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Iran Update, July 21, 2025
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.
The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[i] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come as the E3 has threatened to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it may trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and make “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[ii] The E3 would have to initiate the snapback mechanism by September 3 to complete the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasized on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the United States and stated that Iran has “no plans” to negotiate with the United States.[iv]
Baghaei also announced that Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[v] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia and China would likely not be able to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[vi] Any JCPOA signatory can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[vii] China and Russia could therefore try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the United States, the United Kingdom, or France could veto such a resolution.
Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed "expanding military cooperation.”[viii] Iranian media also reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[ix] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[x] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[xi] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future, which underscores the limits of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[xii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may expand strategic relations with other partners, such as China, due to Russia’s limited support for Iran during and after the war.[xiii]
Pro-government Bedouin groups and Druze militias continued to adhere to the US-brokered ceasefire in Suwayda Province on July 21 as Syrian transitional government forces evacuated over 1,500 Bedouin civilians who were targeted in intercommunal violence since July 13.[xiv] Druze militias have obstructed the implementation of some ceasefire terms, but fighting has not resumed on a large scale.[xv] Suwayda Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Ahmed al Dalati announced on July 21 that Druze militias agreed to allow Suwaydawi civilians to evacuate the province with assistance from the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) until “their safe return to their homes is secured.”[xvi] Dalati also announced that the transitional government established a security cordon around Suwayda Province to stop fighting between Druze and Bedouin militias and maintain the ceasefire agreement.[xvii] The evacuation of civilians from Suwayda is part of the second phase of the July 18 ceasefire agreement, which also mandates the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of basic services to civilians in Suwayda Province.[xviii] Druze militias prevented the delivery of humanitarian aid by the transitional government into Suwayda Province on July 20, however.[xix] The Syrian Communications Ministry also said that Druze militias prevented it from entering Suwayda City to assess the city’s fuel needs and address electricity and communications outages.[xx] The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned Druze militias on July 20 for preventing Syrian Red Crescent aid convoys led by three Syrian ministers from entering Suwayda.[xxi] The Syrian Foreign Ministry said that Druze militias only permitted a small number of Red Crescent vehicles to enter the province.[xxii] Druze militias reportedly did not participate in a prisoner exchange on July 20 in the town of Umm al Zaytoun, which was stipulated in the second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[xxiii]
The transitional government faces major obstacles in restoring rule of law, regaining trust, and healing inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even as the ceasefire holds. The third phase of the ceasefire mandates that internal security personnel will deploy to Suwayda Province and that state institutions in the province will reopen.[xxiv] This phase will be difficult for the government to effectively implement due to the displacement of 93,000 people from Suwayda Province since fighting began, the ongoing documentation of atrocities by all actors, and Bedouin-Druze and intra-Druze conflict.[xxv] Distrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities remains high as more accounts of reciprocal atrocities surface. This inter-communal mistrust is compounded by the Druze community’s distrust of the transitional government after government forces committed abuses against Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16.[xxvi] This distrust challenges the government’s ability to maintain order and restore the rule of law in Suwayda. The Syrian government remains responsible for holding all perpetrators of atrocities accountable, including government forces. The Syrian National Inquiry Commission, which investigated the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast in March, presented its findings to President Ahmed al Shara on July 13.[xxvii] While the details of the Inquiry Commission’s conclusions have yet to be published, whether or how the transitional government holds its forces accountable for abuses committed during the March coastal violence will likely inform future peace processes in Suwayda Province. The Syrian government’s response to the coastal atrocity report could further build or degrade minority trust in Suwayda, depending on how the government responds to the report’s findings. Holding perpetrators of atrocities accountable requires the government to not only investigate the atrocities, but to act on its findings and charge, sentence, and punish perpetrators.
Key Takeaways:
- Iran-E3 Talks: The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.
- Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.
- Syria Ceasefire: The Syrian transitional government faces major obstacles in restoring rule of law, regaining trust, and healing inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even as the ceasefire holds. Distrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities remains high as more accounts of reciprocal atrocities surface. This inter-communal mistrust is compounded by the Druze community’s distrust of the transitional government after government forces committed abuses against Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16. This distrust challenges the government’s ability to maintain order and restore the rule of law in Suwayda.
