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The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed National Resistance Front (NRF) Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who controls Yemeni government-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate near the Houthi frontlines, echoed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) rhetoric that frames the recent STC offensive as necessary to fight the Houthis.[i]  The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and confirmed on December 8 that it had successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[ii] Saleh declared his willingness to cooperate with the STC against the Houthis and other terrorist groups in a phone call with STC President Aidarous al Zubaidi on December 11.[iii] STC and NRF-affiliated media reported that Saleh echoed the STC’s justification for its recent seizures of key areas of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates as a “true starting point” to launch an offensive against the Houthis in northern Yemen during his call with Zubaidi.[iv] Saleh’s call with Zubaidi notably came after Saleh met with Saudi-supported Yemeni President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashid al Alimi as well as other unspecified Saudi officials in Riyadh on December 10.[v] Saleh is one of the seven vice presidents on the PLC.[vi] Saleh stated on the sidelines of his Riyadh meetings that “republican ranks,” likely referring to the anti-Houthi coalition, should focus on the battle against the Iranian-backed Houthis.[vii] Saleh is originally from northern Yemen and is the nephew of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Tariq Saleh previously served as a commander in the Presidential Guard until the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014.[viii] Saleh and the NRF have historically sought the unification of Yemen, which contrasts with the STC’s long-standing secessionist aims.[ix] The STC’s claim that its actions in Hadramawt and Mahra are meant to disrupt Houthi supply lines aligns with Saleh’s goal of removing the Houthis from northern Yemen, however.[x] The UAE has historically backed Saleh.[xi]

The STC continues to portray itself as a reliable military and political standard bearer for the anti-Houthi coalition.[xii] STC Vice President Major General Ahmed Saeed bin Brik described the STC as “an active and responsible partner in supporting regional and international security and stability” on December 11.[xiii] The UAE-backed Security Belt Forces (SBF) General Commander Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah al Wali similarly praised the STC’s offensive in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates and confirmed the SBF’s commitment to defending the STC‘s operation on December 11.[xiv] 26 southern Yemeni political groups separately published a joint statement on December 11 in which they confirmed their allegiance to the STC and Zubaidi as their leader.[xv] Most of the groups appear to have been aligned with the STC before the STC offensive.

Alimi and other non-UAE-backed Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) actors in Yemen continue to call for the complete withdrawal of STC forces from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates.[xvi] Alimi stressed the need for STC forces to hand back security authority to local leaders in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates in separate phone calls with Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi and Mahra Governor Muhammad Ali Yasser on December 11.[xvii] Other non-UAE-backed officials also published statements on December 10 condemning the STC’s “unilateral actions” and warning that “external networks” outside the 2019 PLC framework could influence decision-making.[xviii]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated on December 11 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by the United States’ December 31 deadline. It is possible that the LAF’s disarmament efforts will not meet Israel’s criteria for Hezbollah’s disarmament, however. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said on December 11 that the LAF has completed 90 percent of its disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon.[xix] Berri added that the LAF will complete its disarmament plan in southern Lebanon by the December 31 deadline set in the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xx] The LAF has, however, not met key Israeli demands regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament. The LAF has reportedly rejected Israeli demands to conduct “house-to-house searches” because the LAF seeks to avoid “civil strife.”[xxi] Hezbollah has historically used civilian homes to store weapons.[xxii] An Israeli military source told Israeli media on December 9 that the LAF cannot disarm Hezbollah because it does not search private property.[xxiii] Israel has repeatedly warned in recent weeks that the Israel Defense Forces may increase its operations in Lebanon, citing the LAF’s insufficient progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xxiv] US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus reportedly recently warned Lebanese officials that Israel will conduct “major and decisive strikes” in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley if Hezbollah does not hand over “drones and precision missiles,” presumably to the LAF, by January 1.[xxv] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports that the LAF has seized arms from Hezbollah fighters or raided any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present.

