Iran Update, December 5, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Former senior Assad regime officials are likely funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Reuters reported on December 5 that former Military Intelligence Chief Major General Kamal Hassan and Bashar al Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, have formed rival Alawite militias in coastal Syria that seek to secede coastal Syria from transitional government control and restore Assad-era power structures, citing 48 informed anonymous sources.[i] Makhlouf and Hassan have reportedly spent over $6 million and $1.5 million, respectively, to recruit and pay the salaries of Alawite fighters in Syria and Lebanon.[ii] Unspecified Assadist and Syrian government sources told Reuters that Hassan and Makhlouf’s militias are also competing to gain access to 14 Assad-era command-and-control rooms scattered across coastal Syria and dozens of weapons caches.[iii] Tartous Province Governor Ahmed al Shami confirmed the existence of the Assad-era command rooms in the region but stated that the “centers have been significantly weakened” and that “there is no concern about their continued existence.”[iv] Reuters reported that Hassan also established a charity in Lebanon to build influence among Alawites who fled from Syria to Lebanon after the Assad regime fell in December 2024.[v] Thousands of Syrians tied to the Assad regime and Hezbollah fled coastal Syria to northern Lebanon after Assad was ousted, and Hassan may seek to recruit these Alawite refugees to participate in a potential future pro-Alawite insurgency.[vi]  The General Security Service (GSS) arrested a Makhlouf-funded insurgent cell in Latakia in October as well as a pro-Alawite insurgent commander in August who had ties to Makhlouf, which highlights Makhlouf’s efforts to actively support cells in coastal Syria that could participate in an Alawite insurgency.[vii]

Assadist officials’ claims that three prominent former Assad officials command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria are almost certainly an exaggeration. Reuters reported that internal documents from Makhlouf’s and Hassan’s factions claim that these officials control 54,000 and 12,000 fighters, respectively.[viii] The Assad regime officials have reportedly not yet mobilized the fighters because “the time is not yet right.”[ix] Reuters also reported that Bashar al Assad’s brother, Maher, commands 25,000 fighters in and outside of Syria that he could mobilize, citing former Assad commanders in Lebanon.[x] CTP-ISW has not observed a consistent level of violence or insurgent activity in coastal Syria that would be expected if the three former Assad regime officials actually commanded this number of fighters. Reuters reported that fighters on the coast are accepting money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, which suggests that many of the fighters are “ghost soldiers” who accept small payments but lack real loyalty or willingness to fight for either Makhlouf or Hassan.[xi] An anonymous local Alawite militia commander stated that the payments from Makhlouf and Hassan are insufficient but noted that “there is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years.”[xii]  Five other militia commanders echoed this commander's sentiment and said that Makhlouf attempted to buy their loyalty with “crumbs of money.”[xiii] The commanders' evident disdain for their patrons indicates that it is unlikely that Makhlouf or Hassan could launch a large-scale Alawite insurgency in coastal Syria because these commanders would be unlikely to risk their lives for their patrons. The GSS, with help from the Alawite community, dismantled an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-linked Assadist insurgent cell in Sheikh Badr, Tartous Province, on November 12, which suggests that an insurgency that seeks to restore Assadist power structures may lack broad Alawite support.[xiv] The pro-Assad Alawite insurgency has continued at a relatively low level since the height of the Alawite insurgency in March 2025, despite Makhlouf and Hassan’s efforts. Several Alawite insurgent groups remain active in coastal Syria but have conducted limited and largely ineffective attacks targeting the transitional government, and these groups currently lack the capabilities to force the transitional government to cede control of coastal Syria.[xv]

Many Alawites in Syria continue to hold grievances toward the Syrian transitional government that malicious actors may seek to exploit, but the vast majority of the Alawite community does not appear inclined to use violence to address these grievances. Alawites in Syria have repeatedly called for autonomy since the fall of the Assad regime because they are skeptical of the transitional government’s ability and willingness to protect their communities, particularly after some government forces participated in reprisal massacres against Alawites in coastal Syria in March 2025.[xvi] Some members of the Alawite community have also argued that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised under the new government.[xvii] Assadists like Makhlouf and Hassan may attempt to present themselves as defenders of the Alawite community and exploit the community’s grievances toward the government to recruit fighters. Prominent voices within the Alawite community have advocated against violence, however, and violence in coastal Syria has remained at low levels since March 2025.  Over 1,000 Alawite protestors participated in peaceful demonstrations on November 25 along the Syrian coast and western Hama Province following an incident of sectarian violence in Homs City.[xviii] These protests largely remained peaceful at the request of prominent Alawite leaders.[xix]