Iran
Senior Iranian officials reiterated their opposition to the planned Zangezor Corridor to senior Armenian officials on July 19. The Zangezor Corridor is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Iran opposes the proposed Zangezor Corridor because the route would cut off Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian emphasized that Iran opposes any “change in the region’s geopolitics” in a phone call with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[xxviii] Grigoryan assured Ahmadian that Armenia has not changed its position “regarding regional transit routes.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized Iran’s support for “preserving the territorial integrity of all countries” in a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[xxix] The July 19 phone calls come after the United States offered on July 11 to manage the Zangezor Corridor.[xxx] Iranian media described the Zangezor Corridor on July 16 as a Turkish attempt to extend Turkish influence into Eurasia.[xxxi] Iranian media also argued that the Zangezor Corridor would prevent Iran from being able to militarily support Armenia against Azerbaijan. Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growth of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus in recent years, particularly since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iranian officials have expressed concern that Russia’s focus on the war in Ukraine has left a power vacuum in the South Caucasus for other regional actors, such as Turkey and Israel, to exploit.[xxxii]
The Iranian Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) navies started an annual naval exercise with the Russian Navy in the Caspian Sea on July 21.[xxxiii] The exercise is taking place in the 4th Artesh Naval District, which is based in Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province, and will continue until July 23.[xxxiv] A Russian naval commander told Iranian media on July 21 that the exercise demonstrates Iran and Russia’s commitment to “strengthening military interactions” with each other.[xxxv] Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan participated in the previous iteration of this exercise in July 2024.[xxxvi]
Iran is continuing to develop its space program, which could support Iran’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Iran conducted a suborbital test of the Qased space launch vehicle (SLV) on July 21 to evaluate unspecified “new technologies.”[xxxvii] The Qased SLV previously launched the Nour-1 satellite in April 2020, the Nour-2 satellite in March 2022, and the Nour-3 satellite in September 2023.[xxxviii] All three launches took place at the Shahroud Space Center in Semnan Province, which is operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force.[xxxix] Advancing Iran’s space program could contribute to Iran's development of ICBMs given that SLVs use similar technologies.[xl] The Defense Intelligence Agency previously assessed in 2019 that Iran was developing SLVs with “increasing lift capacity” and “boosters that could be capable of ICBM ranges and potentially reach the continental United States, if configured for that purpose.”[xli]
Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahifard met with newly appointed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi on July 21.[xlii] Sabahifard claimed that Iranian air defense capabilities forced Israel to “retreat” during the Israel-Iran War. Israeli strikes on Iranian air defense systems during the war enabled Israel to establish air superiority over large parts of Iran, however. Sabahifard’s meeting with Mousavi follows a series of similar meetings between senior Iranian military commanders in recent days. Many of these commanders were recently appointed to their posts by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei following the Israeli decapitation campaign targeting senior Iranian military commanders during the Israel-Iran War. The recent meetings include a meeting between newly appointed Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Majid Mousavi on July 14 and a meeting between newly appointed IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour and newly appointed Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami on July 17.[xliii]
The Guardian Council reappointed Ahmad Jannati and Siamak Rahpeyk as its secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, on July 18.[xliv] The Guardian Council is a 12-member regime body that is responsible for supervising elections, vetting candidates, and approving legislation. Jannati has served as the Guardian Council secretary since 1988.[xlv] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reappointed senior clerics Ahmad Khatami, Alireza Arafi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani as Guardian Council clerical members on July 15.[xlvi] The Iranian Parliament approved Hadi Tahan Nazif, Gholam Reza Mola Beygi, and Behzad Pour Seyyed as Guardian Council legal experts on July 16.[xlvii]
Iraq
An Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee delegation met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Wisdom Movement leader Ammar al Hakim in Baghdad on July 20.[xlviii] Iraqi media reported on July 20 that Hakim has been mediating efforts between the Shia Coordination Framework and Shia nationalist cleric Moqtada al Sadr to convince Sadr to re-enter Iraqi politics.[xlix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Sadr announced in March 2025 that his political party would not participate in the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, although some Iraqi politicians speculate that Sadr could sway voters by endorsing certain policies or candidates.[l]
Syria
US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi met on July 19 to discuss steps to restore Syrian stability and unify Syria.[li] Barrack stated after the meeting that there could be a breakthrough in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government “in the coming weeks.“[lii] A Turkish journalist that previously wrote for a pro-Erdogan newspaper claimed on July 21 that the United States and Turkey gave the SDF a 30-day deadline to finish integrating into the Syrian government.[liii] The Turkish journalist claimed that Turkish and US officials told the SDF that some SDF units would not integrate into the Syrian army and would need to disarm.[liv] The SDF denied this report.[lv] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report.