The United States Congress’s repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will reopen the Syrian economy to global investment. President Trump is expected to sign the NDAA into law on December 22.[xxvi]  The Caesar Act was the most stringent layer of US sanctions imposed on Syria and imposed secondary sanctions that targeted anyone who provided financial support to the Syrian government.[xxvii] Congress’s repeal requires President Trump to submit an unclassified report to Congress within 90 days of the NDAA’s passage that confirms that the Syrian transitional government is meeting eight key US security demands.[xxviii] The US President will be required to submit biannual reports to Congress for the next four years on the status of these demands.[xxix] The US demands include:

• Continuing to cooperate with US forces on counter-ISIS efforts[xxx]
• Removing foreign fighters from senior government and military positions[xxxi]
• Protecting Syrian religious and ethnic minorities[xxxii]
• Avoiding unprovoked attacks on nearby states, including Israel[xxxiii]
• Implementing the March 10 agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces[xxxiv]
• Combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and weapons and drug trafficking[xxxv]
• Prosecuting government security forces responsible for post-2024 atrocities[xxxvi]

The repeal of the Caesar Act removes a major obstacle to Syria’s economic recovery by reopening Syria’s access to foreign capital, imports, and reconstruction investment. The Syrian Economy Minister, Nidal al Shaar, praised Congress’s repeal of the Caesar Act and described the Caesar Act as the “biggest obstacle facing the Syrian economy.”[xxxvii] Shaar added that the repeal of the Caesar Act will inject foreign currency into Syria’s economy and allow Syria to import basic materials, machinery, and key technologies to revitalize stalled factories and support price stability in local markets.[xxxviii] The World Bank estimated in October 2025 that the Syrian Civil War left Syria with $216 billion in reconstruction costs, but the Caesar Act sanctioned anyone who supported the Syrian government or its key sectors.[xxxix] These sanctions blocked Gulf investment into Syria and obstructed Syria’s post-Assad economic recovery.[xl] The Congressional repeal of the Caesar Act does not include a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the act, but the US President can decide to impose new targeted sanctions on Syrian individuals, businesses, or government institutions if Syria fails to meet US demands for two consecutive reporting periods.[xli] Any future US sanctions on Syria would target Syrian citizens, businesses, or government institutions. Foreign banks may be more willing to lend money to investors for projects in Syria because they do not have to worry about the reimposition of Caesar sanctions, as they likely did with the six-month Caesar Act waivers that Trump issued prior to the full repeal. President Trump and Congress reportedly plan to lift more sanctions on Syria in 2026, according to a Washington-based Syria researcher.[xlii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may use the 2026 NDAA’s broad definition of the term “Iraqi security forces” to try to retain their influence in Iraq by integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and is “a part of the Iraqi armed forces,” according to the 2016 Popular Mobilization Commission Law.[xliii] The NDAA states that “Iraqi security forces” can only receive up to 75 percent of their allocated funds from the 2026 US Defense Department budget until the US Defense Secretary certifies to Congress that the Iraqi federal government has taken “credible steps” to weaken Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xliv] These steps include:

• Reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are not integrated into the “Iraqi security forces” through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process,”[xlv]
• Strengthening the Iraqi prime minister’s “authority and operational control” over the “Iraqi security forces”, and[xlvi]
• Investigating militia members who operate outside of the “Iraqi security forces’” chain of command to attack US personnel, among other activities.[xlvii]

The NDAA defines “Iraqi security forces” as the “military and other security forces of or associated with” the Iraqi government. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors could therefore integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF to receive US funding while simultaneously enabling the militias to continue operating.  Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades as well as forces that operate outside of the PMF.[xlviii] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xlix] Iraq’s ruling Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered multiple options to meet US demands to disarm the militias, including integrating the militias into the PMF.[l] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on November 7 that integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would likely preserve their existing networks and political influence.[li] Any integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security apparatus must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[lii]

The US Defense Secretary can issue a six-month waiver if reduced US security funding to Iraq harms US national security interests. A previous version of the NDAA stipulated that the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, which equips and trains elements of the Iraqi security establishment, could only receive up to 50 percent of its allocated budget for 2026 until the US Defense Secretary certified to Congress that the Iraqi federal government had taken the above “credible steps” to weaken Iranian-backed militias.[liii] The NDAA clarifies that funds allocated to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan are not affected by the “credible steps” outlined above.[liv]

Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups established the “People’s Fighters Front” (JMM) on December 10, which highlights how anti-regime militant groups operating in southeastern Iran continue to pose a significant threat to Iranian security. Jaish al Adl, which frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran, previously announced on November 29 that it had merged with other Baloch groups.[lv] JMM stated that it seeks to “restore and protect the economic, political, cultural, and religious dignity” of Iranians and overthrow the “Velayat-e-Faqih regime,” which is a reference to the Iranian regime.[lvi] JMM claimed its first attack targeting Iranian security forces near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 10. JMM fighters killed four Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base personnel from the Imam Hossein Battalions near Zahedan on December 10.[lvii] The Imam Hossein Battalions is a highly trained unit in the Basij paramilitary organization.[lviii] It is notable that JMM decided to conduct its inaugural attack near Zahedan given that Zahedan has historically been a hotspot for anti-regime activity, which has been exacerbated by the Iranian regime’s poor treatment of Sunni Baloch communities.[lix] Iranian security forces violently suppressed Sunni Baloch protesters in Zahedan in September 2022 in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[lx] The formation of JMM reflects greater coordination between anti-regime Baloch organizations in southeastern Iran, which could increase the threat these groups pose to Iran’s internal security and regime stability. 

The United States seized an oil tanker, Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that has illicitly transported Iranian oil.[lxi] This seizure will likely increase Iran’s concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to block Iranian oil exports. Skipper’s beneficial owner and operator is Nigeria-based Thomarose Global Ventures Ltd., and its registered owner is Marshall Islands-based Triton Navigation Corp.[lxii] US Attorney General Pam Bondi stated that Skipper has transported sanctioned oil from Venezuela and Iran.[lxiii] Skipper has also conducted at least two ship-to-ship transfers to export illicit Iranian oil to China in 2025, according to two maritime analytics firms. [lxiv] The United States sanctioned the vessel in 2022 for its role in illicit Iranian oil shipments under the vessel’s former name Adisa.[lxv] Iran's embassy in Caracas condemned the seizure and claimed that it was a violation of international laws and norms.[lxvi] The recent seizure comes amid Iranian concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to prevent Iranian oil exports. Iran recently conducted a two-day naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman that likely sought to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare Iranian forces for potential future maritime escalation.[lxvii]

Key Takeaways

• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: United Arab Emirates-backed National Resistance Front Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who controls Yemeni government-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate near the Houthi frontlines, echoed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s rhetoric that frames the recent STC offensive as necessary to fight the Houthis.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated on December 11 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by the United States’ December 31 deadline. It is possible that the LAF’s disarmament efforts will not meet Israel’s criteria for Hezbollah’s disarmament, however.
• Congress’s Repeal of the Ceasar Act: The United States Congress’s repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will reopen the Syrian economy to global investment.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Influence in the Iraqi Government: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may use the 2026 NDAA’s broad definition of the term “Iraqi security forces” to try to retain their influence in Iraq by integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces.
• New Anti-Regime Militant Group in Iran: Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups established the “People’s Fighters Front” (JMM) on December 10, which highlights how anti-regime militant groups operating in southeastern Iran continue to pose a significant threat to Iranian security.
• Iranian Concerns About Potential US Seizures of Iranian Vessels: The United States seized an oil tanker, Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that has illicitly transported Iranian oil. This seizure will likely increase Iran’s concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to block Iranian oil exports.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

The United States will reportedly refuse to engage with an Iraqi prime minister or appointees to certain ministries and security institutions who have ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxviii] The United States reportedly told the Shia Coordination Framework and the Iraqi federal government that the United States will not engage with any prime minister or appointee to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Counterterrorism Service, National Intelligence Service, or Iraqi Army Chief of Staff with ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, according to five Iraqi officials speaking to Qatari-owned, London-based newspaper al Araby al Jadeed on December 11.[lxix]  This report comes after Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[lxx] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iranian-aligned parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[lxxi] A political source told Iraqi media on November 30 that the framework may grant control of the Interior Ministry to the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[lxxii]

