Iran Update, January 26, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

 Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework selected State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister designate on January 24, even though at least four framework members opposed Maliki’s nomination.[i] These dissenting framework members and their parties could attempt to block the Iraqi presidential election in order to try to delay or prevent Maliki from becoming prime minister. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The framework selected Maliki by a majority vote with National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim, Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, and former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi opposing his nomination. Abadi did not participate in the November 2025 parliamentary elections but appears to maintain influence within the framework.[ii] There have been conflicting Iraqi media reports about whether the fourth framework member who opposes Maliki is Labor Minister Ahmed al Asadi or Services Alliance and Kataib al Imam Ali head Shibl al Zaidi.[iii] Asadi is a member of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition.[iv] A National State Forces Alliance parliamentarian told Iraqi media that Hakim did not support Maliki due to Maliki’s “working methods and priorities to run the [Iraqi] state and deal with the crisis at this stage.”[v] Iraqi media reported on January 26 that Maliki rejected Hakim’s request to “chair” the framework and control the Ministry of Oil in return for Hakim’s support for Maliki’s nomination, according to information circulated by “online platforms close to Maliki.”[vi] An unspecified Shia leader told Iraqi media on January 26 that the framework had tried to avoid selecting a prime minister designate via a majority, as opposed to a consensus, due to the “implications of [framework] division.”[vii] This statement suggests that the framework may be aware that opposition to Maliki among some framework members could cause these members to try to delay or prevent Maliki from becoming prime minister. Parliament must elect a president by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum before the newly elected president selects the prime minister designate to form a government.[viii] The framework blocked the 2022 presidential election by preventing the quorum in order to prevent Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr from forming a government without Iranian-backed parties.[ix] Parliament is scheduled to vote on a president on January 27, but the process may last for more than one session given that 18 candidates are currently competing for the presidency.[x] The parties within the framework that oppose Maliki’s nomination control between 48 and 51 seats, depending on who the fourth framework member opposed to Maliki is. 108 seats are required to block the presidential election.[xi]

The spokesperson of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition stated on January 25 that the coalition supports Maliki’s nomination.[xii] Maliki may have offered Sudani spoils in the new government to persuade Sudani to forgo the premiership. The spokesperson said that the coalition will form a parliamentary coordinating committee to “unify positions and visions” with the next Iraqi government.[xiii] Maliki offered former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi control of the now defunct National Council for Strategic Policies as a spoil following the 2010 elections and successfully secured the premiership despite Allawi’s coalition winning a plurality of votes.[xiv] Maliki may have similarly offered spoils to Sudani to gain Sudani’s support for his premiership. Sudani reportedly conditioned his withdrawal from the premiership race on January 12 on Maliki’s fulfillment of a list of conditions that Maliki unlikely met.[xv] Sudani’s conditions reportedly included the approval of all framework leaders, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr, and unspecified Kurdish and Sunni political parties for Maliki's nomination.[xvi] CTP-ISW assessed on January 13 that Sudani may have wagered that Maliki would fail to meet these conditions, as Sudani would have reportedly received the premiership with the framework’s backing if this had occurred.[xvii] The framework’s nomination of Maliki and Sudani’s coalition’s support for Maliki despite Maliki’s apparent failure to meet these conditions suggests that Maliki has won Sudani’s favor.

Iraqi Sunni political parties are also divided over Maliki’s nomination.[xviii] Some of the Sunni parties that oppose Maliki could join an effort to block the presidential election. The Sunni National Political Council released a statement on January 24, prior to the announcement of Maliki’s nomination, that implicitly warned the framework against selecting Maliki for the premiership.[xix] Multiple Sunni parties, including the Progress Party, the National Determination Alliance, and the Azm Alliance, formed the Sunni National Political Council in November 2025 to unify their political efforts and positions on key issues.[xx] The council’s statement said that the “deep political, security, and economic crises” that occurred under Maliki’s leadership when he was prime minister between 2006 and 2014 led to serious security failures that allowed the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to enter Iraq.[xxi] The Azm Alliance and the National Determination Alliance, which is led by current Defense Minister Thabit al Abbasi, issued statements on January 24 and 25 in support of Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate.[xxii] An Azm Alliance parliamentarian posted on X that the council’s statement only represents the opinion of Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi and not the consensus of the council.[xxiii] Iraqi media reported on January 22 that Halbousi’s recent posts on social media indicate that he opposes Maliki.[xxiv] A Progress Party parliamentarian insisted on January 26 that the council’s statement was formed via consensus, however.[xxv] Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai discussed “entitlements,” which refers to the control of ministries and other political spoils, with Maliki on January 26, which indicates that Maliki may have offered Samarrai spoils in the new government in exchange for the Azm Alliance’s support.[xxvi] The Progress Party, as well as the other two Sunni National Political Council parties that have not commented on the council’s statement, control 36 seats in parliament.[xxvii] Those 36 seats combined with the seats held by framework parties opposed to Maliki means that only 21 to 24 additional parliamentarians would be needed to block the presidential election.