Barrack also stated that he believes that the violence in Suwayda Province will not derail integration negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government.[lvi] Syrian media has accused Syrian Defense Ministry forces of raiding homes, conducting summary executions, looting, and threatening civilians at gunpoint.[lvii] These actions risk eroding Syrian minority communities’ trust of the Syrian government, regardless of whether or how the government holds perpetrators accountable. Minority communities that fear the government will not protect them, such as the Kurds, may view the violence in Suwayda as confirmation of their fears and resist integration and disarmament. Kurdish political parties have consistently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[lviii]
Arabian Peninsula
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted drone strikes on Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port on July 21.[lix] The IAF said that it destroyed Houthi infrastructure, including fuel tanks, vessels, and engineering tools used to restore the port.[lx] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on July 21 minutes after the strikes shows smoke plumes near berths two and five. The IAF recently struck and caused significant damage to berth two on July 6.[lxi] Satellite imagery indicates that the Houthis minimally repaired damage that the port’s berths sustained during the most recent Israeli strikes on July 6. Israeli airstrikes targeting Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several berths at the port inoperable.[lxii] The recent Israeli strikes could further hinder the Houthis’ ability to repair these facilities.
The IAF intercepted a Houthi drone before it crossed into Israeli territory on July 21 after Israel struck Hudaydah Port.[lxiii]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
[i] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1947110751929237571
[ii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hold-nuclear-talks-with-european-powers-friday-2025-07-20/
[iii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025
[iv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3358890
[v] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3358890
[vi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025
[vii] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf ;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snapback-sanctions-iran-more-bark-bite
[viii] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/234585/Iran-Russia-defense-ministers-meet-in-Moscow
[ix] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1947209086866530591
[x] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095
[xi] https://x.com/ali_motahari_ir/status/1939591211867582569 ; https://www.newsweek.com/iran-pivots-russia-china-quest-new-weapons-after-israel-war-2100933 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran
[xii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025
[xiii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025
[xiv] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947200677068865898
[xv] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159 ;https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947011605784318184
[xvi] https://t.me/sana_gov/134075
[xvii] https://t.me/syriafree25/1512
[xviii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025 ; https://t.me/sana_gov/133962 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946614190103286064
[xix] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159 ;https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947011605784318184
[xx] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947011605784318184
[xxi] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159
[xxii] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159?single
[xxiii] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1946969578031947831
[xxiv] https://t.me/sana_gov/133963
[xxv] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947200677068865898 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947261700366868659 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1947351857644335587 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1945930804728561723 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946313538462433418
[xxvi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025
[xxvii] https://t.me/SyPresidency/1270
[xxviii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/763609/
[xxix] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/875879/
[xxx] https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/strengthening-us-turkiye-relations-and-advancing-relations-with-syria ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-told-armenia-it-is-ready-manage-transport-corridor-with-azerbaijan-2025-07-16/
[xxxi] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/762702
[xxxii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2023
[xxxiii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/764227
[xxxiv] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[xxxv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3359205
[xxxvi] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501292/Iran-hosts-joint-Caspian-Sea-search-and-rescue-exercise
[xxxvii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3359195
[xxxviii] https://nextspaceflight dot com/rockets/231 ; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-05/news-briefs/iran-launches-military-satellite ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/09/29/iran-launches-satellite-using-ballistic-missile-technology/
[xxxix] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html ; https://mepei dot com/iran-launches-its-first-military-satellite-into-orbit/
[xl] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2023
[xli] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[xlii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/764209
[xliii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025
[xliv] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/515797/Key-figures-retain-positions-in-Iran-s-Guardian-Council-presidium
[xlv] https://iranwire.com/en/politics/118680-97-year-old-cleric-jannati-re-elected-as-guardian-council-chief/
[xlvi] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/message-content?id=60686
[xlvii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/25/3355606
[xlviii] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/وفد-يراني-في-بغداد-لمراجعة-العلاقات-الثنا-ية-مع-العراق ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3359007/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A6%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6537564/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF
[xlix] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-يبحث-عن-مفتاح-الحنانة-ويستعين-بشخصية-دينية-ل-قناع-الصدر
[l] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/status/1905319183518150830 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7 ; https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/270320252
[li] https://x.com/USEmbassySyria/status/1946655485773692960
[lii] https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9
[liii] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurds-face-30-day-ultimatum-us-turkey
[liv] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurds-face-30-day-ultimatum-us-turkey
[lv] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1947356843308614063
[lvi] https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9
[lvii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025
[lviii] www.npasyria dot com/211587
[lix] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1947208668241375573
[lx] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1947208668241375573
[lxi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025
[lxii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025
[lxiii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1947268927374938582
[BS1]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFLQNW
[AP2]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFLQNa