Iran Update, December 23, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Israel is reportedly considering a plan that outlines “stringent conditions” for southern Lebanon in return for Israel “forgoing military action,” according to Lebanese media.[i] It is unclear whether “forgoing military action” refers to Israel refraining from conducting a new, expanded operation in Lebanon or Israel stopping its current military activity in Lebanon. The reported Israeli plan would divide southern Lebanon into three areas: the current Blue Line that demarcates the Israel-Lebanon border, a “red line,” and a “line of interest.”[ii] The proposed “red line” would reportedly include Israel’s five permanent positions in southern Lebanon.[iii] The “line of interest,” also referred to as the “green line,” would act as a buffer and economic zone with strict restrictions on civilian access.[iv] The “line of interest” closely mirrors the economic zone that the United States proposed in September 2025.[v] The US economic zone, which aims to economically transform southern Lebanon, would reportedly stretch from Mount Hermon in southeastern Lebanon to Shebaa and Naqoura in southwestern Lebanon and cover at least 27 southern Lebanese towns.[vi] It is unclear if the “line of interest” would cover this same area. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reportedly propose this plan to US President Donald Trump during their meeting on December 29.[vii] This Israeli proposal comes after Israeli and Lebanese officials agreed to discuss opportunities for economic cooperation during meetings on December 3 and 19, according to Netanyahu.[viii] It is unclear if Israel presented its proposal to Lebanese officials during either meeting.

Lebanon and Israel continue to disagree on several key issues, which may hinder the implementation of diplomatic initiatives such as Israel’s proposal. An unspecified senior source told US-based al Monitor on December 22 that Israeli and Lebanese officials voiced different priorities during the December 19 meeting.[ix] Lebanese officials rejected Israel’s proposal for an economic zone and emphasized that displaced Lebanese civilians must be allowed to return to border towns before Israel and Lebanon can discuss other issues, such as economic cooperation.[x] Israeli officials have contrastingly maintained that Israel and Lebanon should first establish an economic and security zone along the Israel-Lebanon border before addressing other issues.[xi] Lebanese and Israeli officials also continue to disagree on the timeline for Hezbollah’s disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[xii] Lebanese officials have repeatedly stated that negotiations and the implementation of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) plan to disarm Hezbollah are contingent upon Israel ceasing its operations in Lebanon and fully withdrawing from Lebanese territory.[xiii] Israeli officials have repeatedly emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[xiv] These outstanding issues have previously caused Israeli and Lebanese diplomatic efforts to reach a “dead end.”[xv]

The LAF’s limited progress in preventing Hezbollah’s reconstitution could also undermine Israeli-Lebanese diplomatic efforts to prevent a renewed conflict in Lebanon. Israeli security sources told al Monitor on December 22 that they are concerned that Hezbollah is reconstituting its capabilities faster than the LAF is disarming the group.[xvi] Israeli and US officials have echoed these concerns and repeatedly warned that Israel could use military action against Hezbollah if the LAF fails to confront Hezbollah’s efforts to reconstitute.[xvii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on December 20 that Israel will act in Lebanon if it feels threatened by Hezbollah.[xviii] Lebanese media reported on December 22 that Netanyahu will show Trump reports about Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its military capabilities during his upcoming visit to the United States to secure “a green light” to launch an operation in Lebanon.[xix] The Lebanese government has taken some steps to limit Hezbollah’s smuggling and financing efforts, including closing several illegal border crossings, cracking down on Hezbollah’s presence at the Beirut airport, and increasing regulations on Lebanese financial institutions.[xx] There are still approximately 136 illegal border crossings between Syria and Lebanon as of July 2025 that Iran can use to transport weapons and funds to Hezbollah, however.[xxi] A US official told Saudi media on December 21 that Iran is using “every possible means” to send weapons to Hezbollah, including dozens of land routes via Syria and maritime routes to Lebanese ports.[xxii]

Iranian regime entities continue to emphasize that Iran is prioritizing the expansion of its missile program to reestablish deterrence against Israel. An Iranian outlet affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of the Supreme Leader’s representatives to the Defense Council, reported on December 23 that Iran formed the Defense Council to restructure its defense strategy and restore deterrence through “hard power.”[xxiii] Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, established the Defense Council following the Israel-Iran War.[xxiv] The outlet stated that the Defense Council's most significant achievement since the war has been the reconstruction and improvement of Iran’s defense capabilities, most likely referring to Iran’s missile and air defense capabilities.[xxv] A political analyst close to former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander and Expediency Discernment Council member Mohsen Rezaei confirmed on December 23 that Iran recently conducted a missile exercise.[xxvi] Najafi stated that the missile exercise and recent threats from Iranian officials are part of an effort “to restore deterrence” ahead of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States.[xxvii] Western media recently reported that Netanyahu will brief US President Donald Trump on options to strike Iranian ballistic missile sites during his visit to the United States.[xxviii] Iran has taken concrete steps since the war to rebuild its missile program, including reconstructing infrastructure at at least two missile bases.[xxix] Iran has also imported a chemical precursor for solid missile fuel and attempted to obtain fuel mixers from the People’s Republic of China.[xxx] Iran has historically prioritized missile development as a deterrent against potential Israeli attacks.[xxxi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that this approach is deeply embedded in Iranian military doctrine and is unlikely to change in the near future.[xxxii]

