Iran Update, February 11, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Iran may be floating the possibility of talks about Iran’s ballistic missile program in an effort to delay possible US military action and extract concessions from the United States in nuclear negotiations. Israeli media, citing unspecified sources, reported on February 10 that Iran communicated to regional mediators that it is not willing to make any compromises on its ballistic missile program at this time but may be willing to discuss its ballistic missiles “in the future.”[i] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani separately told Omani media on February 10 that Iran could agree to expand the scope of its talks with the United States “to other areas” if the current nuclear negotiations are successful.[ii] Iran’s suggestion that it could discuss its ballistic missile program at an unspecified point in the future is consistent with Iranian officials’ statements that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missiles in the current talks. This signaling may also be intended to drag out the current talks by leaving open the possibility for discussions about other issues apart from the nuclear issue. Iran may calculate that continuing to reject any possibility of discussing its ballistic missile program with the United States could increase the risk of US or Israeli military action against Iran.

Iran appears to be conditioning the possibility of talks about its ballistic missile program on US concessions in the current nuclear talks. Larijani’s statement to Omani media suggests that Iran would only be willing to entertain the possibility of talks on its ballistic missiles in the event that the United States and Iran reach a nuclear agreement. Iran's nuclear-related demands include the United States recognizing Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium and lifting sanctions in return for any Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.[iii] Iran has thus far only offered limited concessions on its nuclear program. Some regime officials have suggested that Iran may be willing to dilute its enriched uranium from 60 percent to 20 percent but only if the United States provides full sanctions relief.[iv] This hypothetical deal would require a less significant concession from Iran than it agreed to in the 2015 deal, when Iran was relatively stronger compared to its position today. The 2015 nuclear deal made Iran cap its enrichment at 3.67 percent for a period of 15 years.[v] The deal also prompted the UN Security Council to impose an eight-year ban on Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles and a five-year ban on conventional arms transfers, including missile systems, to Iran.[vi]

Iran may calculate that prolonging the talks with the United States provides Iran with additional time to reconstitute its ballistic missile program, which Iran may calculate would raise the costs of US or Israeli military action against Iran. Two unspecified Israeli sources told CNN on February 10 that Israeli officials are concerned about Iran’s rapid progress in restoring its ballistic missile stockpile and capabilities to their pre-Israel-Iran War levels.[vii] The sources added that Iran could possess between 1,800 and 2,000 missiles “within weeks or months.”[viii] CNN’s report comes after other Israeli sources reported in December 2025 that the Iranian regime may only need one to two years to produce enough ballistic missiles to overwhelm Israeli air defenses, which is an estimate calculated based on Iran’s ability to produce about 300 ballistic missiles per month.[ix] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on February 11 to urge Trump to force Iran to agree to limit its ballistic missile program, according to Israeli and US officials.[x] The officials said that Netanyahu sought to convince Trump to launch a strike against Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities if he cannot secure a diplomatic agreement that includes restrictions on Iran’s missile program.[xi] Iran’s prolongment of the negotiations may be part of an attempt to buy more time to replenish its ballistic missile stockpile before another possible round of fighting between Iran and the United States or Israel. Iran launched multiple barrages of missiles at Israel during the Israel-Iran War and Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to fire missiles at US bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[xii] 

Iran is also pursuing multiple diplomatic tracks to try to prevent a US strike. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on February 11 that Larijani discussed Iran’s highly enriched uranium with Omani officials during his February 10 trip to Moscow.[xiii] CTP-ISW assessed on February 9 that Larijani may have conveyed details about potential nuclear concessions during his visit to Oman.[xiv] Larijani’s trip to Oman followed his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on January 30 in which Larijani and Putin likely discussed the US-Iran talks and ways to prevent US military action against Iran.[xv] Russia recently offered to store Iranian enriched uranium on February 4.[xvi] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov called his Omani counterpart on February 9 to express support for Oman’s mediation efforts, almost certainly in relation to Larijani’s visit to Oman.[xvii] Larijani is Iran’s principal negotiator with Russia.[xviii] Larijani also met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani on February 11 to discuss regional developments.[xix] The Qatari Emir also held a phone call with Trump on February 11 to discuss “efforts for regional de-escalation.”[xx] Larijani’s diplomatic efforts are taking place alongside Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s diplomatic efforts. Araghchi is Iran’s principal negotiator with the United States and led the Iranian delegation to Oman on February 6, after which he traveled to Qatar.[xxi]

