Iran Update, January 20, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely decided to temporarily halt the Syrian government offensive on Syrian Democratic Forces-held (SDF) territory in northeastern Syria after a phone call with US President Donald Trump on January 19.[i] Shara and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi failed on January 19 to finalize a ceasefire that both men had agreed to the day prior on January 18, reportedly due to Abdi’s request for five days to consult with other SDF leaders on Shara's demands.[ii] Syrian government forces then advanced toward the remaining SDF-held regions with large Kurdish populations.[iii] Shara and Trump discussed the “protection of the Kurdish people” during their January 19 phone call, according to a Syrian readout of the call.[iv] Shara later provided a major concession to Abdi in a “mutual understanding” on January 20 by granting Abdi four days to consult with SDF leaders and secure their agreement to Shara’s terms, which include the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state and the handover of Hasakah Province to the state.[v] This is a major concession because Shara could have continued his advance and attempted to finish his efforts to destroy the SDF while it was disorganized and militarily vulnerable. The four day pause also provides Abdi an opportunity to prepare defenses if he cannot secure agreement within the SDF to accept the deal (more on preparing defenses below). Shara pledged that the Syrian army will not enter Hasakah City, Qamishli, or Kurdish villages” in the event of an agreement.”[vi] Trump said during a January 20 press conference that his administration is “trying to protect the Kurds” in Syria, further suggesting that his call influenced Shara to enact a brief ceasefire to reduce harm to Kurdish communities.^[vii] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 20 a full ceasefire on “all sectors,” and the SDF affirmed its commitment to the agreement.^[viii]

A four-day ceasefire that slows the government’s takeover of Hasakah Province may enable the Syrian government and SDF to organize a more orderly transition of control over Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) detention facilities and camps holding ISIS supporters, which have been subject to uncoordinated and dangerous handovers. These conditions must be set rapidly because there is a very high risk of ISIS breakouts at this time. The government's sudden offensive against the SDF in northern Syria caused a chaotic SDF withdrawal that has prevented an organized handover of SDF security responsibilities, including the SDF's control of ISIS detention facilities and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps that house ISIS supporters. The MoD backfilled the SDF on January 20 at the al Hol IDP camp—the largest in Syria with 10,000 Syrians and 6,000 third country nationals, many of whom are ISIS supporters.[ix] The Syrian government accused the SDF of abandoning the camp with no coordination and “releas[ing]” residents, and the SDF accused the Syrian army of taking the camp by force.^[x] The SDF also claimed that government forces continued to engage SDF forces at Aqtan Prison, which is an ISIS detention center north of Raqqa City, on January 20.[xi] A brief pause in fighting near Hasakah may allow the government to divert more resources to ensuring the safe handover of previously SDF-held detention centers and IDP camps, which has largely not taken place thus far. Government-SDF fighting at Shaddadi Prison resulted in the breakout of over 100 ISIS fighters into the surrounding area on January 19, for example.[xii] Hasakah City, which the government has pledged to remain outside of for four days, hosts ISIS detainees at a center in the Ghuwayran neighborhood.^[xiii] ISIS previously attacked this facility in 2022, which enabled nearly 100 fighters (but possibly many more) to escape the facility.[xiv]

The Syrian army will likely enter Hasakah City, Qamishli, and other Kurdish towns and villages in the absence of an agreement after the four-day ceasefire expires and is currently setting conditions to do so. Syrian civil institutions will enter Hasakah City, Qamishli, and other areas in the event of an agreement, but it is unclear how these institutions will be protected.[xv] The Syrian army will likely use the four-day pause to solidify its control and presence in other areas of Hasakah Province. The Syrian army reportedly deployed to positions that Shammari tribal fighters seized in northeastern Hasakah Province on January 20, such as the Yaroubiyah border crossing with Iraq and Tel Hamis.^[xvi] Iraqi and Syrian media reported that the fighters are members of the Sanadid Forces, which is an SDF-affiliated unit that consists of about 4,500 fighters from the Shammar tribe.^[xvii] Some Arab SDF contingents have defected since the beginning of the government offensive.^[xviii]  The Syrian army’s capture of territory in the SDF’s rear provides the government with significant tactical advantages if or when fighting resumes.

