Iran Update, December 17, 2025

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Iranian regime announced new Artesh appointments on December 17 as part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leadership following the Israel-Iran War.[i] Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami appointed Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as his assistant for air defense affairs.[ii] Alireza Sabahi Fard most recently served as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander.[iii] Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[iv] Sabahi Fard’s new appointment may reflect Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of Iranian air defenses under Sabahi Fard’s command during the Israel-Iran War. Israel established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems during the first 24 hours of the conflict.[v]

Khamenei separately appointed Brigadier General Bahman Behmard as the new Artesh Air Force commander based on Hatami’s recommendation.[vi] Behmard replaced Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, who became Hatami‘s adviser for aviation affairs.[vii] Behmard previously served as the commander of the Artesh Air Force 1st Tactical Air Base in Tehran and 4th Tactical Air Base in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, and most recently served as the Deputy Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Operations Deputy.[viii]

These appointments are part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leaders after the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian regime has signaled that it urgently seeks to improve its air defense capabilities to better defend against potential future attacks on Iranian territory. Iran has expressed interest in acquiring advanced air defense systems and aircraft from Russia, such as the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jet, given that it currently lacks advanced air defense systems and fighter aircraft.[ix]

All sources for the above graphic are included in the endnote section at the end of this update.[x]

Ansar al Furqan recently conducted a tactically sophisticated attack targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. This attack is demonstrative of the growing threat that anti-regime Baloch groups in southeastern Iran have posed to the Iranian regime since late 2022. Ansar al Furqan, which is a Salafi-jihadi group, claimed that it killed at least 16 Iranian intelligence and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) personnel at a checkpoint in Fahraj, Kerman Province, on December 16.[xi] Iranian media reported that the group only killed three LEC personnel and one civilian at the checkpoint, however.[xii] Ansar al Furqan claimed that its fighters launched the attack on the checkpoint from three axes and initially killed the security forces at the checkpoint before ambushing reinforcements that arrived at the checkpoint following the initial attack.[xiii] Ansar al Furqan claimed that 43 of its fighters participated in the attack. The group also said that the attack marked the second phase of “Operation Sayf al Furqan.”[xiv] Ansar al Furqan stated that the first phase of “Operation Sayf al Furqan” took place in August 2025 when the group allegedly killed over 50 Iranian security personnel in Golkhani, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xv] Iranian media did not report any casualties among Iranian forces in the August 2025 attack. Ansar al Furqan did not specify a motive for the August 2025 attack, but the group’s spokesperson stated on December 16 that the recent attack on the Fahraj checkpoint was in response to Iranian officials insulting a companion of Prophet Mohammad.[xvi] Ansar al Furqan has reportedly not merged with the newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is notable given that Ansar al Furqan operates in southeastern Iran like the MPF.[xvii] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi organization, and several other Baloch groups established the MPF on December 10.[xviii] MPF fighters killed four Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base personnel from the Imam Hossein Battalions near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 10.[xix]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is reportedly “ready” to begin disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers as part of the second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan. This effort would mark an unprecedented step by the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River.[xx] Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said on December 17 that the LAF is “ready” to move to the second phase of its disarmament plan, which covers the area between the Litani and Awali rivers and does not have a specified timeline, according to Lebanese media.[xxi] The Awali River is located roughly 18 miles north of the Litani River.[xxii] Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said on December 11 that the LAF had completed 90 percent of its disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon, in reference to the LAF’s disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River under the first phase of its plan.[xxiii] Berri is Hezbollah’s highest-ranking ally within the Lebanese state and was heavily involved in negotiating the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah.[xxiv] The ceasefire agreement only mandated that the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River, but the Lebanese cabinet agreed in August 2025 to pursue Hezbollah’s complete disarmament.[xxv] LAF disarmament efforts north of the Litani River would be an unprecedented step toward disarming Hezbollah throughout Lebanon beyond what is mandated in the ceasefire. Mitri’s statement comes amid the LAF’s recent searches of Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon following Israeli pressure on the LAF to search private property and rural areas.[xxvi] The LAF searched a Hezbollah tunnel near Touline, southern Lebanon, on December 17 in response to an Israeli request through the ceasefire monitoring committee, according to videos published by Lebanese media.[xxvii] The LAF has previously reported searching Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon without sharing video or photo evidence.[xxviii] The LAF also searched a reported Hezbollah building for weapons in Yanouh, southern Lebanon, on December 13 after Israel threatened to strike the building.[xxix] The LAF reportedly found no Hezbollah weapons or ammunition at either location, however.[xxx] Israeli officials have repeatedly warned in recent weeks that Hezbollah is reconstituting faster than the LAF is disarming the group.[xxxi] Senior Israeli officials noted in late October 2025 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon.[xxxii] Syrian authorities have also interdicted multiple weapons shipments likely bound for Hezbollah in recent weeks.[xxxiii] Syrian authorities seized around 100 rocket-propelled grenades near Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on December 17, for example.[xxxiv]