US government officials have discussed seizing tankers involved in transporting Iranian oil but refrained from doing so due to concerns over Iran’s “near-certain” retaliation and the impact that tanker seizures would have on international oil markets, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal on February 10.[xxii] Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, have previously threatened to target shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz if the United States disrupts Iran's oil trade.[xxiii] Iran has demonstrated its willingness and ability to disrupt regional maritime and energy security, such as by attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and Saudi energy facilities in 2019 during US President Donald Trump’s first term.[xxiv] The US government previously considered seizing and inspecting tankers carrying Iranian oil in March 2025 in order to disrupt Iran’s illicit oil trade, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters.[xxv] The US government ultimately did not adopt this strategy. The United States and Iran later started nuclear negotiations in April 2025.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Efforts to Delay Potential US Military Action: Iran may be floating the possibility of talks about Iran’s ballistic missile program in an effort to delay possible US military action and extract concessions from the United States in nuclear negotiations. This signaling may be intended to drag out the current talks by leaving open the possibility for discussions about other issues apart from the nuclear issue. Iran may calculate that continuing to reject any possibility of discussing its ballistic missile program with the United States could increase the risk of US or Israeli military action against Iran.
• Iranian Efforts to Extract US Concessions: Iran appears to be conditioning the possibility of talks about its ballistic missile program on US concessions in the current nuclear talks. Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani suggested to Omani media that Iran would only be willing to entertain the possibility of talks on its ballistic missiles in the event that the United States and Iran reach a nuclear agreement. Iran has thus far only offered limited concessions on its nuclear program that are far less significant concessions than Iran agreed to in the 2015 nuclear deal.
• Iranian Ballistic Missile Program Reconstitution: Iran may calculate that prolonging the talks with the United States provides Iran with additional time to reconstitute its ballistic missile program, which Iran may calculate would raise the costs of US or Israeli military action against Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump on February 11 to urge Trump to force Iran to agree to limit its ballistic missile program, according to Israeli and US officials. Two unspecified Israeli sources told CNN on February 10 that Israeli officials are concerned about Iran’s rapid progress in restoring its ballistic missile stockpile and capabilities to their pre-Israel-Iran War levels.
• Illicit Iranian Oil Trade: US government officials have discussed seizing tankers involved in transporting Iranian oil but refrained from doing so due to concerns over Iran’s “near-certain” retaliation and the impact that tanker seizures would have on international oil markets, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal on February 10. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to target shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz if the United States disrupts Iran's oil trade.

Iran

The IRGC, Law Enforcement Command (LEC), and intelligence agents dismantled a “terrorist cell” in Khash and Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on February 10, likely in response to a Mobarizoun Popular Front attack that injured two LEC officers on February 9.[xxvii] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated Defa Press reported that security forces killed four “terrorists,“ arrested several individuals affiliated with the cell, and seized several firearms.[xxviii] Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib stated on February 11 that counterterrorism forces, in cooperation with the IRGC and the LEC, also arrested and killed some "terrorists” in Kerman Province.[xxix] The Mobarizoun Popular Front is a coalition of anti-regime Baloch groups that formed in December 2025.[xxx]  The Mobarizoun Popular Front conducted an attack in Khash on February 9 that injured two LEC officers. The Mobarizoun Popular Front also claimed that it attacked and destroyed vehicles belonging to a special forces unit in Iranshahr on February 11.[xxxi]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar on February 10, likely to discuss anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xxxii] Iranian officials often discusses cross-border issues, including anti-regime militant activity, with Pakistani officials because anti-regime militant groups operate in the Iran-Pakistan border area..[xxxiii] Anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province has long posed an internal security challenge for the Iranian regime. Jaish al Adl, which is part of the Mobarizoun Popular Front, and other Baloch groups frequently attack Iranian regime security forces and institutions in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxxiv]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

