Iran Update, December 15, 2025

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Criti cal Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) likely seeks to conduct insider or “green-on-blue" attacks targeting US forces in Syria as part of an effort to reduce US forces’ trust in Syrian partner forces and disrupt the United States’ ability to effectively work with Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13.[i] Three US servicemembers and two Syrian fighters were also injured in the attack.[ii] Syrian forces killed the attacker at the scene.[iii] Palmyra is located in Syria’s central desert (also known as the Badia), which is a sparsely populated region that ISIS has used as a sanctuary to rest, refit, and train new fighters, particularly since its territorial defeat in 2019.[iv] The December 13 attack marked the first ISIS-affiliated attack on US forces in Syria since 2019.[v] Insider or “green-on-blue" attacks risk significantly reducing trust between the force that is attacked and its partner force, which can adversely impact the two forces’ ability to achieve joint tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Insider attacks cause the force that is attacked to take additional security precautions when operating alongside or meeting with the partner force, for example.

Recent Islamic State (IS) calls to monitor US forces and attack Syrian government forces may have motivated the recent attack. A BBC Salafi-jihadi expert noted on December 13 that high-profile IS supporters have encouraged ISIS sympathizers to conduct attacks against the Syrian transitional government “whenever and wherever possible” in the weeks since Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on November 10.[vi] The expert also stated that IS has encouraged its Syrian supporters to conduct what resembles pattern of life analysis on the movements of US forces and coalition partners in Syria.[vii] The expert added that prominent ISIS supporters launched a coordinated online campaign that urged sympathizers to kill foreigners, including US citizens.[viii] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated on December 13 that it had warned US officials about possible ISIS attacks on US forces.[ix]

The attacker and any accomplices were able to conduct this attack because the Syrian government has needed to rapidly expand local security forces to meet the state’s security needs after the fall of the Assad regime. Institutions like the MOI’s security forces have evolved from small organizations that operated in Hayat Tahrir al Sham-controlled Idlib Province into large organizations that oversee security in most of Syrian territory. This transformation has required local Syrian authorities to rapidly recruit personnel in order to address the sudden and significant increase in security tasks assigned to local forces. This approach appears to have enabled some individuals affiliated with ISIS or who hold ISIS-aligned views, such as the Palmyra attacker, to join units in the Syrian army or Syrian MoI. The Palmyra attacker joined the MoI’s Badia Security Directorate about two months ago as a base guard and was one of 5,000 recruits.[x] The MoI spokesperson explained in a December 13 statement that internal evaluations had flagged the attacker for “extremist” beliefs on December 10 and that the MoI planned to dismiss him on December 14.[xi] The perpetrator carried out the attack on December 13 while off duty.[xii] It remains unclear whether the attacker was an active member of ISIS or just held ISIS-aligned beliefs. Syrian security forces, in collaboration with US forces, arrested five suspects in Palmyra on December 13 and 14 in connection with the attack, which suggests that the attack was not a lone wolf attack.[xiii]

ISIS’s effort to sow divisions between the United States and Syria appears to be unsuccessful at this time because senior US officials have indicated that the recent attack “reinforces” the United States’ policy of supporting Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. The United States currently maintains about 1,000 personnel in Syria who provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other Syrian partners, such as the Syrian Free Army.[xiv] US intelligence sharing with Syrian MoI forces has led to numerous successful counter-ISIS raids across Syria in recent months.[xv] US forces also assist SDF units in managing and securing ISIS-affiliated detention camps in northern Syria.[xvi] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack stated on December 14 that the attack on US forces does not “invalidate,” but rather “reinforces,” the United States’ strategy of supporting Syrian partners to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.[xvii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani on December 14, and a Syrian state readout of the call noted that Rubio expressed the United States’ “continued support” for the Syrian government and joint counterterrorism efforts.[xviii] US President Donald Trump blamed the attack on ISIS and promised a “very serious [US] retaliation” on December 13.[xix] Trump gave no indication that the attack would change the United States’ policy toward or engagement with the Syrian government.

