Iran Update, December 4, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supports his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes Maliki, is currently considering multiple candidates for prime minister, including Maliki.[ii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised primarily of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the prime minister.[iv] Maliki likely claimed that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while in office because he believes it could garner him US support for another term.

Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the PMF, into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister. This effort would harm Iraqi stability because Maliki pursued authoritarian and sectarian policies when he previously served as prime minister that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Maliki has continuously defended the PMF throughout the United States’ efforts to dissolve it in 2025.[v] He did, however, state in February 2025 that the PMF should be “reconsidered and rehabilitated” to have an “exclusive” connection to the prime minister.[vi] Maliki’s proposed modification of the PMF bears resemblance to the extra-constitutional Office of the Commander and Chief, which Maliki used to bypass the chain of command and directly influence Iraqi security affairs.[vii] Maliki centralized power, weakened multiple Iraqi institutions, and exacerbated Sunni grievances toward the Shia-dominated Iraqi federal government while in office.[viii] His mismanagement of the Iraqi security forces played a pivotal role in the speed of ISIS’s seizure of almost a third of Iraqi territory in 2014.[ix] Maliki then used the threat of ISIS to accelerate his pre-existing effort to form a popular army, which he proceeded to staff with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and place under the purview of the Office of the Commander and Chief. Maliki used this force to coerce his political enemies and increase his power.[x] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa, which called for Iraqis to mobilize against ISIS and is often credited with creating the force that would become the PMF, further propelled Maliki’s mobilization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xi] The United States ultimately delayed support for Iraq in 2014 until Maliki was removed from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[xii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.[xiii] Iraqi state media reported on December 4 that the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Funds had designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations and froze the groups’ assets in mid-November 2025.[xiv] The committee later announced that it would remove the Houthis and Hezbollah from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[xv] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered an investigation of the incident on December 4.[xvi] Two Iraqi officials told the Associated Press on December 4 that the Iraqi federal government reversed its terrorist designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[xvii] The militias reportedly accused the government of targeting regional allies and risking conflict with Iran. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors condemned the Iraqi federal government's designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah on December 4.[xviii] This incident comes as the United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.[xix]

The Iraqi federal government accused “outlaws” on December 3 of committing the November 26 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xx] The Iraqi federal government often uses the term “outlaws” to accuse Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of conducting attacks without explicitly implicating the militias. The November 26 drone attack targeting the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province caused material damage and sparked a fire but did not cause any casualties.[xxi] A committee formed by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to investigate the attack announced the results of its investigation on December 3.[xxii] The committee said that "outlaws” launched two drones at the gas field, one of which hit the gas field and the second landed outside the field.[xxiii] The Iraqi federal government has previously used the term “outlaws” and similar phrases to obfuscate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ culpability in attacks to avoid political blowback.[xxiv] The Iraqi federal government blamed a November 2020 rocket attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad on “outlaws,” even though Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds (formerly called Ashab al Kahf) claimed responsibility for the attack.[xxv] CTP-ISW assessed on November 28 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack on Khor Mor to try to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed political parties in the government formation process.[xxvi] The Shia Coordination Framework, which has controlled the federal government since 2022 and is poised to control the next government following the recent elections, includes the political wings of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvii] The committee did not specify if the perpetrators of the November 26 Khor Mor attack also attempted to conduct a drone attack targeting Khor Mor on November 23.[xxviii] Kurdish security forces intercepted the drone on November 23.[xxix]

It remains unclear which Iranian-backed Iraqi militia conducted the November 26 attack on Khor Mor. The committee said that the perpetrators launched the November 26 attack from eastern Tuz Kharmatu District, Salah al Din Province, and that the attack was the eleventh attack against the gas field.[xxx] Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-controlled PMF brigades under the now defunct PMF Northern Axis, which operated in the Tuz Kharmatu District, have notably previously conducted multiple attacks targeting the Khor Mor Gas Field.[xxxi] Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh ordered the integration of the Northern Axis into the Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command in August 2024.[xxxii] The Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command is led by a Badr Organization-affiliated commander.[xxxiii] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba led a drone strike campaign targeting oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan following the 2021 parliamentary elections to deter the Kurdistan Democratic Party from allying with Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xxxiv] No Iranian-backed Iraqi militia has claimed the November 26 attack at the time of this writing and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, denied that it was involved in the November 26 attack.[xxxv] Lower-ranking fighters could have independently conducted the attack, or militia leadership could have allowed fighters to conduct the attack without publicly sanctioning it, however.

