Iran Update, February 25, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.   

A newly established coalition of anti-regime Kurdish organizations outlined its vision for administering Kurdish-majority areas of Iran if the Iranian regime collapses, which reflects the potential for Iran to fracture if the regime were to collapse. Anti-regime Kurdish groups established the “Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan” on February 22 with the stated objective of achieving self-determination.[i] The coalition includes the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle, and the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan.[ii] PDKI leader Mostafa Hejri told Iranian diaspora media on February 23 that the coalition created a “joint plan for administering” Kurdish-majority areas of Iran during the “transition period,” in reference to the period between the collapse of the current Iranian regime and the establishment of a new central government.[iii] This statement highlights how Kurdish opposition groups are considering and planning for the potential collapse of the regime. Hejri added that citizens in Kurdish-majority areas would elect “the governing bodies of Kurdistan” to “take over the administration of the region” after the establishment of a new Iranian central government.[iv] The coalition issued a joint statement on February 22 in which it similarly outlined its objective to establish a “democratic administrative system in Kurdistan.”[v] Various separatist and anti-regime militant groups operate within Iran, including in northwestern and southeastern Iran.[vi] The collapse of the Iranian regime could create conditions for Iran to fracture if these groups tried to fill the power vacuum left behind by the regime.   

Turkey is concerned about the impact that the Iranian regime’s collapse would have on Turkish internal security. Bloomberg, citing “people familiar with the matter,” reported on February 24 that the focus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) air surveillance in Turkey has shifted from Russia to Iran.[vii] The sources stated that Turkey is concerned about the possibility of an influx of refugees from Iran to Turkey in the event of a “major conflict.”[viii] The sources added that Turkey is considering setting up camps to house refugees near the Iran-Turkey border and deploying forces into Iran to prevent refugees from entering Turkey “in the case of a power vacuum in Iran.”

Turkey would also presumably oppose the possible administration of Kurdish-majority areas in northwestern Iran by Kurdish opposition groups, some of which have ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The newly formed “Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan” includes the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[ix] The PKK announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle,” but PJAK announced that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision.[x] The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States.[xi]

Iran reportedly offered Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)-like concessions in its nuclear proposal to the United States. An unspecified Arab diplomat told Israeli media on February 25 that Iran is willing to reduce its uranium enrichment level from 60 percent to 3.6 percent, which is close to the 2015 JCPOA’s 3.67 percent uranium enrichment limit.[xii] The diplomat added that Iran offered to suspend uranium enrichment for seven years but that the United States has demanded that Iran suspend enrichment for 10 years.[xiii] Diplomatic sources familiar with the US-Iran negotiations told a separate Israeli media outlet on February 25 that Iran “offered no flexibility on the central US demand for a complete halt to uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.”[xiv] Iran also rejected the United States’ demand to transfer its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad, according to the Arab diplomat.[xv] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff suggested on February 22 that the transfer of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, in addition to zero enrichment, are US President Donald Trump’s “red lines.”[xvi] Iran previously transferred 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium to Russia under the 2015 nuclear deal.[xvii] The 11,000 kilograms included uranium enriched to 20 percent--Iran’s most highly enriched uranium at the time.[xviii] Iran has since produced over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons.[xix]

