Iran Update, May 15, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday. 

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025. 

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings. 

Iranian vessel may have harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[i] It is unclear if the collision was intentional or an accident. UKMTO reported that the merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency (VHF) messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be “local authorities.“[ii] The unidentified individuals instructed the vessel to stop and allow authorities to board it. The incident occurred west of Siri Island, which Iran controls. This incident occurred shortly before Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri ordered the deployment of missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12.[iii] Bagheri stated on May 12 that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces "if the US military makes a mistake.” Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani separately claimed on May 15 that Iran recently “neutralized” US naval activity in the Persian Gulf using “light naval units.”[iv]  Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[v] 

Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and delay a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on May 15 that the United States and Iran are "very close" to reaching a nuclear deal and that Iran has “sort of” agreed to US demands.[vi] An unspecified Iranian source familiar with the negotiations told Reuters on May 15 that Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment.[vii] Senior US officials, including lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff, have previously stated that Iran can “never” have an enrichment program.[viii] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this US demand.[ix] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani told NBC News on May 14 that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and willing to limit enrichment to “civilian levels."[x] "Civilian levels" likely refers to the 3.67 percent enriched uranium limit set by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Reuters reported that the United States and Iran also disagree on where and how Iran would transfer its highly enriched uranium stockpile to another location, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[xi] Iran's rejection of the US demands for zero uranium enrichment may jeopardize the talks or force negotiations toward a less expansive agreement than what the United States reportedly desires. 

The Houthis are unlikely to seriously engage in the Saudi-led peace roadmap because doing so would undermine their objectives to control all of Yemen. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on May 13 that the United States asked the Houthis to return to the peace process, which Saudi Arabia initiated in 2022, as part of the US-Houthi ceasefire.[xii] US President Donald Trump stated during a press conference in Doha on May 15 that “we want [the Houthis] to get along with Saudi Arabia.”[xiii]  CTP-ISW assessed on May 9 that the Houthis have little incentive to participate meaningfully in peace negotiations given that the Houthis have not suffered any military defeats that would compel them to re-engage in peace talks.[xiv] The Saudi-led and UN-facilitated roadmap envisioned a political settlement among Yemen’s factions, including the Houthis, and would presumably work toward some kind of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[xv] The Houthis consider themselves to be Yemen’s legitimate government and will likely oppose any negotiations that could reduce their authority in northern Yemen or undermine their objective to control the entire country.  

Amwaj Media separately reported on May 13 that the Houthis have agreed to release United Nations (UN) employees that the group has taken hostage as part of the ceasefire agreement, according to several Yemeni sources with knowledge of the US-Houthi ceasefire process.[xvi]  The Houthis have taken dozens of UN workers hostage in recent years.[xvii]

Key Takeaways: 

• Activity in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian vessel may have harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates. It is unclear if the collision was intentional or an accident. The incident occurred west of Siri Island, which Iran controls. This incident occurred shortly before Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri ordered the deployment of missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12. Bagheri stated on May 12 that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces "if the US military makes a mistake.”
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and delay a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on May 15 that the United States and Iran are "very close" to reaching a nuclear deal and that Iran has “sort of” agreed to US demands. An unspecified Iranian source familiar with the negotiations told Reuters on May 15 that Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment. Senior US officials, including lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff, have previously stated that Iran can “never” have an enrichment program. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this US demand.
• US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis are unlikely to seriously engage in the Saudi-led peace roadmap because doing so would undermine their objectives to control all of Yemen. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on May 13 that the United States asked the Houthis to return to the peace process, which Saudi Arabia initiated in 2022, as part of the US-Houthi ceasefire. CTP-ISW assessed on May 9 that the Houthis have little incentive to participate meaningfully in peace negotiations given that the Houthis have not suffered any military defeats that would compel them to re-engage in peace talks. Amwaj Media separately reported on May 13 that the Houthis have agreed to release United Nations (UN) employees that the group has taken hostage as part of the ceasefire agreement, according to several Yemeni sources with knowledge of the US-Houthi ceasefire process.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy 

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media reported on May 14 that the Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also known as the Palermo Convention.[xviii] The Expediency Council is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve differences between the Iranian Parliament and Guardian Council. The Palermo Convention seeks to increase international cooperation to fight transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking and weapons smuggling.[xix] Approving the Palermo Convention is one of two necessary steps that Iran must take for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to remove Iran from its blacklist.[xx] Iran must also join the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention.[xxi] The Expediency Council is expected to review the CFT convention in the near future.[xxii] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.[xxiii] The FATF blacklist designation requires the forty FATF member countries to sanction and limit international business interaction with Iran.[xxiv]

