Iran Update, December 8, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, has seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates in eastern Yemen since December 3.[i] The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and seeks to establish an independent state in southern Yemen.[ii] The STC launched an operation on December 3 to "restore stability to Wadi [Hadramawt], end the state of security breakdown, and halt the exploitation of the region by forces alien to [Wadi Hadramawt] and the governorate."[iii] Wadi Hadramawt is a relatively heavily populated region in Hadramawt and has historically been a stronghold for various Saudi-influenced military and political factions. An STC official told Emirati media on December 3 that the STC advanced into Hadramawt to confront a "rebellion" led by tribal forces that demanded greater control over local resources.[iv] STC-backed forces clashed with Yemeni government-affiliated First Military Region forces, which controlled the northern part of the governorate (including Wadi Hadramawt), on December 3 before STC forces took control of Seiyun, the largest city in Wadi Hadramawt.[v] STC forces also expanded their operation to seize key areas of Mahrah Governorate.[vi] Senior STC official Amr al Bidh told Reuters on December 8 that the STC has extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen. These eight governorates previously comprised the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to unification in 1990.[vii] The STC itself emerged from long-running divisions between northern Yemenis and southern Yemenis that have their roots in the conflict between north and south Yemen prior to unification. The STC operation forced some Saudi-backed forces to withdraw from some areas of southern Yemen.

Yemeni actors close to or openly allied with the STC and the UAE have supported or not explicitly condemned the STC’s operation to seize control of these governorates. Some actors have reiterated the STC’s secessionist aims. UAE-backed National Resistance Front (NRF) Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who is also one of the Yemeni government President Leadership Council’s (PLC) seven vice presidents, told NRF forces on December 7 that the STC's recent operation represents a "reorganization of the area of operations."[viii] STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami has similarly not condemned the STC offensive and has held several meetings with ROYG officials, including the Yemeni interior minister, in the office of Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi, since the STC's operation.[ix] Alimi traveled to Saudi Arabia on December 5 and the STC removed Alimi’s portrait and the ROYG flag from Alimi’s office after its fighters stormed the Presidential Palace on December 6.[x] A Yemen analyst suggested on December 8 that Muharrami presented himself as "an active state actor operating within the PLC framework" during his meetings with ROYG officials.[xi] Muharrami appears to be acting both as a representative of the STC and the PLC, but his presence in Alimi’s office without Alimi’s photograph or a Yemeni flag is notable because it implies Muharrami and the STC have sidelined Alimi. STC leaders in Hadramawt Governorate also called on December 8 for schools and government buildings to fly the former PDRY flag instead of the ROYG flag.[xii] The STC commonly uses the PDRY flag. Its demand that schools use the PDRY flag instead of the ROYG flag implies that the STC does not view the ROYG as legitimate in the south, however.

Hundreds of individuals participated in a likely STC-orchestrated demonstration in Khor Maksar, Aden Governate, on December 7, calling for the secession of southern Yemen.[xiii] An STC leader, Momen al Saqqaf, delivered a speech at the demonstration and emphasized that the recent events mark "the beginning of a new phase to impose a new reality."[xiv] STC member Raafat al Thaqali called on STC President and PLC Vice President Aidarous Qassem al Zubaidi to respond to popular demands for the establishment of a fully sovereign state in the south of Yemen.[xv]

There are several non-STC-aligned elements within the PLC that remain active in non-Houthi controlled areas of northern Yemen that border southern Yemen governorates, particularly around Taiz and Marib governorates. PLC Vice President and Marib Governor Sultan al Arada stated on December 8 that the recent developments threaten Yemeni and regional stability, and that "actions taken outside the national consensus" give the Houthis an opportunity to expand their influence in Yemen.[xvi] He emphasized the importance of greater support for President Alimi and the Yemeni government to prevent internal fragmentation. [xvii]

