Iran Update, January 24, 2026

Data Cutoff: 4:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Note: CTP-ISW will publish updates on January 24 and 25 providing analysis about developments in Iran and Syria. We will resume full coverage on Monday, January 26.

  Takeaways

• Syria: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to extend their ceasefire in northeastern Syria for 15 days on January 24. The continued ceasefire will help ensure that the government offensive does not inflict lasting harm on US counter-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) objectives in northeastern Syria because it will create stable conditions for Syrian government forces to deploy to and secure ISIS detention facilities. The ceasefire will also enable US forces to continue to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: The Institute for Science and International Security reported on January 22 that Iran is encasing a newly built facility at Taleghan 2 at the Parchin Military Complex in a concrete “sarcophagus” to harden the facility against potential airstrikes. The Institute reported that the facility houses a cylindrical chamber that resembles a high explosive test chamber.
• Iranian Leadership: Anti-regime media claimed on January 24 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has moved into an underground shelter in Tehran Province, according to two unspecified sources close to the regime. The sources added that Khamenei’s third son, Masoud, has assumed day-to-day oversight of the Supreme Leader’s office and is now the primary conduit for coordination with the government’s executive institutions.

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to extend their ceasefire in northeastern Syria for 15 days on January 24.[i] The continued ceasefire will help ensure that the government offensive does not inflict lasting harm on US counter-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) objectives in northeastern Syria because it will create stable conditions for Syrian government forces to deploy to and secure ISIS detention facilities. The ceasefire will also enable US forces to continue to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria. The United States may transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraqi-controlled facilities, according to US Central Command (CENTCOM).[ii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely decided to temporarily halt the Syrian government offensive on SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria after a phone call with US President Donald Trump on January 19.[iii] A successful transfer of all or most of the ISIS detainees will take several additional days, if not weeks, to complete.[iv]

Both the SDF and Syrian forces continued to prepare for a possible lapse in the ceasefire on January 24 before the parties announced the extension. The continued preparations risk causing a resumption of intense but possibly slower moving and more deadly fighting in Kobani, Hasakah City, and eventually Qamishli. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the SDF could use the four-day ceasefire to reorganize itself and prepare its hardened, ideological Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to defend Kurdish villages and cities against future government attacks.[v] SDF units largely retreated from Arab-majority areas in the initial days of the offensive, leading to rapid Syrian government advances and relatively few casualties.[vi] The buildup of each side’s forces and the fact that fighting has moved to the Kurdish heartland make it more likely that a ceasefire breakdown would lead to intense fighting. The SDF has set up defensive lines between Hasakah City and Qamishli, including digging trenches and mining bridges.[vii] SDF units in Hasakah City have also prepared to defend against a Syrian government offensive for the past several days.[viii] Kurds from outside of Syria have also joined SDF defenses in Qamishli and Hasakah.[ix] Syrian government forces continued to move toward Hasakah City on January 24.[x] The SDF said two hours before the ceasefire was set to end that the Syrian government had “systematically” continued its military buildup around Kobani and Hasakah.[xi] The SDF and MOD engaged each other with one-way attack drones on contact lines southeast of Qamishli on January 24.[xii] SDF fighters also engaged Syrian government forces with unspecified weapons south of Kobani.[xiii]

Kurdish and international organizations are pushing the Syrian government to establish a humanitarian corridor in Kobani, Aleppo Province, as Syrian forces surround the city. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) called on January 24 for the opening of a humanitarian corridor in Kobani to enable civilians to access aid, medical treatment, and basic necessities.[xiv] The ENKS stated that it is in contact with the Syrian government and every “party responsible” to open a corridor.[xv] The deputy spokesperson for the UN Secretary General also noted on January 24 that the United Nations is in contact with Syrian authorities to deliver aid to Kobani.[xvi] Civilians in Kobani have no access to electricity, water, essential food supplies, or internet.[xvii] CTP-ISW noted on January 22 that it is unclear whether SDF shelling caused electricity and water infrastructure to fail or if the government deliberately cut Kobani’s access to those resources.[xviii] The Syrian army announced on January 24 that it will open humanitarian corridors in “the coming hours,” but did not specify if this includes a corridor in Kobani.[xix] Syrian government forces have surrounded SDF fighters in Kobani since January 19, likely as the first part of a multi-stage operation to reduce SDF forces there.[xx] The pattern of events and government deployments around Kobani resembles recent government isolate-and-reduce operations against the SDF in Aleppo City and Deir Hafer, which suggests the Syrian military will employ a similar concept of operations in Kobani.[xxi] This would include opening an evacuation route to enable civilians to leave Kobani before launching an assault on the city.[xxii]