An Iraqi political source told AFP on January 26 that the United States remembers Maliki’s previous terms “in a negative light,” which underscores Maliki’s historic role in driving instability in Iraq.[xxviii] Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies while in office that led to the rise of ISIS in Iraq.[xxix] Maliki’s mismanagement of the Iraqi Security Forces led to ISIS’s seizure of almost a third of Iraqi territory in 2014.[xxx] The United States ultimately delayed support for Iraq in 2014 until Maliki was removed from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[xxxi] Maliki has previously also proven his willingness to work with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors and militias to preserve his personal power, especially after the United States withdrew from Iraq in 2011.[xxxii] A member of Maliki’s coalition claimed on January 25 that Maliki would restrict weapons to the Iraqi state while in office.[xxxiii] An unidentified senior Iraqi official similarly told a Kurdish journalist in December 2025 that Maliki told the United States via unspecified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supported his bid for the premiership.[xxxiv] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister.[xxxv]  US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a phone call with Sudani on January 25 in which Rubio warned against the formation of an Iranian-controlled Iraqi government.[xxxvi] The United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, including by pushing the government to exclude figures from the new Iraqi government who have ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxxvii]  

Several members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have threatened to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, likely to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran. These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western and Israeli media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East and likely seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand a potential conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi stated on January 25 that the Axis of Resistance would support Iran against Israel and the United States and called on Kataib Hezbollah fighters to “prepare” themselves.[xxxviii] Unspecified Iraqi sources similarly told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media that Iraqi groups have "sounded the trumpet of war" and that "all personnel are being armed and are ready" to attack US bases.[xxxix] The Houthis separately posted a video on January 25 of its January 2024 attack on a British oil tanker with the caption “soon.”[xl] The Houthis likely posted this video to implicitly threaten to resume its attacks against international shipping or US military vessels if the United States attacks Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem additionally stated on January 26 that Hezbollah would not remain “neutral” if the United States attacks Iran and, more specifically, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[xli] These statements are likely a response to recent media reports that the United States does not want a wider regional war.^[xlii] These groups are likely threatening to get involved and expand a potential conflict in order to try to deter a US attack against Iran.

It is unclear if the Axis of Resistance would react to a US strike on Iran in the same way that it did during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War because these groups may assess that the United States’ current objectives against Iran are different from the objectives it pursued during the war. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened to intervene in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War if the United States attacked Iran.[xliii] Those threats aimed to deter US participation in the war. The Axis of Resistance failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel or the United States for their attacks against Iran despite its threatening statements.[xliv] The Axis of Resistance may assess that the United States’ objectives in a potential attack against Iran are different from the United States’ objective in June 2025 to degrade the Iranian nuclear program.[xlv] The Axis of Resistance may therefore react differently than it did in June 2025, particularly if it perceived that a US attack posed an existential threat to the Iranian regime. US officials suggested to Israeli media on January 26 that a US strike on Iran would seek to facilitate regime change.[xlvi]

