Iran Update, December 31, 2025

CTP-ISW will not publish the Iran Update on January 1, 2026, in observance of New Year’s Day. We will resume publication of the Iran Update on January 2, 2026, and cover all events between 2:00 PM ET on December 31 and 2:00 PM ET on January 2 in the January 2 update.

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Protests continued to expand geographically across Iran on December 31. Small protests broke out in Tehran on December 28 and have since spread to 17 out of Iran’s 31 provinces.[i] Protests spread to Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Ilam, Khuzestan, Khorasan Razavi, and Lorestan provinces on December 31.[ii] CTP-ISW recorded a total of 31 protests in Iran on December 31, compared to 24 protests on December 30. The protests took place across 12 provinces, including the five mentioned above.[iii]

Iranian security forces shot live fire to disperse protesters in at least two instances on December 31, as protests continued across Iran for the fourth consecutive day. Security forces fired live ammunition at crowds of protesters in Fasa, Fars Province, and Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, on December 31.[iv] The regime appears to be using live fire to suppress protests in less populated areas of Iran. The regime has historically struggled to impose control in more rural areas.

The regime also deployed water cannons in an attempt to suppress protests on December 31.[v] Security forces used a water cannon against protesters in Hamedan. The weather in Hamedan is currently two degrees below zero degrees Celsius.[vi] Security forces also reportedly used a water cannon against protesters in Arak, Markazi Province.[vii] The regime’s use of water cannons against protesters comes amid Iran’s unprecedented water shortage crisis.[viii] The regime’s deployment of water as a tool to suppress protests amid Iran’s water crisis highlights the regime’s prioritization of its security and survival.

The regime also continued to arrest protesters on December 31.[ix] Security forces arrested four Kurdish individuals in Asadabad, Hamedan Province, four individuals in Fasa City, Fars Province, and four individuals in Behbahan, Khuzestan Province.[x] The Intelligence Ministry separately arrested seven individuals who allegedly have ties to Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[xi] The ministry claimed that the individuals had smuggled 100 Colt revolvers into Iran.[xii] An informed source told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency that these individuals intended to incite violence at protest gatherings in Iran.[xiii]

The Iranian regime is taking steps to prevent further protests at universities. The regime likely views university students as a serious threat to regime stability given that students played a significant role in the Masha Amini protests. The regime directed some universities on December 31 to do remote learning until the end of the semester, citing “cold weather.”[xiv] The decision is very likely meant to prevent students from organizing and participating in protests, however.  Students from at least 10 universities across Iran participated in protests on December 30, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[xv] Iranian authorities separately released five Tehran University and Sharif University of Technology students whom security forces arrested on December 30 for participating in protests.[xvi] The Science, Research, and Technology Ministry additionally dismissed the “security managers” of several universities in Tehran on December 31 following the security forces’ “mistreatment of students,” possibly in an effort to appease university students and prevent further student protests.[xvii] An Iranian human rights organization reported on December 31 that security forces violently arrested a student protesting at Sharif University of Technology.[xviii] The regime likely regards university protests as a more serious threat to its stability than demonstrations organized by other segments of the population given that university students were a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement between September 2022 and January 2023.[xix]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC deputy commander on December 27 only two months after appointing him as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[xx]  Vahidi replaced Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, who had served as the IRGC deputy commander since May 2019.[xxi] Khamenei neglected to promote Fadavi as IRGC commander after the killing of former IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami in June 2025.[xxii] Khamenei instead appointed former IRGC Ground Forces Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour as IRGC commander.[xxiii] Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member who previously served as the IRGC Quds Force commander, defense minister, interior minister, and AFGS deputy chief.[xxiv] Khamenei emphasized in Vahidi’s appointment decree that Vahidi should prioritize improving the readiness of the Iranian armed forces and addressing IRGC personnel’s livelihood concerns in coordination with the AFGS.[xxv] Iranian media has not reported who will replace Vahidi as AFGS deputy chief at the time of this writing. Iranian media reported Vahidi’s appointment on December 31, but Khamenei issued the appointment decree on December 27 based on a recommendation from Pakpour.[xxvi]

Vahidi’s appointment as IRGC deputy commander reflects the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to reconstitute Iran’s military leadership following the war. Unofficial reports allege that Vahidi was removed from the AFGS deputy chief position due to internal disputes between Vahidi and Artesh leadership over post-war air defense priorities, including Vahidi’s opposition to the acquisition of airborne early warning and control systems.[xxvii] This internal debate highlights the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to cohere and unite Iran’s new generation of military commanders. Israel killed numerous commanders during the Israel-Iran War, many of whom were part of the IRGC Command Network. The IRGC Command Network was one of the most influential networks in Iran for decades. Khamenei must now fill this void with a new cadre of military leaders, which presents challenges as Khamenei appoints individuals with different personalities and factional ties to senior positions.[xxviii]

The regime’s decision to remove Vahidi from the AFGS deputy chief position and elevate him within the IRGC reflects his status within the security elite and may reflect the regime’s confidence in his ability to manage internal security challenges. The timing of Vahidi’s appointment is notable given the expanding protests in Iran and his prior role in suppressing demonstrations.[xxix] The United States and European Union sanctioned Vahidi in 2022 for his role in directing the Law Enforcement Command during the Mahsa Amini protests.[xxx]

Khamenei is also reportedly considering restructuring the relationship between the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, according to unspecified social media reports.[xxxi] The AFGS is responsible for crafting strategic guidance and military policy and does not have operational responsibility.[xxxii] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is a parallel organization to the AFGS and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xxxiii] Unverified reports have suggested that Khamenei could merge the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters. The AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters previously operated as a single institution, but Khamanei separated the institutions in 2016.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Protests in Iran: Iranian security forces shot live fire to disperse protesters in at least two instances on December 31, as protests continued across Iran for the fourth consecutive day. The Iranian regime is taking steps to prevent further protests at universities. The regime likely views university students as a serious threat to regime stability given that students played a significant role in the Masha Amini protests.
• Iranian Military Appointments: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC deputy commander on December 27 only two months after appointing him as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief. Vahidi’s appointment as IRGC deputy commander reflects the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to reconstitute Iran’s military leadership following the war.

