Iran Update, February 10, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Any US-Iran deal that does not limit Iran's ability to develop its ballistic missile program and support the Axis of Resistance would harm US interests in the Middle East. Iranian officials have continued to insist that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance, which are key pillars of the Iranian regime’s defense and deterrence strategies.[i] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, who reportedly manages Iran's nuclear file and traveled to Oman on February 10, told Omani media on February 10 that Iran would consider expanding the scope of negotiations with the United States to include “other areas” if the current US-Iran talks are successful, but he did not specify which “areas” he was referring to.[ii] Larijani claimed that the United States previously tied “missile and military issues” to the nuclear issue and that “military issues have nothing to do with the nuclear issue.“[iii] Larijani separately met with the Oman-based Houthi spokesperson, Mohammad Abdulsalam, on February 10, likely to discuss regional events, such as developments in the Gaza Strip and potential US or Israeli military action against Iran.[iv] Iranian regime media highlighted how Larijani’s meeting with Abdulsalam reflects Iran's continued support for its regional proxies and partners.[v] Iran possesses the capability to strike US interests in the Middle East using ballistic missiles and the Axis of Resistance, and it has previously demonstrated a willingness to do so even in the absence of direct US action against Iran.[vi]

Iran’s insistence on continuing to develop its ballistic missile program and support the Axis of Resistance comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet with US President Donald Trump on February 11, reportedly to urge Trump not to accept a deal with Iran that only addresses the nuclear issue.[vii] Netanyahu will present Trump with Israeli intelligence about Iran’s military capabilities, including an assessment that Iran could have 1,800-2,000 ballistic missiles within weeks or months, according to an Israeli source speaking to CNN on February 10.[viii] This estimate differs from Israeli media reporting in December 2025 that Iran had already reconstituted its ballistic missile stockpile to 2,000 missiles.[ix] Israeli media reported on February 9 that Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff seek to quickly reach a deal with Iran “with or without an Iranian commitment on the issue of ballistic missiles.”[x] Israeli media added that Netanyahu seeks to urge Trump to “act against the recommendation of” Kushner and Witkoff. Netanyahu’s meeting with Trump comes after Trump suggested on February 7 that he could accept a deal that only addresses the nuclear issue.[xi] Trump later told Israeli journalist Barak Ravid on February 10 that any deal with Iran must address Iran’s ballistic missile program in addition to its nuclear program, however.[xii]

The Iranian regime’s exacerbation of its population’s economic and sociocultural grievances increases the likelihood that protests will break out again. The regime is continuing to securitize Iranian society at the expense of Iranians’ economic well-being. Al Jazeera reported on February 10 that Iranian authorities have closed dozens of small- and medium-sized businesses, mostly in Tehran, in recent days that supported the protests by striking in December 2025.[xiii] Workers at one of Iran’s largest gas refineries went on strike for the sixth consecutive day on February 10 due to poor employment and livelihood conditions.[xiv] The regime has also sustained its internet shutdown, which costs the Iranian economy about $37 million USD per day.[xv] Internet monitor Filterwatch reported on February 3 that the regime plans to grant access to the international internet only to certain individuals, rather than all Iranians.[xvi] A system that only allows some Iranians to access the international internet may exacerbate Iranians’ frustration with the regime and create conditions for further unrest.[xvii]

The regime’s ongoing securitization measures come as some Iranian university students have held demonstrations in recent days to protest Iranian security forces’ killing of university students during the recent protests and arrest of medical personnel who treated injured protesters. Iranian university students at a university in Fars Province and two universities in Khorasan Razavi Province held protests between February 2 and 9.[xviii] Students at Islamic Azad University in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, protested on February 3 the death of a student during the protests while students at Ferdowsi University in Mashhad protested on February 9 against security forces’ killing of two students and arrest of another student.[xix] Medical students at Shiraz University in Fars Province held sit-ins between February 2 and at least February 7 to protest the killing of protesters and arrest of medical staff who treated protesters.[xx] These limited protests highlight how the regime’s repression of its population creates greater disaffection and anger toward the regime, which can in turn set conditions for further anti-regime activity, including protests.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali reportedly failed on February 10 to convince unspecified Iranian officials to abandon their support for State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as Iraqi prime minister designate.[xxi] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on February 10 that Khazali discussed the importance of Shia Coordination Framework cohesion and questioned Iran’s “blessing” for Maliki’s nomination during meetings with unspecified Iranian officials close to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran.[xxii] The sources added that Iran continues to support Maliki’s nomination despite US objections. Khazali met with National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim after he returned to Iraq to discuss his meetings with Iranian officials.[xxiii] Khazali and Hakim have led the intra-framework opposition to Maliki.[xxiv] Iraq analyst Sajad Jiyad reported on January 28 that Iran told the framework to select either Maliki or current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani for the premiership.[xxv] Khazali’s emphasis on framework unity indicates that he favors nominating a compromise candidate instead of Maliki or Sudani. Khazali has previously expressed opposition to Sudani serving another term.[xxvi]

