Congo War Security Review, October 21, 2026

Data Cutoff: October 21, 2026, at 10 A.M. EST

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Key Takeaway: Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Significant fighting took place between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces in the Walungu district highlands for nearly two weeks and spilled over into the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu. Mercenaries linked to US security tycoon Erik Prince reportedly took combat losses in the South Kivu highlands in mid-September. Burundian security services have reportedly arrested dozens of people in recent weeks whom authorities alleged have collaborated with FRN and Rwanda.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. The Congolese army (FARDC) reportedly conducted a drone strike on an FRN position in Kalengera on October 12.[1] Kalengera is about nine miles south of Kiwanja on the RN2. Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters then reportedly ambushed and clashed with an FRN contingent in Kiseguro in the Binza group in Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru on October 13.[2] Kiseguro is about 10 miles north of Kiwanja.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Significant fighting took place between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces in the Walungu district highlands for nearly two weeks and spilled over into the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu. Clashes reportedly broke out in Kabembe group in the Kaziba chiefdom, possibly southwest of Kaziba center, on October 11, when the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters launched an offensive against FRN.[3] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kaziba on the hills of Mitimbili in the Muhumba group east of Kaziba near the border with the Bafulero chiefdom in Uvira on October 12.[4] Fighting also reportedly took place on two other subaxes in Kaziba—the Kashozi and Butuzi groups—on October 11 and 12.[5] Clashes between FARDC-Wazalendo and FRN troops reportedly continued in these areas before spreading to others in Kaziba on October 13.[6] FRN’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed in a statement on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks in Kaziba on October 13.[7] Fighting reportedly continued for a fourth day in Kaziba on October 14.[8] The Congolese media outlet Radio Manedeleo reported on October 14 that the outbreak in fighting caused hundreds of families to abandon their villages, with some heading west toward the Luhwindja chiefdom in the adjacent Mwenga district and others toward Nyangezi and Bukavu.[9] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba for the fifth consecutive day on October 15.[10] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba on October 16 and 17.[11] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that fighting broke out further west toward Walungu town on October 16, when FRN elements attacked Wazalendo positions in Kacuba and Irega villages in the Luhago group in the Nindja chiefdom in Kabare district.[12] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that an FARDC drone struck several FRN positions in Mitimbili in the Muhumba group in Kaziba on October 16.[13] FRN reportedly announced its intention to march on Uvira town and then Kalemie town in Tanganyika province further south during a local rally in Kamanyola on October 16.[14] Wazalendo fighters reportedly disrupted a separate local FRN meeting led by FRN South Kivu governor Patrick Nshombo Busu in Nyangezi, which is further north toward Bukavu, in an attack around October 16.[15] Congolese government-aligned journalist Byobe Malenga claimed that fighting broke out in the mountainous areas of Muhungu and Mugobe near Kamanyola on October 16.[16] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces shot down three FRN drones over Munanira and Butuzi in Kaziba on October 18.[17] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba on October 19, as bombing occurred and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly shot down a drone over a Wazalendo camp near Nambula hill.[18] Fighting reportedly continued in Mitimbili, Muhumba, and Mwera in Kaziba for the tenth day on October 20.[19] Steve Mulindwa, a journalist for Radio Manedeleo, reported on social media on October 20 that no major movements had occurred in Kaziba but that FRN had dislodged Wazalendo fighters from several hills.[20] Mulindwa reported separately on October 20 that FRN had cleared Wazalendo fighters from several hills near Kaziba center, namely Namubula, Kahya, Mbwega, and Malinji.[21] Fighting then reportedly resumed to the east of Kaziba in the Munanira mountains, including in Mugobe, Kamonyi, Kalunga, in the Itara-Luvungi group in Uvira district near Kamanyola on October 20, when FRN attacked FARDC-Wazalendo positions in the area to southwest of Kamanyola in the mountains straddling Walungu and Uvira.[22] One unidentified source told the Congolese media outlet Libre Grand Lac on October 21 that FRN had attacked army positions in Kadeze in an attempt to advance and secure the passage of reinforcements toward Kaziba.[23] FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that FRN took control of Munanira and Bideka after dislodging pro-Congolese government forces on October 20.[24] Congolese government-aligned sources on social media disputed this and said that the FARDC still controlled these positions.[25] The FARDC reportedly reinforced its positions in Luvungi and Lubarika on October 21, after recapturing Muhungu and holding back the FRN offensive.[26] The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported on October 21 that the fighting in Kaziba had displaced more than 12,000 households.[27] Wazalendo fighters then reportedly attacked FRN positions in Kaniola near Walungu town on October 21.[28]