US President Donald Trump highlighted the threat of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs in his State of the Union address on February 24. Trump stated that the United States warned Iran after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War not to attempt to “rebuild [its] weapons program, and in particular nuclear weapons” but that Iran “want[s] to start it all over again and are at this moment again pursuing their sinister ambitions.”[xx] Trump separately stated that Iran is developing missiles “that will soon reach the United States.”[xxi]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has recently conducted a series of military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and along Iran’s southern coast in preparation for a potential conflict with the United States or Israel around the Persian Gulf.[xxii] The IRGC Ground Forces concluded a two-day exercise under the command of the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on February 25.[xxiii] The Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base is the IRGC Ground Forces’ closest regional headquarters to the Strait of Hormuz and oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Fars, Bushehr, and Hormozgan provinces.[xxiv] The exercise took place on unspecified Persian Gulf islands and along Iran’s southern coast.[xxv] The IRGC Ground Forces reportedly used Rezvan loitering drones for reconnaissance and target acquisition and Shahed-136 drones to strike pre-designated targets during the exercise.[xxvi] Rezvan loitering drones have a range of 20 kilometers, and Shahed-136 drones have a range of 1,500 kilometers.[xxvii] Iranian media highlighted the IRGC Ground Forces’ use of Fath-450 ballistic missiles, which have a range of between 150 and 250 kilometers, and Fath-360 ballistic missiles, which have a range of between 30 and 120 kilometers.[xxviii] Iranian media claimed that these systems have high strike accuracy, can resist electronic warfare, and can carry warheads capable of penetrating fortified positions.[xxix] Iranian media described the Fath-360 as capable of carrying a “bunker-busting” warhead.[xxx] This exercise comes after the IRGC Navy conducted an exercise in the Strait of Hormuz on February 16.[xxxi] The recent exercises indicate that Iran is preparing for both a possible maritime conflict near the Strait of Hormuz as well as a possible broader conflict that could involve strikes on US and allied bases and vessels around the Persian Gulf. Four unspecified IRGC members and three senior Iranian officials told the New York Times on February 22 that Iran has positioned ballistic missile launchers along its southern shores within range of US bases and other targets in the region.[xxxii]

Belgium-based outlet Army Recognition assessed that Iran’s use of indigenous radars in its S-300 air defense systems would reduce the effectiveness of these systems.[xxxiii] Israel destroyed the engagement radar of an Iranian S-300 in April 2024 and rendered Iran’s three remaining S-300 systems inoperable in October 2024.[xxxiv] An S-300 battery requires engagement radars, command-and-control centers, fire-control units, and launchers to operate as a functional surface-to-air missile system.[xxxv] Army Recognition reported on February 23 that Iran has deployed at least one of its four S-300 systems near Tehran City and potentially deployed an indigenous Bavar-373 air defense system near Esfahan City, citing commercially available satellite imagery on February 16 and 19.[xxxvi] Iran previously displayed an S-300 with a “new, Iranian-designed” radar in February 2025.[xxxvii] Army Recognition noted that Iran’s use of indigenous radars in its S-300 air defense systems would create “interoperability constraints and potential gaps in data link compatibility.”[xxxviii]

The Iranian regime is trying to limit disruptions to command-and-control and governance in the event of a potential US or Israeli decapitation campaign against senior Iranian leadership. The New York Times, citing six senior Iranian officials and three IRGC members, reported on February 22 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has named four potential successors for each military and government post that he appoints.[xxxix] Khamenei has also reportedly directed other officials to choose up to four successors and delegated authority to a trusted circle to make decisions if he cannot be reached or is killed. This report highlights Iranian officials’ immense paranoia about potential US or Israeli strikes targeting senior leadership. Israeli strikes targeting senior commanders during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War temporarily disrupted Iran's chain of command and delayed its initial retaliation.[xl] Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, who served as the IRGC Coordination Deputy during the war and currently serves as an adviser to IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour, stated in October 2025 that IRGC units requested authorization to strike Israel early on June 13, but that Khamenei delayed approval of the strikes until he had appointed new commanders to replace those whom Israel had killed earlier that day.[xli]

Iranian university students held anti-regime protests for the fifth consecutive day on February 25.[xlii] CTP-ISW recorded 10 protests, including four large protests, at nine universities in three provinces on February 25. CTP-ISW defines large protests as protests with over 1,000 individuals.[xliii] CTP-ISW also recorded a protest at a school in Tehran City and a protest at a 40-day mourning period ceremony in Gorgan, Golestan Province.[xliv] Universities have summoned at least 180 students to disciplinary hearings and suspended numerous others for participating in the protests in Tehran City.[xlv] Plainclothes security personnel arrested three protesters at the University of Art in Tehran City on February 25.[xlvi] Security forces deployed to Shiraz University in Fars Province on February 25. Iranian authorities have also confiscated the student identification cards of student protesters at Shiraz University.[xlvii] Basij members and pro-regime students clashed with protesters at Shiraz University on February 23 and 24.[xlviii] Two Iranian universities in Kurdistan and Zanjan provinces moved classes online, and another in Mazandaran Province is considering doing so in an effort to curb student protests.[xlix]