Framework leaders who oppose Maliki, including Khazali and Hakim, likely sought for Iran to withdraw its support for Maliki after US and domestic opposition to Maliki failed to pressure the framework to nominate a new prime minister designate. Iran has historically exerted major influence in Iraqi government formation, including in the selection of prime ministers.[xxvii] The United States has threatened to sanction Iraq if Maliki becomes prime minister, but the framework has insisted on Maliki’s nomination.[xxviii] An Iranian-backed Badr Organization member dismissed the US threats to sanction Iraq during an Iraqi media interview on February 9.[xxix] Several Sunni parties, including the Progress Party, have also expressed opposition to Maliki.[xxx] Maliki pursued authoritarian and sectarian policies while in office between the US withdrawal in 2011 and 2014 that contributed to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Iraq.[xxxi] The United States ultimately conditioned its support for Iraq against ISIS in 2014 on Maliki’s removal from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[xxxii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that parties opposed to Maliki could attempt to block the presidential election to delay or prevent Maliki from becoming prime minister. Parliament must elect a President via a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum in order for the prime minister designate to attempt to form a government.[xxxiii] The two main Kurdish blocs, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, reportedly told a framework delegation on February 2 that the parties will not agree on a presidential candidate until the framework finalizes its nominee for the premiership.[xxxiv]

An unspecified “influential” framework member reportedly proposed a one-year extension of Sudani’s premiership in which Sudani would have “specific and conditional powers” due to the current political deadlock.[xxxv] It is unclear which framework party proposed this extension given that many framework leaders oppose Sudani remaining in power. A framework source told Iraqi media on February 9 that Sudani will discuss this proposal with the framework in upcoming framework meetings.[xxxvi] Iraqi media separately reported on February 9 that two unspecified framework members recently proposed expanding Sudani’s authority via parliament.[xxxvii] Sudani currently leads a caretaker government with limited powers.[xxxviii] Many framework leaders, including Maliki, Khazali, and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, oppose Sudani remaining in power due to his perceived unwillingness to follow framework direction.[xxxix] Hakim has not indicated his position on Sudani remaining in power and opposes Maliki, which makes it possible that he supports extending Sudani’s premiership.

Sudani almost certainly supports the reported proposal to extend his premiership. Iraqi media leaked a letter from the Iraqi Parliament to the Iraqi electoral commission on February 2 in which Sudani refused to assume his parliament seat, which would force him to relinquish his position as caretaker prime minister.[xl] Sudani withdrew from the premiership race on January 13, but CTP-ISW assesses that Sudani still likely aims to obtain the premiership amid US and domestic opposition to Maliki.[xli] Sudani could seek to obtain the premiership if parties opposed to Maliki block the presidential election and thereby delay or prevent the election of Maliki as prime minister. CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Sudani appears to be maneuvering himself to receive other positions in the Iraqi government if Maliki becomes prime minister but that Sudani’s consistent pursuit of a second term as prime minister demonstrates that he would prefer the premiership over other government positions.[xlii]

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Negotiations: Any US-Iran deal that does not limit Iran's ability to develop its ballistic missile program and support the Axis of Resistance would harm US interests in the Middle East. Iran’s insistence on continuing to develop its ballistic missile program and support the Axis of Resistance comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet with US President Donald Trump on February 11, reportedly to urge Trump not to accept a deal with Iran that only addresses the nuclear issue.
• The Iranian Regime’s Ongoing Securitization Efforts: The Iranian regime’s exacerbation of its population’s economic and sociocultural grievances increases the likelihood that protests will break out again. The regime’s ongoing securitization measures come as some Iranian university students have held demonstrations in recent days to protest Iranian security forces’ killing of university students during the recent protests and arrest of medical personnel who treated injured protesters.
• Iranian Support for Nouri al Maliki as Iraqi Prime Minister Designate: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali reportedly failed on February 10 to convince unspecified Iranian officials to abandon their support for State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as Iraqi prime minister designate. Shia Coordination Framework leaders who oppose Maliki, including Khazali and National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim, likely sought for Iran to withdraw its support for Maliki after US and domestic opposition to Maliki failed to pressure the framework to nominate a new prime minister designate.