Fighting continued around Minembwe town in the highlands in South Kivu. FRN-allied Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Minembwe and Gipimo on October 9.[29] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured an operationally significant position known as Kamombo in Fizi district on October 9.[30] Clashes reportedly took place south of Minembwe in Timbyangoma and Rugezi villages on October 9.[31] Rugezi is about 30 miles south of Minembwe on local roads. Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Gipimo on October 10.[32] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted one-way drone (OWA) attacks on Point Zéro and the surrounding Minembwe area near Gipimo on October 9 and on Rugezi on October 10.[33] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe. Rugabo claimed on social media on October 11 that Twirwaneho had repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on the Gipimo and Rugezi axes.[34] Fighting reportedly continued in Kamimbi, Biziba, and Timbyangoma to the south of Minembwe and in Badinzi and Rugezi on October 11.[35] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Timbyangoma and Rugezi on October 11.[36] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area on October 13.[37] Clashes reportedly continued in the highlands on October 14 and 15.[38] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area using heavy artillery and OWA drones on October 16, as fighting reportedly resumed.[39] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area using heavy artillery and OWA drones on October 18.[40] The FRN-aligned investigative outlet Great Lakes Eye claimed in a report on October 18 that thousands of FARDC and Burundian army (FDNB) troops and Wazalendo fighters and a dozen mercenaries had deployed to reinforce positions to the south of Minembwe near Kabandja center on October 9.[41] The report claimed that another battalion of FARDC personnel, Wazalendo fighters, and Rwandan fighters from the FLN deployed to Shabunda district via Beni town to put pressure on Twirwaneho and FRN positions toward Luhago in Kabare and Nzibira in Walungu district.[42] Kanyuka and Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone and artillery attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo on October 18 and 19, as fighting reportedly continued.[43] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media on October 20 and 21 that fighting continued and that the Congolese government had acquired and used a Chinese-made CH-10 tilt-rotor drone in air attacks around Minembwe.[44]

Clashes also resumed in the Uvira district midlands north of Minembwe near Uvira town. The October 18 report from the Great Lakes Eye claimed that a second major reinforcement of pro-Congolese government troops occurred on October 10, when two FDNB battalions arrived in the Bijombo group in the midlands.[45] Fighting between FRN-allied Twirwaneho and RED-Tabara fighters and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly took place in Bijimbo in the Bavira chiefdom in Uvira, specifically around Magunda village, on October 10.[46] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that FRN conducted drone strikes on enemy positions in Bijombo on October 11.[47] Conflicting accounts on social media presented differing claims about which side regained or seized control of Rubarati, Masango, Malimba, and Bugogoma during clashes that occurred on October 12, with pro-Congolese government forces claiming control of the area.[48] The independent Burundian media outlet SOS Média Burundi reported on October 13 that pro-Congolese government forces had lost several positions in Bijimbo after they abandoned them following drone attacks attributed to FRN, however.[49] The report said that the strikes targeted pro-Congolese government positions in Magunda, Rubarati, Masango, and Ruhuha.[50] Rugabo claimed that FRN and Twirwaneho had retaken control of Rubarati and Ruhuha.[51]