Hezbollah will likely resist the LAF’s efforts to disarm it north of the Litani River more strongly than it has done in southern Lebanon. A Lebanese official and two unspecified security sources told Reuters in October 2025 that the LAF seeks to avoid inflaming tensions in Lebanon and buy time for Lebanese politicians to reach a consensus on what should happen to Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani River.[xxxv] The Lebanese government has historically approached the issue of Hezbollah weapons located north of the Litani River differently because Hezbollah is deeply entrenched in some northern Lebanese communities, such as the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs, where disarmament is a sensitive political issue that is widely opposed by Hezbollah’s Shia support base.[xxxvi] Hezbollah and its supporters largely view disarmament in southern Lebanon as part of implementing the 2006 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701, which designates areas south of the Litani River as a demilitarized zone.[xxxvii] Hezbollah and its supporters view disarmament north of the Litani River as an attempt to strip the organization of its right to “resistance” and an attack on Lebanese Shia communities, however.[xxxviii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has consistently noted that Hezbollah will retain its weapons north of the Litani River, insisting that agreements, such as UNSC 1701 and the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, only limit Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon.[xxxix] Qassem‘s statements indicate that Hezbollah will not be as willing to cooperate or hand over its weapons in areas north of the Litani as the group reportedly did in southern Lebanon.[xl] CTP-ISW has not observed Hezbollah cooperate with the LAF’s disarmament process thus far, but Hezbollah has claimed that it is cooperating with the Lebanese government to disarm in the south.[xli] Hezbollah is also reportedly concentrating most of its rearmament activity in areas north of the Litani River.[xlii] Hezbollah’s continued rejection of its complete disarmament and recent activity in northern Lebanon could complicate the LAF’s ability to implement the next phase of its disarmament plan.

Several Syrian and Kurdish sources have indicated that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government may imminently implement the March 10 agreement or extend the deadline for the implementation of the agreement. An unspecified Syrian government source told Syrian media on December 16 that the SDF and Syrian government have reached an agreement on the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which is the basis for the March 10 agreement.[xliii] The source added that the mechanism for integrating the SDF into the MoD “will be announced in the coming days.”[xliv] Hassan Mohammad Ali, who is a senior member of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), separately said in a December 15 interview with Emirati media that the March 10 agreement only stipulated that the SDF and Syrian government “would strive to implement” the agreement by the end of the year.[xlv] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing.[xlvi] The March 10 agreement stipulates that both sides “shall work toward implementing the agreement no later than the end of the current year,” but does not set a hard deadline.[xlvii] Ali added that the March 10 agreement will succeed, but that its implementation could face delays and would require “patience and political will from both sides.”[xlviii] Ali stated that the Syrian government submitted a military integration proposal and reached an initial agreement with the SDF to form three SDF divisions in northeastern Syria, but that the technical details of the SDF’s future relationship with the MoD are still under discussion.[xlix]

[l]These reports come as US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on December 16. Unspecified Turkish government sources told UK-based Saudi media that the meeting focused primarily on the implementation of the March 10 agreement.[li] Fidan is the main Turkish official in charge of Turkey’s Syria policy. Senior Kurdish officials directly involved in the integration negotiations with the Syrian government said on December 13 that they perceived a less hostile Turkish approach toward the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[lii]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely prefers to implement or extend the deadline of the March 10 agreement over conducting a joint Syrian-Turkish offensive against the SDF that would further destabilize Syria. The Syrian transitional government has reportedly asked Turkey to delay any military action against the SDF twice in 2025, first in January and again in September.[liii] Shara likely remains committed to negotiations with the SDF despite the lack of progress in implementing the March 10 agreement, as any offensive against the SDF would further destabilize Syria.[liv] Shara told Syrian state media in September 2025 that he had done “everything” to prevent a “battle or war” with the SDF, which was likely in reference to his efforts to prevent a Turkish offensive.[lv]