Any resumption of fighting between the SDF and government forces could lead to further ethnic-based violence. Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans President Sheikh Abdul Moneim al Nassaf issued a statement on January 23 in which he called on Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen to stand united and not be drawn into “weak-willed” attempts to sow division.[xxiii] There continue to be reports of SDF violence against Arab civilians in Hasakah.[xxiv] The Syrian army reported on January 24 that the SDF continues to carry out widespread violations, including “arrest operations, displacement, and torture," in SDF-controlled areas.[xxv] The SDF has also continued to spread evidence of MoD abuses and atrocities against Kurds.[xxvi] The government has attempted to address atrocities and extrajudicial violence by creating reporting mechanisms to “redress any injustice or harm” in Deir ez Zor, Raqqa, and Hasakah provinces.[xxvii] A resumption of fighting could increase ethnic-based violence, particularly because Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has deployed divisions to the northeast that contain militias that have previously conducted unsanctioned attacks on minority communities, including Kurds, and destabilized Syria by doing so.[xxviii]

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on January 22 that Iran is encasing a newly built facility at Taleghan 2 at the Parchin Military Complex in a concrete “sarcophagus” to harden the facility against potential airstrikes.[xxix] The Institute reported that growing earth piles near the facility likely indicate that Iran intends to bury the facility once the concrete shell is complete.[xxx] The Institute reported that the facility houses a cylindrical chamber that resembles a high explosive test chamber.[xxxi] The Institute previously assessed in November 2025 that Iran was constructing a possible high explosives containment vessel at Taleghan 2, and it noted at the time that such vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[xxxii] Iran previously used Taleghan 2 to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before it suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[xxxiii] Israel struck Taleghan 2 and destroyed equipment that would be needed to design and test explosives in October 2024.[xxxiv]

Anti-regime media claimed on January 24 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has moved into an underground shelter in Tehran Province.[xxxv] Two unspecified sources close to the regime told the outlet that Khamenei relocated to a “fortified site with interconnected tunnels” after senior Iranian officials assessed that the risk of a potential US attack had increased.[xxxvi] The sources added that Khamenei’s third son, Masoud, has assumed day-to-day oversight of the Supreme Leader’s office and is now the primary conduit for coordination with the government’s executive institutions.[xxxvii] It is plausible that Khamenei has moved into an underground shelter given that he similarly did so during the Israel-Iran War. The New York Times reported in June 2025 that Khamenei had relied on a “trusted aide” and suspended electronic communications while “ensconced in a bunker” during the Israel-Iran War.[xxxviii] These security measures would likely restrict access to Khamenei and disrupt regular communications within the regime. An opposition outlet previously reported that some Iranian officials, including former President Hassan Rouhani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, reportedly attempted to contact Khamenei to advocate for a ceasefire in June 2025 but were unsuccessful.[xxxix]

Iranian officials are continuing to try to deter potential US military action against Iran amid the United States’ military buildup in the Middle East. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on January 23 that Iran would treat any attack “as an all-out war.” His statement comes as a US carrier strike group and other assets will arrive in the Middle East “in the coming days.”[xl] The official added that Iran hopes that the carrier strike group will not be used to confront Iran, but that the Iranian armed forces are ready for the “worst-case scenario.”[xli] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRCG) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour and IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi separately warned on January 24 that Iran is “more ready than ever” and has its “finger on the trigger.”[xlii] An IRGC-affiliated outlet threatened on January 24 that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States disrupts Iranian and regional security.[xliii] These warnings come after senior Iranian officials have threatened in recent days to attack US bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[xliv]