Mercenaries linked to US security tycoon Erik Prince’s Vectus Global reportedly took combat losses in the South Kivu highlands in mid-September. FRN and Twirwaneho fighters reportedly killed and wounded at least 20 people, including US media personality and former Green Beret Tim Kennedy, in an ambush in the highlands as the operators were traveling between locations on September 17.[52] The casualties reportedly included Justin Conaglen, a New Zealander national and a former Special Forces operator.[53] New Zealand media first broke the story of Conaglen’s death on September 24.[54] Kennedy reportedly survived the attack and was evacuated to the United States, following stopovers in Bujumbura and Johannesburg.[55] Reuters cited a Congolese government source on October 9 who said that Rwandan forces might have tracked a surveillance drone back to their location before the ambush.[56] Rwandan state media cited a source who claimed to be familiar with the September 17 attack on October 18 and said that enemy forces had ambushed the contingent as they were attempting to cross Mulima center near Point Zéro as part of their deployments to surround Minembwe.[57] The New York Times cited an anonymous insider source and an incident report on October 9 that said that several Colombian mercenaries employed by Prince also died in a battle in the highlands in early September.[58] The New York Times cited several anonymous former and current officials from the United States, Europe, the DRC, other African countries, and the UN who said that Prince’s mercenaries have been deployed to Kalemie town for the past year.[59] The New York Times cited an adviser close to Tshieskedi who said that Prince and the Congolese government began negotiating a possible new $200 million contract for the protection of Congolese air force assets in September.[60] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on October 8 that the contract specifically focuses on technical and logistical support and maintenance for the FARDC’s helicopters.[61] A source close to Vectus Global told Africa Intelligence that the possible contract is part of “wider capacity-building activities” the company is providing to the Congolese government in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital.[62] The New York Times reported that Prince had tried to contact the Belgian foreign ministry and sought Belgium’s assistance in securing the release of his drones impounded by Dutch customs and greenlighting the “export of guns and ammunition from a Belgian manufacturer” to the DRC in discussions with Belgian officials in January 2026.[63]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

Fighting resumed in southern Masisi district in North Kivu. CTP reported in early October that the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district as significant fighting on this axis had continued.[64] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Katoyi center on October 7.[65] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly also took control of Kasake and Shovu in the Ufamandu group and Kawele and Nyakigano in the Kibabi group near Rubaya town after clashes with FRN around Ngungu and Kasaki on October 8.[66] Clashes then reportedly took place in Kibabi on October 8, with Congolese government-aligned sources claiming that pro-Congolese government forces retained control of their positions in Kibabi but not threatening Rubaya and FRN-aligned sources denying the reports of losing ground and claiming that FRN retook several positions.[67] The front lines reportedly fell largely calm on October 9 and 10.[68] Clashes reportedly resumed near Kanyaru, Kawele, Kasake, and Ngungu on October 11 and 12.[69] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kashovu and Kumadepo and in Lumbishi in Kalehe district to the south in South Kivu on October 13.[70] FRN then reportedly bombed several pro-Congolese government positions in Ufamandu using OWA drones on October 15.[71]

Fighting also resumed on the RP529 near the Masisi-Walikale border in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly launched an offensive and attacked FRN positions in Nyabiondo town on October 14.[72] The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters then reportedly attacked FRN positions further to the west in Kibati on the RP529 on October 16.[73] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government conducted heavy artillery attacks on Buhimba and Mahanga villages in Masisi district on October 16.[74] Buhimba and Mahanga are about 12 and 10 miles southwest of Nyabiondo, respectively. Fighting reportedly continued in Kibati for a third day on October 18.[75]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Kabila and several senior officials from M23 and its now-former political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), announced the launch of FRN from Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, on October 12.[76] Claude Ibalanky, a former special envoy and diplomat for DRC President Félix Tshisekedi who had joined M23 in early 2026, presented the group’s political declaration at a press conference.[77] FRN denounced Tshisekedi’s regime and said that the movement aims to “coordinate all resistance forces to end tyranny by all means, including force” and rebuild the state.[78] FRN designated Kabila as its president and Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa, who were the two most senior political figures in AFC, as vice presidents, with several senior AFC officials taking other political posts.[79] Sultani Makenga, a veteran military commander, retained the position of chief of staff of M23’s army.[80] Tshisekedi convened a defense council meeting in Kinshasa to assess the situation and issued “precise instructions” to the FARDC on October 14.[81] The Congolese defense minister issued an order on October 15 following the October 14 meeting that indefinitely suspended FARDC officers from traveling abroad without prior authorization.[82] CTP assessed on October 15 that FRN is more likely a political rebranding of the AFC-M23 than an extensive restructuring of the rebellion, as it formalizes an uneasy alliance of convenience between Kabila and M23 that remains constrained by internal power dynamics and diverging strategic objectives.[83]

