]  The IDF confirmed that it killed the following individuals:

  • Adham Adnan al Othman.[lxxxiii] Othman was a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander in PIJ’s Lebanon sector. The IDF said that Othman served in this role for several years, in which he was responsible for promoting and executing attacks against the IDF and Israel. Othman trained and recruited fighters and acquired weapons for Hezbollah. Othman also managed Hezbollah’s smuggling via the Syria-Lebanon border and the group’s activities against the IDF in southern Lebanon.
  • Reza Khazai.[lxxxiv] Khazai was the Chief of Staff of the IRGC Quds Force’s Lebanon Corps and served as Hezbollah’s “military buildup chief.” The IDF said that Khazai was a central figure in Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and was responsible for coordinating between Hezbollah and Iran. Khazai oversaw Hezbollah’s acquisition of Iranian weapons and equipment, Hezbollah’s weapons production plans, and the implementation of Hezbollah’s reconstitution plan. Khazai also helped restore Iran’s smuggling routes from Iran to Hezbollah.

Israeli media reported that the IDF also killed the IRGC Quds Force’s Lebanon Corps Commander Dawood Ali Zada.[lxxxv] The IDF has not confirmed Zada’s death at the time of this writing.


[i] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2028783743779955017?s=20

[ii] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2028783743779955017?s=20

[iii] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/government-institution/supreme-national-security-council-snsc

[iv] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/2028838506596901123?s=20

[v] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-irans-assembly-of-experts-election/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/understanding-irans-assembly-experts-vote#:~:text=Patrick%20Schmidt%20is%20a%20U.S.,onboard%20the%20USS%20Ronald%20Reagan.&text=The%20victors%2C%20winnowed%20from%20an,approved%20by%20the%20Guardian%20Council

 

[vi] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2028785346402476135

[vii] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2028430378793304473

[viii] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x97961

[ix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/data-analysis-of-mahsa-amini-protest/

[x] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028824814064947617

[xi] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028616268190740702?s=20 ;

https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2028624313796952136

[xii] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028740049454706932?s=20

[xiii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1820

[xiv] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1820

[xv] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2028832284971782483

[xvi] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6951 ; https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/-the-artesh-irans-marginalized-regular-military_171758621702.pdf

[xvii] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/-the-artesh-irans-marginalized-regular-military_171758621702.pdf

[xviii] https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/5/31/iran-opens-new-oil-export-pipeline-bypassing-strait-of-hormuz

[xix] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6932

[xx] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6932

[xxi] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6932

[xxii] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2028600833789558872?s=20 ;

https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028828944980488202?s=20 ;

https://x.com/andynovy/status/2028779828426547517?s=20 ;

https://t.me/lelotsenzura/86280

[xxiii] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2028523298531815920?s=20 ;

https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2028452773897900481?s=20

[xxiv] https://x.com/guyelster/status/2028740012876165556?s=20 ;

https://ar.haberler dot com/arabic-news-19619877/

[xxv] https://ar.haberler dot com/arabic-news-19619877/

[xxvi] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028598010410578414 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2028759773408084326?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028778295920132411 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028810909758431424

[xxvii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2028395785386082772

[xxviii] https://www.clusterconvention.org/files/publications/A-Guide-to-Cluster-Munitions.pdf

[xxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition/

[xxx] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/

[xxxi] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028781603527291213

[xxxii] https://salalahport dot com.om/liquid-infrastructure ; https://www.omanobserver dot om/article/1184843/business/economy/port-of-salalah-achieves-record-general-cargo-volumes-in-2025

[xxxiii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028781603527291213 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-hits-fuel-tank-omans-duqm-port-2026-03-03/?utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Trending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=IwY2xjawQT7fVleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETFzeU5mZldCVXNObW1iZEpwc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHudzMBwdXCk3BxsOQcs9-2UdRWaLyaPyoMSHYlKHXSuA-jmQlUu2zM1hpym3_aem_aUeQxtxQLJ5TYSPXWV4xng

[xxxiv] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2028026806259900781 ; https://x.com/MenchOsint/status/2028035229089239464   

