Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 9, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is supporting Iranian efforts to rebuild Iran’s military capabilities during the ceasefire period. Russia is reportedly sending drone components to Iran via the Caspian Sea to help Iran rebuild its offensive capabilities following the war, according to US officials. Russian shipments of drone components to Iran support Iran's broader effort to restore its missile and drone capabilities ahead of a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel.
• Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also supported Iranian attacks on US bases during the war. Russia and the PRC both provided Iran with satellite imagery of US and allied bases during the war.
• Iran has not yet responded to the latest US proposal and will likely use any delay in negotiations to continue to rebuild its military capabilities. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 9 that Iran is still reviewing the US proposal and will "pay no attention to...deadlines."

Toplines

Russia is supporting Iranian efforts to rebuild Iran’s military capabilities during the ceasefire period. The New York Times, citing US officials, reported that Russia is sending drone components to Iran via the Caspian Sea to help Iran rebuild its offensive capabilities following the war.[i] Iran and Russia have historically used the Caspian Sea to trade non-military and military goods. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Bandar Anzali Port along the Caspian Sea during the war to disrupt Russian shipments of military equipment, including Shahed drones, artillery shells, and other ammunition, to Iran.[ii] This report comes amid reports that Russia proposed giving Iran 5,000 short-range fiber-optic drones and an unspecified number of longer-range satellite-guided drones equipped with Starlink terminals. There is no evidence that the drone components Russia is providing to Iran during the ceasefire are related to fiber-optic or first-person view drones, however. Russian shipments of drone components to Iran support Iran's broader effort to restore its missile and drone capabilities ahead of a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. Iran is attempting to recover weapons systems and launchers that it hid underground or that were buried under debris due to US and Israeli airstrikes.[iii] Iran would likely use weapons systems and launchers that it retrieves to resume retaliatory attacks against US forces and regional countries if conflict resumes.

Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also supported Iranian attacks on US bases during the war. The US State Department sanctioned four entities on May 8, including several Chinese companies, for providing satellite imagery to Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces in the region during the war.[iv] The sanctioned entities include Earth Eye and Chang Guand Satellite Technology, which are both based in the PRC and supplied Iran with satellite imagery of US and allied military facilities in the region.[v] Western media previously reported that Iran used an Earth Eye TEE-01B reconnaissance satellite that it acquired from the PRC in 2024 to target US military assets and bases across the Middle East during the war.[vi] Russia similarly provided Iran with satellite imagery of US facilities and Shahed drones to support Iranian attacks during the war.[vii]

The United States continues to target the PRC’s support for the Iranian armed forces. The US Treasury Department sanctioned 10 individuals and companies on May 8, including several entities based in the PRC and Hong Kong, for supporting Iranian efforts to procure weapons components and raw materials used to produce drones and ballistic missiles.[viii] It is unclear whether these entities have attempted to provide Iran with weapons components and raw materials during the ceasefire period. The PRC previously supported Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War by supplying sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant, to Iran.[ix]

Iran has not yet responded to the latest US proposal and will likely use any delay in negotiations to continue to rebuild its military capabilities (see above). Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 9 that Iran is still reviewing the US proposal and will "pay no attention to...deadlines."[x] US President Donald Trump told Fox News on May 6 that Iran had one week to reach a deal that ends the war and establishes a framework for future nuclear negotiations.[xi] Iran's ability to enrich uranium, Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz remain major sticking points between the two sides, however. Two sources with knowledge told Axios on May 8 that Qatar is serving as one of the intermediaries between the United States and Iran.[xii] Qatari officials are reportedly in contact with senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials involved in Iranian decision-making, US officials, and Pakistani mediators.[xiii]

Maritime Developments

Satellite imagery shows a possible large oil spill near Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, but the cause of the possible oil spill remains unknown.[xiv] The New York Times, citing satellite imagery, reported on May 8 that there appears to be a large oil slick near Kharg Island.[xv] Orbital EOS, which is a global oil spill monitoring service, told the New York Times that the possible spill covered more than 20 square miles on May 6 and that more than 3,000 barrels of oil may have been released.[xvi] The cause of the spill remains unclear, but energy experts told the New York Times that Iran’s recent decision to store large volumes of crude oil in tanker vessels increases the risk of spills.[xvii] Iran has increasingly stored oil in tanker vessels due to the US naval blockade on Iranian ports, which has prevented Iran from exporting oil. Experts added that a rupture in the aging Abuzar oil field–Kharg Island undersea pipeline could be another possible cause, citing repeated leaks in recent years, including a breach in October 2024.[xviii] An Israeli OSINT analyst separately assessed that the slick was likely the result of an unspecified malfunction or Iran washing materials out of oil tanks.[xix] Commercially available satellite imagery from May 9 shows that the spill has flowed southwards and dissipated significantly.