Iran

Iran continues to reinforce and harden the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground complex entrances against potential US or Israeli military action. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on February 9 that Iran has completely covered the ENTC’s middle and southern tunnel entrances with soil, according to satellite imagery from early February 2026.[xliii] The Institute added that Iran has backfilled the northern ENTC tunnel entrance.[xliv] Western media previously reported in June 2025 that US strikes during the Israel-Iran War blocked the tunnel entrances to the underground complex at the ENTC that reportedly stores part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.[xlv] The Institute assessed that Iran’s efforts to protect the ENTC’s tunnel entrances would “help dampen” potential airstrikes and complicate any ground raid intended to seize or destroy any uranium at the complex.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have continued to take steps to implement the January 30 agreement. The SDF is reportedly preparing to withdraw from the frontlines in Hasakah City and redeploy its forces to military positions “away from urban areas.”[xlvi] Pro-SDF media reported on February 10 that the Syrian army withdrew its forces positioned near Hasakah City toward al Shadaddi, Hasakah Province.[xlvii] Syrian government forces and SDF internal security forces, known as Asayish, backfilled these positions.[xlviii] The January 30 agreement stipulates the Syrian army and SDF’s withdrawal from Hasakah City.[xlix] The Syrian government and the SDF have also taken steps to integrate SDF institutions into the Syrian state as part of the agreement. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Kurdish media on February 9 that the Syrian government and the SDF formed a committee to negotiate the integration of the SDF’s “existing bodies” into “directorates.”[l] Abdi was likely referring to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which will integrate into the Syrian state under the agreement, given that the newly-formed committee includes the AANES regional co-chair.[li]

Recent statements by SDF and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) officials suggest that there may be some opposition and uncertainty within the SDF and the YPJ regarding certain terms of the January 30 agreement, however. Abdi told Kurdish media on February 9 that the SDF’s control over the Semalka border crossing will “remain as is.”[lii] Abdi noted that a Syrian government delegation will oversee “some state-related matters” at the crossing, such as passport checks.[liii] Abdi’s statements, which mirror those of other SDF officials, contrast Syrian government officials' statements regarding the future of SDF-controlled border crossings. Syrian government officials have consistently stated that the Syrian government will control all border crossings as part of the agreement.[liv] There also appears to be uncertainty about the future of the YPJ. SDF Media Center Director Farhad Shami told Kurdish media on February 9 that the YPJ will maintain “its identity” and that some female comrades will command a brigade within the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[lv] The YPJ has consistently refused to disarm and stated that it will join newly-formed SDF brigades.[lvi] The January 30 agreement did not explicitly address YPJ integration, but the Syrian government has reportedly rejected the formation of a women’s brigade.[lvii] These statements underscore the need for Syrian government and SDF negotiators to clarify the agreement’s terms.

Members of the US-led, anti-ISIS coalition met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 9 to discuss the coalition’s ongoing counter-ISIS efforts.[lviii] Senior diplomatic and defense officials, including US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, discussed US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) operation to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq.[lix] US forces have transferred 4,583 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq since January 21.[lx] The officials also discussed coordination with Iraqi and Syrian forces and the “reintegration” of individuals from al Hol and Roj internally displaced persons camps.[lxi] These camps currently house more than 25,000 individuals, some of whom are ISIS supporters.[lxii] The coalition members affirmed their readiness to work closely with the Syrian government and provide direct support to Syrian and Iraqi forces.[lxiii] This meeting was the coalition’s first meeting since the SDF and the Syrian government reached the January 30 agreement.[lxiv] The SDF has historically been the coalition’s main partner in Syria.[lxv] The Syrian government joined the coalition in November 2025.[lxvi]

Hezbollah reportedly provided support for a Syrian militia cell operating in Mezzeh, Rif Dimashq Province, that has links to the former Assad regime.[lxvii] Syrian forces arrested two members of the cell and seized several Grad rockets and launch platforms in Mezzeh, Rif Dimashq Province, on February 10.[lxviii] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated that the arrested individuals were the remaining members of the Hezbollah-linked militia cell that Syrian forces previously arrested on February 1.[lxix] Hezbollah provided the cell with rockets, launch platforms, and other weapons that the cell had used to conduct multiple attacks in Mezzeh since November 2025.[lxx] One of the members who was arrested on February 2 reportedly has ties to the Assad regime and previously served as a Municipal Council leader in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, prior to the regime’s collapse in December 2024.[lxxi] Iranian forces and Iranian-backed groups had a strong presence in Deir ez Zor Province, including in al Mayadin, during the Assad regime.[lxxii]