The reported planned withdrawal of all non-Syrian Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters from Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory to Iraq would reduce the risk that these fighters could launch or participate in an anti-government insurgent campaign in northeastern Syria. Three unspecified sources told Al Monitor on February 10 that at least 100 non-Syrian PKK fighters have withdrawn from Syria to Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxv] UK-based, Saudi-funded outlet Al Majalla separately reported on February 10 that Syrian PKK commander Bahoz Erdal has left Syria for Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxvi] The Syrian army said that the PKK deployed Erdal to Tabqa, Raqqa Province, on January 16 after he arrived from the Qandil Mountains in Iraq, which is the PKK’s stronghold.[xxxvii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara suggested that Erdal may have commanded Asayish fighters in Kurdish-majority neighborhoods in Aleppo City during the December 2025 and January 2026 fighting between government forces and the SDF.[xxxviii] It is unclear if the sources speaking to Al Monitor were referring to 100 PKK leaders, fighters, or a mix of the two, but Erdal’s reported withdrawal suggests that some commanders may have been among the fighters who withdrew from Syria.[xxxix] The withdrawal of 100 senior PKK leaders from Syria would be much more significant than the withdrawal of relatively low-level fighters. 

Non-Syrian PKK fighters will also reportedly continue to withdraw from Syria in the coming days and weeks. A Western official told Al Majalla that around 1,000 non-Syrian PKK fighters will withdraw from Syria in total.[xl] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi acknowledged in December 2024 that foreign PKK fighters came to Syria to support the SDF during the civil war.[xli] Turkey has long demanded the withdrawal of non-Syrian PKK fighters from Syria.[xlii] The January 30 SDF-Syrian government agreement does not explicitly require foreign PKK fighters to withdraw from Syria, but previous SDF-government agreements have called for the SDF to remove all non-Syrian PKK fighters from Syria.[xliii] The January 30 SDF-government agreement stipulates that the Syrian government will send workers to SDF-held border crossings to prevent smuggling and the entrance of foreign fighters.[xliv]

The removal of non-Syrian PKK fighters from Syria reduces the risk that these fighters could lead or participate in an anti-government, Kurdish-led insurgency in northern Syria. The actions of foreign-based PKK commanders and foreign fighters were probably a determining factor in the Syrian government’s decision to launch a military operation in Deir Hafer on January 13.[xlv] Fighters taking orders from PKK leadership in the Iraqi Qandil Mountains continued to fight against Syrian government forces in Aleppo City even after SDF leadership ordered a ceasefire on January 9.[xlvi] These fighters later withdrew to Deir Hafer, and the Syrian army used the presence of “PKK fighters” in the area to justify its operation.[xlvii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that some individual hardline Kurdish fighters may organize a low-grade, relatively unorganized insurgency that does not involve senior People’s Protection Units (YPG) or Kurdish leaders.[xlviii] The fighters who participate in such an insurgency could be Syrian fighters affiliated with the PKK or YPG, however.

The Turkish Armed Forces’ continued presence in Syria indicates that Turkey still perceives the SDF as a threat to Turkish security, even following the January 30 SDF-Syrian government agreement. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler told Turkish media on February 9 that Turkey has “no plans to withdraw” from Syria “for now.”[xlix] Guler said that the Turkish military will prepare for “all possible scenarios” despite the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army.[l] Guler added that the risk of terrorism from Syria may not always remain at its current low level.[li] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan similarly told Turkish media that the YPG, which dominates the SDF, should sever its ties from the PKK.[lii] Turkey maintains at least 10,000 troops in Syria, according to a February 2026 estimate.[liii] Turkey also maintains over 60 military bases and outposts in former SDF-held territory in Raqqa and Hasakah provinces that Turkey built after its 2019 offensive in Syria.[liv] The Turkish military largely avoided direct involvement in the Syrian government’s January offensive against the SDF, although the SDF reported multiple Turkish drone strikes.[lv] It is unclear whether the Turkish or Syrian military operated those drones, however.[lvi]