A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party suggested that Turkey will no longer consider the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be a “terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its integration into the Syrian state. Turkey has long considered the SDF to be a terrorist organization due to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) historic ties to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the dominant faction within the SDF.[xxxvi] Justice and Development Party (AKP) Spokesperson Omer Celik told Turkish media on December 2 that the SDF would “cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over airports, border crossings, and oil fields that it controls to the Syrian government and integrates into the Syrian state per the March 10 agreement.[xxxvii] The SDF-approved March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF will transfer its control over border crossings, oil and gas fields, and Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria to the transitional government.[xxxviii] Turkey probably views the SDF’s transfer of key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as a mechanism through which to reduce the SDF’s perceived threat to Turkey because it would limit the SDF’s access to the Turkish border and the SDF’s revenue from oil fields. The SDF has not yet transferred control of any of these resources or infrastructure to the Syrian transitional government, however.[xxxix]

Celik’s reference to a possible change in Turkey’s threat perception suggests that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s compliance with the March 10 agreement, which possibly indicates positive momentum in the integration process as the end-of-year integration deadline approaches. Both Turkey and the Syrian government have maintained that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian state by the end of the year.[xl] Turkey has consistently called for the SDF’s military and administrative integration into the Syrian state since March 10.[xli] Turkey has also argued in recent months that the SDF is not complying with the March 10 agreement and has likely pushed the Syrian government to coerce the SDF to implement the agreement.[xlii] Celik’s remarks about a possible change in Turkey’s perception of the SDF suggest that the SDF’s integration may be proceeding along the lines agreed to by the Syrian government and SDF. The Syrian government and SDF reached a limited breakthrough in October 2025 and agreed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Army in three divisions and several independent brigades after months of stalled negotiations.[xliii] There have been few updates on the progress or development of these units, but a Syrian Democratic Council official noted on December 4 that dialogue is “currently underway” between the SDF and Syrian government after US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack met with senior Syrian officials in Damascus on December 1.[xliv]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.[xlv] The exercise took place in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC Navy claimed on December 4 that it alerted US vessels in the region about the exercise.[xlvi] The Iranian regime’s primary English language news outlet stated on December 4 that this exercise sends a “dual message” of peace toward Iran’s regional partners and a warning to Iran’s adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[xlvii] The IRGC Navy previously used this annual exercise to signal Iran’s commitment to “sustainable security” in the region but did not issue a warning to the United States and its allies.[xlviii] The IRGC Navy also named this year’s exercise after deceased IRGC Navy commander Mohammad Nazeri, who was reportedly involved in the seizure of two US patrol boats and 10 US personnel in the Persian Gulf in January 2016.[xlix] Senior Iranian military officials have consistently threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States blocks Iranian oil exports since the Israel-Iran War.[l] 

Key Takeaways

• Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Political Efforts: Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supports his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3. Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the PMF, into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister.
• Iranian Influence in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.
• Militia Activity in Iraq: The Iraqi federal government accused “outlaws” on December 3 of committing the November 26 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi federal government often uses the term “outlaws” to accuse Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of conducting attacks without explicitly implicating the militias.
• Turkey’s View of the Syrian Democratic Forces: A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party suggested that Turkey will no longer consider the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be a “terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its integration into the Syrian state. The spokesperson’s statement suggests that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s compliance with the March 10 agreement, which possibly indicates positive momentum in the integration process as the end-of-year integration deadline approaches. 
• Iranian Military Posture: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.

Iran

Iran is using recent Israeli actions in the Middle East to try to rally regional countries against Israel. Iranian efforts to discourage regional countries, including the Gulf states, from cooperating with the United States and Israel are unlikely to succeed, however. Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani emphasized in an interview on December 2 that Iran must create a “new front” in the region to counter Israeli and US influence.[li] Zakani is a hardline politician who has served as the mayor of Tehran since 2021. Zakani claimed that regional countries, including Turkey, realized that they cannot trust the United States and Israel after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. Zakani added that some regional countries realized after the war that Western military equipment and defense coalitions cannot protect them against Israeli threats. Zakani’s comments come after Iranian officials highlighted the opportunity for Iran and Turkey to work together to counter Israel’s presence in Syria during Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Tehran on December 1.

