Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2 pm ET on September 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Putin spoke to journalists in Beijing on September 3 and falsely claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution has "no ways to extend the powers of the president" and that Zelensky's "powers are over" now that his five-year term limit "passed" in 2024.[i] Putin described Zelensky rather as the "current head of the administration" and claimed that a meeting with Zelensky would therefore be "a road to nowhere." Putin claimed that a bilateral meeting is nonetheless possible, but that Zelensky should come to Moscow. Putin has repeatedly flaunted an inaccurate reading of the Ukrainian Constitution to falsely claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate president of Ukraine – claims that ISW has repeatedly shown to be inaccurate.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Putin's claims of Zelensky's illegitimacy demonstrate Putin's disinterest in a peace settlement and set conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Putin should sign with Zelensky at a time of Russia's choosing in the future.[iii] Kremlin newswire TASS reported in May 2024 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) put Zelensky on Russia's wanted list for unspecified reasons, a report that puts a very different color on Putin's ostensible invitation to Zelensky to come to Moscow, considering that Putin has said he does not recognize Zelensky's legitimacy.[iv]

Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling. Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities should hold a referendum, including to decide on "territorial issues," "if they want to be legitimate and fully participate in the settlement process."[v] Putin correctly noted that Ukrainian law does not allow Ukrainian authorities to hold elections during martial law, but claimed that Ukraine "must" lift martial law. Ukrainian law states that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[vi] Ukrainian authorities are unable to hold the referendums and elections Putin is calling for until, at a minimum, Russia agrees to a ceasefire – which Putin has repeatedly refused to do.[vii] It is standard practice for peace processes to include ceasefires or armistices before the final stages of negotiations toward a war termination agreement. Putin, instead, is trying to force Ukraine to first make concessions and agree to Russia's demands before the implementation of the theater-wide, longer-term ceasefire that would actually allow Ukraine to lift martial law and hold referendums and elections as Putin claims he wants. Putin's statement that Ukraine cannot, in fact, make the concessions he is demanding under the conditions he is imposing is a further indication that Putin is completely unserious about negotiations.

Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means. Putin stated in Beijing that Russia will have to "solve all the tasks" surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine by "armed means" if current peace efforts fail.[viii] Putin claimed that the "overwhelming majority" of his Russian military commanders are "in favor of Russia achieving all of its goals outlined at the beginning of the [war]." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on September 3  that lasting peace in Ukraine requires international legal recognition of the "new territorial realities" that emerged after the referendums in occupied  Crimea and Russian-occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – a reference to the illegal referendums Russia held in Crimea in 2014 and parts of the four oblasts in 2022 in which Russia claimed that Ukrainian citizens overwhelmingly voted to join Russia and that Russia uses to legitimize its claim to all of the territory of these five areas.[ix] Lavrov reiterated Russia's demands that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov repeated Kremlin claims that these "root causes" include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post-Cold War expansion; NATO's efforts to include Ukraine in the alliance; and alleged Ukrainian violations of human rights in Ukraine, including the supposed persecution of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and the purported destruction of the Russian language, culture, traditions, "canonical Orthodoxy," and Russian-language media. Lavrov reiterated Russian demands that Ukraine must be "neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear."

Putin's and Lavrov's statements make clear that Russia remains committed to the demands it made in 2021 and 2022 when Russia issued its prewar ultimatums to NATO and launched the full-scale invasion.[x] Putin's reference to Russian military commanders' support for a protracted war is an attempt to deflect responsibility for the decision about continuing the war from Putin onto his military subordinates. Putin has notably been intentionally cultivating Russian society’s commitment to achieving Russia's original war aims through a protracted war, and Putin has not sought to prepare Russian society to accept a peace settlement other than total Ukrainian capitulation.[xi]

Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3. Putin claimed that Russian forces are successfully advancing "in all directions," although at "different speeds."[xii] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces are unable to conduct large-scale offensive operations and are only "holding the existing line." Putin has maintained a theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to sustain gradual tactical gains regardless of the losses incurred, that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will be unable to regain significant territory or launch effective counteroffensives.[xiii] Putin remains committed to achieving his goals on the battlefield through a protracted war and is uninterested in genuine peace efforts.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia. Lukashenko stated on September 2 that Belarus and Russia are "working together on all fronts" and that they are “one country in principle,” likely referencing the Union State Treaty of Russia and Belarus.[xiv] The Union State framework establishes a political union between Belarus and Russia with a Kremlin-dominated federated government with a common set of federal laws and institutions for Belarusians and Russians to be governed as a single polity.[xv] The Kremlin has long pursued its strategic efforts to de facto annex Belarus through the framework of the Union State Treaty.[xvi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.[xvii] The Russian MoD posted footage on September 3 that it claimed confirms that Russian forces control roughly half of Kupyansk.[xviii] The Russian MoD claimed that the footage shows Russian forces in central Kupyansk. The drone footage shows lone Russian servicemembers walking with a Russian flag. The geolocations of the MoD's footage indicate that the individual soldiers were operating at four points in northern, northwestern, and central Kupyansk.[xix] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces killed the Russian soldiers in the footage, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain positions in these areas of the town. A Ukrainian army corps operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces changed into civilian clothing to enter Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces killed the Russian soldiers involved in filming the MoD's footage.[xx] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko also stated that soldiers from a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Ukrainian forces killed a Russian soldier in the footage.[xxi] Kovalenko noted that Russian forces are attacking Kupyansk's northern flank. The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the area similarly reported that Russian soldiers are changing into civilian clothing and infiltrating into Kupyansk to film footage with a Russian flag.[xxii] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces control the situation in Kupyansk and are blocking Russian forces on the northwestern outskirts. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces have taken several tens of Russian soldiers who have infiltrated Kupyansk in civilian clothing prisoner in the past week and a half. The Russian MoD's footage shows one Russian servicemember starting to run away from the street after unfurling the flag for a few seconds – in line with Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces lack enduring positions and do not control the area. It would also be unprecedented for Russian forces to make an advance this deep into an urban area without more significant, objective corroborating evidence.

The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers. One Russian milblogger blamed the command of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) for lying to the Western Grouping of Forces and subsequently the Russian MoD about battlefield successes in Kupyansk.[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that sources "in the know" were "bewildered" by Gerasimov's August 30 claim.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed that the MoD's September 1 footage is questionable, particularly as the drone footage filmed the lone Russian soldiers from afar and for a short period of time – unlike previous MoD footage celebrating Russian settlement seizures that showed multiple Russian soldiers up close for minutes at a time.[xxv] Another Russian milblogger cautioned that Russian forces do not control all of the areas that the Russian MoD claimed Russian forces seized.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that "pairs" of Russian soldiers may be in the area alongside Ukrainian forces. The milblogger acknowledged that it is unclear how to portray the situation accurately on a map. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that it was "curious" that the MoD's footage showed "practically no destruction" in Kupyansk.[xxvii] The milblogger attempted to reason that Russian forces may have pushed Ukrainian forces back using small group tactics without large-scale clashes. The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces may not have completely cleared the area.

The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from open source intelligence (OSINT) sources like ISW. Russian officials and milbloggers have repeatedly claimed that footage showing Russian forces holding flags was evidence of Russian seizures of settlements.[xxviii] These Russian information operations seek to assert Russian territorial control by having soldiers infiltrate areas and ostentatiously wave flags.[xxix] The Russian MoD has even been adapting these methods to be more convincing, moving from amplifying footage of flags that Russian forces hung in settlements using drones to promoting footage showing actual Russian soldiers holding the flags.[xxx]

Russia has previously benefited from confusion that maps depicting limited Russian raids or infiltration missions have generated in the information space, such as Russia's recent limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups penetration near Dobropillya, which Russian forces were unable to actually consolidate and exploit. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited raids or infiltration missions. ISW has deliberately distinguished between the Russian “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control, however. (ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term FLOT to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time.) The Kremlin's "flag raising" tactics are meant to support wider informational efforts to posture a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and to push Ukraine to concede to Russia's maximalist demands sooner rather than later. Informational efforts like the one surrounding Kupyansk are also meant to reinforce Putin's theory of victory – the belief that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition.[xxxi] ISW is combating these Russian information operations by introducing a new feature - the "Assessed Infiltration Events in Ukraine" feature - to visualize geolocated points where Russian or Ukrainian forces conducted assessed infiltration missions but have not advanced and do not control the territory.

Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3 — the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 16 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai.[xxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia also launched 502 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 430 drones, 14 Kalibr cruise missiles, and seven Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that three missiles and 69 drones struck 14 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 14 locations. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian State Emergency Service, reported that Russian drones and missiles struck civilian, energy, transportation, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lviv, and Sumy oblasts.[xxxiii] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are increasingly launching drone strikes against Ukraine during the daytime.[xxxiv] Zelensky also stated that Russia’s drone and missile strike campaign is intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure ahead of the winter season in an effort to undermine Ukrainian morale.[xxxv] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine before the summit to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the Trump administration.[xxxvi] Russia will likely continue to escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.
• Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling.
• Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means.
• Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.
• The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers.
• The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from OSINT sources like ISW.
• Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3—the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and Tetkino, north of Sumy City near Varachyne, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on September 2 and 3.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[xxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to enter Kursk Oblast east of Yunakivka using several armored vehicles.[xl]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command deployed North Korean forces to the Sudzha direction in Kursk Oblast.[xli] The milblogger noted that North Korean forces are not engaging in assaults but rather constructing defensive structures in the Russian border area.

