Iran Update, July 22, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi leveraged an interview with a US media outlet on July 21 to misrepresent Iran's nuclear program and Iran’s policy towards the West to a Western audience. Araghchi held an interview with Fox News on July 22 and stated that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful.[i] Araghchi stated that Iran has never produced 90 percent enriched uranium and only produced 60 percent uranium after its facilities were “sabotaged.”[ii] Civilian nuclear programs only need to enrich uranium up to 5 percent. Iran has taken several other steps that are consistent with the steps necessary for a state to develop a nuclear weapon, if it chooses to do so. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed in May 2025 that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities that could support the development of nuclear weapons at three locations in Iran until the early 2000s.[iii] The IAEA stated that Iran conducted implosion tests at one of these sites in 2003 as part of its broader plan to conduct a cold test, which is typically the final test of a nuclear weapon implosion development program.[iv] Axios reported in June 2024 that Iran had begun running computer simulations that could support the research and development of a nuclear weapon, citing US and Israeli intelligence agencies.[v] Iran has developed several large enrichment facilities, like those at as Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Natanz Enrichment Complex. CTP-ISW has long assessed that Iran would likely build a nuclear arsenal—not just a single weapon—if it chose to weaponize, and large enrichment facilities would be necessary for an arsenal but unnecessary for a purely civilian program.

Araghchi downplayed Iranian threats to assassinate senior US officials. Araghchi stated that Iran’s “Death to America” slogan does not include Americans, and it has “never been Iran’s official position” to call for the death of senior US officials.[vi]  Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to kill senior US officials.[vii] US intelligence has previously identified credible evidence that Iran is actively working on plots to kill US President Donald Trump.[viii] Araghchi stated that it has also "never been Iran's policy" to "wipe Israel from the map."[ix] Iran has also cultivated a transnational coalition of partners and proxies since 1979 to pursue its strategic interests that include expelling the United States from the Middle East and destroying the Israeli state. Senior Iranian officials, including Khamenei, who sets the regime’s official policy, have repeatedly emphasized that Iran seeks to “erase Israel.”[x] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian made a similar effort to platform Iran's demands and misrepresent Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East during an interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson on July 7.[xi]

Araghchi reiterated Iran’s stated right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil. He noted that uranium enrichment in Iran “has now stopped” because US and Israeli strikes caused “serious and severe” damage to Iranian nuclear facilities.[xii] Araghchi’s comments are consistent with previous assessments of the damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Araghchi emphasized that Iran “cannot give up its enrichment” program long-term, however.[xiii] Araghchi stated that Iran will not import enriched uranium to support a civilian nuclear program because domestic uranium enrichment is a ”question of national pride.” Araghchi's statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran will almost certainly not accept a nuclear deal that includes a zero-uranium enrichment demand.[xiv] Araghchi suggested Iran will also not accept a deal that includes limits on its missile program because the missile program is Iran’s “most reliable means of defense.”[xv] Araghchi stated that Iran's missiles are ”for defense, not for offense.”[xvi] Iran launched hundreds of ballistic missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[xvii]

There continues to be internal disagreements within Iran over how to engage with the West. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on July 22, accusing Araghchi of making "two strategic errors" in his Fox News interview. [xviii] The article criticized Araghchi for acknowledging damage to Iranian nuclear facilities and stating that enrichment in Iran has stopped. The article said such statements can be  ”interpreted as a sign of flexibility” and encourage further Western pressure.[xix] The article also criticized Araghchi for attributing threats to assassinate Trump to “radical groups” and stated that this portrayal undermined national unity.[xx] Several Iranian parliamentarians, including ultraconservative members, similarly criticized Pezeshkian for failing to endorse recent clerical fatwas against Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and undermining national unity during his interview with Western media in early July 2025.[xxi] Khamenei stated on July 16 that individuals who oppose Iranian officials on “diplomatic or military issues” must express their opposition in line with regime policy.[xxii] Khamenei may have been referring to efforts by the anti-negotiation camp in the regime to block efforts to resume nuclear talks with the United States. The backlash to Araghchi’s interview highlights ongoing disagreements between Iranian reformists and hardliners over nuclear negotiations and US-Iran relations following the 12-day Israel-Iran war.