[xxxv] https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/annual-report/2020/our-investments/detail/oman2/index.html

[xxxvi] https://agsi.org/analysis/u-s-secures-access-to-omans-crowded-ports/   

[xxxvii] https://agsi.org/analysis/u-s-secures-access-to-omans-crowded-ports/   

[xxxviii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028796661053407574

[xxxix] https://valorfzc.com/oil-terminals-in-fujairah-strategic-insights-into-their-role/ ; https://www.tradearabia.com/News/389719/Fujairah-bunker-sales-hit-four-month-high-in-January

[xl] https://x.com/qatarenergy/status/2028786864476266700

[xli] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-03/iraq-starts-shutting-oil-output-at-rumaila-as-storage-fills-up

[xlii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-03/iraq-starts-shutting-oil-output-at-rumaila-as-storage-fills-up

[xliii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028629802354102425 ; https://www.axios.com/2026/03/03/iran-us-embassy-riyadh-saudi-arabia-drones

[xliv] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028629802354102425 ; https://www.axios.com/2026/03/03/iran-us-embassy-riyadh-saudi-arabia-drones

[xlv] https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/2028782092775989536

[xlvi] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/qatar-carried-out-strikes-in-iran-saudi-arabia-to-soon-follow-israeli-reports/

[xlvii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028640600707174407?s=20

[xlviii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028583866831708545 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028620425731756208

[xlix] https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/02/politics/six-soldiers-killed-in-iranian-strike-kuwait  ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/01/us/politics/iran-war-troops-deaths-casualties.html   ;

[l] https://t.me/farsna/414702

[li] https://t.me/farsna/414702

[lii] https://t.me/defapress_ir/49975

[liii] https://t.me/awlialdm/206 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/205

[liv] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-saraya-awliya-al-dam

[lv] https://t.me/QudsN/667223

[lvi] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/qatar-carried-out-strikes-in-iran-saudi-arabia-to-soon-follow-israeli-reports/  ; https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2028834766917619791

[lvii] https://www.facebook.com/dohanews/posts/qatars-ministry-of-defence-has-published-updated-figures-on-attacks-detected-and/1348141280677147/

[lviii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028792452409102789

[lix] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-israel-us-strikes-2026/card/qatar-says-it-shot-down-two-iranian-planes-TDitfcmkT8WhCRJeK7wH

[lx] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/3/3/qatar-says-iran-didnt-warn-of-missile-attacks-no-comms-with-tehran

[lxi] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028792452409102789

[lxii] https://t.me/mmirleb/10210

[lxiii] https://t.me/mmirleb/10211

[lxiv] https://t.me/mmirleb/10211

[lxv] https://t.me/mmirleb/10212

[lxvi] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2028572933883314453 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/10212

[lxvii] https://t.me/mmirleb/10213

[lxviii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028665914044866983

[lxix] https://t.me/mmirleb/10209

[lxx] https://t.me/mmirleb/10209

[lxxi] https://t.me/mmirleb/10209

[lxxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/can-lebanon-disarm-hezbollah-2025-08-06/    ; https://theconversation.com/israel-has-invaded-lebanon-six-times-in-the-past-50-years-a-timeline-of-events-240157   

[lxxiii] https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanons-political-forces-oppose-a-war-with-israel/   

[lxxiv] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028726172255687078?s=20

[lxxv] https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/2028743403249217935

[lxxvi] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028726172255687078?s=20

[lxxvii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028726172255687078?s=20

[lxxviii] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2028572776810864954

[lxxix] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028775810824319037?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028612119827013837?s=20

[lxxx] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028750781357212105?s=20

[lxxxi] https://x.com/Philipp27960841/status/2028614039803150760 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028585619442606220 ; https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2028738543749599648 ; https://x.com/WarMonitors/status/2028725651591614615

[lxxxii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028750781357212105?s=20

[lxxxiii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028587615465722040

[lxxxiv] https://x.com/CaptainElla1/status/2028740707242918185

[lxxxv] https://t.me/moriahdoron/29022

 

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