Iran

Iran reportedly conducted a missile launch in an unspecified location in Ilam Province, near Iran’s western border with Iraq, according to an Iranian media outlet with ties to the regime and footage circulated on social media on December 30.[xxxv] CTP-ISW cannot verify that a launch took place or the purpose of the reported missile launch at the time of this writing. Open-source intelligence X accounts circulated a video on December 30 of an alleged missile test in Ilam Province.[xxxvi] Iranian outlet Nameh News published the same footage but claimed that the Iranian regime conducted a missile attack targeting a Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) “headquarters,” citing unconfirmed reports on December 30.[xxxvii] PJAK is a Kurdish anti-regime group that operates in the border region between Iran and Iraq.[xxxviii]  Nameh News is owned by Ali Pour Mohammadi, who is related to Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Mostafa Pourmohammadi previously served as interior minister under hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and is reportedly well connected within the Iranian regime's intelligence apparatus.[xxxix] The reports about a missile launch in Ilam Province come after the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reportedly recently conducted a missile exercise across multiple bases in Iran.[xl]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

The spokesperson of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s (AANES) negotiating team told Kurdish media on December 30 that AANES and Syrian government representatives may meet within the next two weeks to discuss the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) integration into the Syrian state.[xli] The spokesperson said that the meeting is expected to lead to the “practical activation” of previous SDF-government agreements.[xlii] The Syrian government and the SDF have gone back and forth over the past two weeks over a proposal that outlines the mechanisms for the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian state.[xliii] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi was expected to travel to Damascus on December 29—almost certainly to meet with Syrian government officials to discuss or finalize the SDF’s military integration agreement—but “logistical and technical arrangements” delayed his visit.[xliv] The SDF’s political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council, asserted on December 31 that implementing the SDF and Syrian government’s March 10 Agreement is a “political priority” and emphasized that Syria must draft a new constitution.[xlv] The SDF has maintained its demand that the Syrian government enshrine federalism into the Syrian constitution since the SDF signed the March 10 Agreement.[xlvi]

Turkey is indicating that it supports the Syrian government’s efforts to extend negotiations with the SDF despite Turkey’s previous demand that the SDF complete its integration into the Syrian state by December 31, 2025.[xlvii] The Turkish Defense Ministry’s spokesperson accused the SDF on December 31 of not taking tangible steps toward integration but stated that Turkey would support any Syrian government initiative to promote “unity” with the SDF.[xlviii] The spokesperson said that Turkey is closely monitoring the integration process.[xlix] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to attack the SDF if it failed to integrate into the Syrian state by the end of the year and has expressed concerns about the future security situation in northeastern Syria if the SDF retains its current influence there.[l] Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the SDF’s military integration into the state after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara on December 16 and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkey-Syria policy.[li] Hakan expressed optimism about the negotiations in a December 18 interview and said that Turkey does not want to resort to military action against the SDF.[lii] Senior Turkish defense officials, including Fidan, also likely discussed Turkey’s position on the SDF’s integration with Syrian officials in Damascus on December 22.[liii] The Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson’s December 31 remarks that Turkey supports the Syrian government’s efforts to achieve “unity” suggest that Turkey is willing to allow negotiations to continue for the time being.

A Syrian military delegation met with the Turkish defense minister in Ankara on December 30, likely to discuss Syrian-Turkish military cooperation and training. Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali Nassan, Naval Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad al Saud, and other Syrian commanders met with Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler.[liv] Turkish and Syrian officials likely discussed ongoing developments regarding the SDF as well as efforts to enhance Syrian-Turkish defense cooperation under the military cooperation agreement that Turkey and Syria signed in August 2025.[lv] The agreement stipulates that Turkey will provide the Syrian government with weapons, military equipment, training, and logistical support.[lvi] The Turkish Army’s Chief of the General Staff, General Selcuk Bayraktaroglu, and Ground Force Commander General Metin Tokel both visited Damascus to discuss military cooperation with Syrian defense officials in early December 2025.[lvii]

Arabian Peninsula

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew military personnel and equipment from Yemen on December 31.[lviii] Unspecified sources told Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)-affiliated media that four Emirati military transport aircraft carrying “hundreds” of personnel and unspecified military equipment departed from al Rayyan Airport in Mukalla, Hadramawt Governorate, on December 31.[lix] This withdrawal follows the UAE’s announcement on December 30 that it would withdraw Emirati counterterrorism personnel from Yemen in response to Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashad al Alimi’s annulment of the Yemen-UAE defense agreement.[lx] Emirati counterterrorism forces have been operating under the anti-Houthi coalition since Emirati forces left Yemen in 2019.[lxi] The UAE notably did not state that it would halt Emirati support for UAE-backed groups in Yemen, namely the Southern Transitional Council (STC), however.[lxii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.