The STC offensive may increase tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while increasing Emirati influence in Yemen. Saudi forces have reportedly withdrawn from several parts of southern Yemen, including parts of Aden and Mahrah governorates and from Perim Island in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, since December 3.[xviii] Some social media users have circulated footage of Saudi forces reportedly mobilizing toward the al Wadiah border area near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.[xix] A Yemen analyst reported on December 7 that Saudi-backed forces are mobilizing near al Wadiah, citing unspecified sources.[xx] It remains unclear how Saudi Arabia will respond to the STC offensive. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have historically had conflicting objectives in Yemen. Alimi reportedly warned on December 7 that any actions outside the framework of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which forced the STC to recognize the legitimacy of ROYG and subordinate its structures to ROYG, will threaten Yemen’s stability.[xxi] Alimi told US, French, and British diplomats on December 7 that he rejects any "unilateral measures” that undermine the ROYG.[xxii]

Recent meetings between Saudi officials and their Hadrami contacts suggest that Saudi Arabia was not forewarned about the pending STC operation and that Riyadh is still determining how it should react. A Saudi delegation led by Chairman of the Special Committee on Yemen Major General Mohammad Obeid bin Julaighm has held meetings with various factions in Hadramawt Governorate since December 3 to discuss the “eventual transfer of certain positions” to the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces.[xxiii] A delegation of Hadramawt tribal leaders and forces also arrived in Saudi Arabia on December 6 to discuss recent developments in Hadramawt.[xxiv]

The Turkish government has continued to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) by December 31, 2025. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters on December 6 that the SDF has shown “no intention” of honoring the March 2025 agreement to integrate the SDF into the Syrian state and instead seeks to circumvent the agreement.[xxv] Fidan added that “there can only be one army, one command structure,” but caveated that “in local administration, [the SDF and Syrian government] can reach a different settlement and different understandings."[xxvi] Fidan separately said on December 6 that he wants the SDF to immediately expel its non-Syrian members, including those from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, according to Turkish media.[xxvii] Unspecified Turkish security sources told a pro-Erdogan Turkish newspaper on December 7 that Syria and Turkey will launch a joint military offensive against the SDF if the SDF does not comply with the March 2025 agreement.[xxviii]

Anonymous Turkish security sources separately told a Turkish journalist on December 7 that Turkey will “not accept the appointment” of senior Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) leaders to leadership positions “within the Syrian government,” which indicates that Turkey seeks to bar SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the Syrian army.[xxix] The YPG is the dominant faction within the SDF.[xxx] The Syrian transitional government previously agreed in October 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades.[xxxi] Turkey’s rejection of any appointment of senior YPG leaders to “leadership positions” effectively prevents senior SDF leaders from commanding the division- and brigade-level units proposed under the October 2025 agreement.[xxxii] The security sources also noted that Turkey insists on SDF members joining the Syrian MoD as individuals.[xxxiii] Turkey’s call for SDF fighters to integrate into the MoD as individuals and demand for a “one command structure” indicates that Turkey rejects the integration of SDF divisions into the MoD as blocs and opposes allowing former SDF commanders to lead any unit formed from individually integrated SDF personnel.[xxxiv] 

Corroborated reports of Turkish military deployments to northeastern Syria further suggest that Turkey may be preparing for potential joint offensive operations in the area.  Turkish forces deployed reinforcements on December 7 to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province, according to Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish sources.[xxxv] Kurdish media reported on December 7 that a Turkish convoy consisting of 20 heavy and medium vehicles entered Ras al Ain in Raqqa Province, which is located along the Turkish-occupied Peace Spring frontlines.[xxxvi] A local pro-Syrian government, anti-SDF source published a video of the reported Turkish military deployment on December 7 that shows three Turkish armored vehicles and three unspecified Turkish transport vehicles on an unspecified road in northern Syria.[xxxvii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the size or composition of these deployments, or whether they are specifically intended for offensive combat operations.[xxxviii] The Turkish military could launch offensive operations against the SDF from Turkish-occupied areas of Syria, including the Peace Spring region, given Turkey’s existing positions and air superiority over the SDF.[xxxix] The Turkish military reportedly maintains more than 60 active positions in the Peace Spring area, including at least two command bases and a renovated airstrip.[xl] The Turkish military previously deployed heavy military assets to Kuweires Airbase, Aleppo Province, near the MoD-SDF frontlines on September 28.[xli] The SDF also does not possess adequate air defense systems that it would need to counter Turkish close air support.[xlii]