ISIS has increased the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10. ISIS fighters killed four MoI officers near Maarat al Numan, Idlib Province, on December 14.[xx] ISIS gunmen on motorcycles also engaged two Syrian 80th Division fighters near Ghanzawi, Aleppo Province, on December 15 and severely injured one fighter.[xxi] ISIS began publicly claiming attacks on Syrian government and former regime figures across Syria at a higher rate after November 28, following a long period in which ISIS rarely acknowledged attacks in government-held areas.[xxii]

The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations that seeks to facilitate “deep political change” in Iran, outlined its objectives in a charter on December 10.[xxiii] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, and several other Baloch groups established the Mobarizoun Popular Front on December 10.[xxiv] The other groups that comprise the Mobarizoun Popular Front include the Pada Baloch Movement, Nasr Movement of Baluchistan, and Mohammad Rasul Allah Group.[xxv] The Mobarizoun Popular Front stated in its charter on December 10 that it seeks to increase cohesion among anti-regime Baloch organizations, likely to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of attacks against the regime.[xxvi] The Mobarizoun Popular Front also stated that it seeks to use “up-to-date" insurgent tactics to confront the regime.[xxvii] The group added that it will conduct media and diplomatic activities in addition to “legitimate defense,” which suggests that the organization will use media engagement and public messaging to try to cultivate legitimacy in Iran.[xxviii] The organization lastly called for increasing coordination and cooperation with all anti-regime parties and groups across Iran. This call suggests that the Mobarizoun Popular Front may view itself as a vanguard for a popular uprising against the Iranian regime. Vanguardism is a method that some social movements, like Marxism-Leninism and Salafi-jihadism, employ that posits that a “small core of committed individuals [is] necessary to mobilize the masses” to remake society.[xxix] The Mobarizoun Popular Front's use of the word “mobarizoun” in its name also suggests that the group views itself as a vanguard. Mobarizoun were individuals in the 7th century Middle East who engaged in duels with opposing forces prior to a main battle between two armies.[xxx] The Mobarizoun Popular Front may therefore view itself as a vanguard that can initiate and incite “resistance” against the Iranian regime.[xxxi]

Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Second Class Abbas Malekizadeh as the new Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters commander on December 13, possibly in response to the recent establishment of the Mobarizoun Popular Front.[xxxii] The Artesh Ground Forces is responsible for defending Iran from foreign attacks, and the Southeast Regional Headquarters oversees Artesh Ground Forces units in Hormozgan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces, as well as in parts of Yazd Province.[xxxiii] Malekizadeh replaced Brigadier General Amir Gholam Alian, who had commanded the headquarters since August 2020.[xxxiv] Malekizadeh had previously served as the deputy commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters since at least July 2022.[xxxv] Malekizadeh served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade, which is based in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, prior to becoming the deputy commander of the Southeast Regional Headquarters.[xxxvi]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual-use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025.[xxxvii] A second unspecified US official familiar with the seizure stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran’s missile program.[xxxviii] US officials did not identify the vessel or its owner.[xxxix] The PRC has previously helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile program by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The PRC sent at least two shipments of sodium perchlorate to Iran before the Israel-Iran War, and European intelligence sources are tracking 10 to 12 shipments to Iran following the war, according to CNN.[xl] Iranian efforts to procure components and solid fuel ingredients for its missile program from the PRC are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[xli] An Israeli journalist recently reported on December 11 that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” ballistic missile stockpile to approximately 2,000 missiles.[xlii]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy possibly seized the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker Talara on November 14 in response to the US interdiction of the PRC-origin, Iran-bound vessel.[xliii] The United States interdicted the vessel on an unspecified date in November 2025. The IRGC circulated a Quranic verse on X after the Talara’s seizure that suggested Iran seized the Talara in retaliation for a previous incident.[xliv] Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that the United States and its allies could enforce United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which calls on United Nations member states to inspect any Iranian vessel within their territorial waters suspected of ”carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[xlv]