The economic conditions that triggered anti-regime protests in December 2025 continue to worsen. The Iranian currency has suffered a steep collapse since November 2025, which exacerbates economic instability. Iranian business owners have told Western media that they have experienced a substantial decline in sales following the regime’s internet shutdown to suppress protests in early January 2026.[l] Both the Iranian public and parts of the regime itself have demonstrated a deep lack of trust in the regime’s ability to reform or stabilize the economy. Iranian media reported on February 23 that investors are rapidly shifting their assets away from equities and into hard currency and gold, which indicates a widespread belief that the government cannot restore predictable market conditions.[li] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Israeli media previously reported that regime officials have transferred hundreds of millions of US dollars out of Iran in recent months, which likely reflects intra-regime concerns about economic stability.[lii]

Islamic State (IS)-run media explicitly linked ISIS’s recently claimed attacks in northeastern Syria to the Islamic State’s February 21 call to action, which likely seeks to exploit conditions created by the Syrian government’s recent offensive to recruit fighters and expand ISIS networks.[liii] IS-run media outlet Amaq News confirmed on February 24 that recent ISIS attacks against Syrian government forces were in direct response to IS spokesperson Abu Hudhayfa al Ansari’s February 21 call for a “new chapter of resistance” in Syria against the Syrian government.[liv] ISIS claimed an attack on a civilian in Albukamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on February 24.[lv] The group accused the individual of working with the Syrian government.[lvi] ISIS also likely conducted four additional attacks against Syrian government forces in northeastern Syria on February 24 and 25. The attacks did not cause any casualties.[lvii] Syrian government forces have continued to respond to ISIS activity, such as by arresting an ISIS fighter in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, on February 25 who killed a Syrian soldier in the town on February 23.[lviii] A Syria analyst assessed that ISIS’s attack rate against Syrian government forces in northeastern Syria since February 21 remains lower than its attack rate in the second half of 2025, despite the recent increase in ISIS attacks.[lix] The recent attacks continue to demonstrate that ISIS’s primary target in Syria has shifted from the SDF to the Syrian government since December 2025.[lx]  Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in November 2025.[lxi]

An ISIS prisoner whom the Syrian government recently released from prison reportedly attacked Syrian government forces, which highlights the need for the Syrian government to thoroughly vet individuals who were previously imprisoned by the SDF.[lxii] A northeast Syria-based news outlet reported on February 23 that Syrian General Security Service (GSS) forces raided the home of an ISIS fighter who attacked government forces in Dhiban, Deir ez Zor Province, after the government released him from Aqtan prison on February 23.[lxiii] Other media outlets and local sources have not corroborated this report. The Aqtan prison in Raqqa Province was previously an SDF-administered ISIS detention facility that the SDF handed over to the Syrian government in January 2025.[lxiv] The Syrian Justice Ministry has released hundreds of SDF political prisoners from Aqtan prison after taking over the facility.[lxv] Aqtan prison likely held many SDF political prisoners, but the report that the government released an ISIS fighter who later attacked government forces highlights the need for the Syrian government to properly vet individuals it releases.

IS media has continued to leverage the Syrian government’s membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and cooperation with the United States to try to boost ISIS recruitment among Syrians sympathetic to ISIS.[lxvi] Amaq News’ February 24 report on recent ISIS attacks against Syrian government forces in northeastern Syria used an image of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s September 2025 meeting with US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper in Damascus rather than an image of the attacks.[lxvii] Multiple Syria analysts remarked that Amaq typically includes a photo of an attack, but that Amaq used the photo of Cooper and Shara in this instance to highlight the Syrian government’s “apostasy” and “subservience” to the United States.[lxviii] IS media has consistently criticized the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS cooperation and relationship with the United States to drive recruitment among Syrian Islamists who are dissatisfied with the Syrian government.[lxix]