A Russian milblogger posted footage on September 3 purportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions with a guided glide bomb in Uhroidy (east of Sumy City).[xlii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Varachyne.[xliii] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Znob-Trubchevska (northwest of Sumy City) and Barylivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xliv] Drone operators of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[xlv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 2 and 3.[xlvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to conduct reconnaissance in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) before launching assaults.[xlviii] The commander stated that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups with mopeds, motorcycles, and buggies.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[xlix]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 3.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for reports of Russian infiltrations into Kupyansk.

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself, northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, northwest of Kupyansk toward Monachynivka, west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on September 2 and 3.[l]

A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces entered Sobolivka.[li]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[lii] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 2 and 3.[liv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Stavky and south of Kolodyazi (both north of Lyman) and claimed that Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[lv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie and toward Drobysheve, Novoselivka, and Derylove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Kolodyazi, and Karpivka; and east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova on September 2 and 3.[lvi]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces killed or wounded 2,200 Russian soldiers during the summer of 2025 and that 60 percent of Russian casualties were deaths.[lvii] The brigade reported that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces “six-fold” in the Lyman direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Note: ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk Oblast to better analyze and assess the Russian military command's tactical and operational objectives east and west of Ukraine's fortress belt. ISW combined the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions into the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Tactical Area, given that the previously separate Chasiv Yar and Toretsk axes have now converged into a single tactical area around Kostyantynivka. ISW also created a separate Dobropillya Tactical Area, given that the Dobropillya salient is supporting operations beyond Pokrovsk in the fortress belt area of operations. ISW will continue refining its operational-tactical framework for the fortress belt as the situation evolves. 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 2 and 3.[lviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[lix]

A Russian milblogger denied recent Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces seized Fedorivka and noted that footage of Russian forces raising a Russian flag in a settlement does not have any military significance but is rather an information operation.[lx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka and in Pereizne (south of Siversk).[lxi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 3 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Oleksandro-Shultyne and Predtechyne (north of Oleksandro-Shultyne) and in Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechnyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Kleban Byk, and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Popiv Yar and toward Sofiivka on September 2 and 3.[lxiv]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction are attacking with drone and artillery support.[lxv] The commander reported that Russian forces are trying to use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver supplies.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Rusyn Yar.[lxvi] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxvii] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Chervone (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and into western Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, and Vilne and toward Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak, Zapovidne, and Ivanivka on September 2 and 3.[lxx]

Geolocated footage published on September 3 indicates that a Ukrainian servicemember infiltrated Russian positions in southern Boikivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have been operating near Boikivka for over a week.[lxxii]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi reported that Ukrainian forces continue to block and destroy Russian forces that previously infiltrated Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya area.[lxxiii] Belsky stated that Russian forces are attempting to bring reserves to the Dobropillya penetration along dirt roads over which Ukrainian forces have full fire control.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shakhove and Vilne.[lxxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on September 3 that Ukrainian forces liberated Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka and toward Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on September 2 and 3.[lxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne and Novoekonomichne.[lxxviii]

Ukraine's State Border Guard reported that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are trying to use low quality anti thermal cloaks to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes.[lxxix]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka, and Novokhatske on September 2 and 3.[lxxx]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that Dachne (south of Novopavlivka) is a contested "gray zone."[lxxxi]

The Russian MoD posted footage on September 2 purportedly showing elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies striking a Ukrainian radar station near Preobrazhenka (east of Novopavlivka) with a Lancet drone.[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Ivanivka.[lxxxiii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Novopavlivka, and reconnaissance elements of the 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly identifying targets for strikes against Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, and Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Maliivka, Burlatske, Sichneve, Shevchenko, and Ternove on September 2 and 3.[lxxxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoselivka.[lxxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Obratne on September 2 and 3[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Zahirne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on September 2 and 3.[lxxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Plavni.[xc]

A Ukrainian army corps operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast posted footage and reported on September 3 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault in the Orikhiv direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven pieces of heavy equipment, including armored personnel carriers (APCs) and tanks, and 30 Russian personnel.[xci] Geolocation of the Ukrainian army corps' footage indicates that the Russian mechanized assault occurred north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[xcii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xciii]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near Antonivka, on September 2 and 3, but did not advance.[xciv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.