The Shia Coordination Framework reportedly set a new condition for the premiership that requires the next Iraqi prime minister to agree to consult with the framework before making domestic and foreign policy decisions.[lxxiii] Unspecified informed sources told Iraqi media on December 11 that the framework added this condition after Sudani nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize and the Iraqi federal government designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations without the framework’s approval.  The Sudani administration designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations on November 17 but later reversed its decision, reportedly due to pressure from Iran.[lxxiv]  The framework’s other conditions for premiership reportedly include that the candidate cannot form a political party, cannot have held any prior military, security, or judicial positions, and must agree to run in the next parliamentary elections as a member of the framework if the candidate seeks to serve a second term as prime minister.[lxxv] These conditions would disqualify Sudani from a second term as prime minister. Multiple framework members opposed Sudani’s decision to participate in the November 2025 parliamentary elections and seek a second term as prime minister.[lxxvi] The framework may seek to exclude prime minister candidates like Sudani due to fears that these candidates may act against the framework’s interests. Sudani recently dismissed two Iranian-backed militia commanders and withdrew a bill from Parliament that would have formally institutionalized parts of the Popular Mobilization Forces, for example.[lxxvii] Sudani’s largely independent decision-making has eroded some framework parties’ confidence that they can control and co-opt Sudani.[lxxviii] Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors have historically sought prime ministers who are perceived as malleable and susceptible to framework influence.[lxxix]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.

div>

[i] https://2dec dot net/news77893.html; https://www.4may dot net/news/152935 ; https://www.4may dot net/news/152893

[ii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-10-2025/

[iii] https://2dec dot net/news77893.html; https://www.4may dot net/news/152935

[iv] https://2dec dot net/news77893.html; https://www.4may dot net/news/152935

[v] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/333078; https://2dec dot net/last77878.html; https://2dec dot net/last77879.html

[vi] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/12/9/who-are-the-groups-controlling-yemen

[vii] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/333078; https://2dec dot net/last77878.html; https://2dec dot net/last77879.html

[viii] https://acleddata.com/profile/national-resistance-forces; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668

[ix]

https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5130552-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D9%88-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A1%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/independence-southern-yemen-stc-perspective ; https://www.4may dot net/news/152927; https://jamestown.org/yemens-wildcard-general-an-updated-profile-of-brigadier-tariq-saleh/

[x] https://www.4may dot net/news/152893

[xi] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/172441; https://www.newarab.com/analysis/tareq-saleh-making-comeback-battle-houthis; https://acleddata.com/profile/national-resistance-forces

[xii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-10-2025/

[xiii] https://www.4may dot net/news/152926; https://wcys.org/the-growing-battle-for-south-yemen/

[xiv] https://www.4may dot net/news/152927

[xv] https://www.4may dot net/news/152948

[xvi] https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/139266; https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/139247; https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/333084

[xvii] https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/139266

[xviii] https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/139247; https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/333084

[xix] https://www.facebook.com/nabihberri/posts/pfbid0gMdGpjydmkdbbWzexdJk9L9RDU9jrdhF56YcdnYgUzgho1mqJffYSA6tf9yWYmsZl

[xx] https://www.facebook.com/nabihberri/posts/pfbid0gMdGpjydmkdbbWzexdJk9L9RDU9jrdhF56YcdnYgUzgho1mqJffYSA6tf9yWYmsZl ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/

[xxi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-pushes-lebanon-army-search-more-intrusively-hezbollah-arms-sources-say-2025-11-10/

[xxii] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-releases-photos-purporting-to-show-how-hezbollah-stores-munitions-in-civilian-homes/

[xxiii] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1998452888327037332

[xxiv] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1998452888327037332; https://x.com/ItayBlumental/status/1987233176289161595 ; https://x.com/HezkeiB/status/1993595254977839160 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/alarmed-by-hezbollah-rearming-israel-presses-beirut-to-act-before-the-idf-has-to/ ; https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/975338/ ;  https://www.aljadeed dot tv/news//550566/

[xxv] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/871407/مؤشرات-التصعيد-مستمرة----وبغداد-تحذر-الأميركيين-من-المس-بالش

[xxvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/majority-us-house-backs-massive-defense-policy-bill-voting-continues-2025-12-10/ ; https://x.com/azelin/status/1998883084943700391 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1999115727333179597

[xxvii] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/the-power-and-limits-of-threat-the-caesar-syrian-civilian.html

[xxviii] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxix] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxx] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxi] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxii] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxiii] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxiv] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxv] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxvi] https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xxxvii] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/187810

[xxxviii] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/187810

[xxxix] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/10/21/syria-s-post-conflict-reconstruction-costs-estimated-at-216-billion ; https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/the-power-and-limits-of-threat-the-caesar-syrian-civilian.html