The Syrian government has additionally taken steps in recent months to build stronger relationships with some Alawite communities along the coast. The recent dismantlement of an IRGC-affiliated Assadist cell with the help of the Alawite community in rural Tartous on November 12 indicated that some GSS units are improving their counter-insurgency approach in rural minority areas by working with locals.[xx] Syrian security forces additionally worked to prevent counter-protesters from attacking Alawite protesters and de-escalated attempts to instigate violence on November 25.[xxi] High-ranking senior government officials have continued to engage with local Alawite leaders and dignitaries in order to build trust and improve community engagement, including through economic development.[xxii] Four Syrian aides stated that a former Assad-era military commander and current adviser to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Khaled al Ahmad, is financing jobs and other economic opportunities within the Alawite community to combat unemployment in the community.[xxiii] The governor of Tartous Province called Khaled al Ahmad a “crucial” individual in building trust between Alawites and the government.[xxiv]  Improved trust and more robust partnerships between the Syrian government and the Alawite community can reduce opportunities for Assadists and Alawite insurgents to recruit fighters.

Key Takeaways

• Assadist Insurgency Efforts: Former senior Assad regime officials are likely funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Assadist officials’ claims that three prominent former Assad officials command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria are almost certainly an exaggeration.
• Alawite-Syrian Government Relations: Many Alawites in Syria continue to hold grievances toward the Syrian transitional government that malicious actors may seek to exploit, but the vast majority of the Alawite community does not appear inclined to use violence to address these grievances. The Syrian government has additionally taken steps in recent months to build stronger relationships with some Alawite communities along the coast.

Iran

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy continued its two-day naval exercise on December 5 that likely aims to simultaneously deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare for potential future maritime escalation.[xxv] The exercise took place in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC Navy fired medium-range Ghadr-110 ballistic missiles, Ghadr-380 anti-ship cruise missiles, Ghadir cruise missiles, and unspecified “303” ballistic missiles from multiple inland launch sites.[xxvi] Iranian media did not provide any details about the “303” ballistic missile. The ship-mounted surface-to-air Navab air defense system struck projectiles targeting IRGC Navy fast attack craft and Iran’s coastline.[xxvii] Iranian media claimed that the IRGC Navy used the Sejjil anti-ship cruise missile, which reportedly has a range of 180 kilometers, for the first time during the exercise.[xxviii] Iran has reportedly previously tried to send Sejjil anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.[xxix] The Iranian regime’s primary English language news outlet stated on December 4 that this exercise sent a “dual message” of peace toward Iran’s regional partners and a warning to Iran’s adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[xxx]

Iran is trying to portray itself as a reliable security partner for Eurasian countries, particularly Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Defa Press published an op-ed on December 5 in which it argued that Iran’s recent “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise demonstrated Iran’s importance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its reliability as a security partner.[xxxi] Iran held the exercise near the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade’s headquarters in East Azerbaijan Province between December 1 and 5.[xxxii] All ten SCO members, which include Russia, Belarus, and the PRC, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[xxxiii] The op-ed stated that the exercise sent a “geopolitical message” that Iran is ready to “form a new security order alongside the great Asian powers.”[xxxiv] The op-ed claimed that the exercise increased SCO members’ confidence in Iran's ability to guarantee the “security of economic and strategic routes.” Defa Press was likely referring to regional transportation routes, which Iran has sought to develop as a means to facilitate trade with regional countries and undermine sanctions. IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour stated on December 4 that Iran is also prepared to share its counterterrorism expertise with SCO members “without any restrictions.”[xxxv] Iran may be trying to position itself as a reliable security partner to SCO members as part of Iran’s longstanding effort to undermine the US-led international order by strengthening ties with partners in multilateral security and economic institutions.[xxxvi]

Iraq

State of Law Coalition Spokesperson Aqeel al Fatlawi claimed on December 4 that unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members removed Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani from the framework’s WhatsApp group because the Sudani administration designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.[xxxvii] The Sudani administration designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations on November 17 but later reversed its decision, reportedly due to Iranian pressure.[xxxviii] Fatlawi emphasized that Sudani will not serve a second term as prime minister.[xxxix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. An unidentified political source told Iraqi media on December 4 that Sudani was not removed from the framework’s WhatsApp group, however.[xl] This report comes as the framework is reportedly considering multiple candidates for prime minister, including Sudani and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki.[xli]  

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.