Hezbollah could be attempting to rebuild its networks in Syria. These arrests come amid frequent Hezbollah activity along the Syria-Lebanon border in recent months, largely in areas that Iranian-backed militants controlled before the Assad regime’s collapse. Syrian forces previously arrested a Hezbollah cell and seized weapons in Sasa and Kanaker, Rif Dimashq Province, in September 2025.[lxxiii] Syrian forces have also thwarted numerous smuggling attempts in the province in recent months, which suggests that Assad-era smuggling routes remain active.[lxxiv] Syrian forces, for example, interdicted a ”gang” that was attempting to smuggle Konkur anti-tank guided missiles and Iranian-made rockets from Jarajir, Rif Dimashq Province, into Lebanon on January 26.[lxxv] Hezbollah-affiliated fighters and Iranian forces that operated in Rif Dimashq Province before the Assad regime fell used the area as a strategic position to store weapons before smuggling them to Hezbollah.[lxxvi] This activity suggests that Hezbollah may be attempting to rebuild its Assad-era networks in Rif Dimashq Province.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uncovered two separate Hezbollah- and Hamas-linked militia cells operating in the northern West Bank in October 2025.[lxxvii] The IDF announced on February 10 that Hezbollah recruited an individual to form militant cells and conduct terrorist operations in the northern West Bank.[lxxviii] The individual recruited several other individuals and remained in constant correspondence with Hezbollah via social media and gaming applications until his arrest in October 2025.[lxxix] The IDF also uncovered in October 2025 a separate cell comprised of two militants operating in the northern West Bank.[lxxx] A Hamas-linked individual recruited these two militants with the assistance of several Hezbollah fighters.[lxxxi] All five of the arrested militants operated under Hezbollah’s instructions.[lxxxii] Hezbollah has historically provided support to and recruited Palestinian operatives to conduct attacks in the West Bank on its behalf.[lxxxiii] The IDF’s arrests highlight how Iran’s Axis of Resistance will attempt to rebuild its militia networks in the aftermath of the October 7 War.

The United States and the Lebanese government are continuing to take steps to reduce Hezbollah’s access to illicit funding, including via Lebanon’s cash-based economy. The US Treasury Department sanctioned a senior member of al Qard al Hassan, which is Hezbollah’s main financial institution, and an al Qard al Hassan-affiliated gold exchange company, Jood SARL, on February 10.[lxxxiv] Senior al Qard al Hassan members reportedly established multiple Jood SARL branches in majority Shia areas, including southern Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley, in order to ease Hezbollah’s liquidity pressures by laundering funds and obfuscating Hezbollah’s financial activities.[lxxxv] The US Treasury Department also sanctioned a Russian individual as well as two Turkish shipping companies and two vessels involved in a sanctions evasion network to facilitate the export of Iranian fertilizer.[lxxxvi] The US Treasury Department reported in November 2025 that Iran had smuggled at least $1 billion USD to Hezbollah in 2025, mostly through Lebanese money exchange companies.[lxxxvii]

The Lebanese government may have increased pressure on Lebanon’s financial institutions to regulate Lebanon’s cash economy following meetings with US Treasury Department officials in November 2025.[lxxxviii] The Lebanese Central Bank has issued multiple circulars since November 2025 to strengthen reporting requirements for Lebanese financial institutions in order to counter money laundering and terrorist financing.[lxxxix] A US Treasury Department delegation reportedly called on the Lebanese government in November 2025 to further economically degrade Hezbollah by shutting down al Qard al Hassan branches and increasing the government’s regulation of Lebanon’s cash economy.[xc] The Lebanese government may have also taken steps to regulate Lebanon’s economy in order to receive funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Gulf countries. The IMF has called on the Lebanese government to increase its efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, such as by increasing financial due diligence, particularly with high-risk customers and organizations, and seizing illicit funds entering Lebanon.[xci]

The IDF captured a senior Jumaa Islamiya member during a raid in southern Lebanon on February 9.[xcii] IDF 210th Division forces captured senior Jumaa Islamiya member Atwi Atwi in Habbariyeh, Hasbaya District.[xciii] The IDF said that Atwi promoted “terrorist activities” in northern Israel.[xciv] The IDF reported on February 10 that it seized and destroyed a Jumaa Islamiya weapons cache in Beit Jinn, Rif Dimashq Province, Syria, within the past week.[xcv] Jumaa Islamiya is a Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood splinter group, and the group’s military wing, the Fajr Forces, has previously engaged Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and fired rockets from Lebanon into northern Israel during the October 7 War.[xcvi] Hezbollah almost certainly permitted Fajr Forces to conduct attacks from southern Lebanon on Israeli targets given the extent to which Hezbollah controlled the area during the war.[xcvii]