Please find below the most recent in-depth analysis pieces from CriticalThreats.org.
AQAP’s prominence in the al Qaeda network should not be interpreted to mean that AQAP has risen to replace the core group in Pakistan or that it is directing the network in some way. It must be interpreted within the broader context of the al Qaeda network.
Reasonable people can disagree about the extent to which President Obama’s proposed “limited strike” will secure American interests, but not about whether the interests are real or vital.
This groundbreaking report describes the state of the al Qaeda network today, drawing on detailed and granular analysis not only of the core al Qaeda group, but also of the affiliates and the associates that have taken root around the world.
A weak strike is more in line with U.S. interests than a refusal to strike or, worse, congressional action blocking any attack. Not just U.S. credibility but also the will of the Syrian opposition is at stake.
The recent al Qaeda threat is real, though little is known about the exact target of the attack, or where it will occur. A number of factors indicate that the attack initially expected on August 4 may have been planned for August 7.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may be in the final stages of preparing an attack on American interests in the Middle East and North Africa region on August 7, 2013. A number of factors suggest that the attack widely expected for Sunday, August 4, may, in fact, be planned for Wednesday, August 7.
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), made history on May 11, 2013 when it won Pakistan's general elections and completed the country's first constitutional transition of power from one democratically elected government to another. Sharif’s government inherited a country rife with problems, however.
The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt elicited reactions from the al Qaeda network.
The war against al Qaeda is not going well. Current trends point to continued expansion of al Qaeda affiliates and their capabilities, and it is difficult to see how current or proposed American and international policies are likely to contain that expansion, let alone reduce it to 2009 levels or below. Americans must seriously consider the possibility that we are, in fact, starting to lose the war against al Qaeda.
The Yemeni military has long been weakened by corruption, fragmentation, and instances of insubordination, but in the past year and a half its soldiers have been bucking orders and casting out commanders at an increasingly faster rate. If this trend continues to accelerate, it risks knocking out a vital pillar of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.