The independent commission investigating abuses on the Syrian coast in March 2025 found that the massacres were not centrally organized or sectarian, but that a lack of government control over armed groups in the Ministry of Defense contributed to the abuses.[xxiii] Syrian National Inquiry Commission spokesperson Yasser al Farhan and chairperson Judge Jumaa al Anzi said on July 22 that their commission had referred 298 individuals to the Syrian judiciary for their attacks on Alawites in March. The commission also identified 265 individuals involved in anti-government insurgent activities in coastal Syria during this time. The commission reported that the government ordered large numbers of personnel to the coast but that other groups mobilized without orders.[xxiv]

The report’s excuse that the killings were not “sectarian” but instead revenge-based ignores the complexity of sectarian violence, which is almost always in retaliation or revenge for a perceived attack by another sect. The spokesperson said that seemingly sectarian attacks were based on getting revenge for the actions of the Assad regime and not based on ideological opposition to the Alawite faith. Some Sunni Syrians equate all Alawites with the Assad regime and therefore see massacres targeting Alawites as justifiable, however. Such killings are therefore technically in “revenge” or “retaliation,” but in practice, the way in which victims are identified is almost always by sect. This contributes to a cycle of fear and violence that creates long-term instability.

The Syrian government will almost certainly need to take concrete steps to punish those responsible for the violence on the coast to restore trust, but the trust-building process will be slow and will suffer setbacks. Alawites, for example, have already rejected the findings. Alawite communities are unlikely to accept the excuse that all of the attacks were “revenge-based.” The Alawite community is especially unlikely to accept this excuse in instances where there is no evidence that a Sunni militiaman personally targeted Alawite individuals for violence that the targeted individual personally inflicted on the Sunni militiaman or his family during the war.[xxv] It is unclear how many killings were or were not motivated by personal instances of revenge or score-settling. Killings targeting an Alawite for perceived affiliation with the Assad regime are by definition sectarian because such killings are punishing an individual for the acts of other members of their sect. Other communities will carefully watch the government’s response to this report and the actions the government takes, especially in the wake of the intercommunal violence in southwestern Syria, which saw many trends similar to those on the Syrian coast.

The commission ultimately decided that the abuses were not centrally organized by any one group but acknowledged that the transitional government had “partial and sometimes non-existent" control over factions incorporated into the Ministry of Defense (MoD), which contributed to the abuses. The commission issued recommendations for military reform based on the investigation.

Iraqi and Kurdish media reported on July 20 and 22 that the United States is placing increasing pressure on the Iraqi government to encourage the Iraqi government to subordinate Iraqi militias to the state.[xxvi] US embassy officials reportedly told a delegation of Shia political officials that the United States may “act decisively” if the Iraqi government fails to take meaningful steps towards disarming the militias, according to an unspecified member of the Shia Coordination Framework who spoke to a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-affiliated journalist.[xxvii] The source claimed that the Iraqi government has drafted a plan to dissolve the militias, integrate the members into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and offer key leadership positions in the next Iraqi cabinet to the political heads of the Iraqi militias.[xxviii] The heads of Iraqi militias could exert undue influence over the Iraqi Security Forces and replace competent Iraqi commanders with militia loyalists under this arrangement, however. The Iraqi government also shared this plan with unspecified Iranian government figures and Shia religious authorities for approval.[xxix] An unspecified US Department of State Spokesperson told Kurdish media outlet The New Region on July 21 that the Popular Mobilization Authority Law would be detrimental to US-Iraqi relations.[xxx]

The plan described by the Shia Coordination Framework member mirrors the existing Popular Mobilization Authority Law.  The proposed Popular Mobilization Authority Law would integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias operating outside of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the PMF before the PMF integrates into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[xxxi] The amended version of the law allows PMF leaders who entered their posts before the law’s passage to maintain their position.[xxxii] Senior Iranian-backed Iraqi commanders have sought senior positions within the Iraqi federal government in exchange for integrating into the ISF. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani withdrew this version of the law from the parliamentary agenda on July 17 following US concerns about the legislation.[xxxiii] The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces does not, on its own, prevent the militias from taking orders from Tehran, nor does the law commit the Iraqi federal government to ensuring the militias will follow government orders.[xxxiv] The Iraqi federal government would have to disarm and disperse militia personnel across existing units to break existing informal chains of command outside of the Iraqi state.

A Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) member said in an interview with Iraqi media on July 22 that the SCF rejects US influence in Iraqi internal affairs, such as the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[xxxv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The United States has pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve and disarm the Popular Mobilization Forces and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders in recent months.[xxxvi]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are attempting to use sectarian events in Syria to justify the continued existence of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Iran-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais Khazali said on July 21 that “anyone who wants to hand over their weapons should prepare to have their mustache shaved off,” referring to the abuses Syrian security forces committed against Druze men in Suwayda Province.[xxxvii] Shia Coordination Framework member Amer al Fayez suggested in an interview with Iraqi media on July 21 that the situation in Syria justifies the PMF‘s continued existence.[xxxviii] The PMF was established in 2014 by "institutionalizing” pre-existing and predominantly Shia militias that were engaged in the fight against ISIS. Among these were various Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Asaib Ahl al Haq.[xxxix] These Shia actors have remained immensely distrustful of the Syrian transitional government under Ahmed al-Shara due to his historic ties to al Qaeda and ISIS. Discussion surrounding US demands to disarm the PMF is probably driving some of these Iraqi militia efforts to justify their existence.[xl]

Key Takeaways:

1. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi leveraged an interview with a US media outlet to misrepresent Iran's nuclear program and Iran’s policy towards the West to a Western audience. Iran asserted that it maintained a peaceful nuclear program despite enriching uranium far beyond levels required for a civilian program and developing technology that would be required for weaponization. Araghchi also downplayed repeated, credible threats from senior Iranian officials to assassinate senior US officials.
2. The independent commission investigating abuses on the Syrian coast in March 2025 found that the massacres were not centrally organized or sectarian, but that a lack of government control over armed groups in the Ministry of Defense contributed to the abuses. The report’s excuse that the killings were not “sectarian” but instead revenge-based ignores the complexity of sectarian violence, which is almost always in retaliation or revenge for a perceived attack by another sect.
3. Some Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are attempting to use sectarian events in Syria to justify the continued existence of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). These Shia actors have remained immensely distrustful of the Syrian transitional government under Ahmed al Shara due to his historic ties to al Qaeda and ISIS. Discussion surrounding US demands to disarm the PMF is probably driving some of these Iraqi militia efforts to justify their existence.

Iran

Clashes between border guards and Kurdish opposition forces in Kurdistan Province, northwestern Iran, on July 22 killed a border guard, according to an Iranian Border Guard commander.[xli] Iran continues to perceive Kurdish opposition forces in northwestern Iran as a threat to regime stability. Iran has increased its military presence in the region to ”fight against counter-revolutionaries and enemies” in the northwest region, likely referring to Kurdish opposition groups.[xlii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Force opened a new aviation base in Oroumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, close to the border with Turkey, in September 2024.[xliii] The base operates under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, responsible for West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces.[xliv]

Iraq

Several unidentified Shia political parties have reportedly attempted to gain Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s endorsement ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xlv] An unspecified source close to Sadr told Iraqi media on July 22 that unidentified Shia political parties have used intermediaries to tell Sadr that their political priorities align with Sadr’s priorities in an effort to gain support from Sadrists in the elections by securing support from Sadr himself.[xlvi] A close associate of Sadr reported on July 13 that Sadr previously requested information on candidates and blocs that are supportive of Sadr‘s agenda, which suggests Sadr is contemplating endorsing a candidate or bloc. Sadr’s agenda includes promoting Iraqi independence, dismantling the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces, and cracking down on corruption.[xlvii] Sadr announced in March 2025 that his Shia Nationalist Movement would not participate in the elections. Sadr holds significant support among the Iraqi Shia.[xlviii]

Syria

Axios reported on July 22 that the United States will mediate a meeting between senior Israeli and Syrian officials on July 24 to reach a “security understanding” in southern Syria.[xlix] Intercommunal violence broke out between Druze factions and Sunni Bedouin tribes in Suwayda Province on July 13.[l] Undisciplined government personnel committed crimes during the government’s response, which exacerbated the violence. The IDF conducted over 160 airstrikes on July 15 and 16 on Syrian government targets after the government deployed forces to Suwayda to ”save” the Druze in Syria, prompting government forces to withdraw from Suwayda Province.[li]  Israel and Syria agreed to a ceasefire on July 18.[lii] The ceasefire permitted Syrian government forces to return to Suwayda Province to restore security.[liii] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack will mediate, and senior Israeli and Syrian officials will attend the meeting.[liv] The meeting is expected to focus on security in southern Syria and increasing coordination between Israel and Syria to prevent any future crises.[lv]  A previous meeting between Syrian and Israeli officials occurred during a Syrian diplomatic visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, on July 12, before events in Suwayda began, possibly to discuss relations between Israel and Syria.[lvi]