The Turkish government appears to be the main impediment to the implementation of the March 10 agreement and is the main party pushing for the end-of-year deadline. Fidan recently rejected the SDF’s proposal to integrate three SDF divisions into the MoD and suggested on December 6 that Turkey seeks to bar senior SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the MoD.[lvi] Turkey likely pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from US- and French-brokered integration negotiations with the SDF in Paris in August 2025.[lvii] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a December 12 speech that Turkey has called for “the implementation of the March 10 agreement, which risks escalating into a crisis if resisted.”[lviii] A pro-Erdogan newspaper interpreted Erdogan’s speech as Turkey’s “final warning” to the SDF on December 17.[lix] The same pro-Erdogan newspaper also said on December 17 that the SDF has until December 31 to integrate into the Syrian MoD.[lx]

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly appointed three Syrian National Liberation Front (NLF)-affiliated commanders to oversee military affairs in central, western, and southern Syria as “assistant defense ministers.”[lxi] The MoD probably appointed these commanders to improve the MoD’s capacity to supervise armed groups operating under the MoD across Syria. The NLF is a Turkish-backed coalition of civil war opposition factions that formed in 2018.[lxii] The Syrian MoD likely appointed these three NLF-affiliated commanders due to their loyalty to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and experience within the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Fateh al Mubin operations room that helped topple the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxiii]  HTS has supported and coordinated with the NLF since 2022 to weaken the NLF and draw it into HTS’s sphere of influence.[lxiv] The Syrian MoD, now led by former HTS commanders, has appointed numerous other NLF commanders to prominent positions within the MoD.[lxv]

The positions of these three new appointees will presumably mirror the role of Brigadier General Fahim Issa, who oversees the MoD’s affairs in northern Syria.[lxvi] Issa is a Turkish ethno-nationalist who formerly commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is a European Union-sanctioned civil war faction that fought within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.[lxvii] Issa has likely used his personal ties and experiences with Turkish-backed groups in northern Syria to facilitate their integration into the Syrian army, as seen through his meetings with militia leaders in Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, in May 2025.[lxviii] Issa also presumably supervises the Defense Ministry’s affairs in the northern region, given that he accompanied an MoD delegation to meet with Russian military officials in Moscow in October 2025.[lxix] Russia currently maintains forces in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[lxx] The three new commanders who will oversee MoD affairs in western, southern, and central Syria may increase the MoD’s institutional capacity and build the ministry's influence among local factions in these regions, which is an essential step in the professionalization process for the Syrian army.[lxxi] The new appointments are as follows:

• Assistant Defense Minister for the Central Region: Brigadier General Fadlallah al Hajji (Abu Yamen).[lxxii] Abu Yamen is a prominent pro-Turkish Syrian opposition figure who formerly led Faylaq al Sham. The Turkey-based Syrian Interim Government appointed Abu Yamen as Chief of Staff of its Defense Ministry, which oversaw the SNA, in 2017.[lxxiii] Abu Yamen assumed command over the NLF after its formation in 2018 and reportedly participated in the offensive that toppled the Assad regime alongside NLF forces in 2024.[lxxiv] He has served as the director of the MoD’s Higher Military Academy since February 2025.[lxxv] The “central region” presumably refers to parts of the Syrian central desert as well as Aleppo, Raqqa, and Rif Dimashq provinces.
• Assistant Defense Minister for the Southern Region: Brigadier General Ahmed Issa al Sheikh (also known as Abu Issa).[lxxvi] Abu Issa led the Suqour al Sham Brigades in the Idlib countryside during the early years of the Syrian Civil War before joining the Islamic Front and the NLF.[lxxvii] He maintained a close relationship with HTS and fought within the Fateh al Mubin operations room.[lxxviii] The “southern region” almost certainly refers to Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda provinces in addition to Damascus and parts of Rif Dimashq Province.
• Assistant Defense Minister for the Western Region: Brigadier General Mohammad Diaa Saleh Tahan (also known as Abu Saleh Tahan).[lxxix] Abu Saleh Tahan was a founding member of hardline Islamist group Ahrar al Sham and oversaw its military wing from 2014 to 2016.[lxxx] He defected from Ahrar al Sham in 2016 to join Jaysh al Ahrar, which briefly joined HTS when it formed in 2017 before splitting from the group.[lxxxi] Jaysh al Ahrar, under Abu Saleh Tahan’s leadership, joined the NLF and fought in the offensive that collapsed the Assad regime.[lxxxii] The “western region” presumably refers to coastal Syria, the Lebanese border areas, and parts of Homs and Hama provinces.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Military Appointments: The Iranian regime announced new Artesh appointments as part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leadership following the Israel-Iran War. Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami appointed Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as his assistant for air defense affairs. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei separately appointed Brigadier General Bahman Behmard as the new Artesh Air Force commander based on Hatami’s recommendation.
• Anti-Iranian Regime Baloch Groups: Ansar al Furqan recently conducted a tactically sophisticated attack targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. This attack is demonstrative of the growing threat that anti-regime Baloch groups in southeastern Iran have posed to the Iranian regime since late 2022.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is reportedly “ready” to begin disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers as part of the second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan. Hezbollah will likely resist the LAF’s efforts to disarm it north of the Litani River more strongly than it has done in southern Lebanon.
• Syrian March 10 Agreement: Several Syrian and Kurdish sources have indicated that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government may imminently implement the March 10 agreement or extend the deadline for the implementation of the agreement. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely prefers to implement or extend the deadline of the March 10 agreement over conducting a joint Syrian-Turkish offensive against the SDF that would further destabilize Syria.
• Syrian Ministry of Defense Appointments: The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly appointed three Syrian National Liberation Front-affiliated commanders to oversee military affairs in central, western, and southern Syria as “assistant defense ministers.” The MoD probably appointed these commanders to improve the MoD’s capacity to supervise armed groups operating under the MoD across Syria.