Syrian MoD forces also continued to advance on Kobani, northern Aleppo Province, on January 20.[xix] Syrian forces have seized Sarrin, which is roughly 16 kilometers south of Kobani.[xx] Syrian forces have also taken a key bridge over the northern Euphrates River that will provide Syrian forces a more direct route to Kobani from government territory.[xxi] Syrian forces appear to control the majority of the east-west M4 highway as of January 20, which will also aid their deployment to Kobani and cut off an SDF retreat from Kobani in the absence of a negotiated settlement.[xxii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and the Syrian MoD committed to not entering Kurdish villages and towns on January 20, but it is unclear at the time of this writing if MoD forces will halt their advance before entering Kobani, as the city is not explicitly mentioned in the agreement.[xxiii]

Shara’s concession to Abdi may enable the SDF to reorganize its forces for a defense against future government attacks. Abdi confirmed on January 20 that the SDF has “withdrawn” and consolidated forces within Kurdish-majority areas in Syria.^[xxiv] The SDF could use the four days to reorganize itself and prepare its hardened, ideological Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to defend Syrian Kurdish villages and cities. Many YPG commanders have fought for decades as part of the Kurdish insurgency.[xxv]

Shara’s decision to deploy units accused of human rights abuses to Hasakah Province could exacerbate tensions in sensitive Kurdish-majority areas, though the pause will create an opportunity to replace these units if Shara chooses to do so. Shara’s decision to exploit advantageous military conditions for a rapid government advance into Hasakah Province on January 18 and 19 likely led him to choose to risk deploying units accused of human rights abuses against Kurds into sensitive Kurdish-majority areas. The Syrian army’s 72nd Division, which consists of several pro-Turkish militias that fought in Turkish offensives targeting Kurdish forces during the Syrian civil war, advanced into Hasakah City on January 19, for example.[xxvi] Elements of the 72nd Division were already in place northwest of Hasakah City and therefore a logical if extremely dangerous choice to exploit success on the ground, especially since Shara has prioritized destroying SDF control over northeastern Syria over all other priorities during this offensive. A Syria analyst circulated a report on January 20 that suggests that the 76th Division is deployed within Hasakah Province.[xxvii] The 76th Division is led by US-sanctioned commander Sayf Abu Bakr and largely consists of former fighters from the Hamza Division, which the United States and European Union sanctioned in 2023 and 2025, respectively, for committing abuses against minorities, including Kurds.[xxviii] The deployment of the 76th Division, if accurate, risks further destabilizing the situation in northeastern Syria by introducing actors who have set conditions and created a culture within their units where atrocities against certain minorities are acceptable and perhaps even encouraged.[xxix] The atrocities committed in March 2025 by the 76th Division significantly worsened the security situation in western Syria, for example.[xxx]

Some hardline elements within the SDF’s leadership may pressure Abdi to reject Shara’s terms for the SDF’s integration. Abdi will “consult” with other SDF leaders on a “detailed plan” for the integration of the SDF and its remaining territory into the Syrian state over the next four days.[xxxi] The Syrian government will likely advance into Hasakah City and Qamishli if the SDF does not agree to Shara’s terms. The SDF affirmed its willingness to “move forward with the implementation of the January 18 agreement” in a statement on January 20 about Shara and Abdi’s new agreement, but existing divisions within the SDF make it far from clear whether Abdi will be able to sell Shara’s terms to his fellow SDF leaders.[xxxii] US and Syrian officials have blamed the prolongment and lack of progress in government-SDF negotiations on PKK-linked leaders within the SDF’s leadership, whose hardline demands have prevented pragmatic SDF leaders from making progress with the government.^[xxxiii] Syrian media reported that PKK-aligned leaders have placed “immense pressure” on Abdi to renounce his January 18 agreement with Shara.^[xxxiv] Shara has not compromised on any of his core demands, including the handover of Hasakah Province and the SDF’s integration into the defense and interior ministries. Abdi may not be able to secure any concessions from Shara that would possibly convince hardliners within the SDF to surrender territory to the Syrian government.

