Iran Update, February 12, 2026

The Critical Threats Proje ct (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) withdrawal from key bases in Syria illustrates that the United States is gradually shifting its counter-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) framework to engage with the Syrian government rather than the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[i] CENTCOM confirmed on February 11 that US forces completed their withdrawal from al Tanf Garrison in the central Syrian desert as part of a “deliberate and conditions-based transition.”[ii] US forces have maintained a presence at the al Tanf Garrison since 2015 alongside a Syrian opposition group known as the Syrian Free Army (formerly known as Maghawhir al Thawra).[iii] US forces and the Syrian Free Army established the al Tanf Garrison to prevent ISIS from taking over the entire Iraq-Syria border in 2015 and US forces maintained their presence there to monitor the expansion of Iran’s military activity in Syria in coordination with Israel and Jordan.[iv]

The Syrian government assumed control of al Tanf Garrison in a coordinated and “orderly” handover.[v] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Major General Kevin Lambert coordinated the Syrian army’s takeover of al Tanf on February 11.[vi] The US-trained Syrian Free Army reportedly remained at the base after US forces withdrew.[vii] The Syrian Free Army integrated into the Interior Ministry’s Badia Security Directorate in October 2025 and has continued to conduct counter-ISIS operations within the al Tanf Deconfliction Zone and in southern Syria since then.[viii] The unit has about 600 fighters.[ix]  Badia-based Syrian media reported that the Homs Province-based 54th Division also deployed to al Tanf.[x] The 54th Division, which is commanded by former Ahrar al Sham commander Brigadier General Hussein al Obaid, is comprised of former Ahrar al Sham fighters and new recruits.[xi] The division participated in the government's recent offensive in Hasakah Province.[xii] The Ministry of Defense (MoD) said that it will deploy border guards along the Jordan-Iraq-Syria border in the coming days.[xiii]

The US withdrawal and Syrian government’s backfill of US forces at al Tanf Garrison is representative of how the United States is changing its framework for sustaining success against ISIS in Syria. The United States has relied on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as its primary counter-ISIS partner on the ground since 2014.[xiv] The SDF agreed to integrate into the Syrian army and internal security services on January 30.[xv] A US State Department press release on February 9 following the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS meeting in Saudi Arabia stated that the Syrian government intends to assume national leadership over counter-ISIS efforts.[xvi] The United States and the Syrian government have collaborated on counter-ISIS operations since July 2025, and the Syrian government joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in November 2025.[xvii]

CENTCOM’s withdrawal from al Tanf Garrison comes amid speculation from sources in Syria that the United States plans to withdraw from its remaining positions in northeastern Syria.[xviii] US forces began a phased withdrawal from northeastern Syria in April 2025.[xix] Unspecified US officials previously told the Wall Street Journal on January 22 that the United States would withdraw its forces from Syria following the Syrian government’s defeat of the SDF in January.[xx] US forces are reportedly finishing or have finished their mission to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq. An unspecified Iraqi security official told UAE-based media that the coalition transferred the last group of detainees to Iraq on February 12 and that the total number of transferred detainees  is “close” to 7,000.[xxi] A spokesperson for the Iraqi prime minister said on February 12 that Iraq has received 4,500 detainees in total, however.[xxii]  

US forces will continue the US mission to combat ISIS even without a force presence at positions such as al Tanf. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper commented on CENTCOM’s withdrawal from al Tanf and said that US forces remain “poised” to address and respond to threats from ISIS.[xxiii] An unspecified US official told Al Jazeera on February 12 that the United States will continue to conduct counter-ISIS airstrikes in Syria from outside Syrian territory.[xxiv] Syrian sources reported that US aircraft struck likely ISIS targets in the central Syrian desert on February 12.[xxv] CENTCOM reported on February 12 that it has struck more than 100 ISIS targets and captured or killed 50 ISIS fighters since December 2025.[xxvi]