Iranian Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[xlvi] Sabahi Fard’s removal from these positions may reflect Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with Sabahi Fard’s performance during the Israel-Iran War. Elhami previously served as deputy commander of the Artesh Air Defense Force, commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Academy, and operations deputy of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters.[xlvii] Former Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander in February 2025.[xlviii] Sabahi Fard maintained his position as Artesh Air Defense Force commander, which he had held since June 2018, when he was appointed as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander.[xlix] The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[l] Sabahi Fard’s removal is notable given the poor performance of Iranian air defenses under his command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems in the first 24 hours of the war.[li] The regime has not appointed Sabahi Fard to a new position at the time of this writing.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi Arabia remain at odds over the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen. Saudi and Emirati defense ministry delegations met with STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi and STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami in Aden on December 12.[lii] Saudi media reported that the officials were expected to discuss the withdrawal of "any forces from outside the eastern governorates."[liii] Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors, including PLC President Rashid al Alimi, continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as the "only option for restoring normalcy” in the region.[liv] Zubaidi and Muharrami told the Saudi delegation in Aden that the STC will not withdraw from its newly seized territory, according to three STC sources speaking to a Yemen analyst.[lv]

The STC's refusal to withdraw from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates comes amid the STC’s continued efforts to legitimize its authority over these areas and frame its recent military action as necessary to fight the Houthis. Zubaidi formed the "Preparatory Committee for the Southern Fatwa Authority" on December 13, stating that the committee would "steadily pursue” the secession of southern Yemen.[lvi] The secession of southern Yemen is a long-standing STC aim. A Yemen analyst assessed that the creation of the committee reflects the STC's efforts to establish long-term governance and normalize the idea of an independent southern state.[lvii] STC leaders have also continued to meet with ROYG officials, including Parliament Speaker Sultan al Barakani, to discuss governance and joint efforts to fight the Houthis.[lviii] An STC spokesperson told Saudi media that the offensive aimed to address security threats from the east, such as Houthi smuggling from Oman, and claimed that ROYG’s failure to combat such threats forced the STC to intervene.[lix] The STC’s rhetoric is almost certainly part of a broader STC effort to justify its recent actions and frame itself as the most viable leader of Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement. 

Key Takeaways

• Attack on US Forces in Syria: ISIS likely seeks to conduct insider or “green-on-blue" attacks targeting US forces in Syria as part of an effort to reduce US forces’ trust in Syrian partner forces and disrupt the United States’ ability to effectively work with Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13. ISIS’s effort to sow divisions between the United States and Syria appears to be unsuccessful at this time because senior US officials have indicated that the recent attack “reinforces” the United States’ policy of supporting Syrian partners to defeat ISIS.
• Threat of Baloch Militant Groups to Iranian Regime Security: The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations that seeks to facilitate “deep political change” in Iran, outlined its objectives in a charter on December 10. The coalition stated in its charter that it seeks to increase coordination and cooperation with all anti-regime parties and groups across Iran. This call suggests that the Mobarizoun Popular Front may view itself as a vanguard for a popular uprising against the Iranian regime.
• PRC Military Support for Iran: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual-use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025. A second unspecified US official stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran’s missile program.
• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi Arabia remain at odds over the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen. The STC continues to take efforts to legitimize its authority over these areas and frame its recent military action as necessary to fight the Houthis, while Saudi-backed leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to claim that they are the rightful leaders of the Republic of Yemen Government.

Iran

A delegation from a US-sanctioned, Iranian regime-controlled shipping company met with Sudanese port authorities in Port Sudan on December 13 to discuss re-establishing the company’s operations at the Red Sea port after a seven-year hiatus.[lx] The US Treasury sanctioned the Hafez Darya Shipping Company, which is a subsidiary of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, in 2018 for transporting unspecified cargo to at least one known front company for the Iranian regime-controlled Defense Industries Organization.[lxi] The Defense Industries Organization, which the US Treasury sanctioned in 2007 for materially contributing to the development of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[lxii] The Iranian ambassador to Sudan organized the meeting between Sudanese port officials and the Hafez Darya Shipping Company delegation.[lxiii] A representative from Hafez Darya Shipping Company claimed that the company seeks to transport “containers only” from Sudan but did not specify what type of cargo the company would transport in the containers.[lxiv]  Iranian access to a Red Sea port in Sudan may allow Iran to expand its trade and influence in the Red Sea. It remains unclear if Iran seeks to use potential Red Sea port access to support other regional activities, such as Iran’s illicit oil trade, weapons smuggling, or surveillance to support campaigns against international shipping.    