Some members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, face domestic constraints that may limit their ability to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran. Lebanese Hezbollah has continuously prioritized reconstitution and avoided direct conflict with Israel and the United States following the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[xlvii] Hezbollah has not responded militarily to any Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and personnel in recent months, including Israel’s killing of Hezbollah’s “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in November 2025.[xlviii] Hezbollah likely opposes any intervention in a potential US-Iran conflict that would threaten the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement because such action would undermine Hezbollah’s objectives of limiting Israel’s presence and operational scope in Lebanon. A US or Israeli response against Hezbollah would also likely disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to reconstitute its forces and weapons stockpiles. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah may also be hesitant to intervene in a renewed conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions on their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is important for Iraqi militias because it will determine the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[xlix] An Iraqi militia attack on the United States could prompt some Iraqi political parties to distance themselves from Iranian-backed militias, particularly if militia actions risk dragging Iraq into a conflict with the United States. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.^[l]

Iran has covered the anti-drone cage at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at the Natanz Nuclear Complex with panels, which the Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed are meant to allow Iran to explore the rubble at the site discreetly.[li] It is unclear if Iran has repaired the anti-drone cage under the panels. Commercially available satellite imagery from January 26 shows that Iran has completely covered the PFEP’s anti-drone cage with panels.[lii] Israeli airstrikes destroyed the PFEP during the Israel-Iran War.[liii] The PFEP housed over 1,700 centrifuges, including IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges, which Iran used to enrich uranium, including 60 percent enriched uranium.[liv] The Israeli airstrikes almost certainly destroyed or rendered inoperable most, if not all, of the centrifuges at the facility.^[lv] Damage to the anti-drone cage and the internal structure was still visible in imagery from December 12, 2025.[lvi] It is unclear if Iran completed rebuilding the anti-drone cage before covering the facility with panels.

Fighting between the Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continued on January 26 but did not collapse the January 20 ceasefire or disrupt ongoing US transfers of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq. The Syrian government and the SDF agreed on January 20 to a four-day ceasefire, which they extended by 15 days on January 24.[lvii] The Syrian army and the SDF have continued to engage each other along frontlines in the Kobani and Qamishli countrysides since agreeing to the ceasefire.[lviii] The Syrian army engaged SDF forces in Jabaliyah and Kharabat al Ashaq, Aleppo Province, along the Kobani axis, on January 25 and 26, before advancing and capturing the nearby Lafarge Cement Factory on January 26.[lix] The Lafarge Cement Factory has several tall buildings and structures that provide the Syrian army with clear lines of sight to nearby SDF positions, particularly along the M4 highway.[lx] The Syrian army and SDF forces also engaged each other with heavy weaponry, artillery, and drones near al Safa, Hasakah Province, on the Qamishli axis on January 26.[lxi] Pro-SDF and pro-government sources reported that Turkish drones conducted reconnaissance and struck al Safa on January 26.[lxii] The Syrian army and the SDF did not engage in clashes near Hasakah City and the fighting along the Kobani and Qamishli axes did not disrupt US efforts to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq.[lxiii]

The Syrian government and the SDF have made some progress on integration negotiations during the ceasefire. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Kurdish media on January 25 that he proposed individuals for senior positions in the Syrian government, including assistant defense minister and Hasakah governor.[lxiv] The January 18 ceasefire proposal signed by Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Abdi allowed the SDF to choose appointees for senior roles in the Syrian government. That Abdi is following up on the provisions set out in the January 18 proposal is positive but does not mean that other SDF leaders will agree to Shara’s negotiation terms. CTP-ISW assessed on January 21 that the most likely course of action entails Abdi and a subset of more moderate SDF leaders agreeing to Shara’s terms while some hardline SDF leaders refuse to capitulate and continue to fight.[lxv] Abdi reached out to Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masrour Barzani and Bafel Talabani on January 26 for support in the ongoing negotiations.[lxvi] Iraqi Kurdish leaders have previously facilitated meetings between US officials and Abdi to negotiate the ceasefire and the SDF’s integration.[lxvii]