Fidan’s statements and Turkey’s potential military preparations come amid senior Turkish and Syrian military officials’ discussions about enhancing military cooperation between the two countries. Turkish Chief of General Staff Selcuk Bayraktaroglu and Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra reportedly discussed ways to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries in Damascus on December 5.[xliii] Bayraktaroglu also reportedly inspected a joint Turkish-Syrian operations room on December 5.[xliv] Independent Turkish media described Bayraktaroglu’s visit as a Turkish attempt to “intimidate” the SDF, while pro-government Turkish media claimed that his visit was a “warning to the SDF.”[xlv] The Turkish and Syrian officials may have also discussed the August 2025 Turkish-Syrian military agreement.[xlvi] Turkish and Syrian defense officials formalized a military training and “consultation” deal in Ankara on August 13 following Syria’s July 23 request for Turkish assistance to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities.[xlvii] Unspecified regional sources told independent Turkish media on December 7 that Syrian forces have been training with Turkish military advisers, weapons, ammunition, and equipment “for some time” to prepare for “potential clashes.”[xlviii]

Israel and the United States began a week-long naval exercise off the coast of Israel on December 7 to prepare for “regional threats.”[xlix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on December 7 that the exercise, codenamed “Intrinsic Defender,” aims to improve naval coordination between the Israeli Navy and US 5th Fleet and prepare for “various regional threats.”[l] Iran and Iranian-backed groups have frequently posed maritime and aerial threats to Israel and international shipping, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel.[li] This exercise also comes after the IRGC Navy conducted a two-day naval exercise on December 4 and 5 in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Sea of Oman, which likely aimed to simultaneously deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare for potential future maritime escalation.[lii] The IRGC tested several missiles, drones, fast attack craft, and air defense systems during the exercise.[liii] The IRGC tested a ballistic missile named “303” but Iranian media did not provide any details about this missile. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated on December 6 that Iran tested a missile during the exercise that had a range of over 1,375 kilometers, possibly in reference to the “303” ballistic missile.[liv] Tangsiri also warned that the IRGC Navy is prepared for any conflict that could take place in the maritime domain.

The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the US Congress is expected to vote on in the coming days, demands that the Iraqi federal government take “credible steps” toward reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in order to receive US security funding in 2026.[lv] The NDAA allocates the Department of Defense’s 2026 budget.[lvi] The NDAA states that the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, which equips, trains, and supports elements of the Iraqi security establishment, can only receive up to 50 percent of its 2026 budget until the US Defense Secretary certifies to Congress that the Iraqi federal government has taken “credible steps” in three main areas regarding Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lvii] These areas include:

1. Reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias not under the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process,”[lviii]
2. Strengthening the Iraqi prime minister’s “authority and operational control” over the ISF, and
3. Investigating militia members who operate outside the ISF’s formal chain of command to attack US personnel, among other illegal activities.[lix]

The NDAA stipulates that the US Defense Secretary can issue a six-month waiver if the lack of US security funding harms US national security interests.[lx]

It is unclear if the NDAA’s use of the term “Iraqi Security Forces” refers to the Iraqi security apparatus as a whole or to the ISF specifically. Iranian-backed actors could try to use this ambiguity to retain their influence in Iraq. The Iraqi security establishment includes the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) while the ISF does not. The United States has consistently pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lxii] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades as well as forces that operate outside of the PMF.[lxiii] Iraq’s ruling Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered multiple options to meet US demands to disarm the militias, including integrating the militias into the PMF.[lxiv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors could exploit the NDAA’s lack of specificity to deem integrating the militias into the PMF as satisfactory to meet US demands, as the PMF is a part of the security apparatus but retains significant independence from the Iraqi state. CTP-ISW assessed on November 7 that integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would likely preserve their existing networks and political influence.[lxv] Any integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security apparatus must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[lxvi]

Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour gave speeches to students at the IRGC-controlled Command and Staff University and Imam Hossein University, respectively, on December 7.[lxvii] Both officials called on the Iranian armed forces to develop and utilize advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence.[lxviii] Mousavi emphasized the need for Iran to keep up with technological developments and strengthen the armed forces’ “preemptive capabilities.”[lxix] Iranian media noted that developing “preemptive capabilities” is consistent with Iran’s “active deterrence” strategy, which is an offensive strategy that Iran has employed since at least 2014.[lxx] “Active deterrence” emphasizes the need for Iran to intervene in situations abroad in order to expand Iranian influence and confront threats before they endanger Iran.[lxxi] Pakpour highlighted applications for artificial intelligence in surveillance and targeting and stated that “stealth technology” could improve Iranian missiles’ ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses.[lxxii] Pakpour emphasized that “more work should be done at Imam Hossein University in areas such as air defense and stealth technology.”[lxxiii] Mousavi and Pakpour’s emphasis on technological developments comes after Israel reportedly used artificial intelligence to identify Iranian targets during the war.[lxxiv]

Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels.[lxxv] The diplomats stated that Israel would likely attack Iran if Iran takes “serious steps” to enrich uranium and advance its ballistic missile capabilities, and if the United States and Iran do not reach a nuclear deal. The European diplomats did not provide any evidence for these assertions, however. Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that Israel and the United States damaged during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.[lxxvi] The Institute assessed on November 21 that Iran’s clean-up efforts at three nuclear weaponization sites “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”[lxxvii] There are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war. Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the war, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons.[lxxviii] A political analyst with ties to the Iranian regime assessed on December 7 that the probability of a “limited” and ”targeted” Israeli attack on Iran is high and that President Donald Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy aims to uphold “the status quo” by containing Iran rather than pursuing strategic reconciliation or full-scale war.[lxxix] The analyst claimed that the United States aims to keep Iran in a permanent state of “defense and effort to preserve survival” and prevent Iran from rebuilding its deterrence and influence.[lxxx] The analyst suggested that Iran can impose costs on Israel and Arab states to reduce their willingness to contain Iran in line with the US National Security Strategy.[lxxxi]

Key Takeaways

• The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s Advance in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, has seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates in eastern Yemen since December 3. Yemeni actors close to or openly allied with the STC and the UAE have supported or not explicitly condemned the STC’s operation to seize control of these governorates. Some actors have reiterated the STC’s secessionist aims. The STC offensive may increase tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while increasing Emirati influence in Yemen.
• Turkish Military Preparations in Syria: The Turkish government has continued to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense by December 31, 2025.
• Israeli and US Naval Exercise: Israel and the United States began a week-long naval exercise off the coast of Israel on December 7 to prepare for “regional threats.” Iran and Iranian-backed groups have frequently posed maritime and aerial threats to Israel and international shipping, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel.
• US Security Aid to Iraq: The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the US Congress is expected to vote on in the coming days, demands that the Iraqi federal government take “credible steps” toward reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in order to receive US security funding in 2026. It is unclear if the NDAA’s use of the term “Iraqi Security Forces” refers to the Iraqi security apparatus as a whole or to the ISF specifically.
• Iranian Efforts to Advance Military Technology: Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities.
• Potential Israeli Operation Against Iran: Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels. Iran has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, but there are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war.

Iran

Iran is pragmatically pursuing closer diplomatic and trade ties with Azerbaijan amid Iranian concerns about Azerbaijan’s relationships with the United States and Israel, which Iran perceives as a threat to its security. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on December 8 to discuss strengthening Iranian-Azerbaijani relations.[lxxxii] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s support for the 3+3 format, which is a diplomatic initiative involving Iran, Turkey, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to ensure security in the Caucasus through trade “without any foreign interference.”[lxxxiii] Araghchi and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, also discussed how Iran and Azerbaijan are expanding bilateral trade through border infrastructure projects, such as the Rasht-Astara Railway and the Aghband-Kalalah highway bridge.[lxxxiv] An Iranian expert on the Caucasus told Iranian media on December 8 that Iran wants Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to remove trade barriers between the two countries.[lxxxv] Iran is not an EAEU member but has had an “observer status” in the union since 2024 and signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU in May 2025. Member or observer status in the union reduces tariffs by 90 percent.[lxxxvi] The Iranian expert noted that increased trade between Iran and Azerbaijan would activate Iran‘s land trade routes with Russia and support Iran’s regional trade network.[lxxxvii] Iran’s efforts to increase trade with Azerbaijan come amid Iranian officials’ concerns about US and Israeli interference in the Caucasus. The United States proposed in August 2025 to oversee the development of the Zangezur Corridor in southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[lxxxviii] The corridor would run along Iran’s only shared border with Armenia and sever Iran’s land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. Some Iranian media outlets separately accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to launch attacks against Iran from Azerbaijani territory during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, which Azerbaijan has denied.[lxxxix] Iran remains concerned about Israeli infiltration into Iranian territory from Azerbaijan, as well as Azerbaijan’s deepening relationship with Israel.[xc]