Key Takeaways

• Planning for a Post-Iranian Regime Reality: A newly established coalition of anti-regime Kurdish organizations outlined its vision for administering Kurdish-majority areas of Iran if the Iranian regime collapses, which reflects the potential for Iran to fracture if the regime were to collapse. Anti-regime Kurdish groups established the "Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan” on February 22 with the stated objective of achieving self-determination.
• Iranian Nuclear Proposal: Iran reportedly offered Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)-like concessions in its nuclear proposal to the United States. An unspecified Arab diplomat told Israeli media on February 25 that Iran is willing to reduce its uranium enrichment level from 60 percent to 3.6 percent, which is close to the 2015 JCPOA’s 3.67 percent uranium enrichment limit.
• Trump State of the Union Address: US President Donald Trump highlighted the threat of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs in his State of the Union address on February 24. Trump stated that the United States warned Iran after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War not to attempt to “rebuild [its] weapons program, and in particular nuclear weapons” but that Iran “want[s] to start it all over again and are at this moment again pursuing their sinister ambitions.”
• Iranian Military Exercises: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has recently conducted a series of military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and along Iran’s southern coast in preparation for a potential conflict with the United States or Israel around the Persian Gulf. The IRGC Ground Forces concluded a two-day exercise under the command of the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on February 25.
• Iranian Air Defense Systems: Belgium-based outlet Army Recognition assessed that Iran’s use of indigenous radars in its S-300 air defense systems would reduce the effectiveness of these systems. Israel destroyed the engagement radar of an Iranian S-300 in April 2024 and rendered Iran’s three remaining S-300 systems inoperable in October 2024.
• Iranian Steps to Avoid a Decapitation Campaign: The Iranian regime is trying to limit disruptions to command-and-control and governance in the event of a potential US or Israeli decapitation campaign against senior Iranian leadership. The New York Times, citing six senior Iranian officials and three IRGC members, reported on February 22 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has named four potential successors for each military and government post that he appoints.
• Protests in Iran: Iranian university students held anti-regime protests for the fifth consecutive day on February 25. The economic conditions that triggered anti-regime protests in December 2025 continue to worsen.
• ISIS Attacks in Northeast Syria: Islamic State (IS)-run media explicitly linked ISIS’s recently claimed attacks in northeastern Syria to the Islamic State’s February 21 call to action, which likely seeks to exploit conditions created by the Syrian government’s recent offensive to recruit fighters and expand ISIS networks. IS media has continued to leverage the Syrian government’s membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and cooperation with the United States to try to boost ISIS recruitment among Syrians sympathetic to ISIS.

Iran

Senior Iranian officials met with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Tehran on February 24 and 25. Iranian Defense and Armed Forced Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi held separate meetings with Papikyan and emphasized that the presence of extra-regional powers in the region will cause instability, likely referring to the United States and Israel.[lxx] Nasir Zadeh previously met with Papikyan in May 2025, which CTP-ISW assessed was likely part of a broader Iranian strategy to counter Israeli, Turkish, and Western influence in the South Caucasus.[lxxi] President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani also held separate meetings with Papikyan on February 24 and 25 to discuss expanding bilateral cooperation.[lxxii]

Iraq

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee claimed in a statement on February 25 that the United States has not fulfilled its commitment to withdraw its forces from Iraq, likely to justify the continued existence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxiii] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, a Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada front group, and Harakat Ansar Awfiya.[lxxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from federal Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[lxxv] US-led international coalition forces redeployed from federal Iraq to Iraqi Kurdistan in late 2025 as part of the first phase of the planned US withdrawal.[lxxvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically used the presence of US and foreign forces in Iraq to justify their continued existence.[lxxvii] This statement comes amid US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxviii]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s statement also condemned US “interfer[ence] in Iraq’s internal affairs,” which almost certainly refers to ongoing US efforts to pressure the Shia Coordination Framework to rescind State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate.[lxxix] The United States recently threatened to sanction “Iraq’s oil lifeline and financial core,” including the State Organization for the Marketing of Oil, the Iraqi Central Bank, the Oil Ministry, and senior Shia officials linked to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, if the framework continues to support Maliki’s nomination.[lxxx] 