The Syrian transitional government, Bedouin groups, and Druze militias continued to adhere to the US-brokered ceasefire in Suwayda Province on July 22. The ceasefire has remained in its second phase, which includes the delivery of aid, provision of services, and repair of infrastructure.[lvii] The US-brokered Syria-Israel ceasefire, agreed to on July 18, has three phases.[lviii] The third phase of the ceasefire will activate state institutions, redeploy government forces to Suwayda Province, and integrate Suwaydawi institutions into the Syrian state.[lix] Bedouin militias from other areas of Syria have reportedly begun to gradually withdraw from Suwayda Province to Daraa Province on July 22 to allow the GSS to oversee disengagement between Druze and Bedouin fighters.[lx] GSS forces continue to operate in towns in western Suwayda Province.[lxi] A joint Syrian Red Crescent, Civil Defense (White Helmets), and United Nations convoy entered the village of Walgha, Suwayda Province, on July 22 to evacuate more civilians, including UN staff and foreigners, from Suwayda.[lxii]

The GSS dismantled a rudimentary vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the village of Kafr Nouran, Aleppo Province, on July 22.[lxiii] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) said it deployed security forces to investigate reports of a suspicious parked vehicle in Kafr Nouran.[lxiv] The vehicle contained over 20 anti-tank mines connected with an electric wire.[lxv] The VBIED carried a large explosive payload, but the construction of the VBIED was rudimentary and did not resemble sophisticated VBIEDs such as those previously employed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.[lxvi] The perpetrators merely placed mines in the vehicle rather than disguising the explosive payload like more capable military organizations have in the past. MoD engineers safely disabled the VBIED.[lxvii] It is unclear what the VBIED’s intended target was, or what group was responsible for its construction. The village of Kafr Nouran lies on the border between Aleppo and Idlib provinces.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile at Ben Gurion Airport on July 21.[lxviii] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted the Houthi missile before it crossed into Israeli territory on July 21.[lxix] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel in October 2023.[lxx]

Israel’s Eilat Port’s Chief Executive, Gideon Golber, told the Washington Post on July 21 that activity at Eilat Port had dropped by 90 percent since October 2023 because shipping companies remain concerned about transiting through the Red Sea amid Houthi attacks.[lxxi]  Golber added that Eilat Port has lost $1,193,301 per month since October 2023.[lxxii] Golber warned that the port could be shut down completely without financial assistance.  Golber told Reuters in December 2023 that shipping activity at Eilat Port had dropped by 85 percent in the first three months of the October 7 War.[lxxiii] Eilat is Israel’s third-largest port and the only port on the Red Sea.[lxxiv] Eilat Port handles mostly car imports and Israeli fertilizer products exports.[lxxv] Most of Israel’s trade transits through Israel’s Mediterranean ports, Haifa and Ashdod, however.[lxxvi]

A Yemeni journalist reported on July 21 that Israel’s July 21 airstrikes at Hudaydah Port struck a vessel, a loading vehicle, storage tanks, and repair equipment, including a mobile crane.[lxxvii] Satellite imagery captured on July 19 indicated that the Houthis had conducted minor repairs to berth 3 at Hudaydah Port sustained from Israeli strikes on July 6.[lxxviii] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on July 21, minutes after the strikes, showed smoke plumes near berths two and five, leaving a crater near berth 5.[lxxix] Israeli airstrikes targeting Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several berths at the port inoperable.[lxxx] The recent Israeli strikes targeting Houthi repair equipment suggest that Israel aims to hinder the Houthis’ ability to repair these facilities.

The United States sanctioned two individuals and five private entities on July 22 for money laundering and importing petroleum products into Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen:[lxxxi]