Iraq

Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), announced on December 8 that it sent the November 2025 parliamentary election results to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court for ratification, which will officially start the government formation process.[xci] This announcement comes after the Electoral Judicial Panel announced on December 7 that it resolved the 853 appeals that political parties and candidates had submitted to it regarding the election results.[xcii] The government formation process will include the selection of the Iraqi parliament speaker and their deputies, the president, and the prime minister.[xciii] The 2021 government formation process lasted almost a year after the Federal Supreme Court ratified the October 2021 election results in late December 2021.[xciv]

State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s office denied on December 6 that Maliki contacted the United States and promised to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xcv] The office’s denial comes after an unidentified senior Iraqi official told a Kurdish journalist on December 3 that Maliki told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supported his bid to become prime minister.[xcvi] CTP-ISW assessed on December 4 that Maliki likely claimed that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while in office because he believed it could garner him US support for another term.[xcvii] The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, is currently considering multiple candidates for prime minister, including Maliki.[xcviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.

Syria

The Syrian transitional government’s counter-insurgency efforts have likely degraded Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s ability to conduct attacks in Syria. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah said on December 6 that its activity has “recently significantly declined” due to the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) and MoD’s “arrest and persecution” campaigns in collaboration with the Global Coalition to Defeat Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[xcix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah added that ISIS continues to “persevere” and “bear the brunt” of the Syrian government’s counter-insurgency operations in Syria.[c] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has continued to circulate anti-Damascus propaganda on its social media channels despite its reported weakened ability to conduct attacks.[ci] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah said on December 2 that defeating the Syrian transitional government is “more important and more justified than anything else.”[cii] Syrian security forces previously dismantled an ISIS-affiliated cell in Latakia Province on November 24 that may have been part of Saraya Ansar al Sunnah rather than ISIS.[ciii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has not claimed an attack in Syria since July 2025 but continues to threaten violence against Syrian minorities.[civ]  

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The United States and the European Union (EU) are preparing to provide additional security assistance to Lebanese security forces amid international partners’ frustration over the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah and Israeli warnings about a potential operation in Lebanon if the LAF does not disarm Hezbollah.[cv] Reuters, citing an internal EU document, reported on December 8 that the EU will conduct a “scoping mission” in early 2026 to potentially provide “advice, training, and capacity-building” assistance to the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF).[cvi] The EU aims to strengthen the ISF so that the LAF can gradually transfer some of its internal security tasks to the ISF and allocate more soldiers toward disarming Hezbollah.[cvii] The US State Department separately approved the sale of $90.5 million worth of medium tactical vehicles and related equipment to the Lebanese state on December 5.[cviii] This US military sale comes amid US officials’ frustration over the LAF’s lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah.[cix] Several US congressional members reportedly sent a letter to senior Lebanese officials on December 3, warning that the United States would find it “increasingly difficult” to justify continued support to the Lebanese government if it does not meet its commitment to disarm Hezbollah.[cx] Israel has also expressed frustration over the LAF’s lack of progress and warned about a potential Israeli operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government does not disarm the group.[cxi] US and European officials have attempted to prevent an Israeli operation in Lebanon.[cxii] Israeli media reported on December 7 that US President Donald Trump called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to shift from offensive operations and escalation threats in Lebanon to diplomacy and confidence-building measures.[cxiii] US and French diplomats told Lebanese media on December 8 that the United States asked Israel to respect the United States’ December 31 deadline for the LAF to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and give time for Israeli and Lebanese officials to negotiate through the ceasefire monitoring committee.[cxiv]