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee may have also released its statement on February 25 to set information conditions for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan if the United States or Israel attacks Iran. A senior Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee source recently told al Araby al Jadeed on February 22 that several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the committee have decided to provide military support to Iran and “open fronts” in a potential conflict between Iran and the United States.[lxxxi] CTP-ISW assessed on February 23 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would probably participate in a potential conflict between Iran and the United States or Israel if the militias perceived that the conflict posed an existential threat to the Iranian regime’s survival.[lxxxii]  CTP-ISW also assessed that one course of action that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may take in response to a US or Israeli attack on Iran would be to attack US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.[lxxxiii]

Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi has continued to advocate for decentralization as the SDF integrates into the Syrian state.[lxxxiv] Abdi stated on February 15 that Syrian Kurds’ core demand is “decentralized local rule.”[lxxxv] Abdi later stated in an interview with PBS on February 23 that the SDF seeks to preserve Kurdish "local” governance over Kurdish-majority areas.[lxxxvi] Kurdish and SDF officials have consistently called for decentralization since the SDF and Syrian government began negotiations over the SDF's integration in early 2025.[lxxxvii] The SDF views decentralization as a way to ensure local authority over regional affairs and views the government’s push to concentrate power in Damascus as an attempt to impose autocratic rule.[lxxxviii] The SDF agreed to integrate into state structures under the January 30 agreement, and SDF officials and Kurdish political parties have indicated that they seek to secure rights for the Kurdish population from the central government through political advocacy after integrating into the state.[lxxxix] The Syrian government transferred some authorities from the central government to governors and local officials throughout Syria on February 15 through the Syrian Ministry of Local Administration’s Decision No. 13, which may satisfy some of the SDF's demands regarding decentralization.[xc]

The Syrian government and SDF's disagreements over decentralization do not appear likely to collapse the January 30 agreement at this time, given the progress on the agreement (described in more detail below) and both parties' commitment to the agreement. Abdi told PBS on February 23 that he accepts the January 30 agreement and that he does not want a Kurdish insurgency in northeastern Syria.[xci] CTP-ISW reported on February 3 that a low-grade Kurdish insurgency could still threaten the implementation of the January 30 agreement and the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[xcii] Abdi acknowledged that the SDF “will persist in our fight until the very end” if the deal collapses.[xciii]

The Syrian government and SDF have taken several steps since February 21 to integrate former SDF territory and institutions into the Syrian state.[xciv] The Syrian government took control of Qamishli Airport on February 22 and deployed alongside Asayish forces, according to Syrian media.[xcv] The 14-point January 30 agreement stipulates that the SDF would hand over Qamishli Airport as well as border crossings and oil fields in northeastern Syria to the Syrian government.[xcvi] The 14-point January 30 agreement outlines four phases of implementation to be completed before the end of February 2026.^xciv The fifth phase of the agreement aims to establish “permanent commitments” between the SDF and the Syrian government.[xcvii]

Both the SDF and Syrian government have taken several steps to improve coordination ahead of implementing certain terms of the January 30 agreement. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara appointed Brigadier General Ziyad al Ayesh on February 21 as a presidential envoy to oversee the implementation of the January 30 agreement.[xcviii] Ayesh, who is from Qamishli, Hasakah Province, previously served as the Civil Affairs Director in the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib Province and has reportedly been involved in Syrian government-SDF negotiations.[xcix] Ayesh met with Hasakah Province Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Marwan al Ali and Hasakah Governor Noureddine Issa Ahmed in Hasakah City on February 24 to discuss accelerating the integration of Hasakah Province’s institutions into the Syrian transitional government and activating new government services.[c] The Syrian government and the SDF also formed a joint committee following a meeting between SDF internal security forces (known as Asayish) Commander Siamand Afrin, Raqqa Governor Abdul Rahman Salameh, and Hasakah Province Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Marwan al Ali to coordinate the return of Kurdish internally displaced persons (IDP) to Raqqa Province.[ci] Afrin also reportedly met with Syrian officials in Aleppo Province on February 22 to discuss the return of Kurdish IDPs to Afrin as well as the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo City.[cii] The last point of the January 30 agreement calls for the return of displaced persons to Afrin, Sheikh Maqsoud, and Ras al Ain.[ciii]

The Syrian government and the SDF have also continued to discuss the integration of the SDF into the Syrian security services.[civ] Syrian Chief of General Staff Major General Ali al Nassan met with SDF General Command members in Damascus on February 22 to discuss steps for integrating the SDF into several brigades of the Syrian army.[cv] A northern Syria-based source reported on February 25 that the Syrian government has transferred SDF fighters from Hasakah City to their hometown of Kobani in preparation for their deployment as local security forces.[cvi] The agreement specifies that a Syrian army brigade comprised of local forces will operate in Kobani.[cvii] Syrian Interior Ministry Spokesperson Noureddine al Baba said on February 25 that the ministry is enhancing its security expertise in the Jazeera region through integrating the Asayish into Syrian Interior Ministry forces that operate in the area.[cviii]

Syrian General Security Service (GSS) forces killed on February 24 the leader of an Assadist insurgent group that has operated in coastal Syria since August 2025.[cix] The Syrian Interior Ministry said that GSS forces killed the leader of the Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad) during a raid on the group’s safehouse in the Jableh countryside, Latakia Province.[cx] The GSS commander of Latakia Province, Brigadier General Abdul Aziz al Ahmad, stated that the GSS also killed two other commanders, arrested six fighters, and seized the group’s weapons cache during a “dual operation” in Jableh.[cxi] Men of Light is an Assadist insurgent group associated with former Tiger Forces Commander Suhail al Hassan that has conducted low-level improvised explosive device (IED) attacks targeting Syrian government vehicles in Latakia Province since at least August 2025.[cxii] These IED attacks have failed to inflict casualties on government forces, and only one attack in October 2025 destroyed a GSS vehicle.[cxiii] Likely Assadist insurgents conducted a grenade attack against a GSS checkpoint in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on February 25, which similarly failed to inflict casualties.[cxiv] The leader of the Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad) previously declared in November 2025 that his group sought to remove government control in coastal Syria and declare an independent region for Alawites.[cxv] The GSS previously killed three Men of Light (Saraya al Jawaad) insurgents and arrested one other in Latakia Province in December 2025.[cxvi] The Men of Light members were reportedly planning to conduct unspecified attacks during New Year’s celebrations.[cxvii]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its Yemen coverage starting on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

A Hezbollah official told Western media on February 25 that Hezbollah would not militarily respond to a “limited” US or Israeli strike on Iran.[cxviii] A Hezbollah official told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on February 25 that Hezbollah would “not intervene militarily” if the US conducts “limited strikes” on Iran.[cxix] Lebanese ministerial sources told Saudi media on February 25 that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri gave President Joseph Aoun “assurances” that Hezbollah would not intervene in a potential conflict.[cxx] It is unclear what Hezbollah considers “limited strikes.” Hezbollah previously did not defend Iran or retaliate against US or Israeli targets during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[cxxi] Iranian officials have reportedly pressured Hezbollah in recent weeks to intervene in a future conflict and have supported efforts to bolster Hezbollah’s drone capabilities.[cxxii]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that Hezbollah may participate in a future conflict between Iran and the United States or Israel if Hezbollah perceives that the United States and Israel aim to topple the Iranian regime.[cxxiii] The Hezbollah official also told AFP that any US attack that targeted Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is a “red line,” which further supports CTP-ISW’s assessment.[cxxiv] Hezbollah adheres to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih and takes its orders from the supreme leader.[cxxv] A war that causes the collapse of the Iranian regime would be a major setback for Hezbollah and its regional goals since Hezbollah remains deeply ideologically aligned with Iran and relies on the regime for substantial financial support.[cxxvi]