Iraq

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court ratified the November 2025 parliamentary election results on December 14, which officially begins the constitutionally mandated government formation process.[lxv] Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid must convene a parliament session by December 29, during which newly elected parliamentarians will elect a parliament speaker and two deputies.[lxvi] The Iraqi parliament must then elect a new president within 30 days of the speaker’s election by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum. The new president will then have 15 days to select the candidate of the largest parliamentary bloc as prime minister designate, who will have 30 days to form a government. The government formation process after the 2021 elections did not follow the constitutionally mandated timeline due to divisions between Iraqi political parties.[lxvii] Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish political parties continue to negotiate over the selection of the next prime minister, parliament speaker, and president.[lxviii]

Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh discussed Iraqi government formation with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani in Erbil on December 15.[lxix]  Barzani is a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which won 26 seats in the parliamentary elections.[lxx] Iran has repeatedly demonstrated that it seeks to ensure that its allies in Iraq maintain control of the Iraqi government.[lxxi]

Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari denied on December 13 that Kataib Hezbollah would “confront” US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya but urged Iraqi politicians to avoid interacting with Savaya.[lxxii] Askari’s statement comes after Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.”[lxxiii] Kaabi threatened that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would “shove a rock down [Savaya’s] mouth” if the United States did not stop Savaya’s “interference.”[lxxiv] Savaya had made several comments that could have upset Kaabi, such as Savaya’s statement that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the drone attack that targeted the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province on November 26.[lxxv] CTP-ISW assessed on December 3 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an attack would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts.[lxxvi] Askari and Kaabi’s comments come amid US pressure to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government, including pressure on the Iraqi government to not appoint any figures to the premiership, certain ministries, or security institutions who have ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxvii]  

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The IDF killed the deputy commander of Hamas’ military wing, Raad Hassan Saad, in an airstrike on Gaza City on December 13.[lxxviii] The IDF stated that Saad was one of the last senior Hamas military officials remaining in the Gaza Strip and had led Hamas’ diminished leadership cadre over the past several months.[lxxix] The IDF noted that he played a pivotal role in the group’s weapons production and military operations.[lxxx]

Emirati and Lebanese media reported that the United States and Israel may postpone the United States’ December 31 deadline to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon until at least January 31, 2026.[lxxxi] A Western diplomatic source told Emirati media on December 15 that the United States is considering postponing its deadline until at least January 31 to allow US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to discuss Lebanon policy options at an upcoming meeting on December 29.[lxxxii] Unspecified diplomatic sources also told Lebanese media on December 13 and 14 that the United States and Israel are considering a proposal to postpone the US deadline for disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon until at least January 31.[lxxxiii] This reported postponement comes amid US diplomatic efforts to avoid an outbreak of conflict in Lebanon.[lxxxiv] A former senior Israeli military official told the Washington Post on December 15 that US officials have urged Israel to restrain its operations in Lebanon over the last two weeks.[lxxxv]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) entered private property to search for Hezbollah weapons on December 13 amid recent repeated Israeli warnings that the LAF’s disarmament efforts are insufficient.[lxxxvi] The LAF searched a building in Yanouh, southern Lebanon, twice on December 13 after Israel threatened to strike the building.[lxxxvii] The LAF reported that it found no Hezbollah weapons or ammunition in either search.[lxxxviii] Israeli officials have repeatedly warned in recent weeks that the LAF’s progress in disarming Hezbollah is insufficient, often citing the LAF’s unwillingness to enter private property to search for Hezbollah weapons.[lxxxix] The LAF’s December 13 search suggests that the LAF may begin to enter private property as part of its Hezbollah disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon, which is a key Israeli demand.[xc] The LAF received permission from the property owner to conduct the search, and it is unclear whether the LAF would be willing to search private property if it is not given permission to do so.[xci]  CTP-ISW has not observed any reports that the LAF has seized arms from Hezbollah fighters or raided any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present.