• Muhammad al Sunaydar: Manager of the petroleum companies' network between Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US Treasury also sanctioned the following three UAE-based Sunaydar subsidiaries, which exported approximately $12 million’ worth of Iranian petroleum products from the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Company (PGPICC) to the Houthis through Houthi-controlled Ras Issa Port.
  • Arkan Mars Petroleum Company for Oil Products Imports: A UAE-based entity, which signed an agreement with the Houthis to import gas and oil, including Iranian petroleum products, through Houthi-controlled Hudaydah and Ras Issa ports. Iranian-affiliated companies have facilitated payments between the Iranian government and Arkan Mars since June 2025.
  • Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC: UAE-based subsidiary of Akan Mars involved in exporting oil to Yemen.
  • Arkan Marz Petroleum FZE: UAE-based subsidiary of Akan Mars involved in exporting oil to Yemen.
• Yahya Mohammed al Wazir: Responsible for laundering and raising money for the Houthis.
• Al Saida Stone for Trading and Agencies: A Sanaa-based Houthi front company that purchased six million euros’ worth of bulk coal across five payments to import to Yemen between November and December 2024.
• Amran Cement Factory: A Houthi-controlled cement production company that funds Houthi operations and enables Houthi money laundering. The Houthis directed the production of cement from Amran Cement Factory to the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate in northern Yemen in March 2025 to fortify military, weapons storage, and ammunition cache sites.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah’s primary financial institution, al Qard al Hassan, announced on July 19 that it is increasing its number of branches and employees as well as its financial solvency ratio.[lxxxii] A financial solvency ratio is a financial metric that assesses a company’s ability to meet its financial obligations.[lxxxiii] Al Qard al Hassan said that the association is not subject to the authority of Lebanon’s central bank, stressing that it will continue to perform its social and financial duties at “an increasing pace and [with] greater effectiveness.”[lxxxiv] The Lebanese Central Bank recently banned all licensed Lebanese banking institutions from working directly or indirectly with al Qard al Hassan.[lxxxv] Al Qard al Hassan is one of Hezbollah’s main banking and financial arms that the group uses to transfer, manage, and receive funds.[lxxxvi]

Al Qard al Hassan has opened four new branches in the past few days, but it is unlikely that four new branches will increase the effectiveness of the organization’s operations.[lxxxvii] This is the first time that Al Qard al Hassan has opened new branches since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire.[lxxxviii] Al Qard al Hassan has had to stop payments at most of its locations due to operational difficulties and cash shortages.[lxxxix] It is unclear how four new branches will increase the organization’s effectiveness under these conditions.

Al Qard al Hassan’s announcement is likely an attempt to alleviate financial concerns among Hezbollah fighters, given that the institution has not resumed compensation payments and continues to face financial challenges. Hezbollah has struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters following the Israel-Lebanon conflict in late 2024. Al Qard al Hassan temporarily froze compensation payments in February 2025 and later indefinitely suspended payments to its fighters in June 2025.[xc] Hezbollah supporters have stated that Hezbollah has not provided the funds it promised in the wake of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon and raised concerns over the group’s ability to maintain its financial commitments.[xci] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and payments for those who lose their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xcii] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits could reduce support among its base.

Hezbollah may use its front companies and exploit charitable organizations to acquire funds and mitigate disruptions. Hezbollah has previously used front companies to generate millions of dollars in revenue and support the group‘s operations.[xciii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) similarly uses bonyads, which are quasi-governmental institutions that perform charitable activities on behalf of the Iranian government, to generate revenue and evade sanctions.[xciv]

US and Lebanese officials recently met to continue discussing proposals on Hezbollah disarmament.[xcv] The United States, Lebanon, and Hezbollah continue to disagree over key outstanding issues.[xcvi] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met between June 20 and 22 to discuss the state’s monopoly on violence, Hezbollah disarmament, and the US proposal for Hezbollah disarmament in June.[xcvii] The Lebanese government responded to the US proposal on July 7 with a seven-page document that included its recommendations.[xcviii] It is unclear what the document entailed or what these recommendations were. Aoun gave Barrack a draft comprehensive memorandum on July 21 to gradually implement the return of the state’s monopoly on weapons ”in stages,” which would progress as Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xcix] Lebanese media reported on July 22 that Berri is also expected to present a proposal to Barrack that will call for Israel to suspend its attacks on Lebanon for 15 days, after which Lebanon would begin a disarmament process.[c] Hezbollah has insisted that Israel must first meet a series of its demands before it will hand over its heavy weapons, however.[ci] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem previously called on July 8 for the implementation of the Taif Agreement, which Lebanese parliamentarians signed in 1989.[cii] The Taif Agreement states that Lebanon would be ”taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from [Israel], to spread state sovereignty over all the territories.”[ciii] This includes the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms, in Hezbollah’s view.[civ] Hezbollah is also exempt from the Taif Agreement’s requirement for militia disarmament because Hezbollah argues that it is a unique exception and must retain its weapons to resist Israel.[cv]