Burundian security services have reportedly arrested dozens of people in recent weeks whom authorities alleged have collaborated with FRN and Rwanda. Africa Intelligence reported on October 15 that security services are carrying out an arrest campaign across towns and rural areas in Burundi, targeting people affiliated with or belonging to the Congolese Banyamulenge community residing in Burundi and accusing them of collaborating with FRN and Rwanda, ahead of Burundi’s 2027 elections.[84] The report said that Burundian authorities have arrested and held incommunicado several Christian pastors from well-known churches among the community, accusing them of maintaining ties with “young people and political organizers” close to FRN and collecting intelligence for FRN and Rwanda.[85] Burundian authorities presented 13 “suspects” to the press, most of them reportedly Banyamulenge refugees and including several pastors with a regional following whom the authorities accused of passing intelligence to Rwanda, at the headquarters of Burundi’s intelligence service in Bujumbura on October 8.[86] The spokesperson for Burundi’s ministry of state security called on the population to “monitor” the activities of all members of the Banyamulenge community and to “stop renting houses to them, especially in Bujumbura.”[87] Africa Intelligence reported that an alleged network operates through intermediaries in several East African countries and uses local nationals to “infiltrate” churches.[88] The report said that Burundian security services also have alleged that some pastors arranged for the transfer of Twirwaneho fighters injured in the eastern DRC to Burundi to receive medical care.[89] Africa Intelligence reported that Burundian security services are seeking to dismantle these networks in part by using “young Burundian and Congolese deserters” from FRN or allied groups.[90] Burundian authorities are also reportedly monitoring cross-border movements.[91] The Burundian interior minister had banned entry to Burundi for people arriving from areas controlled by FRN or transiting through them in early October.[92] The arrest campaign has extended into the ruling party’s own ranks, as Africa Intelligence reported that several members of the party’s youth wing and intelligence officers have “disappeared in recent weeks after responding to calls from individuals presented as allies.”[93] Africa Intelligence had reported in August 2026 that a previous arrest campaign that began in March 2026 may have been part of an effort to purge the ruling party ahead of the elections, amid what party members had described as an “atmosphere of mutual surveillance” in which members are encouraged to denounce anyone seen as “potentially subversive.”[94] CTP assessed in early September that Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye is jockeying to keep and consolidate power within the ruling party ahead of the 2027 elections as domestic challenges exacerbated by the Burundian government’s war costs in the eastern DRC continue to mount.[95]

African Union (AU) mediators for the DRC peace process met with Tshisekedi in Kinshasa as part of their regional tour. CTP reported in early October that three of the AU mediators had visited Goma and Kigali, the Rwandan capital, in early October.[96] The panel of facilitators except for former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo arrived in Kinshasa on October 8 for a three-day visit to meet with Tshisekedi and Congolese stakeholders.[97] French state media reported on October 8 that facilitators are planning to attend a meeting between the parties in Doha for late October, although FRN-aligned journalist Steve Wembi reported that it may not take place following the creation of the FRN, adding that the panel could return to Goma before the end of 2026 and that another meeting was planned for December in Tanzania.[98] The visit to Goma was the first step under a six-month roadmap that the facilitators had adopted during a summit focused on peace in the eastern DRC in late July.[99]

Rwanda repatriated over 350 refugees from the DRC. The Rwandan government said that it voluntarily repatriated 369 people from the DRC via Goma and Bukavu on October 8.[100] The last reported repatriation was in early September.[101] At least 3,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda this year, and Rwanda and the DRC reportedly agreed to repatriate 10,000 refugees in the second half of 2026 in line with the Washington Peace Accords.[102]