The Syrian government has the tools to be an effective US counter-ISIS partner in Syria but will face temporary constraints as it integrates the SDF and northeastern Syria into the state. Hayat Tahrir al Sham leaders and security services leveraged connections formed with local Arab communities as part of a counter-ISIS strategy in Idlib Province prior to the collapse of the Assad regime.[xxvii] The Syrian government, and specifically the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI), therefore presumably have the same capability and can pursue a similar strategy, particularly given the government’s highly effective tribal outreach strategy prior to its recent offensive.[xxviii] The Syrian government will likely contend with several constraints that may limit its capability to fully assume counter-ISIS responsibilities in the northeast in the coming days and weeks.[xxix] The nature of the SDF’s collapse and chaotic withdrawal in Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces prevented any organized handover of SDF security responsibilities and counter-ISIS efforts in these areas.[xxx] Government forces will need to effectively communicate and coordinate with the SDF in order to gain an understanding of their new areas of operation.[xxxi] The MoI will also need time to establish security and intelligence networks in recently captured SDF territory where the Syrian government has not operated before.[xxxii] The Syrian government should be able to overcome these challenges with time and US support, however.

The SDF, which is the best-trained force in northeastern Syria to counter ISIS, will also likely face constraints on its counter-ISIS operations after it integrates into the Syrian army’s chain of command. The Syrian government relies primarily on its internal security forces, rather than the Syrian army, for counter-ISIS operations.[xxxiii] The January 30 agreement does not specify whether SDF counterterrorism units will integrate into the  MoI or the MoD.[xxxiv] The United States has previously urged that the Syrian government and SDF coordinate on future counter-ISIS operations.[xxxv]

European media reported on February 12 that the third-country national annex at al Hol internally displaced persons (IDP) camp is nearly empty.[xxxvi] ISIS-affiliated families have reportedly escaped from al Hol camp to other Syrian provinces and Lebanon.[xxxvii] The third-country national annex is a heavily guarded separate section of al Hol camp that previously housed around 6,000 third-country nationals.[xxxviii] Third-country nationals are more likely than other IDPs at al Hol to be ISIS-affiliated because many of them traveled from abroad to join the group in Syria.[xxxix] Multiple local sources told European media on February 12 that less than 20 families remain at the third-country national annex at al Hol camp in Hasakah Province.[xl]  An unspecified analyst told UK-based media on February 12 that unspecified actors removed the third-country nationals from al Hol overnight on February 11.[xli] The United Nations has not confirmed that most third-country nationals have left al Hol.[xlii]  Local sources have circulated conflicting reports about whether the Syrian government moved third-country nationals to a new location or whether the third-country nationals escaped al Hol.[xliii] Local Syrian sources reported that some camp residents have made multiple escape attempts from the camp since Syrian government forces took control of the camp from the SDF on January 20.[xliv] Third-country nationals from al Hol have reportedly escaped to other Syrian provinces and Lebanon.[xlv] A humanitarian source told French media on February 12 that unspecified actors have smuggled families to Idlib and other provinces.[xlvi] Several Salafi-jihadi-aligned foreign fighter groups have remained in Idlib since the collapse of the Assad regime.[xlvii] A Lebanese source told French media on February 12 that four members of his family and other ISIS-affiliated families have recently returned to Lebanon.[xlviii] Syrian authorities are in the process of learning lessons that the United States and the SDF previously learned at al Hol. Syrian authorities have taken steps in recent weeks to improve Syrian government control over al Hol, including by starting a census and monitoring the area with drones.[xlix] The SDF spent years developing counter-ISIS operations in al Hol, and the United States provided the SDF with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor the camp, capabilities that the MoI currently lacks.[l]