The outlet affiliated with Shamkhani separately called on the regime to develop a mechanism for "strategic information dissemination" to manage popular perceptions and retain public trust during periods of conflict.[xxxiii] The outlet argued that narrative warfare and psychological operations have become an “inseparable part” of modern conflicts and called on the regime to strengthen its “narrative management” in addition to its “hard power.”[xxxiv] The outlet’s call for “strategic information dissemination” is consistent with Iranian officials’ belief that Israel sought to use psychological operations during the Israel-Iran War to degrade Iranian national unity and overthrow the Iranian regime.[xxxv] The regime may believe that increasing its control over media narratives and increasing the dissemination of regime propaganda are necessary to counter such psychological operations and protect Iranian internal security in future conflicts with Israel.  

Key Takeaways

• Israeli-Lebanese Diplomatic Efforts: Israel is reportedly considering a plan that outlines “stringent conditions” for southern Lebanon in return for Israel “forgoing military action,” according to Lebanese media. Lebanon and Israel continue to disagree on several key issues, which may hinder the implementation of diplomatic initiatives such as Israel’s proposal. The LAF’s limited progress in preventing Hezbollah’s reconstitution could also undermine Israeli-Lebanese diplomatic efforts to prevent a renewed conflict in Lebanon.
• Iranian Efforts to Restore Deterrence: Iranian regime entities continue to emphasize that Iran is prioritizing the expansion of its missile program to reestablish deterrence against Israel. Iran has taken concrete steps since the war to rebuild its missile program, including reconstructing infrastructure at at least two missile bases.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

The Shia Coordination Framework issued a statement on December 22 in which it expressed support for disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and restricting weapons to the Iraqi state.[xxxvi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. This statement comes after six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including three with political wings in the framework, issued statements between December 18 and 20 expressing their views on the issue of disarmament.[xxxvii] Two of the militias that appear to accept disarmament, Kataib Imam al Ali and Asaib Ahl al Haq, have political wings in the framework.[xxxviii] Kataib Hezbollah, which also has a political wing in the framework, notably rejected disarmament on December 20.[xxxix]   

Syria

Renewed fighting between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods of Aleppo City indicates that the SDF and the Syrian government have not fully implemented the April 1 agreement. The April 1 agreement is a 14-point agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF that stipulates the integration of Aleppo City's Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods, Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud, into the city's municipality, as well as the integration of the SDF’s internal security forces, known as Asayish, into the  Syrian government’s local police.[xl] Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and SDF internal security forces engaged each other with heavy weapons in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud  on December 22.[xli] Both sides agreed to a ceasefire and temporary truce after hours of fighting on December 22.[xlii] The fighting reportedly killed at least four civilians, an MoD soldier, and injured dozens of other civilians.[xliii] The SDF and Syrian government forces previously fought one another in Aleppo City in October 2025.[xliv] The Syrian government and the SDF accused one another of initiating the recent fighting that violated a US-brokered October 2025 ceasefire agreement.[xlv] An SDF official involved in integration negotiations with the Syrian government told Kurdish media that the fighting in Aleppo City on December 22 marked the third ceasefire violation since the Syrian government and the SDF signed the April 1 agreement.[xlvi] The official added that the Syrian government and the SDF are still negotiating the terms of the March 10 agreement that seeks to integrate the SDF into the MoD by December 31, however.[xlvii]

Senior Syrian officials traveled to Moscow on December 23, likely to continue negotiations over Russian basing rights in Syria and possibly to discuss the establishment of a Russian military presence in southern Syria.[xlviii] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and intelligence officials traveled to Moscow.[xlix] Russian state media reported that Shaibani will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on December 23.[l] Qasra met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on December 23.[li] Qasra previously met with Russian defense officials in October and November 2025 to discuss Syrian-Russian military cooperation.[lii] Qasra, Syrian Navy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad al Saud, and the Tartous Province governor met with the Syrian Foreign Ministry’s deputy director for Russia and Eastern Europe on December 18 ahead of the Syrian delegation’s visit to Moscow, likely to discuss Russia’s presence at the port of Tartous.[liii] Shaibani stated in November 2025 that there is still “no finalized agreement” on Russian basing rights in Syria.[liv]

Russian and Syrian officials may have also discussed the establishment of a Russian military presence in southern Syria. A Russian and Turkish military delegation toured former Russian military sites located along the Syrian border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on November 17.[lv] The Russian military previously operated approximately 12 observation posts in Syria along the border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[lvi] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara may have discussed redeploying Russian military police to southern Syria as a “guarantor” against Israeli advances during Shara’s October 2025 visit to Moscow.[lvii] CTP-ISW has not observed further Russian activity in southern Syria since November 17.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The IDF killed an LAF soldier in an airstrike near Sidon, southern Lebanon, on December 22.[lviii] The IDF reported that it struck and killed three Hezbollah fighters, including one fighter who was also an LAF intelligence officer.[lix] The IDF said that the fighters were involved in efforts to rebuild Hezbollah military infrastructure in the area.[lx] The LAF stated that an LAF Anti-Tank Regiment soldier was killed in the December 22 airstrike.[lxi] Lebanese authorities have denied that the soldier had any connection to Hezbollah.[lxii]