Belgian police reportedly raided several properties belonging to members of Tshisekedi’s inner circle in Belgium in mid-October as part of a money-laundering investigation. Lawyers representing civil society groups from Katanga and four former executives of Congolese state mining company Gécamines had filed a complaint with Belgium’s federal prosecutor in July 2025 against nine members of Tshisekedi’s family, including first lady Denise Nyakeru Tshisekedi, several of his brothers, and at least one of his sons.[103] The complaint accused them of corruption tied to the plundering of mining sites in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces in the southern DRC and named only family members who are Belgian citizens.[104] The plaintiffs alleged that Tshisekedi’s relatives acquired Gécamines mining residues for a nominal price and obtained subcontracts related to those residues.[105] Belgian police reportedly carried out searches in Brussels and Flemish and Walloon Brabant on October 14, including at Tshisekedi’s family residence, as part of what the Belgian federal prosecutor’s office said was a money-laundering investigation opened in response to complaints filed in July 2025.[106] A lawyer for the plaintiffs told Le Monde on October 17 that the sums allegedly embezzled amounted to billions of dollars.[107] The Congolese foreign minister reportedly received the Belgian ambassador to the DRC on October 15 for what the Congolese foreign ministry characterized as an “an exchange on the state of bilateral relations,” but the French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on October 16 that the meeting was directly linked to the raids.[108] Tshisekedi’s chief of staff issued a circular on October 15 prohibiting presidential staff from contact with the Belgian embassy unless authorized by the foreign ministry.[109] An official in Tshisekedi’s office said that the circular was an internal measure to coordinate communication, and the Belgian foreign minister said on October 16 that “no situation justifies” prohibiting contact with the embassy and that he hoped the measure would be “extremely temporary.”[110] Nyakeru Tshisekedi denied the accusations on October 15 and said that she would cooperate with Belgian authorities.[111]

Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Congolese health authorities said in mid-October that more than $700 million in international donor funding for the DRC’s Ebola response is unaccounted for. Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya said at a press conference in Kinshasa on October 14 that donors had disbursed about $962 million directly to organizations implementing the response, rather to the Congolese government, and that the roughly one-third of implementing partners that shared financial information with the Congolese health ministry reported receiving $228 million.[112] Kaseya told Reuters on October 15 that it was premature to allege embezzlement but called the discrepancy a “major transparency and financial reporting problem.”[113] Africa CDC said in a statement on October 16 that it was working with the Congolese government to reconcile the funds.[114] The DRC’s national public health authority said on October 20 that around 30 partners had declared funding commitments totaling $250 million to $300 million, of which approximately $200 million had been received and just over $100 million spent.[115] Bloomberg reported on October 20 that Ebola cases in the DRC have stopped declining, as elevated transmission rates in North Kivu threaten to reverse progress made in the outbreak’s original epicenter in Ituri province.[116]

Congolese central bank documents reportedly show that Tshisekedi received salary payments well above his official base salary and that his office recorded more than $100 million in travel expenses in 2025. Africa Intelligence reported on October 15 that Congolese central bank documents show that Tshisekedi received at least $420,000 in “salary supplements” in 2025, well above the roughly $140,000 annual base salary set in that year’s finance law.[117] Tshisekedi’s office told Africa Intelligence on October 15 that Tshisekedi had “taken significant measures to mobilize state resources for the war effort” and that the president himself was “making considerable financial sacrifices.”[118] Africa Intelligence reported separately on October 21 that central bank accounts show that Tshisekedi and his staff recorded about $122 million in 2025 for mission and travel expenses, nearly a third of the presidency’s revised budget of about $373 million, which the presidency exceeded, with spending rising to more than $1 billion.[119] One trip to Tanganyika province in late 2024 cost $1.78 million alone, according to the report.[120] Tshisekedi’s office told Africa Intelligence on October 21 that the war in the eastern DRC “requires extensive security arrangements for the president's and first lady’s travel.”[121]