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported that ISIS and an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group conducted five failed assassination attempts against Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and other senior Syrian government officials in 2025.[li] A successful assassination of Shara would have profound implications for the future trajectory of Syrian stability because of the role that Shara plays as the central figure leading Syria’s transition.[lii] The UNSC observed in a February 2 report that ISIS attempted to conduct three unspecified assassination attempts on Shara, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Interior Minister Anas Khattab. The UNSC assessed that Shara is a "priority“ target for ISIS.[liii] A successful assassination of Shara or senior Syrian officials such as Shaibani or Khattab could have possibly devastating effects on Syria’s stability and recovery. Shara is irreplaceable for a stable Syrian transition at this time. There is no other leader capable of uniting the ruling coalition, and there is no alternative Syrian opposition figure who commands the degree of moral authority Shara does.[liv] Shara also does not have a clear successor if he or members of his leadership circle were assassinated, which could potentially cause a destabilizing power vacuum in Syria. Syria’s vice president is supposed to assume the presidency in the event of a vacancy, according to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration, but Shara has not appointed a vice president yet.[lv]

The UNSC also observed that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah attempted to assassinate President Shara in Aleppo and Daraa provinces on unspecified dates in 2025.[lvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS that opposes the Syrian transitional government and seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia.[lvii] The UNSC identified Saraya Ansar al Sunnah as a front group for ISIS and noted that the group provides ISIS with “plausible deniability and improved operational capacity.”[lviii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah referred to itself as an “administratively independent group” from ISIS in December 2025 but noted that it shares ISIS’s creed and methodology. The group added that it sought to pledge allegiance to ISIS.[lix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah most recently claimed responsibility for detonating an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an Alawite mosque in Homs City in December 2025.[lx]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented US President Donald Trump with evidence that the Iranian regime continued to kill protesters even after it told the United States that it would stop harming civilians and that Iran has never intended to discuss non-nuclear issues with the United States, according to Israeli media.[lxi] Netanyahu and Trump met at the White House on February 11.[lxii] A US-based human rights organization has recorded a total of 7,002 deaths and over 52,000 arrests in the recent protests as of February 11.[lxiii] Unspecified Iranian lawyers defending detained protesters in Iran separately told Western media on February 6 that the Iranian regime plans to execute “thousands” of Iranians who participated in the recent protests.[lxiv] CTP-ISW cannot verify the reliability of this report. The Iranian judiciary conducted its first execution of a protester from the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement in December 2022, two months after the start of the protest movement.[lxv]

Trump and Netanyahu also discussed the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[lxvi] Trump stated that he insisted that “negotiations with Iran continue” during his meeting with Netanyahu.[lxvii] Netanyahu’s office stated that Netanyahu emphasized Israel’s security needs during the meeting.[lxviii] Israeli media previously reported that Netanyahu sought to urge Trump not to accept a deal with Iran that does not address Iran’s ballistic missile program.[lxix]

The Iranian regime is unlikely to make any concessions on its ballistic missile program because it views its missile capabilities as an essential component of its defensive and deterrence strategies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an op-ed on February 12 in which it suggested that strengthening Iran’s defense readiness and missile capabilities could increase Iran’s leverage in negotiations with the United States.[lxx] Defa Press added that Iran can use its “military winning card,” likely referring to its ballistic missiles, to respond to any US actions.[lxxi] Iranian officials have continued to insist that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance during the current US-Iran talks.[lxxii] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani told Omani media on February 10 that Iran could agree to expand the scope of its talks with the United States “to other areas” if the current nuclear negotiations are successful. Larijani likely made this comment in an attempt to float the possibility that Iran may be willing to negotiate on its ballistic missile program to drag out the current talks and prevent US or Israeli military action against Iran.[lxxiii] Larijani did not state that Iran would be willing to make concessions on its ballistic missile program even if it agreed to “discuss” the issue with the United States, however. The Iranian regime is unlikely to make any concessions that would limit its ability to produce and maintain its ballistic missile stockpile due to the centrality of the missile program in Iranian defensive and deterrence strategies. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[lxxiv]

Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be using State of Law Coalition leader and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s recent remarks to portray him as hostile to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in order to try to reduce support for Maliki’s premiership nomination among other framework members.[lxxv] Maliki stated on February 11 that building a “stable state” requires restricting weapons to the state and “having a single army” that is subordinate to Iraq’s prime minister.”[lxxvi]  Maliki’s statement follows a February 3 interview in which Maliki said that he could use his “close ties with the groups” to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxvii] CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Maliki likely claimed that he could disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while in office because he believed such a statement could garner him US support for another term.[lxxviii]  The United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since early 2025.[lxxix] The Shia Coordination Framework has maintained its nomination of Maliki despite US and domestic opposition.[lxxx]