US-Israeli Air Campaign

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Internal Dynamics

Nothing significant to report.

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Nothing significant to report.

Other Axis of Resistance Response

An Iraqi committee is reportedly close to finalizing an “executive plan” to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xx] The Shia Coordination Framework authorized this committee to oversee the implementation of “mechanisms” to disarm the militias, classify the militias in a special database, and reintegrate militia members into Iraqi civil and security institutions, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on May 9.[xxi] The committee’s members include outgoing Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi, and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.[xxii] Iraqi media reported that the framework chose Ameri for this role because his ties to Iran are meant to “help build trust with the militias and persuade them to engage with the state.”[xxiii] Badr has integrated itself into Iraqi state institutions to a greater extent than other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since 2003.[xxiv] The committee is expected to present its plan to disarm the militias to unspecified US officials "in the coming days."[xxv] A senior political official told Asharq al Awsat that the plan involves the confiscation of militias’ medium and heavy weapons, as well as the restructuring of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), but did not provide further details about the plan.[xxvi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xxvii] Informed Iraqi sources also told Asharq al Awsat that the plan is unlikely to do more than “buy time” amid increased US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias.[xxviii]

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have rejected disarmament in recent days. A spokesperson for an unidentified militia told Asharq al Awsat on May 8 that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Hezbollah reject disarmament.[xxix] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other Iraqi militias.[xxx] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi rejected disarmament on May 6 and called the group’s weapons a “red line.”[xxxi] The Iraqi committee charged with disarming the militias has reportedly held meetings with unspecified Iraqi militia leaders in recent days to present them with “ideas on how to disarm and integrate,” with some meetings failing to “proceed calmly.”[xxxii]

The Iraqi federal government’s disarmament efforts come amid increased US financial pressure on Iraq. The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has bolstered its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[xxxiii] US and Iraqi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 22 that the US Treasury Department has temporarily halted shipments of Iraq’s oil export revenue via the US Federal Reserve due to concerns about militia behavior.[xxxiv] The officials said that the United States first blocked a shipment of oil export revenue to the Central Bank of Iraq in late February 2026 and recently blocked a cargo plane delivery of nearly $500 million USD.[xxxv] The Central Bank of Iraq has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve on behalf of the Iraqi Finance Ministry since 2003 that holds the Iraqi federal government’s revenue from oil exports in US dollars.[xxxvi] Oil revenue accounts for about 90 percent of the Iraqi state’s budget.[xxxvii] The United States has also reportedly suspended its funding for some counterterrorism and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) training programs until Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks cease and the Iraqi federal government takes unspecified steps to “dismantle” the militias.[xxxviii] A senior Iraqi political source told Asharq al Awsat on May 8 that Iraqi security advisers have accelerated their efforts to develop militia disarmament and integration proposals due to mounting US pressure.[xxxix]

The Iraqi federal government’s efforts to disarm the militias also come as Iran has reportedly pressured its Iraqi partners to end Iranian-backed Iraqi militia kinetic activity, likely to avoid US financial pressure against Iraq that negatively impacts Iran.[xl] Unidentified informed sources told Iraqi media on May 5 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned about “real dangers” that could result in a loss of unspecified military privileges and discussed the need for an “alternative plan” regarding militia disarmament during meetings with unspecified militias and framework leaders in Baghdad on April 18.[xli] Ghaani reportedly proposed a militia disarmament plan that seeks to avoid provoking the United States by ending the kinetic role of some militias, while simultaneously consolidating Iranian influence in Iraq by further infiltrating Iranian-backed Iraqi actors into Iraqi government, diplomatic, and security institutions.[xlii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran could decide to build a new, loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement the political activity of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. US financial pressure on Iraq, such as the US Treasury Department’s reported decision to halt shipments of Iraqi export oil revenue to Iraq, heavily impacts Iran due to Iran’s use of the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion and to help fund the Axis of Resistance.[xliii]