A $17.6 million transfer from a Congolese government-affiliated bank account to a US defense firm is reportedly at the center of a Trump administration investigation into a feud between two Trump allies. Former Trump lawyer Alina Habba Mildon reportedly accused Richard Grenell, a top Trump adviser, on October 9 of misallocating funds she claimed that her now-husband, Turkish businessman Turhan Mildon, had sent at Grenell’s direction in May 2025.[122] Habba Mildon’s account of the dispute reportedly shifted over time, but she now claims that most of the money was for a business transaction and that Turhan Mildon believed that $5.6 million of the transfer would go to the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC, which Grenell then ran.[123] Trump reportedly directed White House Counsel Will Scharf to investigate and look into Habba Mildon’s claims.[124] Habba Mildon reportedly first told the White House that the money came from Turhan Mildon, but The New York Times reported on October 17 that the initial documents that his lawyer submitted had redacted the sender’s name.[125] A Trump administration official told Axios on October 19 that the funds were wired from the Congolese Ministry of Finance in Kinshasa, where the official noted Mildon has “business and access to finances,” rather than from Mildon’s bank as indicated initially by Habba Mildon.[126] The recipient of the transfer reportedly was TX-AT, a Texas defense and security firm, which Grenell has acknowledged that he consulted for in 2024.[127] Axios reported on October 19 that Habba Mildon and Mildon’s attorneys told the White House that the deal involved a Houston-based defense company’s software and the DRC, and that Mildon alleges that the payment was meant to be split between a deal related to the DRC and a donation to the Kennedy Center.[128] Axios also reported on October 19 that a May 2025 text message purportedly sent from Grenell to Mildon, which also discussed the software for the DRC, promised Mildon access to exclusive events, administration officials, and even Trump himself once the money reached “the company” and Grenell arranged the Kennedy Center donation.[129] The New York Times reported on October 17 that a June 2025 text message purportedly from Grenell appeared to ask about a payment related to a “software system.”[130] The purpose and details of the underlying deal reportedly remains unclear, aside from the reported link to the software.[131] Grenell reportedly denies sending the texts, receiving any payment from Mildon, or having any ties to TX-AT at the time of the transfer.[132] Grenell also told The New York Times on October 15 that he never solicited payments on the firm’s behalf.[133] The New York Times noted on October 17 that Mildon has acknowledged through a spokesperson that he advises Tshisekedi and holds a Congolese diplomatic passport.[134] Mildon’s company, Milvest, has won at least a dozen major Congolese government construction projects, including the Kinshasa Financial Center, facilitated by the backing of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and endorsed by Tshisekedi, and several senior Congolese politicians and one of Tshisekedi’s sons reportedly attended the Mildons’ wedding in New York in September.[135] Scharf and several other senior Trump administration officials also reportedly attended the wedding.[136] Africa Intelligence had reported in March 2026 that Milvest secured a $67 million contract from the Congolese government to build a drone launch base in Kisangani in the central DRC for use in the war against FRN and Rwanda.[137] It remains unclear whether the $17.6 million was tied to a contract separate from the major projects already awarded to Mildon’s companies, and whether Mildon was the payer, as he has claimed, or an intermediary for Congolese government funds. Mildon and Grenell reportedly grew close in late 2024 and early 2025 over mutual interests in Venezuela, where Grenell was Trump’s special envoy at the time and Mildon has extensive business holdings, including a contract to operate state-owned cement plants awarded by Alex Saab, a confidant of then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro with ties to Russia, Iran, and Turkey.[138] The May 2025 text purportedly from Grenell also reportedly said that he wanted to make Mildon the “American face” in Venezuela.[139] Saab, who previously was Venezuela’s industry minister, reportedly had met with a Congolese delegation in Caracas that included one of Tshisekedi’s sons ahead of Maduro’s January 2025 inauguration, and The New York Times reported on October 12 that Saab had awarded Mildon the cement contract two months later.[140] Both men were reportedly sidelined after Secretary of State Marco Rubio took a harder line on Venezuela that culminated in Maduro’s capture in January 2026, and the two later reportedly fell out.[141] US authorities arrested Saab in May 2026 after Venezuela deported him to the United States, and the US Department of Justice charged him over what it called “a sprawling international money laundering conspiracy” involving a Venezuelan government food program and state-owned oil.[142]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

Burundi signed a $1.4 billion electricity partnership with a US-backed company. Weza Power, a subsidiary of Anzana Electric Group, signed a 25-year public-private partnership with the Burundian government on October 16 to expand and operate the electricity distribution network in half of Burundi, while a Burundian state-owned utility company will continue to operate the national transmission network and distribute power in the other half.[143] The readout said that the deal will mobilize $1.4 billion in financing, including from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the US International Development Finance Corporation, and projected that electricity access in Burundi will rise from about 15 percent to more than 50 percent by 2030.[144] The US State Department said the deal will raise Burundi’s electrification rate from 12 percent to 70 percent over the next several years and could encourage additional US private sector investment.[145]