Some Shia Coordination Framework members who oppose Maliki responded to his February 11 statement by emphasizing that any candidate for the premiership must support the continued existence of the PMF. These framework members, particularly the ones that control armed wings, likely oppose Maliki consolidating control over the PMF and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within it.[lxxxi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lxxxii] A member of the National State Forces Alliance, which opposes Maliki’s nomination, declared on February 11 that his party will not accept anyone “dissolving or merging” the PMF.[lxxxiii] Several members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun political wing similarly stated on February 11 and 12 that their parliamentary bloc will reject any candidate who does not support the continued existence of the PMF.[lxxxiv] The leaders of the National State Forces Alliance and Asaib Ahl al Haq have led intra-framework efforts to oppose Maliki’s nomination.[lxxxv] Maliki later clarified on February 11 that he would not seek to dissolve the PMF and emphasized that his priority is to consolidate state authority.[lxxxvi]

Portraying Maliki as an opponent of the PMF may lead other framework members to oppose Maliki’s nomination. Services Alliance head Shibl al Zaydi said on February 11 that any candidate for the premiership must “unequivocally” support the PMF.[lxxxvii] The Services Alliance has not publicly supported nor opposed Maliki’s nomination. Several framework members, like Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali and Zaydi, control militias that are part of the PMF.[lxxxviii] CTP-ISW assessed in December 2025 that Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister.[lxxxix]

Key Takeaways

• US Withdrawal from al Tanf: US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) withdrawal from key bases in Syria illustrates that the United States is gradually shifting its counter-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) framework to engage with the Syrian government rather than the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). CENTCOM confirmed on February 11 that US forces completed their withdrawal from al Tanf Garrison in the central Syrian desert as part of a “deliberate and conditions-based transition.” Syrian government forces backfilled the United States at the base.
• Al Hol IDP Camp: European media reported on February 12 that the third-country national annex at al Hol internally displaced persons (IDP) camp is nearly empty. ISIS-affiliated families have reportedly escaped from al Hol camp to other Syrian provinces and Lebanon.
• ISIS and ISIS-Aligned Assassination Attempts: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported that ISIS and an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group conducted five failed assassination attempts against Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and other senior Syrian government officials in 2025. A successful assassination of Shara would have profound implications for the future trajectory of Syrian stability because of the role that Shara plays as the central figure leading Syria’s transition.
• Trump-Netanyahu Meeting: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented US President Donald Trump with evidence that the Iranian regime continued to kill protesters even after it told the United States that it would stop harming civilians and that Iran has never intended to discuss non-nuclear issues with the United States. Trump and Netanyahu also discussed the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
• Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: The Iranian regime is unlikely to make any concessions that would limit its ability to produce and maintain its ballistic missile stockpile due to the centrality of the missile program in Iranian defensive and deterrence strategies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an op-ed on February 12 in which it suggested that strengthening Iran’s defense readiness and missile capabilities could increase Iran’s leverage in negotiations with the United States.
• Shia Coordination Framework Maneuvering: Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be using State of Law Coalition leader and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s recent remarks to portray him as hostile to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in order to try to reduce support for Maliki’s premiership nomination among other framework members. Some framework members, particularly the ones that control armed wings, likely oppose Maliki consolidating control over the PMF and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within it.