Ongoing SDF-Syrian government fighting caused the Russian military to abandon its only base in northeastern Syria on January 26. Multiple Syrian sources reported that the Russian military evacuated its forces and equipment from the Qamishli Airport in Hasakah Province on January 26.[lxviii] Russia established a base at the Qamishli Airport in 2019 and later reestablished its presence there in March 2025 after the fall of Assad in December 2024.^[lxix] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters on January 26 that the Russian military would transfer some troops to Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province and send others back to Russia.[lxx]  The SDF captured some of the Russian military equipment that was left at the base and will likely use it to fight the Syrian army if fighting resumes.[lxxi]  The Russian equipment that the SDF captured is unlikely to improve the SDF’s defensive capabilities against MoD offensive operations, however, because the equipment does not appear to be advanced or heavily armored.[lxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Government Formation: The Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework selected State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister designate on January 24, even though at least four framework members opposed Maliki’s nomination. These dissenting framework members and their parties, as well as some Sunni parties that oppose Maliki, could attempt to block the Iraqi presidential election in order to try to delay or prevent Maliki from becoming prime minister. An Iraqi political source told AFP on January 26 that the United States remembers Maliki’s previous terms “in a negative light,” which underscores Maliki’s historic role in driving instability in Iraq.
• The Axis of Resistance’s Efforts to Deter a US Attack on Iran: Several members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have threatened to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, likely to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran. These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western and Israeli media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East and likely seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand a potential conflict. Some members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, face domestic constraints that may limit their ability to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran.
• Repairs at Natanz Nuclear Complex: Iran has covered the anti-drone cage at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at the Natanz Nuclear Complex with panels, which the Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed are meant to allow Iran to explore the rubble at the site discreetly. It is unclear if Iran has repaired the anti-drone cage under the panels.
• Syrian Government-SDF Conflict: Fighting between the Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continued on January 26 but did not collapse the January 20 ceasefire or disrupt ongoing US transfers of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq. The Syrian government and the SDF have made some progress on integration negotiations during the ceasefire.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

US forces continue to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq amid the Syrian government-SDF ceasefire. An Iraqi security official told AFP that US forces transferred up to 1,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq via land and air on January 24 as part of the United States’ plan to transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees to Iraqi-controlled facilities.[lxxiii] A second unspecified official told AFP that the 1,000 detainees include Europeans and Iraqi nationals and that the Iraqi government will hold the detainees in three detention facilities. The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council separately announced on January 25 that it will try and prosecute ISIS fighters accused of terrorism whom US forces have recently transferred to Iraq.[lxxiv]

The Iraqi federal government has also continued to take steps to secure the Iraq-Syria border amid the ongoing transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq. Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayadh visited the 73rd Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade headquarters on January 24 and called for “strengthening coordination” among Iraqi security forces to secure the Iraq-Syria border.[lxxv] The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[lxxvi] The 73rd PMF Brigade operates under the Ninewa Operations Command, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[lxxvii] A senior Iraqi official told a Kurdish journalist on January 24 that the Iraqi government has blocked Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from deploying to the Iraq-Syria border based on a request from the United States.[lxxviii] The official added that only the Iraqi army and the PMF are operating along the Iraq-Syria border. The PMF includes Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, that control parts of the Iraq-Syria border.[lxxix] The PMF announced on January 26 that the 13th PMF Brigade, which is closely aligned with Kataib Hezbollah, is continuing its “great work” to secure the al Qaim border crossing, for example.[lxxx]

Iraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri claimed in an interview with the Washington Post that the number of ISIS fighters in Syria has increased from 2,000 to 10,000 over the past year.[lxxxi] Shatri is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[lxxxii] CTP-ISW cannot verify Shatri’s claim and Shatri’s estimate of the number of ISIS fighters in Syria significantly surpasses the estimates of some international organizations. The United Nations Security Council estimated in August 2025 that there was a total of 3,000 ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq, for example.[lxxxiii] Shatri claimed that the 10,000 fighters include individuals who previously supported Syrian President Ahmed al Shara but have become “disaffected by the political direction [Shara] has taken.” Shatri claimed that the number also includes Arab tribesmen and individuals who defected to ISIS from Jabhat al Nusra and “Ansar al Sunna,” presumably in reference to the Syrian ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah. Shatri’s estimate presumably only includes active fighters and not fighters who are detained in detention facilities. Iraqi National Security Advisory member Saeed al Jayashi separately claimed that Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani told Iraqi officials that the number of ISIS fighters in Syria had increased to 5,000 during a visit to Baghdad in March 2025.[lxxxiv]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.