The United States sanctioned six individuals and 12 entities on May 14 for helping Iran procure materials needed for the production of ballistic missiles.[xxv] The sanctioned entities and individuals are based in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States sanctioned an Iran-based company that has supplied carbon fiber to the IRGC Aerospace Force Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization and the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization. Carbon fiber is used to produce ballistic missiles.[xxvi] The United States sanctioned these two IRGC organizations in 2017 for involvement in Iranian ballistic missile research, development, and flight test launches.[xxvii] The United States also sanctioned one PRC-based company and three of its employees for sending carbon fiber to Iranian companies.[xxviii]

Iran approved the opening of the first branch of a Russian bank in Iran on May 15.[xxix] Iran and Russia launched a new interbank network to circumvent the US dollar-based SWIFT system in November 2024 that allows Iranians to use Iranian bank cards to withdraw money in Russia.[xxx] The opening of a Russian bank branch is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. 

The Iranian rial appreciated from 836,000 rials to one US dollar on May 14 to 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15.[xxxi]

Syria 

The US government has begun the process of lifting sanctions on Syria. The US Treasury Department announced on May 15 that it is working with the State Department and National Security Council to lift US sanctions on Syria.[xxxii] US President Donald Trump announced on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, though there are several legal obstacles that Trump must overcome in order to be able to do so.[xxxiii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara praised Trump’s announcement as a "historic" and "courageous" decision in a speech on May 14.[xxxiv] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed US-Syria relations and a sanctions removal roadmap with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Antalya on May 15.[xxxv] Rubio told reporters that Trump will issue waivers under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act to lift sanctions.[xxxvi] Shara thanked world leaders who have aided Syria’s transition thus far and called on Syrian and international investors to “take advantage of the opportunities available.”[xxxvii]  

Several actors in Syria and abroad are taking steps ahead of the expected US sanctions relief to accelerate Syria’s integration into the global economy. Central Bank of Syria Governor Abdul Qadir Husariyeh announced on May 15 that the Central Bank is working to access the SWIFT global transfer system, which would facilitate exports and reduce import prices.[xxxviii] US sanctions previously prevented Syria from accessing the SWIFT system.[xxxix] The EU is reportedly considering a proposal that would ease sanctions to allow funding for the Syrian defense and interior ministries to support "the areas of reconstruction, capacity-building, counterterrorism and migration."[xl] The Syrian government has struggled to pay staff salaries for its employees since the Assad regime fell.[xli]  

Prominent Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf claimed that he has assembled “forces” to defend the Syrian coastal region from the transitional government for the second time since late April 2025.[xlii] Makhlouf is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s maternal cousin and a member of the prominent Syrian Makhlouf family that formerly dominated Syria’s political, economic, and security spheres through a mafia-like network.[xliii] He was a member of Assad’s inner circle for many years and was often referred to as Syria’s “real” finance minister before he and Assad had a public falling out in 2020.[xliv]  Makhlouf has reportedly lived in the UAE since 2020.[xlv] Makhlouf warned coastal Alawites against working with insurgent recruiters who are falsely using his name in a Facebook post on May 15.[xlvi] Makhlouf stated that his al Bustan Charitable Association will soon return to the coast with the support of diaspora Syrians and “private and international entities.”[xlvii] Makhlouf’s al Bustan Association was a Latakia-based organization that supported the families of Alawite soldiers who were killed during the Syrian Civil War.[xlviii] Makhlouf previously controlled several pro-government militias through the al Bustan Association.[xlix] Makhlouf reiterated a previous claim that he has forces ready to protect the coast, but did not provide more details.[l] Makhlouf previously claimed on April 27 that he and former Special Forces Commander Suhail al Hassan have assembled 150,000 special forces fighters to “defend” the Alawite community against the transitional government.[li]  Hassan was a notorious Assad-era officer close to Russia that has reportedly ordered numerous massacres against civilians during the civil war.[lii]

Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with 98th Armored Division leaders on May 14 to discuss ways to enhance the division’s readiness and combat performance.[liii] Qasra and unspecified 98th Armored Division leaders discussed the status of armored vehicles and plans to develop the division’s organizational structure.[liv] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently appointed Abdul Basit al Jamal (Youssef al Hamawi) as the 98th Armored Division commander on April 14.[lv] Hamawi previously led a splinter of the hardline Islamist group Ahrar al Sham.[lvi] The 98th Armored Division has recently engaged in demining and ordnance removal operations in several areas of Idlib province.[lvii] Qasra’s meeting with 98th Armored Division leaders to discuss the division’s organizational structure suggests that the 98th Armored Division may not yet be fully operational.  

Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with Syrian Air Force Commander Brigadier General Asem Hamari and other unspecified air force commanders on May 15.[lviii] Qasra, Hamari, and the other commanders discussed the air force’s progress in rehabilitating and maintaining its various units.[lix] Israeli airstrikes in December 2024 significantly damaged the Syrian Air Force’s weapons arsenal and infrastructure.[lx]    

Turkish Defense Minister Hakan Fidan stated on May 15 that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has not taken the necessary steps to implement its agreement with the Syrian transitional government.[lxi] The SDF and Syrian government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10.[lxii] The agreement included the integration of the SDF’s military and civil organizations into the Syrian government and the handover of SDF-controlled sites in northeastern Syria to the government.[lxiii] Fidan said that Turkey originally welcomed the agreement as it hoped to see the dismantlement of the SDF’s military structure and deployment of the Syrian army along the Syria-Turkey border.[lxiv] Both the SDF and the Syrian government have taken several concrete steps to implement the March 10 agreement, including implementing a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam and the SDF ceding control of disputed territory in Aleppo City to the government.[lxv] The SDF and Syrian government have also held multiple meetings to discuss the agreement and its implementation.[lxvi] Anti-SDF media reported on May 15 that the Syrian government’s negotiating committee and SDF representatives will meet in the coming days to discuss outstanding issues that the March 10 agreement did not resolve.[lxvii] Neither the Syrian transitional government nor Kurdish political parties have adjusted their positions on the issues of Syria’s governing structure or the integration of the SDF into the Syrian military apparatus since March 10, despite the early steps toward integration that both sides have taken.[lxviii]  

The Turkish MoD announced on May 15 that it will soon establish a mechanism with regional countries to collect weapons from Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters.[lxix] The Turkish MoD stated that the Turkish Armed Forces will continue to conduct searches and screening activities in PKK-dominated areas.[lxx] The Turkish MoD’s announcement follows the PKK’s announcement on May 9 that it will dissolve itself and disarm.[lxxi] PKK-affiliated media reported on May 13 that the PKK will not disarm without ”necessary legal changes” from the Turkish government, however.[lxxii] PKK leaders have insisted that Turkey must free imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan before the PKK will dissolve.[lxxiii]

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani ordered the opening of a Syrian embassy and consulate in Libya on May 15.[lxxiv] Shaibani stated that the embassy will enable the transitional government to provide services to Syrians in Libya and strengthen diplomatic relations between the two countries.[lxxv]

The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) worked with the Turkish MoI to seize over 9 million Captagon pills in Syria and Turkey on May 15.[lxxvi] Syrian and Turkish counter-narcotics units seized the drug shipments, arrested four smugglers, and seized the smugglers’ weapons on both sides of the Syrian border.[lxxvii] This operation appears to be the first joint drug enforcement operation between Syria and Turkey since the transitional government took power in December 2024.

Unknown gunmen on motorcycles continued to conduct revenge killings targeting former Assad regime members in Syria on May 14 and 15.[lxxviii] Unknown gunmen on motorcycles killed an Assad regime informant in the Karam Houmed neighborhood of Aleppo City on May 14.[lxxix]  Gunmen have used motorcycles for extrajudicial killings across Syria since the fall of Assad.[lxxx] The General Security Services (GSS) imposed a ban on using motorcycles at night in Latakia City on May 15.[lxxxi] The GSS similarly restricted motorcycle usage in Deir ez Zor City on May 14 and banned motorcycles in Homs City on May 4 after gunmen riding motorcycles conducted several sectarian killings there.[lxxxii] Extrajudicial revenge killings are in part due to a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war, which causes vigilantes to take matters into their own hands. Motorcycle bans are a stopgap solution that fail to address the root causes of vigilante behavior. 

Iraq 

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula 

Axis of Resistance objectives: 

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas 
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen 
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip 

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon 

The United States sanctioned four individuals based in Iran and Lebanon on May 15 for coordinating financial transfers to Hezbollah.[lxxxiii] The sanctioned individuals worked closely with Hezbollah leadership to transfer funds from overseas donors, including Iran.[lxxxiv] Iran has financially supported the reconstitution of Hezbollah since the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire went into effect in November 2024.[lxxxv] One of the sanctioned individuals oversaw the financial activity of Hezbollah-aligned groups, such as the Hezbollah-aligned Islamic Movement of Nigeria.[lxxxvi] US Deputy Treasury Secretary Michael Faulkender noted that these sanctions underscore Hezbollah’s extensive global reach through its network of terrorist donors and supporters, particularly in Iran.[lxxxvii] The United States sanctioned the following individuals:[lxxxviii]

• Muin Daqiq al Amili: Amili is an Iran-based senior Hezbollah representative who previously worked directly for the office of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. 
• Jihad Alami: Alami is a Lebanon-based Hezbollah financial facilitator.  
• Fadi Nehme: Nehme is a Lebanon-based Hezbollah facilitator and business partner to Hezbollah’s Central Finance Unit Chief Ibrahim Ali Daher. 
• Hasan Abdallah Nimah: Nimah is a senior Lebanon-based Hezbollah official responsible for Hezbollah funding and networking across Africa.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.     

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. 

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.