Iran

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on February 11 that Iran is likely fortifying entrances at its Kolang Gaz La Mountain nuclear facility in Esfahan Province to protect the facility from future US or Israeli strikes.[xc] The Institute published imagery that shows concrete-reinforced headworks, additional dirt overburdens, and heavy construction machinery at multiple tunnel portals.[xci] The Institute reported that construction materials and heavy machinery suggest that the site is likely still not operational.[xcii] The Institute previously assessed that Iran could use the Kolang Gaz La facility to house an advanced centrifuge assembly plant or potentially a small undeclared enrichment plant.[xciii] The Institute has assessed in recent weeks that Iran is also hardening infrastructure at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and Parchin Military Complex’s Taleghan 2 facility in preparation for possible future strikes.[xciv]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Lebanese cabinet will reportedly determine on February 16 how the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River.[xcv] The Lebanese cabinet will meet on February 16 to discuss the LAF’s proposed plan for the next phase of the state’s disarmament plan, which details Hezbollah’s disarmament between the Litani and Awali rivers.[xcvi] The Lebanese cabinet and the LAF will almost certainly adopt a cautious approach toward disarming Hezbollah north of the Litani River given that Hezbollah has framed its disarmament in the north as an existential issue.[xcvii] Lebanese officials have become increasingly sensitive to the potential risk of trying to disarm Hezbollah outside southern Lebanon since October 2025, likely due to Hezbollah’s extreme opposition to its disarmament and threats. Lebanese officials told Reuters in October 2025 that the LAF seeks to avoid inflaming tensions and buy time for Lebanese politicians, including Hezbollah politicians, to reach a consensus on the state’s approach toward confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons north of the Litani River.[xcviii] LAF Commander Rodolphe Haykal similarly stated in December 2025 that the LAF is approaching Hezbollah’s disarmament north of the Litani River “carefully.”[xcix]

Lebanon’s regional and Western partners are continuing to prepare to hold an LAF support conference in March 2026.[c] The conference will only take place if the Lebanese government meets certain conditions, however. French, US, Saudi, Qatari, and Egyptian officials will participate in a preparatory meeting in Doha on February 15.[ci] The preparatory meeting aims to gain an understanding of the LAF’s needs and develop mechanisms for financial and military support.[cii] Invitations to the conference will reportedly be sent out after the meeting.[ciii] There are conflicting media reports about whether the preparatory meeting will take place on February 15, however. Informed diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on February 12 that the meeting has been postponed due to “technical reasons.”[civ] The conference participants have postponed the conference several times due to the Lebanese government’s slow progress in meeting certain conditions.[cv] These conditions include the Lebanese government clarifying “how any financial or military assistance would be spent, reinforc[ing] mechanisms for institutional transparency, and clear[ing] links between aid and measurable reform steps.”[cvi]   

Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa and Interior Minister Ahmed Hajjar affirmed on February 11 that the Lebanese government is working to improve military salaries, which is crucial to strengthen Lebanese security institutions.[cvii] Menassa and Hajjar met on February 11 to discuss possible options to address the difficult living conditions of Lebanese military personnel.[cviii] The officials stated that they will submit a proposal to increase salaries and pensions to the Lebanese cabinet in an upcoming session.[cix] The average monthly salary for about 70,000 LAF soldiers is roughly $30 to $50 USD as of December 2025, compared to about $800 USD per month prior to the 2019 Lebanese economic crisis.[cx] These salaries are insufficient to cover the average cost of living for one person in Lebanon, which is approximately $1,100 USD per month.[cxi] The LAF and Lebanese Internal Security Forces’ effective strength is severely limited because many soldiers work a second job to augment their salaries.[cxii] Menassa and Hajjar stated that these living conditions directly impact Lebanese security forces’ morale and stability.[cxiii]   

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and LAF forces deployed to Wadi al Hujeir, a valley in southern Lebanon, on February 12.[cxiv] Wadi al Hujeir is considered to be a “strategic route” because it is located between southern Lebanon’s three major districts: Marjaayoun, Bint Jbeil, and Nabatieh.[cxv] The valley was a hotspot for Israel-Hezbollah fighting during the 2006 War.[cxvi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly attempted to deploy to Wadi al Hujeir during its Fall 2024 ground offensive but was unsuccessful.[cxvii] The IDF conducted limited searches in the valley in December 2024.[cxviii] Lebanese media reported on February 12 that the LAF has frequently deployed to southern Lebanese valleys in recent months as part of its disarmament plan.[cxix] The LAF has conducted inspections in these valleys, including in Wadi al Hujeir, occasionally at Israel’s request.[cxx]