The Syrian government and the SDF  implemented steps of the third phase of the January 30 agreement on February 10 and 11. Local Syrian sources reported on February 10 that the SDF withdrew from Hasakah City to three agreed-upon military bases in Hasakah Province: Tal Baydar base, Jabal Kowkab base, and a former US base near Shamouka.[lvii] Syrian sources also reported on February 10 that SDF internal security forces (known as Asayish) and Syrian General Security Service (GSS) forces backfilled positions after the Syrian army withdrew from Hasakah City toward al Shadaddi.[lviii] The January 30 agreement stipulates that SDF forces in Hasakah City and Qamishli must withdraw to agreed-upon bases, while the Syrian army must withdraw its forces near Hasakah City to al Shadaddi.[lix]

Multiple Syrian sources reported that Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) workers began removing fortifications on the roads leading to the southern entrance of Hasakah City on February 11 to reopen the Hasakah-Deir ez Zor and Hasakah-Raqqa roads for civilian use.[lx] A source separately told Syrian media that the SDF transferred prisoners from Hasakah prisons to Qamishli in preparation for a prisoner exchange with the Syrian government.[lxi] A pro-SDF source reported on February 11 that the SDF and the Syrian government will conduct a prisoner exchange “within the next 24 hours.”[lxii]

SDF-proposed Hasakah Province Deputy Internal Security Director Siamand Afrin previously told Kurdish media on February 4 that the withdrawal of SDF and government forces, a government-SDF prisoner exchange, and the end of the government’s “siege” on Kobani, Aleppo Province, are part of the third phase of the January 30 agreement.[lxiii] Kurdish media reported that the government continued its siege on Kobani on February 11, however.[lxiv] The 14-point January 30 agreement outlines four implementation phases before the end of February, followed by a fifth phase to establish permanent commitments between the SDF and the Syrian government.[lxv] 

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Senior Iranian diplomats have reportedly transported large sums of cash to Hezbollah during their visits to Beirut in recent months.[lxvi] Anti-regime Iranian media reported on February 11 that at least seven Iranian diplomats, including Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and diplomats traveling with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, used their diplomatic passports and immunity to transport cash in suitcases to Hezbollah.[lxvii] Larijani and Araghchi visited Beirut in September 2025 and January 2026, respectively.[lxviii] These officials have reportedly transported hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah.[lxix] Iran has used diplomatic visits and civilian flights into the Beirut Airport to smuggle cash to Hezbollah, particularly since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Israel accused Iranian diplomats in January 2025 of smuggling cash to Hezbollah in suitcases after an Iranian diplomat refused to be searched and entered Lebanon with bags of cash for “embassy operations,” according to Iran.[lxx] Lebanese authorities at the Beirut Airport have also thwarted multiple cash smuggling attempts from Iran to Hezbollah via civilian flights since February 2025.[lxxi] Iranian attempts to smuggle funds to Hezbollah likely aim to alleviate Hezbollah’s financial struggles and support its reconstitution.

Regional countries are continuing to take steps to limit Hezbollah’s ability to provide social services to Lebanese citizens. The Kuwaiti government sanctioned and added eight Hezbollah-affiliated private hospitals to its national “terrorism list” on February 9.[lxxii] The designation will immediately freeze all funds and economic resources that the hospitals own or control.[lxxiii] The designation also bars any Kuwaiti citizen, including those abroad, from providing funds or financial services to the hospitals.[lxxiv] The sanctioned hospitals are located in Hezbollah’s Shia-majority strongholds, including in southern Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the Bekaa Valley.[lxxv] The eight private hospitals are part of Hezbollah’s robust social service network, which generates revenue for the group and enables it to maintain its influence among the Lebanese Shia population.[lxxvi] Some of the sanctioned hospitals have previously reportedly been subject to US and international scrutiny, but no country has sanctioned them before Kuwait.[lxxvii] The Lebanese Health Ministry expressed “great surprise” in response to the sanctions and stated that the move is “inconsistent” with Kuwait’s previous support for the Lebanese health system.[lxxviii] Kuwait recently sanctioned al Qard al Hassan, Hezbollah’s main financial institution, in June 2025.[lxxix]