[xl] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/caesar-act-explained-new-us-sanctions-syria ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-sanctions-hold-up-qatari-support-syria-sources-say-2025-02-26 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-congress-moves-toward-repeal-tough-caesar-sanctions-syria-2025-12-08/

[xli] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1999115727333179597 ; https://armedservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RCP_Text_of_House_Amendment_to_S._1071.pdf

[xlii] https://x.com/azelin/status/1998888086453797097

[xliii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus163-KnightsMalikTamimi-v3%281%29.pdf#pdfjs.action=download pg 185 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces

[xliv] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1071/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22National+Defense+Authorization+Act%22%7D

[xlv] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1071/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22National+Defense+Authorization+Act%22%7D

[xlvi] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1071/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22National+Defense+Authorization+Act%22%7D

[xlvii] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1071/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22National+Defense+Authorization+Act%22%7D

[xlviii] https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf

[xlix] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1986855209545629748 ; https://almadapaper dot net/389291/

[l] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1986855479113314742 ; https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1986855752368005355

[li] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2025/

[lii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-23-2025/

[liii] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/2296/text pg 848-849 ; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5638893-2026-ndaa-compromise-released/

[liv] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1071/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22National+Defense+Authorization+Act%22%7D

[lv] https://t.me/The_voice_of_justice/674

[lvi] https://t.me/jmmfront/14

[lvii] https://t.me/jmmfront/24 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/86021637/

[lviii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf

[lix] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/22/iran-bloody-friday-crackdown-years-deadliest

[lx] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/20/iran-fears-grow-of-security-crackdown-in-zahedan-as-anti-regime-protests-persist ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-25-2023-64e925f199f70

[lxi] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/dark-fleet-oil-tanker-seized-off-venezuela-linked-to-iran-trade

[lxii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8jvll9j81o

[lxiii] https://x.com/AGPamBondi/status/1998875795151024337; https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-administration-seizes-oil-tanker-off-venezuela-coast-us-officials-say-2025-12-10/

[lxiv] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8jvll9j81o; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/dark-fleet-oil-tanker-seized-off-venezuela-linked-to-iran-trade

[lxv] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/dark-fleet-oil-tanker-seized-off-venezuela-linked-to-iran-trade

[lxvi] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1765450235778799181; https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-administration-seizes-oil-tanker-off-venezuela-coast-us-officials-say-2025-12-10/

[lxvii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/797626 ; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/12/04/760015/IRGC-navy-launches-major-Persian-Gulf-drill-with-warnings-to-US-ships ; https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/30963/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/09/14/3464008; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-5-2025/;

[lxviii] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/خاص-واشنطن-تلوح-بعقوبات-ضد-العراق-ومقاطعة-أيّ-رئيس-وزراء-من-الفصائل

[lxix] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/خاص-واشنطن-تلوح-بعقوبات-ضد-العراق-ومقاطعة-أيّ-رئيس-وزراء-من-الفصائل

[lxx] https://almadapaper dot net/421228/

[lxxi] https://www.newarab dot com/analysis/iraqs-elections-high-stakes-vote-amid-us-iran-tug-war ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mohammed-shiaa-al-sudani-2    

[lxxii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-كواليس-توزيع-النفوذ-تعيد-تدو-ير-حقا-ب-الشيعة-وتر-د-لر-يس-الجمهورية-نوابه

[lxxiii] https://almadapaper dot net/421745/

[lxxiv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-freezes-funds-hezbollah-houthis-official-gazette-says-2025-12-04/ ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-government-lebanon-hezbollah-yemen-houthis-d58389bf49876f07927ed1916ce3cc41

[lxxv] https://www.nrttv dot com/detail/54550 ; https://almadapaper dot net/421745/

[lxxvi] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/ما-بعد-انتخابات-العراق-مشاورات-الإطار-التنسيقي-بمنأى-عن-السوداني ; https://baghdadtoday dot news/287296-.html

[lxxvii] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/270820253 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-27-2025/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/410578/

[lxxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/post-iraqi-election-disunity-among-iranian-backed-parties-could-threaten-their-influence-in-iraq/

[lxxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/post-iraqi-election-disunity-among-iranian-backed-parties-could-threaten-their-influence-in-iraq/