Some YPG or hardline SDF elements could resume attacks against the government or launch a Kurdish insurgency even if Abdi formally accepts Shara’s terms. Hardliners in Aleppo refused Abdi’s orders to implement a ceasefire there in early January, which led to the current government offensive.[xxxv] CTP-ISW assessed on January 15 that divisions between SDF leaders aligned with the PKK and leaders who are not risks triggering future military engagements between the Syrian government and SDF in northern Syria.[xxxvi] Syrian forces would presumably respond if attacked, which could reignite or expand fighting, particularly given the deployment of problematic Syrian army units.

The government has moved to quickly assert control over Deir ez Zor, Aleppo, and Raqqa provinces, which may reduce the risk of tribal violence in these areas. The Arab Bakara, Jabour, Shammar, and Aqidat tribes defected from the SDF and Kurdish-majority units from the SDF retreated into the Kurdish heartland in northeastern Syria from Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces.[xxxvii] The Syrian Interior Ministry deployed the General Security Service (GSS) to areas of Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces that were seized on January 17 and 18 by Arab tribes previously aligned with the SDF.[xxxviii] The GSS has successfully intervened in minor instances of score settling between members of the same tribe over collaborating with the SDF.[xxxix] Arab tribe members killed at least 15 other tribesmen in instances of score settling in Raqqa City immediately after the SDF withdrew from the city, but GSS deployments to the city on January 18 have reduced reports of interpersonal violence.[xl] The GSS’s efforts to restore security have been aided by the rapid deployment of civil authorities to newly seized areas to provide administrative services.[xli] Syrian authorities appointed Abdel Rahman Salameh as Raqqa Province governor on January 19.^[xlii] Salameh previously served as secretary-general to Shara and supervised former SDF-held Afrin, Azaz, al Bab, Jarablus, and Manbij as the deputy governor of Aleppo Province.[xliii] Syrian government officials are also securing control over water, oil, agricultural, and electricity infrastructure in former SDF-held territory.[xliv]

Lebanese officials likely seek to avoid high-level negotiations with Israel because such negotiations would presumably require the Lebanese government to make firm commitments to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanese territory, which it has thus far been hesitant to do. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee has recently halted its frequent meetings, reportedly due to disagreements among its members over the mechanism’s role and Hezbollah’s disarmament. The mechanism, which oversees the implementation of the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement, has not held any meetings since January 7, and postponed its January 10 and 17 meetings.[xlv] Israeli and Lebanese officials held frequent direct meetings through the mechanism between December 2025 and early January 2026 to resolve outstanding issues and reduce tensions.[xlvi] The meetings produced limited results, however.[xlvii] US and Israeli officials reportedly requested that Lebanon “raise the level of its negotiations” with Israel, which presumably means engaging in higher-level negotiations with Israeli officials.[xlviii] The United States also reportedly proposed the creation of a Lebanese-Israeli political and military committee to manage “hostilities” and efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[xlix] Lebanese sources told Lebanese media on January 20 that the Lebanese government is “attached” to the mechanism and has called for a mechanism meeting to be held immediately.[l] Lebanese officials have routinely rejected any direct negotiations with Israel outside of the mechanism until Israel ceases its operations and withdraws from Lebanon.[li] High-level talks with Israel outside the mechanism would presumably require the Lebanese government to make firm decisions and commitments to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese government is likely reticent to make such commitments because it has sought to avoid taking aggressive action against Hezbollah and is increasingly unwilling to disarm Hezbollah, particularly north of the Litani River, due to its fear of civil unrest.[lii] Hezbollah has frequently rejected disarmament and threatened to incite internal unrest and protests in Lebanon if the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) tries to disarm the group.[liii]