Iran

Senior Iranian officials have held several meetings with Belarusian and Russian officials over the past week that have focused on increasing economic cooperation to circumvent international sanctions. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed the benefits of bilateral trade with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow on December 17.[lxxxiii] Lavrov emphasized that trade with Iran is a Russian “priority” in an interview with Iranian state media on December 15, especially since Russia and Iran both face international sanctions.[lxxxiv] Araghchi also signed three trade-focused memorandums of understanding with his Belarusian counterpart and met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on December 15.[lxxxv] The Belarusian government is a key ally of Russia. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani separately discussed obstacles to operationalizing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Transport Vitaly Savelyev in Tehran on December 16.[lxxxvi] The INSTC is a trade route that, when completed, will connect India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[lxxxvii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the International Peace and Trust Summit in Turkmenistan on December 12.[lxxxviii] Pezeshkian claimed in his meeting with Putin that Iran plans to complete a key Iranian part of the INSTC, the Rasht-Astara Railway, by March 2026.[lxxxix]

Iraq

Iraqi Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parties continue government formation negotiations ahead of the first parliament session on December 29.[xc] An unspecified Shia politician told Iraqi media on December 17 that the Shia Coordination Framework is attempting to resolve internal disputes about the selection of the next prime minister by presenting the framework’s candidates to Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani for input.[xci] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Sadr and Sistani have both stated that they will not intervene in the government formation process.[xcii] The Sunni National Political Council is separately reportedly considering multiple candidates for parliament speaker, including Progress Party head and former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai.[xciii] Multiple Sunni parties formed the National Political Council on November 23 to unify their political efforts and plans on key issues.[xciv] The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party also continue to discuss the selection of the next Iraqi president and the allocation of ministries between the parties.[xcv]

See CTP-ISW's updated database of the Iraqi election results and formalized coalitions here:

Syria

The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) seized several commercially available quadcopter drones from an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighter in Damascus City on December 27.[xcvi] ISIS fighters could use attack drones made from quadcopters to conduct remote attacks on Syrian government forces in urban environments like Damascus City. The GSS arrested an ISIS fighter in Damascus City’s Dummar neighborhood on December 17 and seized six commercial quadcopter drones that ISIS could easily convert into attack drones to use against government forces or civilians.[xcvii] The GSS also seized improvised explosive devices (IED), rifles, and ammunition from the ISIS fighter.[xcviii] The ISIS fighter may have intended to modify the drones into “attack” drones, such as by attaching remotely detonated IEDs to the drones or by converting them into “bomb-drop” drones.[xcix] “Bomb-drop” drones drop a payload, such as a grenade, onto a target using an improvised payload release system.[c] One of the drones that the GSS seized from the ISIS fighter has an estimated payload capacity of three pounds, an 18-minute battery life, and a range of around five kilometers.[ci] ISIS could utilize these converted commercial drones in urban environments like Damascus City to conduct remote attacks on transitional government forces from concealed locations, such as apartments or rooftops. The ISIS fighter could have alternatively sought to use the drones for intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance missions, but ISIS has historically converted commercial drones into attack drones. ISIS first employed converted commercial drones for offensive purposes in Mosul, Iraq, in 2016.[cii] Syrian security services have a finite supply of counter-drone systems, which could complicate the government’s ability to counter ISIS’s potential use of attack drones. This is particularly a concern because ISIS has increased the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory since Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on November 10.[ciii]

ISIS separately claimed a December 16 IED attack on an MoD vehicle in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on December 17.[civ] Local sources denied that ISIS used an IED in the attack, however.[cv] ISIS likely conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on Syrian government forces in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, in May 2025.[cvi]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.