Zakani’s remarks about regional countries not being able to trust Israel bear similarities to Iran’s effort to isolate Israel and the United States after the Israeli strike in Doha in September 2025. Iranian officials used Israel’s strike in Doha to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break up the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region.[lii] Gulf states condemned the Israeli strike in Doha and Iran exploited the Gulf states’ frustration by questioning the reliability of the United States as a security partner.[liii] Iranian officials, for example, misrepresented the degree of US knowledge of the Israeli strike and suggested that US-brokered agreements are incapable of defending Arab states from Israeli attacks.[liv]

Iran seeks to increase defense cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through joint educational and security research. Iranian Supreme National Defense University (SNDU) head Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam and his Chinese counterpart, General Xiao Tianliang, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on security research cooperation in Beijing on December 4.[lv] The MoU includes the exchange of students and instructors as well as joint courses between the two universities.[lvi] Tianliang is one of the PRC’s most important military strategic thinkers.[lvii] Tianliang’s expertise suggests that Moghaddam and Tianliang may have had a high-level strategic discussion during Moghaddam’s visit to Beijing.[lviii] Moghaddam served as the Iranian Law Enforcement commander between 2005 and 2015 and has been involved in the regime’s crackdowns on domestic dissent.[lix] The United States sanctioned Moghaddam in 2011 for human rights abuses.[lx] Iran has recently held similar military-education cooperation meetings with other partners, such as Belarus.[lxi]

Iraq

The Iraqi Electoral Judicial Panel announced on December 4 that the Iraqi electoral commission has finished reviewing appeals and will now send the November 2025 parliamentary election results to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court for ratification, which will officially start the government formation process.[lxii] The Electoral Judicial Panel reviewed 853 appeals that political parties and candidates submitted to it regarding the election results.[lxiii] The government formation process will include the selection of the Iraqi parliament speaker and their deputies, the president, and the prime minister.[lxiv] The selected prime minister will be responsible for attempting to form the Iraqi government.[lxv] The 2021 government formation process lasted almost a year after the Federal Supreme Court ratified the October 2021 election results in late December 2021.[lxvi]  

Syria

Two recent ISIS attacks along the Syrian M5 highway between Aleppo City and Saraqib, Idlib Province, suggest that an active ISIS cell or cells may continue to target Syrian government forces in this area. ISIS has claimed two distinct attacks targeting Syrian government forces or workers along the M5 highway near the Aleppo-Idlib provincial border since November 28. ISIS fighters fired small arms targeting soldiers from the Syrian Army’s 74th Division on the Saraqib Bridge, located along the M5 highway.[lxvii] One 74th Division soldier was killed in the attack.[lxviii] ISIS fighters in a vehicle also fired on Syrian customs officers escorting a truck on the highway near Zerba, south of Aleppo City, on December 3, killing two officers.[lxix] These two attacks, which occurred approximately 30 kilometers apart from each other and within five days, suggest that an ISIS cell or cells may be active between Saraqib and the southern Aleppo countryside. Syrian Interior Ministry Spokesperson Noureddine al Baba warned on November 8 that the ministry expected an increase in ISIS activity as part of an ISIS effort to boost recruitment after Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.[lxx] ISIS also recently conducted two attacks targeting former regime-affiliated personnel in Homs and Hama provinces on November 27 and 28.[lxxi]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

US efforts aimed at reducing tensions between Israel and Lebanon appear to be having some initial success. US officials, including US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa, reportedly convinced Israel and Lebanon to hold direct talks and send civilian representatives to the ceasefire monitoring committee.[lxxii] Israeli and Lebanese officials held direct talks under US auspices on December 3 for the first time since 1983.[lxxiii]  Israeli and Lebanese officials agreed to develop ideas to advance potential economic cooperation and to hold a meeting on Hezbollah disarmament in the coming weeks.[lxxiv] US officials, including Ortagus and US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have visited Lebanon numerous times in recent months to try to renew dialogue between Israel and Lebanon.[lxxv] Ortagus most recently visited Lebanon and Israel this week to try to reduce tensions between the two countries.[lxxvi] A US official told Axios on December 3 that the United States thinks that Israel will not launch an operation in Lebanon “in the coming weeks,” despite Israel’s persistent warnings about a potential, imminent operation in Lebanon.[lxxvii] Israel previously reportedly gave the Lebanese government a December 7 deadline to make progress toward disarming Hezbollah.[lxxviii]