Israel reportedly supports negotiating with the Lebanese government outside of the mechanism and confining the mechanism’s discussions to economic cooperation, according to Lebanese media.[liv] Increased economic cooperation between Israel and Lebanon would help build trust between the two countries and may erode support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese population. Israeli officials have continuously called since December 2025 for mechanism meetings to focus solely on economic cooperation.[lv] Israeli officials have stressed the need to establish an economic zone along the Israel-Lebanon border to create “strategic depth” and reduce the risk of cross-border Hezbollah attacks.[lvi] US officials have also emphasized that economic measures are a key means to weaken Hezbollah.[lvii] Economic cooperation with mechanism members, specifically Israel and the United States, could help the Lebanese government receive the financial support it needs to reinstate itself as the primary provider of services in Lebanon. Hezbollah has historically conducted activities that fill a social service and development void that the Lebanese government has failed to fill itself, which enables the group to maintain its support base and position itself as a critical provider.[lviii] Sustained economic support for the Lebanese government could undermine Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its Shia support base, which in turn would make it easier for the Lebanese state to destroy the group militarily and/or politically.

The Lebanese government’s unwillingness to participate in high-level talks with Israeli officials and take meaningful steps to disarm Hezbollah may undermine efforts to prevent a renewed conflict in Lebanon. Israeli, US, and European officials have warned since October 2025 that Israel will launch an expanded operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government does not take action to disarm Hezbollah.[lix] Israel previously delayed an operation in December 2025 to allow for greater dialogue with the Lebanese government.[lx] Israeli media noted on January 19, however, that the United States is intensifying pressure on the Lebanese government and may “grant” Israel “greater freedom of action” north of the Litani River if the Lebanese government does not demonstrate “a genuine willingness” to disarm Hezbollah.[lxi]

The Iranian regime has expanded its crackdown beyond protesters by targeting merchants and businesses that supported the protests, which risks exacerbating tensions between the regime and a part of the Iranian population that the regime has long relied on for support. Merchants in Tehran began protesting on December 28, 2025, in response to worsening economic conditions and the rapid devaluation of the Iranian rial.[lxii] Shopkeepers and merchants across Iran subsequently went on strike in support of the protests.[lxiii] Engaging in economic strikes is typically less dangerous than participating in protests given that security forces are less likely to violently confront business keepers who go on strike but do not participate in protests. The Tehran Prosecutor’s Office announced on January 20 that it has opened cases against 60 businesses that directly or indirectly supported calls for protests on January 8 and 9.^[lxiv] Tehran Prosecutor Ali Salehi previously signaled a hardline judicial approach to the protests, dismissing US President Donald Trump’s statements about canceled executions as “baseless nonsense” and emphasizing that the judiciary’s response to protesters will be “decisive, deterrent, and swift."[lxv] Iranian Supreme Court Head Mohammad Jafar Montazeri similarly stated on January 20 that the judiciary must file “special cases” against individuals who incited “riots,” including individuals who closed their shops or stopped conducting business during the protests.[lxvi] Anti-regime media separately reported on January 19 that the regime has frozen the bank accounts of several business owners who went on strike in Esfahan Province.[lxvii] Iranian authorities also arrested and seized the assets of Mohammad Saedinia, who is the owner of a popular cafe chain in Qom Province, on January 13 for "inciting unrest" after he joined the national strike.[lxviii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on January 19 that the value of Saedinia’s assets “is almost equal to the financial damage caused” by protesters in Tehran.[lxix] The Iranian regime has previously arrested and threatened to execute merchants who went on strike during past protest waves in order to stop protest activity.[lxx] The regime’s current crackdown on merchants will likely exacerbate the grievances of the demographic that initiated the current protest movement, particularly as the regime has not signaled any willingness or intention to implement fundamental economic reforms to address the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy.

The Iranian regime has threatened to attack US strategic assets in the Middle East if the United States strikes Iran, very likely to try to deter any US action against the regime. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press listed on January 20 several US bases in the Middle East that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force could target.[lxxi] Defa Press claimed that the IRGC Aerospace Force could target these bases with Fateh-110 and Khalij-e Fars missiles and Shahed, Arash, and Hadid 110 drones.[lxxii] Iran previously attacked al Udeid Airbase in Qatar during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[lxxiii] AFGS Cultural Deputy Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi separately warned on January 20 that Iran would respond to any attempt to harm Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with a strong retaliation.[lxxiv] These threats came after an adviser to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf suggested on January 19 that Iran did not use its maximum capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because the regime was anticipating a larger conflict in the future.[lxxv]

US-led international coalition forces completed their planned withdrawal from Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 17, which marked the end of the first phase of the US withdrawal from Iraq.[lxxvi] Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah oversaw the deployment of Iraqi military units to the base and inspected the base’s facilities to confirm operational readiness on January 17.[lxxvii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from federal Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw from the country by the end of 2026.[lxxviii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced in late October 2025 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” would remain at Ain al Asad to support US operations against ISIS in Syria.[lxxix] The Iraqi Defense Ministry director of media and moral guidance said on January 20 that remaining coalition advisers are based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan.[lxxx]  A US official told Reuters in late September 2025 that the United States would reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[lxxxi] CTP-ISW assessed on September 18 that the US withdrawal from federal Iraq increases the United States’ reliance on positions in Iraqi Kurdistan to counter ISIS in the region.[lxxxii] The withdrawal of US forces from Ain al Asad also attaches greater weight to the United States maintaining a productive US-Kurdish relationship.

Key Takeaways

• Syrian Government Offensive in Northeastern Syria: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely decided to temporarily halt the Syrian government offensive on Syrian Democratic Forces-held (SDF) territory in northeastern Syria after a phone call with US President Donald Trump on January 19. Shara and Trump discussed the “protection of the Kurdish people.” Shara later provided a major concession to Abdi in a “mutual understanding” on January 20 by granting Abdi four days to consult with SDF leaders and secure their agreement to Shara’s terms, which include the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state and the handover of Hasakah Province to the state. The four-day pause provides Abdi an opportunity to prepare defenses if he cannot secure agreement within the SDF to accept the deal.
• Status of ISIS Detention Facilities and IDP Camps: A four-day ceasefire that slows the government’s takeover of Hasakah Province may enable the Syrian government and SDF to organize a more orderly transition of control over Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) detention facilities and camps holding ISIS supporters, which have been subject to uncoordinated and dangerous handovers. The MoD backfilled the SDF on January 20 at the al Hol IDP camp—the largest in Syria with 10,000 Syrians and 6,000 third country nationals, many of whom are ISIS supporters.
• Internal SDF Decision-Making: Some hardline elements within the SDF’s leadership may pressure Abdi to reject Shara’s terms for the SDF’s integration. Abdi will “consult” with other SDF leaders on a “detailed plan” for the integration of the SDF and its remaining territory into the Syrian state over the next four days. Some YPG or hardline SDF elements could resume attacks against the government or launch a Kurdish insurgency even if Abdi formally accepts Shara’s terms.
• Iranian Regime Crackdown: The Iranian regime has expanded its crackdown beyond protesters by targeting merchants and businesses that supported the protests, which risks exacerbating tensions between the regime and a part of the Iranian population that the regime has long relied on for support.
• Iranian Threats to US Forces: The Iranian regime has threatened to attack US strategic assets in the Middle East if the United States strikes Iran, very likely to try to deter any US action against the regime.
• US Military Presence in Iraq: US-led international coalition forces completed their planned withdrawal from Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 17, which marked the end of the first phase of the US withdrawal from Iraq.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

The Iraqi federal government has taken steps to secure the Iraq-Syria border, likely to prevent any instability that the Syrian government’s offensive in northeastern Syria creates from spreading into Iraq. Several Iraqi military units, including the 25th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade and forces under the PMF Euphrates Operations Command, have deployed to the border.[lxxxiii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lxxxiv] The forces deployed under the PMF Euphrates Operations Command are led by Major General Kazem Musa al Saadi, who also commands the Badr Organization-affiliated 10th PMF Brigade.[lxxxv] An informed source told Iraqi outlet Baghdad Today on January 19 that unidentified “elite [army] formations” are also deploying to the border.[lxxxvi] Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Yarallah, and several unspecified military leaders visited the al Qaim and al Rumana districts near the Iraq-Syria border on January 20 to review security measures.[lxxxvii] Iraqi federal government officials remain concerned that instability in Syria will cause the threat of ISIS to spill over into Iraq.[lxxxviii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani emphasized the importance of controlling the Iraq-Syria border as well as strengthening Iraq-Syria security cooperation in a phone call with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on January 20.[lxxxix]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.